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Full text of "The Vaisesika sutras of Kanada. Translated by Nandalal Sinha"

THE 

SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS. 



TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS SANSKRIT SCHOLARS. 



EDITED BY 

MAJOR B. D, BASU, IM.S-Retd. 



VOL. Vi.-THE VAlSESIKA SUTRAS OF KAN, 

~K^*L K 

^ 



NANDALAL SINHA, M. A., B L. 




OF THE BEHAR AND ORtSSA OEVEL SER 



SECOND EDITION REVISED AND ENLARGED. 



PUBLISHED BY 

SUDHINDRA NATH BASU M.B. 

THE PANINI OFFICE, BEUVANE&WARl l^RAMA, 
BAHADURGANJ, 
Allahabad. 

PRINTED BY KASHINATH! BAJPAYA AT THE VIJAYA PRESS 

1923. 



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\b-K3 




P K E F A C E. 

The Vai&esika SiUraa of Kanada, with the Commentary of San- 
kara Misra aiid extracts from tho gloss of Jayanarayana and the* 
Bhasya of Chandrakanta, was first published in tho years 1910 and 
1911. Inspite of the numerous imperfections of the work, it appears 
to have awakened a lively interest in the study and propagation 
of one of the oldest systems of Hindu Philosophy. For, its publica 
tion lias been followed by a number of very valuable contributions to 
the literature of the subject from the pen of some eminent scholars. 
First and foremost amongst them is the Positive Sciences of the. Ancient 
Hind-tut by Dr. Brajendranath Seal, M. A. Ph. D. (1915). Dr. Seal 
observes that "Hindu scientific ideas aud methodology (e. g. the in 
ductive method or methods of algebraic analysis),have deeply influienced 
the course of natural philosophy in Asia in the East as well aa in the 

"West in China and Japan, as well as in the Saracen Empirec . and 

enters into "a comparative estimate of Greek and Hindu sconce". 
He gives very lucid expositions of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Themical The- 
oi-v, of the conception of Molecular Motion (Parispanda), and of the 
idons of Mechanics (Kinetics) and Acoustics, and deals very fully with 
the Doctrine of Scientific Method. In the following year (I9l6y, that 
accomplished scholar, Dr. Ganganaiha Jha, M. A., D. Litt., came out \\ith 
an English translation of the Paddrtha-Dharma-Sam jraha, the Maynum, 
Opus of the Vaisesikas , that is, Prasastpada s Bhasya on the Vaisesi- 
ka Sutras of Kanada, with ^ridhara s Commentary (Nyayakandali) on 
the Bhfisya. In tho Introduction he explains the Vaisesika conception 
of Bhuta ( element ), and points out that "what tthe Vaisesika means 
by saying that these are the five bhutas , is that there are five states of 
matter: solid (Earth), liquid (Water), gaseous (Air), luminous (Fire), and 
ethcric (AkAfia*)." The notes he has added in the body of the book are 
very illuminating, and clear up many obscure points in he text. In 
the year 1917, was published the Dasa-Paddrtha.-Sdstra: Chinese Text 
(translation), with Introduction, Translation and Note*, by H- Ui, Pro 
fessor in the Sotoshu College, Tokyo, under the editorship of F. W. 
Thomas Esquire. It is a remarkable publication in many ways. In the 
Jirst place, it presents us with a Chinese version of the tenets of Kanada 
in the form of Kwei-ci s quotations, probably from a commentary on the 
treatise. The author tells us that the treatise was composed^ by a 
follower of the Vaisesika, named Mati Chandra, and translated into 
Chinese by Yuan Chvvang in 648 A. D. It is in the form of a cateciism r 
and, as a catechism of the doctrines of the later school of the Vaiseskas, 
it is almost unsurpassed. In the second place, the author has compiled 
from Chinese records an account of the traditions current among Chi 
nese scholars respecting Kanada, his work, and his school. His resear 
ches fully confirm our view of the great antiquity and popularity of the 
Vaisesika-Siitras. Last but not least is Indian Logic and Atomism (1921) 
which is an exposition of the Nyaya and Vaisesika Systems, by A. B 
Keith, D. C. L., D. Litt., a well-known orientalist. He regards them "ag 
able and earnest efforts to solve the problems of knowledge ard being 
on the basis of reasoned argument". He has attempted "to set out the 



fundamental d< cirii ts < I il e Ms1< u s \\iih clue iegid to their history- 
and their relations to Buddhist j hilosoj hy". Jt is gratifying to : 
find that, as in the ancient past, even so at the present day, the 
Vaisesika has engaged the attention of earnest students all over the- 
world. 

Now, what is the Vaisesika Darsana V We do not know when or 
by whom the name Vaisesika was first applied to the teachings of 
Kanada. In the Sutras the word appears only once (in X. ii. 7) where 
it means characteristic , distinguishing . According to the rule of 
.Paniui, IV. iii. 87, the word is derived from the word Visesa , meanintr 
a treatise on Visesa . The word visesa has various meanings ; e. g. 
species, distinction, difference, excellence, superiority. Accordingly- 
the word Vaisesika also has been variously interpreted. "The origin 
of the name", in one view,, "is in the fact that the system is distingui 
shed from, and superior to, the Sfunkhya . In another view, "fcho work 
was named the Vaifiesika sastra, .since, it excelled other works in all 
respects, or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence". 
h third view is that it is called Vaisesika, because it particular!} or 
specifically treats of Genus, Species, and Combination which have not 
been dealt with in any other treatise and though they are included in 
the predicables Substance, etc. In a fourth view, it is distinguished 
.from the Samkhya in its theory of Buddhi (understanding), natnelv 
that Buddhi is an attribute of the Soul, and not its instrument of know 
ledge. In another view, it is distinguished from the System of Jaimini 
in so far as it declares that the highest good is to be achieved by the 
renunciation of the things of the world and by the contemplation of 
Truth, and not by positive performances. Lastly, it is explained that 
Kanada s system has come to be called "Vaisesika from his theory of 
visesa inhering in the ultimate atoms (I. ii. 6). His atoms are math 
ematical points , without parts, and possessing the same attribute and 
activity in their respective classes of Earth , Water , Fire , and Air . 
It is by means of their visesas or individual characteristics that thev 
are distinguished from one another, and account for the variety of 
things in nature. This last explanation appears to be preferable to till 
the others 

The Vaisesika is a Mohsa-silatra; it teaches u doctrine of release 
release from the coil of mortality. According to Kauada, man must 
work out his own salvation. It is given to him, if he will, to hear the 
Truth from the Scriptures or from a preceptor, on high or here below 
to think over it in his mind, and to meditate upon it in the recesses of 
his heart. He can control his sensory and motor organs, and, by 
eliminating superficial psychic states, make the mind steady in the 
Soul. Steadiness of the mind in the Soul is called Yoga. Yoga is 
neither a mystery nor is it mysticism. It is the realisation of the free 
dom of will, of the free Self. He then becomes master of time and space. 
.For him there is no distinction of past, present, and future ; no disti 
nction of here, there, and elsewhere. The mind being at rest, pleasure 
and pain do not arise, activity ceases, and the law of Karma is cancell- 
ed for all time to come. The accumulated Karma of the past, however 
remains. Having realised the fundamental freedom of the Self, he 
sees what experiences are in store for him, and lives out those exper 
iences in appropriate forms and surroundings brought about by the- 



creative power of will. In this way he cancels the past as well. There 
after, when death takes place, and the soul finally quits its temporal 
.bode, it does not pass into other forms of finite life, but remains free 
for ever till the end of Time. That freedom is called Moksa, the supremo 
good, the be-all and end-all of existence. 

Self-knowledge, Self-realisation, Atma-saksatkara, is then the only 
means of attaining Moksa. The fundamental teaching of Kanada, 
therefore, is "tattva-jnanat nihsreyasam", the supreme good results- 
from the knowledge of the truth about the Soul. It is a translation of 
the Vedic text, "Tarati sokaui Atma-vit", the knower of the Self over 
comes Evil. 

The Soul is therefore to bo known. Kauada shows how it is to be 
known. Hence the Vaisesika Sastra is also called Adhydtma Sdstra, a 
treatise respecting the Soul. It was not necessary for him to call 
Attention to the nature of the Soul in itself, the pure Soul as it was in 
the beginning and as it will be in the end. It was enough for his pur 
pose to demonstrate the nature of the Soul in the interval of Time, the 
suffering Soul, the Soul revolving on the wheel of births and deaths 
and re-births under the Law of Karma. The universal experience of 
Suffering ("Duhkha") compels an enquiry as to the means of its removal,, 
namely, realisation of the truth about the Soul ; and Kauada s view is 
that the Soul can be known by means of the Not-Soul. 

The Soul and the Not-Soul make up Reality. The Real is that 
which is knowablo and nameable-Reality therefore consists of Padar- 
thas, nameables or predicables. They are not merely categoric -f 
Teought, in the sense that they have no existence outside and indepen 
dent of thought. They are classes of entities which have an existence 
antecedent to, and independent of, our thought. They become objects 
of our thought, they are-knowable and nameable, because they exist. 
"In pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch, 
the reality of fch- object in an immediate intuition "(Bergson). Tattva- 
aaksatkara, immediate intuition of reality, is the aim of Kauada s phil 
osophy. 

By a subtle process of analysis and synthesis, Kanada divides all 
nameable things into six classes: viz. substance, attribute, action, genus, 
species, and combination. He then shows, that atfcrribute and action 
exist by oombinaton with substance. Without substance, there were- 
no attribute and action. Similarly, genus and species are correlative, 
and are not absolute, except in the case of the highest geuus which ia 
existence, and the lowest species which is the visosas or individual 
characteristics appertaining to, inhering in the eternal substances. 
Genus and spocies therefore exist by combiuatioti with substances. 
Without substance, there where were no genus and species. Similarly, 
combination is " the intimate connection iu the inseparably connected 
things " ; e. y. of parts and wholes, of substances and their attributes,, 
of action and the sent of action, of genus and soecies and substances, 
in which they reside, and of eternal substances aud their ultimate- 
differences. Without substance, then, there were no combination. 
Substance, there-fore, is the fundamental reality. 

By analysis, substance is resolved into nine kinds : viz. Earth, 
Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind. Of these Earth, 



Water, Fire, and Air are, as effects, i. e., wholes made up of parts, non- 
eternal.. Their ultimate atoms which are without parts, are eternal. 
On the other hand, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind are without 
parts, and. therefore oternal. Ether is held to be "nothing- other than 
the cosmic vacuum (?) which contains all objects, and gives room for 
their activities". Time and Space are complementary to Ether. The 
three substances are in reality one only (Prasastapada and Chandra- 
kanta). Mind, again, is entirely material, and yet capable of coining 
.into intimate relation with the Soul ; it is as it were a sort of camera 
obscura to the Soul. In another view, the ultimate atoms are subject to 
change ; they produce effects ; and themselves undergo changes, but do 
not initiate changes, jexcept in so far as they reflect themselves in the 
Mind. Mind also suffers change ; it modifies in the form of everv ob 
ject it comes in contact with ; otherwise it is absolutely inactive. The 
Soul, on the other hand, does not suffer change of states. Tt is. the 
initiator of change in everything else. Cognition, pleasure, pain, 
desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impressiou are its attri 
butes, and not its essence. They are determinations of Will, and prove 
a state of "indetermination of Will" in which the Soul is truly free and 
eternal, tt follows that Atoms, Minds, and Souls are the ultimate unit* 
in Creation. The highest Soul, the Supreme Person, is God. 

Atoms and Minds do not exist for themselves. They exist for th 
Souls, for their bhoga and apavarga, transmigration and emancipation. 
In the beginning of Creation, activity is induced in them they are set 
in motion, by Adristam, the resultant energy abiding in the Souls aa 
a consequence of their previous activities. It causes the combination 
of iitoms to form the body and the world. "The sphere of transmigra 
tion is the common result of the individual adflsta, and every one 7 * 
bodv and other personal circumstances are the special results of the in 
dividual adrista". It has no activity during the time of the world e 
dissolution. At the end of the period of dissolution, it is set free by 
the will of (rod. It then starts the process of Creation, and maintains 
it ; it is t!ie sustaining energy from the beginning to the end of Crea 
tion. It can be neutralised, its force can be exhausted, only by th 
action of the Soul (Vaisesika Sutras, V. ii. 16). 

In this view the interesting references that are met with here and 
there in the Vaisesika Sutras, to cosu.ology, geology, mineralogy, bot 
any and plant-physiology, zoology, physiology, mechanics, acoustic*, 
and other positive sciences, become explained. The doctrine of adri 
sta carries the enquiry further into the field of ethics and sociology, on 
the one ha id, and lo^io aid epistem>lo^y as well a* psychology and 
philology, 0:1 the other F>>r, the Soul is at the core of reality, that is, 
th.3 raa.1 which is kio.vi jle aid -laudable. Every individual S ml is 
the centre of a separate world of its own, which is evolved to suit its 
alf s ji. T) ki.i.v tlia S >ul, so have invue4iate intuitiiu of it, there 
fore, it is iieje-is iry t> k i-vv the N^ot-Sjul. " For we do not obtain an 
iutuiti > i from reility, that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most 
iiiti iiita part of it, a ileii we have won its confidence by a long r ello- 
w lii j with, its sn jerti^ial manifestations. (Bergson, An Introduction 
to Metaphysics). 

Kviada accordingly elab>r;ibes a process of thinking consideration 
of things. As Dr. Deusseu rightly observes, India i Philosophy did 



5 

not start, as, for the most part, the (Ireecian did, from an investigation 
free of assumptions into the existent, but rather like modern philo 
sophy from t.ho critical analysis and testing of a complex of know 
ledge handed down (through the Veda). " Hence the Vaisesika is also 
called Manana s Astra, treatise based on reasoning, rational or critical 
system. The starting point of the system is the observation and 
analysis of objects, .with a view to their strict definition and a correct 
appreciation of their place and function in the world of bhoga and 
apavarga, probation and perfection, bondage and freedom. And 
tattva-jnana, knowledge of truth, is its end and aim. To accomplish 
this result, it evolves a* doctrine of Scientific Method, which, however, 
is " only a subsidiary discipline, being comprehended under the wider 
conception of Methodology," which proceeds by way of " (1) the pro 
position (or enumeration) of the subject-matter (Uddesa), (2) the 
ascertainment of the essential characters or marks, by Perception, 
Inference, the Inductive Methods, etc. resulting in definitions (by 
Jaksana) or descriptions (by upalaksana) ; and (3) examination and 
verification (pariksa and nirnaya)" (Seal). In this method, logic is 
not pure reasoning or inference ; the reasoning is also proof. And 
the Methodology evolved by Kanada and Gotama has been carried 
almost to perfection in the later Nyaya, "which, inspite of its arid dia 
lectics, possesses a threefold significane in the history of thought: (1) 
logical, in its conceptions of Avachchhedaka and Pratiyogi, being an 
attempt to introduce quantification on a connotative basis, in other 
words,to introduce quantitative notions of Universal and Particular, in 
both an affirmative and a negative aspect, into the Hindu theory of 
Inference and Proposition regarded connotatively as the establishment 
of relations among attributes or marks ; (2) scientific, in its investiga 
tion of the varieties of Vyapti and TJpadhi (and of Anyathasiddha), 
being an elaboration of Scientific Method, in the attempt to eliminate 
the irrelevant and (3) ontological and epistemological, in its classi 
fication and precise determination of the various relations of Know 
ledge and Being, with even greater rigidity and minuteness than in 
Hegel s Logic of Being and Essence" (Seal). 

The criterion of truth, in the Vail^sika Sutras, is the correspon 
dence of thought with things and vice v-ir-ia Truth a:id reality are, in 
this system, convertible terms. "* * * the existence of the concept of au 
object, subjective as well as objective, is tlie lo^isal reas vi for and the 
real consequence of the existence of the object" (\n). Existence per 
vades the world of reality: to be real, is t>> be existe it: a^id to be exis 
tent is t"> bi k -lowable aid nanjable; than is. there mist be in it 
"an immediately intuitable ele:n3 it, which is lete-mi ied by the function 
of o ie or in >re of our se isas. or by in-ier per^itio i" (Si.jwart), or, 
as we sh-m! I say, by th^ Mni i;l , aai all, bv m-d;tation a -id tra isoaa- 
dental or ;>u!-e perse >tio-i (t^ttva-saksatkara). Hen.ce the Vaisesika 
is called a r-aalis:n, a id, ;t dualism. 

A characteristic d ><3tri-ie of the Vaifijsika is its Kriya-vada. This 
is the d >ct.ri e which h >lds that self is active, or that self is affected 
by pleti3ui-? or desire et^ , i i other wjtvls, that it is a kartri or an 
age it, i i tho course of t!ia eyolution, or more jorr-jtly, revolution of 
its traasnai^ratory existence. 



6 



Another characteristic doctrine of the \ r aisesika is its Arambha- 
vada: the doctrine, namely, that the world as an effect, is not a mere 
appearnace (vivarta) of the cause, nor an evolution (pariuama) of tho 
cause, but is produced by aggregation of the cause which is the ulti 
mate atoms. And this leads to the doctrine of Alat-karya-vada, that is, 
that an effect has only a temporary existence, and that, before its pro 
duction, and, after its destruction, it is non-existent. 

Before we close this short notice of the scope and character <C the 
Vaisesika Philosophy, it is our pleasant duty to acknowledge our 
obligations to the distinguished authors cited above. Our special 
thanks are due to Dr. Sea] and 1 rofessor Ui whom \ve have freely 
quoted. 

Translator. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(N. B. Asterisks indicate the Aphorisms of Kanada ) 

BOOK I. 
Of the Predicables. 

CHAPTER I. 
Of Substance, Attribute, and Action. 

SECTION A. 
Of the Problem of Evil. 

Page- 
Human suffering prompts an enquiry as to the means of its 

removal . 

Realisation of the Self alone can end all suffering 
Kanada s view is that the Self can be realised by means of 
the Not-Self by a person who does not covet the things 
of die world ~ 

Sruti and Siuriti in support of the above view 

SECTION B. 

Of the Scope and Method of Kanada. 

The scheme of the Aphorisms of Kanada o 

Kanada s Methodology : Enumeration, Definition and 

Demonstration ft 

SECTION c. 
Of Dharma. 

Dharma is to be explained. 1 ft 

Dharma (Contemplation of Truth) purifies the mind and 

creates thirst after knowledge 
Dharma brings forth Knowledge of Truth and the Supreme 

Good. 2 
Vrittikara s explanation of the Aphorism a 

SECTION D. 
Of the. Veda. 
The Veda is the Word of God, or is an exposition of Dharma, 

and hence is authoritative. 3 fl 

Arguments against the authority of the Veda refuted 7 

SECTION E. 

Of the Supreme Good. 
he Supreme Good results from the knowledge of the truth 

< )out the fc>ix Predicables. 4 g 

The Supreme Good consists in the final cessation of Pain 
1 cessation of pain consists in the antecedent non- 
ustence of pain brought about by the neutralisation of 
tne cause of pain n 

How antecedent non-existence- is an object of volition \ 

of ain eme ^ 110t Uie " abBolut "oil-existence" 

Non-e*i,,tn. * .; distinguished from the state of swoon & 

11 






11 

Neither is it the laya or dissolution of the fudividual Self 

into the Universal Self 

Nor, the removal of the veil of Nescience from the Self 
Nor, the unimpeded flow of the stream of consciousness ... 11 

SECTION F. 

Of the Categories. 

Sixfold division of nameable things defended ... 12 

Mere knowledge distinguished from the realisation of the 

truth 

Upaskara criticised by the author of Vivriti ... 13 

tl Non-existence " is the seventh Predicable, not denied by 

Kanada ... 

Nyaya, Vaisesika, aud Sarnkhya views of the Supremo Good 

are the same ... 

A section of the Nyaya thinkers hold that the Supreme 

Good consists in the permanent cessation of de-merit only 
The division of the Predicables defended from another 

point of view by Chandrakanta ... 15 

Why the system of Kanfida is called Vaisesika ... 15 

In reality, there are only three Predicables, Substance, 

Attribute, and Action ... Itt 

SECTION* G. 

Of the Enumeration of Substance, Attribute and Action. 

* Earth, Waters, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and 

Mind are the nine Substances. 5 ... 17 

" Self " includes Grod ; Metals are transformation of Tcja* 

(Fire) ... 17 

Darkness is not a separate Substance, but a non-entity ... 17 

Chandrakanta thinks that Time and Space are included in 

Akasa (Ether) ... J8 

Attributes reside in Substances, are manifested by Sub 
stances, and themselves manifest Substances ... 18 

* Attributes are Colour, etc. 6 ... 18 
A reflection on the Samkhya theory of Buddhi (Cruder- 
standing) ... 19 

Pleasure and Pain do not differ in kind ... 1& 

* Actions are Throwing Upwards, etc. 7 ... 19 
Action analysed ... 20 

SECTION H. 

Of their Resemblances and Differences. 

* Resemblances of Substance, Attribute, and Action stated. 8 21 

Ultimate stems are not anityam or perishable ... 22 

* Resemablance of Substance and Attribute stated. 9, 10 ... 22 

* Actions do not originate Actions. 11 ... 23 
Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action 

stated ... 24 

* Substance is not destroyed by its own effect or by its own 

cause. 12 ... 24 

* Attributes are destroyed i.n both ways. 13 ... 24 

* Action is destroyed by its own effect. 14 ... . 24 

* A Substance is that which possesses Action and Attribute, 

and operates as a material cause. 15 ... 25 



Ill 

In what sense the Self which is void of action, is a Subs 
tance 25 

* An Attribute is that which inheres in Substance, does not 

possess Attribute, and is not an independent cause of 
Conjunction and Disjunction. 10 ... 2ft 

* An Action is that which inheres in one Substance only, and 

is an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunc 
tions. 17 ... 2d 

* Substance, Attribute, and Action co-exist in one and Ihe 

same Substance. 18 ... 27 

* Thev have the same Attribute as their non-material or 

efficient cause. 19 ... 28 

* Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus are the co-effects of 

Action. 20 ... 28 

* Action is not an immediate cause in the production of 

Substance 21,22 ... 29 

* A single Substance may be the joint effect of many Subs 

tances ; but not so Action. 23, 24 ... 30 

* Certain Attributes are originated by more than one Subs 

tance. 25 ... 80 

* A single Action does not relate to two or more Substances 

at the same time. 26 ... 31 

* Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action further 

stated. 27, 28, 29 ... 32 

Twofold operation of efficient causes explained ... 32 

* Actions produce Conjunctions and Disjunctions. 30 ... 

* Causality of Action further upheld. -31 ... 33 

CHPTER II. 
Of Genus and Species. 

SECTION A. 
Of the Relation of Cause and Effect. 

* Non-existence of effect follows from the non-existence of 

cause. 32 ... 35 

Importance of the principle of causality explained ... 35 

The Samkhya theory of Causation considered ... 35 

The Yaisesika doctrine of Causality maintained ... 36 

* But non-existence of cause does not follow from the non- 

existence of the effect. 33 ... 37 

The bearing of the doctrine of Causality on the problem of 

the Supreme Good explained ... 37 

SECTION B. 
Of Genus and /Species. 

* Geaus and Species are relative terms distinguished by the 

Understanding. 34 ... 38 

Objections to the doctrine of Jati or Universals stated ... 38 

The objections answered ... ... 39 

The Mimamsa doctrine of Jati considered ... 40 

Marks which indicate that a thing is not a Genus, stated 

and explained ... 40 

* Existence is pure Genus, as it recurs everywhere. 35 ... 41 

* The characteristics of Substance, Attribute, and Action 

are both Genera and Species. 36 ... 41 



IV 

Proof of the existence of Genera and Specieg stated ... 12 

* The Predicable Viiesa is pure Species, as it is the ultimate 

principle of differenciation. 37 ... 1-3 

* Existence causes the belief that Substa ice, Attribute, and 

Action are existent. 38 ... 13 

* It is a different object from Substance, Attribute, and 

Action. 39 

* It exists in Attributes and Actions. 40 ... -14 

* It does not comprehend the characteristics of Subsuince, 

Attribute, and Action, as alternately Genus and 
Species- 41 ... 15 

* Substance-ness is a Genus. 42 ... 45 

* Substance-ness is different from Substances. 43 ... 15 

* Attribute-ness is a Genus. 44 ... !<; 

* Attribute-ness is different from Substance, Attribute, and 

Action. 45 ... JO 

* Action-ness is a Genus. 46 ... !> 

* Action-ness is different from Substance, Attribute, and 

Action. 41 ... 17 

~ x ~ Existence is one and universal. 48 ... 17 

BOOK II. 

Of the Substances. 
CHAPTER I. 

Of Earth, Waters, Fire, Air, and hither. 

SECTION A. 
Of the Description of the Five Jjhiltas. 

* Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch 49 ... 1-8 

* Waters possess Colour, Taste, and Touch, and are fluid and 

viscid. 50 ... 51 

* Fire possesses Colour and Touch. 51 ... 53. 
Fourfold Tejas (Fire) explained ... 5:j 

* Air possesses Touch. 52 ... 54 

* Cotour, Taste, fcmell, and Touch do not exist in Ether. 53 54 
Ndf in Space and Time ... 54 

* The fluid state of Earth-substances and Fire-substances 

"(metals) is caused by the action of heat, and therefore 
artificial, and not natural, as it is in the case of 
Waters. 54,55 ... 55 

Gold, etc. are tansformations of Fire (Tejas ... 5^5 

SECTION B. 
Of the Inference of Air. 

* The use of Inference explained. 56 ... 5 O 

* Touch is a mark of the inference of Air. 57 ... 57 
Air is not an object of sense-perception Conditions of Per 
ception discussed ... 59 

* The Touch which infers Air, is Touch without Colour. 58 tfO 

* Air is a separate Substance. 59 ... 60 

* It possesses Action and Attribute. 60 ... (50 
Proof of Parama Anu or Ultimate Atom staled ... (H 

* Air is eternal. 61 ... 6 

* A ; r is manifold. 62 ... 62 

* Visible principle of inference of Air is not known. 63 ... 62 



* Mode of iufereice of Air stated. 64 ... 63 

* The name, Air, is derived from the Veda, 65 ... 64 

SEBTION c. 
Of Existence of Gt-od. 

* Language a id Creation are marks of the inference of 

superior Beings. 66 ... 64 

* Because they presuppose knowledge by Perception. 67 65 

SECTION D. 
Of Inference of Ether. 

* The Samkhya view stated : Actions, e. j/., egress, ingress, 

etc. are marks of Ether. 68 ... 66 

* And criticised : Action appears in corporal Substances only, 

and also not in more than one at a time. 69 ... 66 

* Ether, being a Substance, cannot be a non-material 

cause. 70 ... 67 

~* Neither can it be the occasional (nimitta) cause of 

Action. -71 67 

* An effect derives its attribute from its cause. 72 ... 68 

* Sound is not an attribute of tangible Substances. 73 ... 68 

* Nor of Soul, nor of Mind 74 ... 69 

* Therefore, it is the mark of Eth^r. 75 ... 69 
Time and Space are really identical with Ether, ... 70 

* Ether is a Substance and is eternal, like Air. 76 ... 70 

* It is one, like Existence. 77 ... 70 

* There is nothing to infer a plurality of Ether. 78 ... 70 

* " Separateness of one " (individuality) belongs to Ether. 79 71 
Summary of the chapter ... 71 

CHAPTER II. 

Of the Five Bhutas, Time, and Space. 

SECTION A. 
Of Essential and Accidental Attributes. 

* Smell perceived in a piece of cloth is due to the contact 

of Hower. 80 ... 73 

Smell, etc. proceeding from the material cause of subs 
tance, are essential or natural ; otherwise, they are 
accidental or conditional 

* Smell is natural to Earth. 81 

* Similarly hotness is natural or accidental. 82 

* Hotness is natural to Fire. 83 

* Coldness is natural to Waters. 84 

Touch which is neither hot nor cold, nor is due to the 

action of heat, is natural to Air 75 

SCETION B. 

Of the Characteristics of Time. 

* "Now," " Then," "Simultaneous,"" Slow," " Quick," such 

are the marks of Time. 85 75 

Time is the principle of Change ; Change measures Time 76 

* Like Air, Time is a Substance, and is eternal. 86 

* Like Existence, Time is one. 87 77 

* Time is the efficient cause of all that is produced. 88 ... 78 



VI 



SCETICN C. 

Of the Characteristics of Space. 

* " This, from this "such is the mark of Space. 80 ... 7H 
Distance in place cannot be explained by Time ... 79 
Time relations cannot be altered ; Space relations can be 

altered ~ > 

* Like Air, Space is a Substance, and is eternal. 90 ... 80 

* Like Existence, Space is one. 91 80 
Chandrakanta thinks, Ether, Time, and Space are but 

different forms of a single Substance ... 80 

* Its manifoldness is due to the variety of its effects. 92 ... 81 

* The conception of the East, South, West, and North 

explainsd. 93, 94 ... 8lj 

* Similarly, the intermediate directions. 95 ... H2 

SECTION D. 
Of Doubt. 

* Doubt arises from the perception of the general property, 

non-perception of the differentia, and the recollection 

of the alternatives. 96 

Doubt is not A-Prama or Uncertain Knowledge 
Doubt is neither threefold nor fivefold, as some Nyaya 

teachers think 
Doubt is not "Wonder" or curiosity ; nor is it knowledge 

which does not produce an impression (Samskara) ... SI 

Doubt is (i) internal , or (ii) external : (a) in respect of an 

object in view, or (b) in respect of an object concealed 

from view 84 

* The property seen may have been observed in several 

objects before. 97 ... S 4 

* Or an object may be seen in a different form from that in 

which is was seen before. 98 84 

* Doubt arises from science anb nescience also. 99 ... 85- 
Nyaya Sutra, I-i-22, considered ... 85-; 

SECTION E 
Of Sound. 

* Sound is the object of perception by the ear. 100 ... 86- 
The doctrine of Sphota is refuted by Convention ... 86- 

Sound is an object apart from all other objects : hence 

Doubt arises in respect of it. 101 ... 87 

Sound is not a Substance nor an Action. 102,103 ... 87 

* Sound is transient, not eternal. 104, 105 ... 881 

* Sound differs in property from that which is eternal. IOC ... S() 

* Sound is non -eternal, because it is an effect. 107, 108 ... HO 

* Defect in the doctrine of the eternality of Sound 

stated 109 ... 90 

* Sound is produced from Conjunction, Disjunction, and also 

from another Sound. 110 ... 1)1 

* Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark, viz. to be 

cognisable by the ear. 111 ... 91 

* Arguments in favour of the eternality of Sound stated and 

refuted. 112-116 ... 91-941 



Vll 



Two theories of the production of Sound : (a) Vichitarnga- 
nyaya (successive production of single sounds) and (6) 
Itadamba-golaka-nyaya (simultaneous production of 
multiple sounds) 94 

BOOK III. 

Of Soul and Mind. 

CHAPTER I. 
Of the Marks of Inference. 

SECTION A. 
Of Enquiry Respecting Soul. 

* The objects of the Senses are perceived. 117 ... 96 

* Their perception is the mark of the existence of an object 

different from them. 118 ... 96 

* The Body or the Senses are not the seat of perception. llg, 97 

* Because there is no consciousness in their causes. 120 ... 97 

* For consciousness does not appear in the other products of 

those causes. 121 ... 98 

* And because consciousness is not known to exist in those 

causes. 122 98 

Recollection of previous experience in an amputated part 
of the body, the Law of Karma, recollection of infancy 
in youth, instinctive acts, etc. are so many more objec 
tions to a physiological theory of consciousness ... 98,99 

SECTION B. 
Of Fallacies of Inference, 

* An identical mark cannot be a means of inference. 123 ... 

* Any one thing cannot be a mark of any other thing. 124 100 

SECTION c. 
Of Marks of Inference. 

* The Conjunct, the Inherent, the Co-inherent, and the Con 

tradictory. 125 100 

* One effect, of another effect. 126 

* The non-existent, of the existent. 127 

* The past, of the non-past. 128 

* The past, of the past. 129 102 

* For a mark operates on the recollection of the " universal 

relation." 130 102 

" Universal relation " discussed ... 107 

SECTION D. 
Of Enumeration of Fallacies. 

* The unproved, the non-existent, and the dubious are false 

marks 131 

* E- g-j because it has horns, therefore it is a horse. 132 ... L07 

* A multifarious is also a false mark : e. g. because it has 

horns, therefore it is a cow. 133 
Various kinds of " unproved " mark indicated 
Threefold division of true marks described 

True and false marks discussed. 109 

Other examples of false mark described 

False marks are of three kinds, and not five, as maintained 

in the Nyaya 



Vlll 



SECTION E. 
Of Marks of Inference of Soul. 

* Cognition produced from the contact of the Soul, the Sense, 

and the Object, is a true mark. 134 ... Ill 

The Bauddha theory cf Recognition and Recollection 

criticised m 

A possible attack on the Samkhya theory of Buddhi ... 112 

* Activity and inactivity observed in one s own soul, are 

marks of inference of other souls. 135 ... 113 

CHAPTER II. 
Of the Inference of Soul and Mind. 

SECTION A. 
Of the Mind. 

The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge on the 
contact of the Soul with the Senses and the Objects, are 
marks of the existence of the Mind. 136 J 14 

Mind is not universal, but atomic ]14 

Mind is a Substance, and is eternal. 137 

* Mind is one 138 Hg 
The theory that there are as many minds as there are senses 

in the organism, and that mind is a whole made ui> of 
parts, refuted Ug 

SECTION B. 
Of the Said. 

The marks of the inference of the Soul are many. 139 117 

The body is not the seat of consciousness Hg 

The Soul is a Substance, and is eternal. 140 
The doctrine that the Soul is not known by inference, but 

by Revelation, stated. 141-143 120 

> But the very word "I" infers the Soul, so that the Soul is 

known by inference as well as from Revelation. -144 121 

ine Soul is not imperceptible to the Mind 122 

But " Devadatta (a person) is known by perception : what 

is the use of inference ? 145 j 22 

* Inference strengthens the intuition. 146 123 

" Devadatta goes " is a metaphor. 147 
The metaphor raises a doubt: In I am fair " " I " ma v 

refer to the body or to the Soul. 148 124 

The intuition of I " arises in respect of one s own Soul 

only, and not of others : hence ,t denotes the Soul 

primarily. 149 , O4 

The doctrine that the intuition of " I " j s primarily i n 

respect of the body, raises the same doubt 150-151 12 

Were consciousness an attribute of the body, one would 

perceive the thoughts of another, and vice versa. 152 12(5 

The Soul is not proved by Revel; tion alone, as it is proved 

by its characteristic mark of the intuition in the form 

or 1 . 153 -J27 

The Vedanta doctrine criticised by Jayanarayana iQfi 

How the boul is distinguished as Jiva or isvara 12 9 



SECTION c. 
Of Plurality of Souls- 

* Soul is one, because there is no difference in the productio 

of pleasure, pain, and knowledge. 154 

* Plurality of Souls is proved by circumstances U ** 

* The Veda also supports this view. 156 

BOOK IV. 

Of the Origin of Bodies. 

CHAPTER T. 

Of Atoms. 

SECTION A. 

Of the Eternal. 

* The eternal is that which is existent, and uncaused. 157... 

SECTION B. 
Of Existence of Ultimate Atoms. 

* The effect is the mark of the existence of the Ultimate 

Atom. 158 1 _ 

* The Ultimate Atoms possess Colour, etc. 159 J* 

* The Ulimate Atom is eternal. 160 

Objections to the eternality of the Ultimate Atom stated ... 

* It is an error to suppose that the Ultimate Atom is not 

eternal. 161 

SECTION c. 

Of Condition of Perception. 

* Perception takea place from magnitude due to possession of 

component parts, and from colour. 162 

* Air is not perceived by the Senses, because it has not colour 

developed in it 163 137 

SECTION D. 
Of Perception of Attributes. 

* Perception of Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch takes place 

from their special characteristics, and from their inhere- 
ing in compound bodies. 164,165 ... 188, 139 

Conditions of their perception are their special charac 
teristics, absence of a more powerful like attribute, 
their intensity, and inherence in compound bodies 

* Gravitv is not perceptible. 166 

Gravity is perceptible to Touch, says Vallabhacharya 

SECTION E. 
Of Hi-sensual Perception. 

* Numbers, Magnitudes, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunc 

tion, Priority, Posteriority, and Action are perceptible 
to the eve in bodies possessing Colour, and not else 
where. 167, 168 141,142 

SECTION F. 
Of Omni-sennual Perception. 

* The classes, Attribute-ness and Existence, are perceptible 

to all the Senses. 169 

CHAPTER II. 

Of Tangible Atomic Products. 



SECTION A. 
Of Threefold Product. 

* Atoms produce Earth, etc. in three forms, vix t Body, Sense, 

and Object. 170 ... 143 

SECTION B. 
Of Body. 

* The Body is not composed of the five Bhutas ; neither is it 

a compound of three Bhutas. 171, 172 ... 144 

* The influence of the other Bhutas is not denied. 173 ... 145 

SECTION c. 
Of Twofold Body. 

* Body is twofold : sexually and a-sexually-produced 174 145 

The sexual body is either womb-born or is egg-born ... 146 

Plants are living bodies ... [4g 

* A-sexual bodies are produced by Ultimate Atoms not con 

fined in direction and place 175 ... 14(5 

They exist in the worlds of Varuna, etc. ... 148 

* Ultimate Atoms are moved by a particular Dkarma towards 

the production of the a-sexual bodies of gods and 
sages. 176 ... 147 

* Thero is record of the existence of such bodies 177 ... 147 

* Brahma, the first-born must have been produced a-sexuallv. 

-178 ... U8 

* A-sexual bodies do exist;as is seen in the Veda 179, 180... 148 

Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies cannot but be a-sexually 

produced. ... 149 

Constitution of the organs of Sense described. ... 149 

Manifestations of Earth, Waters, Fire, and Air described... 149 

BOOK V. 

Of Investigation of Action. 

CHAPTER I. 
Of Voluntary Action. 

SECTION A. 
Of Upward Movement. 

* The hand moves up in the presence, and by the volition, of 

the Soul. 181 ... 151 

Action analysed ... 15] 

* With the hand, the pestle goes up. 182 ... 151 

* Volition is the cause neither of the rebounding of the pestle 

nor of the going up of the hand with it. 183-186 ... 152,168 

SECTION B. 
Of Downward Movement. 

* In the absence of an impediment, a body falls from 

gravity. 187 ... 154 

* It does not go upward nor sideward, because there is no 

impulse towards those directions. 188 ... 154 

* A particular impulse is given by a particular volition 189 155 

* Range of motion depends upon the impulse. 190 ... 155 

SECTION c. 

Of Cause of Merit and Demerit. 
Like the reaction of the hand, the playful movements o-f 

limbs by an infant are non-moral. 191 ... 155 

* So is the bursting of bodies caused by burning. 192 ... 156 



XI 

* Slodp-walking is non-volitional. 193 ... 

SECTION D. 
Of Indifferent Movement 

* (Trass is moved by Air. Ig4 ... 157 

SECTION E. 
Of Movement caused by Adristam. 

* Adristam causes the jewel to move towards the thief, and 

also the attraction of iron, grass, etc. by magnetic and 
electric bodies, 195 ... 157 

SECTION F 
Of Nature of Motion. 

* Motion is not one and continuous, but consists of a series of 

discreet movements. 196 ... 15& 

* Movement springs from impulse which produces impetus 

which keeps up a succession of movements from point to 
point 197 ... 159 

A single impetus runs through the whole series of move 
ments ... 159 

The Nyfiya maintains the theory of a series of impetus as 

well ... 159- 

* Gravity destroys the impetus, and the body falls. 198 ... 160- 

CHAPTER II. 
Of Non-volitional Action. 

SECTION A. 
Of Action in Earth. 

* Impulse, Impact, and conjunction with a moving body, 

are causes of action in terrene substances. 199 ... 161 

* Earthquake* etc. which affect birth, and bhoga, are caused 

by adristam (destiny). 200 ... 161 

SECTION B 
Of Action in Water. 

* Rain is caused by the gravity of water particles disengaged 

from the cloud. 201 ... 162 

* Water flows in a stream or current on account of 

fluidity. 202 ... 162 

* Sun and air cause the evaporation of water. 203,204 ... 162,163 

* Circulation of water in trees is caused by adristam 205 ... 163 
Water is transformed as snow, hail, etc. by the actiou of 

heat. 206-209 ...164,165 

SECTION, c. 
Of Action in Fire, and Air. 

* Conflagration, volcanic eruption, tempest, meteor, etc. are 

caused by adristam. 210 ... 

Adristam caused the movement of fire, air, atoms, and mind 

at the time of Creation. 211 ... 

SECTION D. 
Of Action in Mind. 
(i) Caused by Volition Soul. 

Volition of the Soul causes movement of the mind. 119 .., 266 

Function of the nervous process explained 167 

Pleasure and pain, cognition, volition, etc. are caused by 
the conjunction of the soul with the object through the 
mind and the senses. 213 



XI) 

* No change can be produced in the mind when it abides in 

the soul, which is the state of Yoga. 214 ... 167 

SECTION E. 

Of Action in Mind, etc. 
(ii) Caused by Adyistam. 

* The ingoing and outgoing of life and mind at birth and 

death, metabolic, physiological and other vital processes 

are caused by adristam. 215 ... 169 

* Emancipation takes place in the absence of adristam.-" 216 170 
How Yoga destroys adyistam is described ... 170 

SECTION F. 
Of Action in Shadows, 

* Darkness is a non-entity. 217,218 ... 171 

SECTION G. 
Of Absence of Action. 

* Space, Time, Ether, Soul, Action, Attribute, Genus, Species, 

Combination are void of action, as they are incorporeal 

or imponderable. 219-224 ... 172-174 

BOOK VI. 

Of the Investigation of Dharma and A-Dharma. 
CHAPTER I. 

Of Vedic Duties. 

SECTION A. 
Of Source of the Authority of the Veda. 

* The Veda is a statement of facts by a person who has previ 

ously known those facts. 225 
It is the work of an Absolute Person 
The Mlmdmsd doctrine that Word is eternal, is refuted 

* Allotment of names in the Brdhmana portion of the Veda is 

a mark of the previous knowledge of the things 

named. 226 ... 175 
"* Injunctions on gift and on acceptance of gift are also such 

marks. 227,228 ... 176 

SECTION B. 
Of the Reaper of Consequences. 

* Result of Act accrues to the performer enly. 229 ... 177 
Exceptions to the rule considered ... 177 
The Vrittikdra does not admit any exception, ... I7g 

SECTION c. 
Of Dharma and A-dharmas from Prescribed and Prohibited Acts. 

* Entertainment of impure Brahmanas at a &rdddha does not 

produce Dharraa. 230 ... 179 

* < Impurity consists in killing. 231 ... 179 

* Association with the impure is sinful. 232 ... 779 

* Entertainment of a pure Brahman a at a Srdddha is not 

sinful 233 ... J80 

* Puiity, and not status, should be the criterion. 234,235 ... J80 

SECTION D. 
Of Certain Exceptions. 

* Stealing, killing, and suicide are not sinful in certain 

circumstances. 236-240 . 181-183 



Zlll 

CHAPTER II. 
Of the Production of Dharma and A-dharma. 

SECTION A. 

Of the Supreme Good. 
"* Acts of which the purpose is not of this world, produce 

Exaltation 241 ... 184 

Proof of Adfistam is stated ... 184 

* Acts of which the objects are not visible stated. 242 ... 181 

SECTION B. 
Of Purity. 

* Parity is purity of heart ; impurity is impurity of 

heart. 243,244 ... 185,186 

* What objects are pure, stated. 245 ... 186 

* Impure objects stated. 246,247 ... 187-188 

SECTION c. 
Of Self-restraint. 
~+ Purity must be coupled with self-restraint in order to 

produce ( Exaltation. 248,249 ... 188 

SECTION D. 
Of Causes of i Faults. 

* Desire and Aversion are caused by pleasure and pain, by 

habit, by adristam, and also by racial distinction. 
250-253 ... 189,190 

SECTION E. 

Of Effects of < Faults. 
"* Desire and aversion cause activity towards dharma and 

a-dharma. 254 ... 191 

Activity of mind, speech, and body described ... 191 

SECTION P. 

Effects of Dharma and A-dharma. 
-* Birth and death are the results of dharma and a-dharma 

255 ... 191 

SECTION G. 

Of the Nature of Release. 

* Release is a state of permanent impossibility of pain. 256 192 
Hew Release is attained, is described ... Ipfc 

BOOK VII. 

Of the Examination of Attributes and of Combination . 

CHAPTER I. 

Of Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, and Magnitude. 
SECTION A. 

Of Non-eternal Attributes. 

* Aphorism I. i. 6 recalled 257 ... 193 

* Colour, etc, of Earth, etc. are non-eternal, because their 

subtrata are non-eternal. 258 ... 193 

SECTION B. 
Of Eternal Attributes. 

* Colour, etc. of the ultimate atoms of Water, Fire, and Air 

are eternal. 259,260 ... 194 

Vrittikdra s reading of Aphorism 250 explained ... 194 

* Bat Colour, etc. of aqueous, ig.ieous, a id aerial bod ies are 

non-eternal. 261 ... 195 



X1T 



SECTION c. 
Of Variety of Colour,etc. in Earth. 

Colour, etc. of terrene bodies are produced from like attri 
butes in their constituent cause and also from the action 
of heat 262 ... 196 

Colour. ness, etc. are not mere apprehensibility by the 
external senses, but are jdtis or universals which are 
the characteristics of the attributes perceptible by the 
external senses ... 196-199- 

Process due to the action of heat is considered. Two views : 
pithara-pdka (pot-baking) and pilu-pdka (atom-baking-) 
distinguished ... 199-202: 

* Because the substance is the same before and after the 

action of heat. 263 ... 202 

SECTION D. 
Of Measure or Extension. 

* The minute is not perceived ; tho massive is perceived. 264 203- 
Measure is of four kinds : Largeness, Smallness, Long-ness, 

and Shortness ... 203 

The universal substances, Space, Time, Ether, and Soul, 
are also infinite in measure, i. e, possesses extreme large 
ness and long-ness ; extreme smallnrss and shortness 
exist in the ultimate atoms ; the next degrees of small- 
ness and shortness exist in binary atomic aggregates ; 
and largeness and long-ness exist in substances from 
tertiary atomic aggregates upwards 203 

* Largeness is produced either from multiplicity of consti 

tuent parts, or from their magnitude, or from their loose 
conjunction. 265 204 

A multiplicity of constituent parts come into combination 

by the direction of God 204 

* Smallness is produced from opposite causes. 266 205 
1 Relative uses of large and small explained. 267-269 205-2UU 
Largeness and Smallness do not exist in Largeness and 

Smallness. 270,271 207 

* Largeness and Smallness do not exist in Attributes and 

Actions. 272 207 

* Long-ness and Shortness do not exist in Long-ness and 

Short-ness.. 273 208 

* Measure of eternal substances and ultimate atoms is eternal, 

and measure of non-eternal substances is non-eternal 
, 274,275 _ 208,209 

Measure of the ultimate atom is called parimandala. 276 20 ( J 
The existence of Measure in a relative sense in perceptible 
bodies, is proof of the existence of Measure in a roal 
sense in imperceptible substances. 277 210 

* Ether as well as the Soul is infinitely large 278 210 

The Mind is infinitely small._279 21.1 

> Space is all-pervading. 280 212 

* Time is all-pervading. 281 

Time is the efficient cause of all that is produced 212 



CHAPTER II. 

Of Number, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, 
Posteriority, and Combination. 

SECTION A. 

Of Attributes which exist in one object as well as in more 
than one object. 

* Unity is a different Attribute. -282 ... 214 
Bhilsana s view criticised ... 214 

* Separateness is a different Attribute. 283 ... 215 
Separateness is distinguished from mutual non-existence, 

difference in property, and Genus ... 215 

* Unity and Separateness do not exist in Unity and Separate- 

ness. 284 216 

* Unity does not exist in Attributes and Actions, because 

they are void of Number. 285,286 ... 216,217 

* If Unity did not really exist, the word could not be used 

even in a relative sense. -287 ... 217 

The Sdmkhyas hold that cause and effect are one and the 
same, i. e. that unity and individuality belong to them. 
This is not correct 217 

* Unity and Individuality do not exist in Effect and Cause. 

288 218 

* The characteristic of having the attributes of the cause as 

antecedents, belongs to non-eternal Unity and Indivi 
duality. 289 -. 219 
Other Numbers and Separatenesses are derivative, and 

embrace more than one substance ... 21g 

The conception of duality analysed ... 221 

How duality is destroyed , ...221-222 

Sridhara, Udayana, and Sanltara- Misra on the idea of 

multiplicity or manifoldness ... 223 

The common consent of humanity that a thing is produced 
and thai a thing is destroyed, is a refutation of the 
Sdmkhya doctaine that cause and effect are identical ... 225 

SECTION B. 
Of Attributes which embrace more than one object. 

* Conjunction and Disjunction are produced either by the 

action of one of the substanees concerned, or by the 
action of both, or by another Conjunction or another 
Disjunction. 290,291. .... 225,228 

Production of things takes place by means of Conjunction 226 
There is no Conjunction among all-pervadiug substances. 

e. g. Space, Time, Ether, and Soul ... 226 

Conjunction is not eternal ... 227 

How Conjunction is destroyed 227 

Sarvajna s view of Disjunction criticised ... 23( 

How Disjunction is destroyed ... 231,282 

* Coniunction and Disjunction do not exist in Conjunction 

and Disjunction. 292,293 ... 232,233 

* Effect and Cause do not possess Conjunction and Disjunc 

tion, because they are already in combination with each 
other. 294 233 



XT! 



SECTION c. 
Of Sound and Sena?. 

* The relation between a Word and its Meaning is neither 

Conjunction nor Combination, because Conjunction is 
an Attribute 295-300 . 

* Because Attribute also may be the meaning of a Word. 296 234- 

* Because Word and its Meaning are both inert. 297 234. 

* And because a non-entity also is denoted by Word. 298 234 

* Word and its Meaning are therefore unrelated. 299 ... 285- 
"* Intuition of Meaning from Word follows from Convention. 

-301 23* 

The convention is the direction of God 236 

It is learnt from usage, testimony, analogy, synonymy, etc. 236 
Tutata, Prabhdkara, the ancients, Sankara Misra, and 

Gautama on the import of Words ... 237,238- 

Convention is twofold : original and modern. The first 

supplies the force of a Word ; the second, the definition 

of a Word 73:T 

SECTION D. 

Of Attributes existing inonc substance and haviny reference 
to all-pervading substances. 

* Priority and Posteriority are produced by two bodies lying 

in the same direction, at the same time, and being near 
and remote. 302 ... 238 

How they are destroyed ...239-241 

* Priority and Posteriority arise from the nearness and 

remoteness of the cause. 303 ... 241 

2 Priority and Posteriority do not exist in Priority and 

Posteriority. 304,306 ... 242" 

SECTION K. 
Of Combination. 

* Combination is that relation by virtue of which arises the 

intuition in the form of " This is here," with regard to 

effect and cause. 307 ... 243 

The test of Consciousness invoked ... 244 

Combination is eternal ... 244 

The view of the Bhattas considered ... 245- 

* Combination is different from Substance, Attribute, Action. 

(jrenus, and Species.- 308 ... 24-j j 

* Combination is one. 300 ... 246 
The followers of Prabhdkara maintarn that Combination is 

manifold, and is non-eternal. This is not reasonable ... 246 i 
The Nydya doctrine that Combination is perceptible to the 

senses, is not valid ... 246- 

BOOK VIII. 

Of Ordinary Cognition by means of Conjunction or 
Combi n ation . 

CHAPTER I. 
Of Presentative Cognition. 

SECTION A. 

Of the Nature of Cognition. 
* Understanding or Cognition is a property of the Soul. 310 247 



XVII 



The Minkh ja doctrine that Understanding is an evolute 
o I rakriti and a distinct entity from Soul, is not 
reasonable ...247-24* 

Coo-nition is either true knowledge or false knowledge : 
"true knowledge is produced by perception, inference, 
memory, or testimony : the forms of false knowledge are 
doubt, error, dream, and uncertainty 

* Soul, Mind, Time, Space, Air, Ether, and Ultimate Atoms 

arc not knowable by ordinary perception. 311 248- 

Sense-born cognition is of two degrees : ordinary and 
transcendental, as of Yogins who can see even ultimate 
atoms ... 24i* 

All that is demonstrable, nameable, and existent, is an 
object of sense-cognition, whether ordinary or trans 
cendental ... 249 

Ordinary perception is either discriminative or non-dis 
criminative ... 249 

Dhar-makirti, and Dinndya s argument against discrimina 
tive cognition stated and arswered ... 249-250 

SECTION B. 
Of the Production of Cognition. 

* Aphorism 111, i. 18 recalled. 312 * ... 25O 

* Cognition of Attribute, Action, Genus, and,. Species is 

rendered possible by means of the substances in which 

they inhere. 313,314 ... 251,252 

* ilenus and Species are causes of cognition of Substance, 

Attribute, and Action. 315 ... 252 

* Substance, Attribute, and Action are causes of cognition 

of Substance 316 ... 253 

* Attribute and Action are not causes of cognition of Attri 

bute and Action. 317 ... 253 

* Combination is a cause of cognition. 318 ... 254 

* Successive cognitions of a pillar, a jar, etc. are not related 

as cause and effect- 319,320 ... 255 

Cognition is either presentative or representative. Presen- 
tativo cognition is either perception or inference. 
Perception is either discriminative or non-discrimina 
tive : again, either ordinary or transcendental- Infer- 
once is either from agreement, or from difference, or from 
commonly observed marks ... 25ti 

Cognition is either true knowledge or false knowledge : 

jicrain. either certitude or doubt ... 257 

CHAPTER II. 
Of Doubly Preset tntive Cognition. 

SECTION A. 
Of Proof of Involved Cognition. 

* This/ ; That Done by you < Feed him, are instances 

of cognition involving cognition of another thing. 321 25$ 

* Tho proof is that such cognitions arise in respect of objects 

seen, and do not arise in respect of objects not seen. 322 258 

SECTION B. 
Of the Meaning of Artha (Object) in the Vaijusika. 

* Substance, Attribute, and Action are called Object.* 323 ... 259 



* 



SECTICK c. 

Of the Senses and their Objects. 

Bodies are not compound products of five elements. 824 ... 
Senses are relative to their corresponding attributes 25i> 

* The Sense of Smell is constituted by the element of Earth. 

-325 *" -39? 

* Similarly the Senses of Taste. Colour, and Touch are 

constituted by the elements of Water, Fire, and Air- 

326 

Likewise the Sense of Hearing is a portion of Ether con 
fined within the cavity of the ear 

BOOK IX. 

Of Ordinary and Transcendental Cognition by means of 
presentation other than Conjunction and Combination. 

CHAPTER I. 
Of Ordinary Perception of Non -Existence 

and 
Of Transcendental Perception. 

SF.CTIOX A. 
Of Enumeration and Demonstration of Non-Ed ixtencc*. 

* An effect cannot, before its production, be spoken of in 

terms of action and attribute, and is therefore then non 
existent. 327 

* The existent becomes non-existent. 

* The existent is quite different from the non-existent.- -329... 2f4 

* What is existent in one form (e. </. a horse) is non-existent 

in another form(e. g. as a cow) 330 
Such reciprocal non-existence is eternal 

* There is a fourth kind of non-existence kno\vn as absolute 

non-existence. 331 

The ancients and the moderns view of absolute non- 
existence 

SECTION i; 

Of the Ptrception of Non -exist en? i-. 

* Absence of perception after destruction, and recollection 

of existence before destruction, are causes of perception 

of consequent non-existence.- -332 26fi 

* Perceptibility after pi eduction is the cause of perception 

of non-existence before production. -333 267 

* Non-apprehension of identity is the cause of the perception 

of reciprocal non-existence. 334 ^tW 

* Non-cognizance of production and destruction is the cause 

of the perception of absolute non-existence. 335 2Ht> 

* The judgment " The water-pot does not, exist in the room." 

merely negates the connection of the existent water- pot 
with the room. 336 - * 

SECTION o. 

Of Transcendental Perception. 

* Perceptual cognition of the Soul results from a particular 

conjunction of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul. 337 272^ 



XIX 



* 



* 



* 



SECTION D. 
Of Nescience. 

Dreain is produced in the same way as Reminiscence. 348 
Intensity of impressions, derangement of the bumours of 

the body, and adristam are causes of dreaming ... 291 

Dreams, good and evil, described 291 

So is also " Consciousness accompanying dreams. "3 49 ...,, 292 

Pratastapdda s and VrittiJcdra * views on Dream stated ... 292 
> Merit and De-Merit also cause Dream and Dream-memory. 

350 ^^ 292 
1 Nescience or False Knowledge arises from imperfection of 
the Senses and also from imperfection of ImDression. 

OKI T 

293 

1 Avidyd or False Knowledge is imperfect knowledge. 352... 293 
The forms of A-vidyd are Doubt, Error, Dream, and 

Indecision go^ 

SECTION E. 
Of Scientific Cognition. 

* Scientific Cognition is cognition free from Imperfection 

~ 363 ... 294 

SECTION F 
Of Cognition by Seers and Siddhas. 

* The cognition of Seers and Siddhaa takes place by means 

of merit. 354 295 

Vfiltiledra s and PraSastapada s views stated 295 

BOOK X. 

Of the Differences of the Attributes of the Soul and of 
the threefold Causes. 

CHAPTER I. 
Of the Attributes of the Soul. 

* Pleasure and Pain are different objects, because of the 

difference of their causes and because of their mutual 
opposition. 355 29ft 

Prafastapdda s view stated 296 

* They are not forma of Cognition. 356-360 ... 297-300 

* The relation of the body and its parts explained. 361 301 

CHAPTER II. 
Of the Threefold Causes, 

SECTION A. 

Of Combinative and Non-combinative caiise. 

Substance is the only combinative cause. 362 .,. 302 

It operates as an efficient cause also.~-363 ... 303 

Actions are non-cornbinative causes 364 ... 304 

Certain Attributes are non-combinative causes, and occa 
sionally operate as efficient causes also 365 ... 304 

* Conjunction is a non-combinative cause. 366,367 ... 804 

SKGTION B. 
Of Efficient Cause. 

* Heat is an efficient cause. 368 ... 305 

SECTION c. 
Of Transcendental Utility of Acts. 

* Of acts enjoined, of which worldly good is not the fruit, 

the utility is transcendental. 369 ... 305 



or ascetics are either yukta or meditative, or viyukta 
or non-meditative. The former have perceptual cogni 
tion of the Soul. The Soul sometimes flashes across 
ordinary hmte consciousness 272 

Transcendental presentation discussed 272 

> Similarly, by means of; Meditation, omniscience is attained! 

273 

< Omniscience also belongs to the viyukta or supra-meditative* 

. . those who have reached the state of independence of 

the sense-apparatus 339 2^ . 

How they exhaust their karma, is described 274 

Ihe Yogin* perceive Attributes and Actions through their 

combination in Substances. 340 

They perceive the attributes of their own souls through 

their combination in their souls o41 
An argument that Kandda recognises only three independ- 

fint Pr<l i <>ahiQa * f "** 



Of Other Forms of Cognition. 

SECTION A. 
Of Inference. 
* the effect, or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory 

" tl " 8 



27 r 
o~ r 



97 t\ 

CHAPTER II. 



Three views of P*ka or the minor term described 07- 

Lingo, or inferential mark (the middle term) discussed 277 

Place of Pardmarja or subsumption of the mark in the 

process of inference discussed 
Different forms of Inference described ! 

^^J f r atUr * i8 /^ baS1 8 f Infer e, nd not the 
relation of Cause and Effect. 343 

How Uniformity of Nature is established 

Two kinds of Inference, logical and rheiorical, described" 281 

Syllogism analysed and illustrated tha terra pratijnd hetu 

uddharana, upanaya, and niyamana explained 2 81 

The Vaisesika terminology stated and explained 282 

SECTION B. 

Of Testimony and Other Forms of Proof 

Verbal is a form of Inferential Cognition. 344 oo 

Gesture, whether conventional or non-conventional, is not 

a form of Proof 

Reason, Word Mark, (Met^s of) Proof, Instrument, the s e" 

are not- antonyms. 345 

Analogy, Presumption, Subsumption, Privation, and Tradi 
tion are included in Inference, because they proceed by 
the cognition of the Uniformity of Nature.~-346 2 8" 

SKCTION c. 
Of Reminiscence. 
Reminiscence takes place from a particular conjunction of 

the Soul aud the Mind and from past impression.-437.. 290 
FrasaetapAda explanaiion quoted Q 

How sagely cognition is produced 

fi y * 



XXI 



The Veda is not impersonal, and is the work of a Supreme 
Person absolutely free from imperfection 
The purpose of sacred observance is to purify the mirror of 
the mind 

SECTION D. 
Of the Author of the Veda. 

The Veda is the work of God. 370 307 

The argument fully stated 307 




THE VAJSESJKA SUTRAS OF KANADA 

WITH THR 

COMMENTARY OF SANKARA MISRA 

AND 

3XTUACTS FROM THE GLOSS OF J AYANARAYANA. 

AXD 

Till-: BHASYA OF CHAXDRAK ANTA. 

SAXKAKA MISRA S INTRODUCTION. 

Salutation to Sri (Janesa ! 

I bow to llara who has the Heavenly lliver playing on the lap 
if His uptied matted locks, and whose forehead is adorned with the 
Umbel li slier of the Night. 

Mv Salutations constantly reach those two, Kanada and Bliava- 
ntitha, by whom I have been thoroughly enlightened in the Vaisesika 
System. 

Xole. Kamula here does not refer to the author of the Vaisesika-Sutram, but to a >vell- 
known Yaisesika teacher of a recent date. 

lihavanatha was the father of Sankara MiSra. 

May success attend this venture of mine who, like a funambulist; 
in the air. walk here without any support, with the only help of the 
Sutram. 

_y 0<e Sutraiii a. piece of rope ; an aphorism ; just as a rope-daucer walks in the air 

with the help (A a (Sutram (rope), so the commentator traverses the philosophy of tho 
Vaisesikiis with the help of the Sutram (aphorisms) of Kamula. 

Human existence is subject to threefold afflictions. These 
afflictions are partly adhyatmika, i.e., bodily and mental. They are 
partly Adhibhautiku, i.e., caused by natural agencies, e. g. man, beast, 
bird, reptile and the immobile. And they are partly adhidaiyika, i.e., 
caused by supernatural powers, such as Yaksa, llaksasa, Vinayaka, 
-etc. Discriminative men, struck with the threefold afflictions, looked 
for the root-cause of the cessation of the threefold afflictions. They 
gathered from the various Srutis (Revelations), Smritis (Recollections), 
Ftihasas (Histories), and Purunas (Cosmogonies), that it is the imme 
diate intuition or direct vision of the principle of the self, or simply, 
self-reali/.ation, which is that cause. They then desired to know the 
path also which led to the attainment of self-realization. Accordingly- 
they approached the very kind sage (muni) Kanada. 



VAIESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Now, the Muni Kanada had accomplished the knowledge of the prin 
ciples (tattvas), dispassion, and lordliness. He thought within himself | 
that the knowledge of the principles of the six padarthas (predicables), I 
by means of their resemblances and differences, is the only royal road 
to the attainment of self-realization, and that that would be easily 1 
accomplished by the disciples through the dharrna (Merit or Worth) of 
renunciation. He therefore resolved first to teach them dharma alone 
with reference to its essential form and with reference to its character 
istics, and then to teach them also the six padfirthas by means of 
their enumeration, definition, and demonstration. 

Note. Dharma of renunciation. The indirect method of Self-realization is Pravritti 
Marga, i. e. through and by means of wordly experience. The direct method of Self-realization - 
is Nivritti Marga, i. e. through and by means of abandonment of worldly experience. 

Hence, to invite their attention, he proposes. 
Jay andrdy ana s Introduction. 

He who of His own will spreads out the production, preservation, 
and destruction of the universe; He who, even though shining forth 
in suppression of all these, still is not known by other than wise men ; 
He, by knowing whom as He is in Himself, men are saved from further | 
immersion into the waves of the stream of transmigration ; the same is 
Bhava (i.e., the Lord of Creation), and He is easy of access by the path 
of communion with Him in constant devotion.* Mayj- He be pleased t<- 
give you prosperity. 

I adore Bhavani (the consort of Bhava), Mahesi (the consort of 
Mahesa, the Great Lord;, who, Herself bearing limbs as dark as th&j 
cloud, still dispels the mass of darkness by myriads of collected rays ;. 
who while cutting asunder the bond of re-birth of Her devotees, is Her-j 
self bound by love to Bhava and is His constant delighter; who! 
although She is born of the Immobile (the Himalaya), ^ still moves from] 
place to place; and who while being the consort of the Pure (Siva), is- 
seated on a corpse. 

After bowing to his good preceptor, the fortunate twice-born r 
Jayanarayana is writing out the vivriti (explanation or elaboration) of 
the aphorisms of Kanada for the pleasure of Isvara. 

Here, indeed, one and all of the disciples, desiring to throw off the 
multitude of afflictions arising from birth, decrepitude, death, and the 
like, hear from the various Srutis, Smritis, Itihasas, Puranas, etc., that 
the vision of the reality of the Self is the fundamental means of escaping 
them. Thus, there is the ruti : " Verily, verily, the Self is to be seen, 
to be heard about, to be thought over, and meditated upon. V erilyj 
O verily, this is (the measure of) immortality 7 (Bnhadaranyaka 2 4, 5;; 
also, " When the Purusa (the in-dweller) will know himself the Self- 
"I am," then wishing what, for which desire, will he pursue the course 
of transmigration?" And the Smriti also: "By elaborating his under 
standing in three ways, namely by "sacred writings, inference, and 
habitual flow of contemplation, a person attains to laudable com 



munion. 



C f. Narada Bhakti Stitrarn, aphorism 58 p. 23, S. B. H., Vol. VII. 
t Cf Sandilya-Sutram, III, 1, 7,|page 7If,S. B. H., Vol. VII. 



KANADA SIJTRAS I, 1, 1. 



Now, some disciples, who were unenvious and who had properly 
studied the Vedas and the Vedaiigas, (i-e., treatises regarded as so many 
limbs as it were of the Vedas) and had also achieved the gravana 
(i.e., the stage of self-culture known by the name, audition, in other 
words, the mere acquisition of knowledge or information as referred 
to in the preceding paragraph^, with due rites approached the great 
and mighty sage Kaiuida for the purpose of manana or intellection (the 
second stage of self-culture, i.e., that of discriminative understanding). 
Thereupon that sage, full of great compassion, taught them a system 
(of self-culture) in Ten Books. There in the First Book he has stated 
the entire group of paddrtlias (Predicables); in the Second Book he 
has ascertained Substance; in the Third Book he has described the 
Soul and the Inner Sense; in the Fourth Book he has discussed the 
body and its constituents; in the Fifth Book he has established Kama, 
(Action); in the Sixth Book he has considered Dharma (piety) according 
to &ruti ; in the Seventh Book he has established Attribute and tiamavdya 
(co-inherence or combination) ; in the Eighth Book he has ascertained 
the manifestation of knowledge, its source, and soon; in the Ninth 
Book he has established particular or concrete understanding; and in 
the Tenth Book lie has established the differences of the attributes of 
the Soul. 

The operation ot this treatise (towards teaching) is three-fold: 
Enumeration, Definition, and Examination or Demonstration. Classi 
fication or Division is a particular form of Enumeration; and hence it 
does not constitute an additional method. 

Although this system is mainly concerned with the determination 
of the Predicables, still, inasmuch as Dharma, being at the root of the 
knowledge of the essence of the Predicables, possesses a prominence of 
its own, therefore he (Kanada) proposes to ascertain that (Dharma} first 
of all. 

Dharma t .y to If- f.i>plaiiif <1. 

w? sq^qr^nr: ii ? I ? I m 



Slr Atha, now. ?[?T: Atah, therefore, [^wfc JDliarmmam, piety, 
religi. n. sqreqWTW: Vyakhyasyamah, (We) shall explain. 



1. Now, therefore, we shall explain Dharma. 1. 

Cpatkai-a. Atha, indicates sequence to the desire of the disciples; Atah Because 
disciples, skilful in, SVeu crua (audition), etc, and uneiiviou d , approached (him)," therefore 
<fr the word atha has the sense of auspiciousness. For it has been said : " Q,nk Ira (aum 
and the word .-tt/ia these two came out, at the beginning, by breaking through the throat of 
Brahma ; hence both of them are auspicious." Audit is as it should" be. How, otherwise 
is it possible on the part of the great sago, while composing the Vaisesika system of self 
culture, not to observe the auspicious ceremony, which has acquired the obligatory nature 
Of a duty, by a succession of observances by pious, men ? It cannot be said, on the other 
side, that the non-observance might be due to the experience of the non-appearance of fruit 
even where the auspicious ceremony has been observed and of the appearance of fruit even 
where it has not been observed ; since a wise man does not engage in a useless pursuit For 
its usefulness becomes certain on the supposition of its observance in another birth in the 
case of the above non-observance where the fruit still appears, and of defect in some part (of 
the ceremony) in the case of the above observance, where the fruit does not still appear 



VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Again, there need be also no apprehension of its uselcssness merely on account of the non- 
appearanco, for the time being, of the fruit of that, the obligatory nature of which has bet n 
taught in the >Sruti ami can be inferred from the conduct of the elect or polite. Nor i,s it that 
there can be no supposition of .something in another birth since an act must produce it.s fruit 
in this (one) life only , because, as in the case of the sacrifice for the birth of a son, so in 
every act the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life is not proved to exist. 
Whereas the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life belongs to Kt ir trl 
(sacrifice for rain) and other sacrifices, because these are performed with that desire alone. 
Here the agent is desirous of completion, as the agent in a sacrifice is desirous of heaven. The 
difference is that there the object (of the observance) is a ne-,v entrance in the shape of 
ftdriftam, while here it is the annihilation of hindrances, since the undertaking is with the 
desire that what has been begun may be safely completed. 



tt cannot be said that the fruit of the observance is tlie mere an 
nihilation of hindrances while completion will follow from its own 
cause. For, the mere annihilation of obstacles is not in itself an object 
of volition, whereas completion as the means of happiness is an objV.-t of 
volition, and it is also uppermost in the mind. Moreover, the mere 
destruction of demerits is not the fruit, for that being 1 otherwise capable 
of accomplishment by propitiation, singing the name of God, crossing 
the river Karmanasfi, etc., there will be plurality of causes, i.e , a 
violation of the rule (that only the observance of the omen will produce 
the result). If it is held that the destruction of demerits is the end, as 
the destruction of the particular demerits which obstruct the fulfil ment 
of the undertaking, then the fulfilment itself properly becomes the end. 
Here too there will be a violation of the rule, since such destruction of 
particular demerits is producible by gift of gold, bathing 1 ^at the con 
fluence (of the GangA and Yamuna) at Prayaga (Allahabad), etc. ; and 
it will be rash to speak of them as so many good omen^. 

Again, the causality of the good omen consists in this that it being 
observed, the completion must necessarily follow. So it has been said: 
"Because of the rule that the fruit necessarily results from an act. 
complete in all its parts, according to the Veda." Hence an alternative- 
cause also is certainly a cause, for the idea of a cause in the Veda 
refers only to the uniformity of immediateness or to the immediate- 
sequence of the effect. It is perverse to suppose a difference in kind 
in the effects, in the case of a plurality of causes. "Where causal it v has 
to be deduced from agreement and difference, there the rule of ante 
cedence to the effect should lie observed, but not in the Yeda also, 
where the appearance of difference does not figure as a weighty con 
sideration. Thus it is not a violation of the rule to say that the- 
omen being observed in all its parts, the completion necessarily 
follows. 

Now, completion or fulfilment is that on the performance of which 
arises the belief that this act has been completed. In the case of writings 
it consists in the writing of the last sentence; in the case of a sacrifice,., 
etc., in the final oblation; in the case of a cloth, etc.. in the addition of 
the last thread ; in the case of going to a village, etc., in the final con 
tact of the feet with the village : and it should be similarly undetstood 
in all other cases. Therefore in the case of completion produced by an 
auspicious observance-, even if we suppose a difference in kind in the- 
effect, still there is no violation of the rule of agreement and diffe 
rence. 



KANADA SUTRAS I, 1, 2. 



An auspicious observance is an act which brings about fulfilment 
as its fruit by the path of the annihilation of obstacles, and that is 
real I v of the form of salutation to the deity, etc. Even where obstacles 
do not exist of themselves, although the commonly attributed (as above; 
charactei sitic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles is 
absent there, still the idea of the auspicious observance is not too 
narrow, because the salutation, etc., as such, possess the incidence of 
tlie characteristic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles 
This is the point. 1. 

The ] irTt>ti adds : Others again say that the non-existence of any 
hindrance having been insured by the virtue born of concentration 
()V< t /a), the sage did not attend to the auspicious observance, or that if 
lie did. he has not inserted that at the beginning of the book. Later 
thinkers, on the other hand, say that, as in the treatise of (lautama (i.f .. 
Nvaya Sutra), in the recital of the word yramana (Proof; which falls, 
witliiu the group of the names of Grod, so too in this treatise, the 
auspicious ceremony has been observed, in the form of reciting the 
word {Ihannci, which also is a synonym of God. 

It should be understood here that dliarma leads up to knowledge 
by the way of the purification of the mind (chitta), thirst after know 
ledge, and so on. Tor the A r eda says: "They come to thirst after know 
ledge by the performance of sacrifices," etc. And says the Smriti also.. 
"Knowledge is produced after demerits or dark deeds have been dest 
royed by good acts." 

Chandrak&nta : The classification of Ulianna is not shown by 
Kan (id a, as it does not fall within the scope of his philosophy ; for, he 
lias undertaken the Sdstra with the object of teaching Tattva-Jnanani, 
knowledge of the essences or principles, only. 

Definition of Dharma. 

: ii ? I n ^ ii 

W. Yatah, whence. Wfg^-fsfcSTWferfe;: Abhyudaya-nihsreyasa- 
siddhih. Exaltation, Supreme (rood. Accomplishment. ST: Sah, that, gn?: 
Dharmah, Piety, Religion. 

2. Dharma (is) that from which (results) the accomplish 
ment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good. 2. 

Ifpashira. Now lie describes the subject proposed : 

Abhyudaya means knowledge of the essences. < Nihsreyasam is 
final cessation of pain. That from which both of them result is (Jli.an,ia. 
The compound of the two words, rendered as nihsreyasa by the path 
of abhyudaya, belongs to that class of compounds which are formed 
l>y the elision of the middle term: or it is a Tat-puriwa compound 
ablatively formed. 

This dliarma will be later on described as being characterised by 
forbearance. If it is the effect of constant contemplation and other 
practices of iogo and is the same as adrittam (the invisible, potential 
after effects of actions, or Merit and Demerit), then it is producible by 
positive performances. 



6 VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



The Vrittikara, however, says: u Abhyudaya is happiness, and 
4 nihsreyasam the simultaneous annihilation of all the particular attri 
butes. (-i.e., modifications) of the Soul. The proof is that in the case of 
dharma, the body, etc., of Devadatta are made up of eleme its s direct 
ed by the particular attributes of the enjoyer or sufferer, and as they 
are products or effects, they are, as the means of his enjoyment or 
experience, like a garland made by himself." Now, this explanation 
has been discarded by superficial readers as being not wide enough to 
apply to each and all (a). Whereas in fact "what is dharma ? and what 
its characteristic ?" the enquiry of the disciples being of such a 
general nature, the answer comes, "That from which (results) the 
accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme (food." 

Thus, that which leads to the attainment of Exaltation, and also 
that which leads to the attainment of the Supreme Good, both of them 
are dharma. Thus that the invariable cause of the object of volition is 
dharma, being the matter to be expressed, the expression "the accom 
plishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme (rood " has been used with 
the object of specially introducing the two great objects of volition, r/z., 
happiness and absence of pain. Because paradise and emancipation 
are the only great objects of volition, being the objects of desire which 
is not dependent upon desire for ulterior objects. And it will be shown 
that the absence of pain also is an object of volition. ___ 2. 

[Note. (.a) " Not wide enough to apply to each and all." The separate characteristics 

are that it produces pleasure and that it produces the Supreme (!ood. The former does nob 

include the dharma of mvritti and tiie latter does not include the dharma of pravriui Tho 

characteristic is that it produce., both pleasure and the .Supreme Good. And this 

does not include that which produces pleasure only, nor that which produce the Supreme 

<,ood only Thus the definition of dharma as explained by the Vrittikara is in cither case too 

IK, according to Upasknra, the view of superficial readers.] 

Chandrakdnta :WliereZrom does the production of the good and 
the ultimate good result? The production of the good and of the 
ultimate good results from Pracritti, activity or employment, that is 
observed in the world, or) exertion of the speech, the mind, and the 
body Therein, it is said, that a person cultivates Jjjta.-ma with the 
speech, by telling agreeable a.,d wholesome truths and by studying the 
sacred writings; with the mind, by showing compassion, contentment, 
and faith; with the body, by practising charity and by relieving the 
poor and the distressed and those who are in danger. q^ *ERq ?a 
?rKanf H*Mfor This text of the Veda also shows that 
Dharma is the designate of the word, " yajati," to perfcrm (sacrifices, 

tc.) 

And this Dharma is subsidiary, because it subserves taf.tcajn:"<nam f 
knowledge of the principles ; which is the principal Dharma, because 
it is the means of the supreme good. 

Authority <>f tha Veda. 

1 1 ? n \\ II 



Tad-vachanfit, ber.ig* His Word or declaration, or its (of 
dharma*) exposition. ?n*crpK9 Amnayasya, of the Veda. 
manyam, authoritativeness. 



KANADA SUTRAS I, 1, 3. 



3. The authoritativeness of the Veda (arises from its) being 
the Word of God [or being an exposition of dharma]. 3. 

Upaski ira. It may be objected, " Well, the Veda is the authority for this that dhurmtt 
characterised by nivritti is the source of the Supreme Good by means of the knowledge of the 
essence or reality. But we are doubtful about the authoritativeness of the Voda itself, ou 
account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition. Falsity is shown by the non- 
production of the son, even after the sacrifice for a son has been performed. The homn 
(oblation to tire) after sun-rise, etc., actually prescribed in the ordinances He offers oblation 
unto fire after sunrise, he offers oblation unto tiro before runrise, he offers oblation unto lire 
at a belated hour, is counteracted by suen t ixts as oyava (a dog of Yamaj eats up the oblation 
of him who oilers oblation unto fire alter sunrise, Savala (the other dog of Yama) eats up the 
oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire before sunrise, $yava and savala eat up the 
oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire at a belated hour, etc. And repetition surely 
appears from the mention of the thrico recital of the first and the last Stimidheni (the Rik 
III. 27. 1-11. directed to kindle fire) in He will recite the first for three times, he will recite 
the last for three times. Beside there is nothing to establish the authoritativeness of the 
Veda. Its eternality being uncertain, its eternal freedom from defect also becomes doubtful. 
On the other hand, if it is the product of a human brain, then by the possibility of mistake, 
oversight, uncertainty, want of skill in the author, etc., its characteristic of being the 
infallible testimony of a great and good (apta) man, certainly becomes doubtful. Thus there 
is no Supreme Good, nor is knowledge of reality its means, nor again is d/iarma. Thus all 
this remains uncertain." 

To meet this objection he says : 

Tat alludes to God whose existence is well-known, although the 
word does not appear in the context ; as in the aphorism of Gautama r 
" That is nuauthoritative on account of the faults of falsity, contradic 
tion, and repetition," the Veda is alluded to by the word Hat , althougfh- 
it^does not appear in the context. Thus tadvachanat, means bei;;g- 
the composition of Him, Isvara ; < amnayasya, of the Veda ; <pra- 
manyam. Or, tat refers to dharma only which is close by i. e., in the 
context. Thus, of dharma ; i vachanat, being the exposition ; 
amnayasya, of the Veda ; pramanyam ; since that statement is really 
proof which establishes something which is authoritative. God and 
the quality of His being an dpta (? . e., a great and good person) will 
lie established later on. 

Now, with reference to what has been said, namely, " on account 
of the faiilts of falsity, contradiction, and repetition," there in the case 
of falsity, the explanation lies in the supposition of producing result 
in another existence or the supposition of defect in the act, the agent, 
and the instrument, since there is the rule that the result necessarily 
follows from an act, complete in all its parts, prescribed in the Veda. 
Moreover, it is not the case that the result must appear in this and 
only this life, as in the case of Karlrl. (i. e., sacrifice for rain.j There 
the occupation is that of one who desires a revival of crops which are 
getting dry. In the case of the sacrifice for a son, the occupation is 
that of one who desires a son only. This is the difference. There is 
also no contradiction, because the condemnatory passages such as 
" Syava eats up his oblations/ etc., have reference only to cases where 
after having particularly vow T ed oblations after sunrise, etc., one 
perfoms such homax at other times. Nor is there the fault of repetition r 
because the repetition has this justification that eleven mantras for 
kindling fire having been as a matter of fact recited, fifteen such 
mantras as required by the text, " By the means of the fifteen word- 
thunders he opposed that enemy who is here," cannot be obtained 
without reciting the first and the iast mantra for three times each. 3. 



g VALSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Vivriti Or here the word tat itself denotes Isvara, on the 
strength of the saying : " Om, Tat, Sat this has been remembered to 
be the three-fold reference to Brahman." 

Knowledge of Predicables is the meana of attaining tJic Supreme Good. 






Dharinma-visesa-prasiitat, Produced by a particular 
f%^^T*T^m^f Dravya-guna-karmma-samanya-vise.<a- 

samavuyanam, of Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Com 
bination. I^T^TI*? Padarthanam, of the padarthas or predicables. tfl^WjIf- 
^Trqfcqj Sadharnmiya-vaidharmmyabhyam, By means of resemblance and 
difference. fl^RTTin^ Tattvajnanat, From knowledge of the essence. ft:^q^^ 
Nihsreyasam, The Supreme Good. 

4. The Supreme Good (results) from the knowledge, pro 
duced by a particular dharma, of the essence of the Predicables, 
Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination, 
by means of their resemblances and differences. 4. 



ra. Having described the nature and characteristic of d/ianna in accordance 
with the desire of the disciples, he lays down the following aphorism for ascertaining tho 
subject-matter and the "relation". 

Such knowledge of the essences i* dependent upon the Vaiiesika, 
System ; therefore it goes without saying that it too is a source of tho 
Supreme Good. If, through its derivation in an instrumental sense, 
namely, that the essence is known by it, the word tattvajiiana refers 
to the treatise, then it will not have apposition to the word dharma-yisesa- 
prasutat. In dravya-gnna, etc., the compound is a copulative com 
pound wherein all the words are prominent, because the knowledge of 
the essence of all the I redicables is the source of the Supreme Good. 

Now, here the i relation is understood to be : between the Doctrine 
and the Supreme Good, that of the means and the end or motive ; bet 
ween the Doctrine and the knowledge of the essences, that of form and 
matter ; between the Supreme Good and the knowledge of the essences, 
that of effect and cause ; between the Predicables, Substance, etc., and 
the Doctrine, that of the demostrable and that which demonstrates. 
And from the knowledge of these relations, those who seek the Supreme 
Good apply themselves to this Doctrine, and those who desire salvation 
apply to it only when they realize that the sage is an dpta or trust 
worthy person. 

; Xilisreyasam " is final cessation of pain ; and the tinality of the 
cessation of pain consists in its noa-simultaneonsness with the antece 
dent non-existence of pain in the same substratum, or in its simultan- 
eonsness, in the same substratum, with the simultaneous annihilations 
"of the special attributes of the Soul, viz., adristam and saniskara. Or, 
Salvation is the antecedent lion-existence of pain upto the moment of 
the annihilation, without leaving any trace, of these special attributes. 



KANADA SUTRAS I, 1,4. 



A 7 c/s Antecedent non-existenos": Non-existenoe is fourfold, viz. 

(a) antecsdent, e.g. of the pot before it is produced. 

(b) enasrgent, e.g. of the pot after it is destroyed. 

(c) reciprocal, e.y. of the characteristic of the pjt in a picture and vice versa. 

(d) absolute, e.g. of the pot in a room where there is no pot. 

It will be noticed that antecedent non-existence has no beginning ; emergent non-existence 
las no end ; and reciprocal non-3xistenc3 and absolute non-existence have neither be< inriin 
ior end. 

The tuing of which there is non-existence, is said to be the opposite or counter-opposite 
pratiyogt) of that non-sxistence. In the abovo illustration the counter-opposite is the pot. 

One kind of non-sxistence (e.g. of the pot) is differentiated from another kind of non- 
jxistence (e.g. of the picture), by means of the characteristics of their counter-opposites. 
fhese characteristics are therefore called determinants or differentiators (avachchhedaka). 

Now, mere cessation of pain is not Salvation ; because there remains the po.ssibilitv of 
aain in future and there remains also the memory of the pain that has then passed into non- 
)eing. The cause of the possibility of pain is adrlstam or karma (merit and demerit) 
ind the cause of the memory of pain is samiMra, (the imprint of the experience of pain left 
n the soul). Salvation will result only when there is not merely the cessation of the pain 
ictually experienced, but also the neutralisation of the causes of possible pain viz, adristant 
ind sainsk&ra. 

Not that it is not an object of volition, being incapable of achieve 
ment, because even antecedent non-existence can be brought about by 
the neutralisation of the cause. Nor does it thereby lose in the charac 
teristic of being antecedent non-existence, because such characteristic 
remains as the characteristic of the non-existence of the producer of 
the opposite (i.e., the existence of pain) ; and to be the producer is 
merely its essential or general fitness to be the cause. Again, antece 
dent non-existence is not the last member or element, so that, it existing, 
the effect must necessarily appear ; for if it were so, then it would follow 
that an effect also has no beginning. Thus, as in the absence of a 
contributory cause it did not produce the effect so long, so also in future 
it will not produce it without the co-operation of a contributory cause 
the person operating to the eradication of the cause. Therefore this 
aphorism too upholds antecedent non-existence. Hence in the second 
aphorism of Gautama, " Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false notion 
on the successive removal of these in turn, there is the removal of the one 
next preceding and thereafter salvation," (Nyaya Sutram, 1, i, 2), the 
statement of the non-existence of the effect on the non-existence of the 
cause, strengthens the idea of salvation as having the form of the antece 
dent non-existence of pain. Removal of activity on the removal of faults 
removal of birth on the removal of activity, of pain on the removal of 
birth here removal does not mean annihilation but non-production, and 
that is nothing but antecedent non-existence. It is not that the opposite is 
lot known, for the opposite is surely known in the form of pain in general. 
As in the case of propitiation, there too only the non-production of pain 
is expected through the annihilation of faults. In the world also it is 
seen that the removal of the snake, thorn, etc. is for the purpose of the 
non-production of pain. So the activity of the wise is directed only 
Cowards removing the causes of pain. 

Some however say : " Only the absolute non-existence of pain is. 
lalvation. If it is not seated in the Soul, yet, as seated in the stone, 
etc., it is connected with the Soul ; and its connection lies in the 
annihilation of pain which does not accompany the prior non-existence 
(or potential existence) of pain ; as it is found in connection with such 
annihilation of pain, seeing that such annihilation taking place, there 
arises the consciousness of the absolute non-existence of pain in that 



10 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

j.Iace. This being so, such texts of the Veda as " He moves about being 
absolutely relieved of pain/ also become explained." We reply that 
it is not so. Absolute non-existence of pain, being incapable of accom 
plishment, is not an object of voluntary activity. Nor has annihilatio i 
of pain any connection to that, since this would entail a techni 
cality. 

tfote. Absolute non-existence has neither beginning nor end. It does not therefore 
depend upon human will or effort. Hence it cannot bo pursued as an object of desire. You 
inav say that, as long as it is not accomplished in the Soul, as the connection of that which 
is not connected with it, such connection taking the form of the annihilation of pain which 
does not coexist with the antecedent non-existence of pain so long surely it is an object of 
dei-ire. But to this also there is an objection ; viz., that the annihilation of pain does not 
form such a connection, as it is not co-extensive with the soul. To hold otherwise, w^uld be 
to i ut a new interpretation upon the word " connection " (Sambandha). 

The text of the A r eda " He moves about being absolutely 
relieved of pain " implies that, by way of the neutralization of causes,, 
prior non-existence of pain may be reduced into a condition similar t<> 
that of the absolute non-existence of pain. 

It may be said, " This is not an object of the will, as it is 
not an object of desire which is not subject to another desire, because those 
only who seek pleasure, become active in the removal of pain, seeing 
that pleasure is not produced at the time oi pain." But this is not so ; 
because it is equally easy to say the contrary also. Will not desire 
for pleasure also be subject to the desire for the absence of pain V seeing 
that men overwhelmed with grief as well as those who turn their fa?es 
away from pleasure, having in view only the absence of pain, are 
inclined to swallowing poison, hanging themselves, etc.. 

Neither can it be said, " Even if it is an object of the will, it 
is so only because it is an object of cognition. But salvation as absence 
of pain is not even an object of cognition. Otherwise (/.<-. if to be an 
object of cognition were Lot a nece.-sary coi clition of being an object of 
the will) men would be inclined to bring about the state of swoon, etc." For 
that which is capable of being known from the Veda and by inference- 
cannot be reasonably said to be unknowable. For there are the texts. 
of the Veda: " He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain," "By 
knowing Him only one transcends death/ etc. There is inference also : 
The series of pain is finally or absolutely rooted out, because it is a 
series like a series of lamps ; and so on. It can be known by perception 
also, since final annihilation of pain for a moment becomes the subject- 
matter of thought in the realization of pain in consciousness (in the 
moment prior to death) and (if you do not admit this), also because the 
yoyins perceive the future annihilation of pain by virtue of the power 
born of concentration (i/w/a). 

It cannot be said, " Still, the loss and gain being the same, it 
is not the object of the will, sii ce with pain, pleasure is also removed, 
the removel of both being due t. the ^ ame set of causes" ; for men 
naturally dispassionate and fearful oi dark days of suffering and who 
overestimate every glow-worm of j leasure, are active to that end. 

]t cani.ot again be said, " Cessation of pain is still not 
the object of the will; becai se cessation of ] ain which is yet to 
come, is inrj cssib.e, \ ain v^hich is j att is in the past, and pain which is 
piesent will ctase even without an eifcrt of the j erson"; for the activity 
of the j erson is towards the eradication of causes, as in j e^unces. Thus. r 



KANADA StiTRAS I, 1, 4. 



false knowledge attended with desire, is the cause of Samsdra, i.e. f 
.succession of mortal existences ; it is rooted out by the knowledge of the 
truth about the Self ; and knowledge of the truth about the Self is 
producible by the practice of Yoya ; he. ice activity in this direction is 
justified. 

It cannot be said that only the manifestation of permanent pleasure 
is salvation, and not the absence of pain ; for there is no proof that 
j)leasure can be permanent ; if there were such proof the i the maniies- 
-tation of pleasure being constant, there would be no difference between 
A worldly and an other-worldly or liberated man, aid also manifesta 
tion being a product or effect, on its termination there wjll again follow 
or stream of mortal existence. 



It cannot be said that salvation consists in the laya or disappearance 
of the Jivdtmd or embodied Self into the Brahmdtmd or un -embodied or 
universal Self ; for if laya means amalgamation, then there is an 
obstacle, as two do not become one. It cannot be explained that laya 
means the removal of the subtle embodiment composed of the senses and 
of the physical organism ; for hereby the absence of the causes of pain 
being imolied, it follows that the absence of pain alone is salvation. 

Hereby the doctrine of the Ekadandins (a sect who carry staffs con 
sisting of single sticks) that salvation means the remaining of the pure 
Self after the cessation of Nescience or false knowledge and that Self is 
by nature true knowledge and happiness, is also refuted, because there 
is no evidence that the Self is knowledge and happiness. The text of the 
Veda u Brahman is eternal, knowledge, and bliss," is no evidence, 
because it proves possession of knowledge and possession of bliss. For we 
have the perceptions " I know," and " I am happy," but not the percep 
tions "I am knowledge " and " I am happiness." Moreover, Brahman 
being even now existent, it would follow that there is no distinc 
tion between a liberated and a worldly man. The cessation of Avidya 
or false knowledge is also not an object of the will. Brahman also, being 
eternal, is not a xddhya or what has to be accomplished. The realization 
of Brahman within the Self, having Him as the object, is not a sddhya or 
what has to be accomplished. Similarly bliss also, having Him as its 
essence or object, is not a sddhya. For these reasons activity directed 
towards Him is not justified. 

It cannot be said that salvation lies in the purity or unimpeded flow 
of the stream of consciousness. For if by purity is meant the removal 
of such impediments as pain, etc., then this much alone being the object 
of the will, there is no reason for or proof of the survival of the stream 
of consciousness. Moreover, the retention or survival of the stream of 
consciousness can be possible only by means of the body, etc., and 
hence in this view the retention of samsdra or the stream of mortal 
existence also would be necessary. 

It is therefore proved that cessation of pain as described above is 
alone the Supreme Good. 

In knowledge of the essence the genitive has been used in the 
place of the accusative. The third case-ending i n Sadharmmya-Vaid- 
harminya-bhyam shows the mode (of knowledge). (K these Sadharmmya 
means recurrent property and Vaidharmmya , divergent property. 



12 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Although a property which is recurrent in one place is divergent in 
another, and vice versa, still knowledge in the shape of recurrent and 
divergent properties, is here intended. 

Here the enumeration itself of the Predicables, Substance, etc., has. 
come to be their division, which has the effect of excluding a more or 
less number. Therefore it follows that as a rule Predicables are o ;1 
sir in number. And this is not proved. If any other Predicable 
which requires to be excluded is known then the rule does not stand 
good ; if it is not known, then the exclusion is invalid. It cannot be- 
said that this is not the exclusion of the addition of something else 
but the exclusion of non-application ; in other words, that the non- 
application of the characteristics of the six to all predicables or things 
is excluded. For all known predicables having been included bv the 
word i Predicable/ there is here then the fault of proving over a train 
and also that something else is not known. Moreover, which is to be- 
excluded, non-application of the characteristics jointly or their non- 
application severally ? In the first alternative, joint non-application 
prevails everywhere, so that there can be no exclusion. It cannot be- 
said that in the econd alternative also there can be no exclusion as 
with reference to one another their individual non-application prevails 
everywhere ; for the purpose of the rule is to exclude the non-applica 
tion of the characteristics of the six, w T hen, according to others, thev 
do not apply to Energy, Number, Similarity, and other Predicables 
recognised by them. Therefore the meaning of the rule that Predic 
ables are only six in number .is that in all perceptible objects, there in 
application of one or other of the characteristics of the six, and not 
that there is non-application. Now, only/ if it goes with the noun, it 
means exclusion of the addition of something else ; if it goes with the 
adjective, it means exclusion of non-application ; and if it goes with the- 
verb, it means exclusion of absolute non-application. Here according 
to some " only" has all this three-fold significance; while others say 
that its force lies in mere exclusion and that non-application, addition 
of something else, etc., are things to be excluded, which are derived by 
association. 

:i Produced by a particular dhanna is the adjective of " knowledge 
of the essence." Here " particular (Uiarma" means piety characterised 
by forbearance or withdrawal from the world. If by " tattvajnuna" 
explained as "by this essence is known." the treatise (i.e., the 
Aphorisms of Kanada) is meant, in that case it should be said that 
" particular dharma" means the grace of a.,d appointment from God, 
for it is heard that the great sage Kanada composed this System by 
obtaining the grace of and appointment from God. In the aphorism 
by " knowledge of the essence" the realization of the truth about the 
Self in the understanding is i;;to",ded. because such relization alone 
is competent to root out false knowledge attended with desire. " By 
knowing Him only one transcends death, no other road is known 
(vidyate) for travelling," " Two Brahmans have to be known (veditavye)" 
"Having no eyes He yet sees, etc." in all these passages the word 
vedana has the sense of realization in the understanding, and the use 
of the fifth case-ending in the causal sense in the word l tattvajiiAnat 
indicates that such realization of the Self comes in the progressive 



KANADA SttTRAS I, 1, 4. IS 



career of hearing from the Sdstras, thinking within oneself, medita 
tion, etc., 4. 

Vivriti. Dharmmavi&esaprasutat means producded by a parti 
cular (go )d conduct, virtue or) merit, acquired in this life or in previous- 
births. It is the qualification of tattvajnanat (knowledge of essence). 
As pointed out by the author of Muktavali, Sadharmmya means 
common property, and i Vaidharmmya means opposing (i. e. f dis 
tinguishing) propei ty. The use of the third case-ending indicates 
ma:iner. The fifth case-ending in * tattvajnanat has the sense of appli 
cability. Thus the meaning is: By particular virtue knowledge of 
essence is produced by means of the generic and specific properties of 
the Predicables, Substance and others; thereafter is produced l intellec 
tual conception of the Self, and next comes the realization of the Self 
in the understanding by constant meditation ; after this liberation 
follows in the train of the removal of false knowledge, etc-, (Vide Nyaya 
Sutram, I. i. 2.) 

The author of the Upaskara has however said : The word tattva- 
j liana in the aphorism conveys the principal idea of the realization of 
the Self in the understanding ; or, if it is interpreted in the instrumental 
se:,se, it refers to the treatise which is the (instrument or) means of 
such realization. In the first of these cases, the word dharmmavisesa 
will mea i that dharma the characteristic of which is forbearance 
(nivfitti) ; a.id in the latter case it will mean a particular virtue or merit 
in the form of the grace of and appointment from God, according to 
the tradition that the great sage Kanada composed this treatise under 
the grace and appointment of God. And as the causal use of the fifth 
case-ending bears the sense of applicability, the realization of the Self 
in the understanding will follow from the treatise through the chain of 
intellection, constant meditation, and soon, for the word, knowing in such 
texts of the Veda as " By knowing Him only one transcends death," 
" Two Brahmans have to be known," etc., denotes realization in the 
understanding (i. e., spiritual intuition), and alone is competent to root 
out false knowledge together w r ith desires. 

This should be considered. If the word tattvajiiana in the apho 
rism denotes the realization of one s Self in the understanding which 
counteracts false knowledge together with desires, then it would follow 
that the expression by means of generic and specific properties as well 
as the term, l of the Predicables, bearing the sense of the sixth case- 
ending, have no syntactical connexion. For in the matter of the 
realization of the Self in the understanding there is neither the 
modality of the ge leric and specific properties, nor the materiality or 
substantiveness of the six Predicables ; because they do not exist there 
as they are distinct form the body, etc., whereas the realization of 
the Self in the understanding is only competent to root out desires, 
etc., which are not distinct from the body, etc. It cannot be said that 
in the state of the representation of separateness from the other (i. e. t 
the Not-Self) in the Self by the virtue born of Yoga (concentration"* 
knowledge of the six Predicables, namely Substance, etc., by means of 
their generic and specific properties, is also produced through their tem 
porary contiguity, inasmuch as the subject-matter of such knowledge 



14 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

(i. e. the Predicates, etc.) appears there for the time being. For 
notwithstanding that such representation contains such indifferent 
generic property, etc., within itaelf, since it is not necessary for the 
real purpose in view, the description of it by the revered Sfge will 
mean so much mad talk on his part. 



the venerable author of the Upaskara has brought forward 
the texts " By knowing Him alone, etc. " as being evidence that the 
realization of the Self in the understanding is the cause of liberation. 
That too has been improper. For the Supreme Self alone being implied 
by the text, " I know Him, the Great Person, of the colour of the Sun, 
beyond the reach of darkness, " the word tat (that) has reference to 
the Supreme Self, and therefore it cannot refer to the Jivdtmd (Subordi 
nate or Embodied Self) which has not been so implied. So much for the 
sake of brevity. 

Here the enumeration- of six Predicables has been made under the 
view of Existence or Being. In fact Non-Existence or Non -Being also 
lias been intended by the sage to be another Predicable. Hence there 
is no impropriety either in the aphorism " Non-existence of effect, fnuu 
non-existence of cause " (I. ii. 1) of the second chapter or in sn -h 
aphorisms as " From non-existence of qualification by Action and 
Attribute" (IX- i- 1; of the Ninth Book. Accordingly in the j\ T yaya- 
Llldvati. it has been said : " Non-existence also should be stated as con 
ducive to the Supreme Good, like the modifications of Existence. This 
ronduciveness is proved by the fact that the non-existence of the effect 
follows from the non-existence of the cause in all cases. In the 
Dravyakirandeali also, Nyaya teachers have admitted that Xoa- 
Existence is the seventh Predicable, in the passage ending thus : " And 
these Predicables have been mentioned as being the principal ones. 
Non-Existence, however, although it possesses a ^ form of its own, has 
not been mentioned, not that it is something negligible, but because its 
.ascertainment is dependent upon the ascertainment of its opposite." 
Thus the knowledge of the generic and specific properties of the seven 
(iiiid not six only) Predicables is conducive to the Supreme Good ; and 
that conduciveness, it should be observed, lies in the mode of knowledge 
of marks (liiiga), etc., in the matter of the establishment of separatenesa 
from the Not-Self in the Self. 

The Supreme Good, according to the views of thy Nyaya, Vais^sika, 
and Sankhya philosophies, consists in the permaie.it cessation of pain, 
and results as the annihilation of pain, which is not synchronous with 
pain co-existent with itself. In fact, annihilation of ultimate pain is 
non-synchronus with pain co-existent with itself, since no pain can at 
that moment arise in the liberated Soul. With a section of the NyAya 
thinkers, salvation means permanent cessation of demerit only, because, 
in their view, this only can be directly accomplished by the realization 
of the Self in the understanding, as the Veda says, " And his actions 
wear off when he sees that High-and-Low (Mundaka 2, 2, 8)." In the 
opinion of the one-staffed Vedantin, salvation lies in the cessation of 
nescience, and nessience is (with him) a different Predicable. In the opi 
nion of the three -staffed Veda itin, salvation means the disappearance of 
the Embodied or finite Self i i the Great Self, aid results as the cessation 



KANADA stTTRAS I, 1, 4. 



of the Upddlii or external condition of the J-lua (Embodied Soul), and 
of the causal body. Causal body again has been proved to be "the 
organic combination of the five life-breaths, mind, understanding, and 
ten senses, arisii g from the elements which have not been compounded 
(i. e.j redintegrated), possessing subtle limbs, and being the means of 
experience (i. *., &/MM/O)". The Bhattas however say that salvation 
consists in the manifestation of eternal happiness, and that eternal 
happiness, though evidenced by the Veda and penetrating all living beirgs 
6/iea*), is unmanifest in the state of transmigration (Samsdra*), and 
becomes manifest to the sense, immediately after the realization of the 
truth about the Self in the understanding. The possible defects in 
these views are not shown here for fear of increasing the volume of the 
book. Bnt in all the views the permanent cessation of pain in the state 
of salvation remains uncontradicted. And that is our point. 

Now, it may be contended, " There are additional Predicables such 
as Ei.ergy, Similarity, etc. How else can it be explained that in the 
vicinity of the jewel, etc., burning is not caused by that which causes 
burning- an d is caused when it is not in the vicinity V Therefoieit 
must be imagined that the jewel, etc., counteract the burning ei.ergy 
of that which causes burns, and that the inciting removal of them 
revivifies it. In like manner, Similarity also is a different Predic- 
able. For it does not fall within the six forms of existence, as it equally 
applies to them all, since such similarity as in "As bovine-ness is 
eternal, so also is horseness," is perceived. Nor is it a non-existence, 
as it appears in the form of an existence." But our reply is that 
reconciliation being possible by the mere suppostion of the self-activity 
of fire, etc., existing away from the jewel, etc., or the supposition of 
the absence, etc., of jewel, as the cause of burning, etc., it is not proper 
to imagine infinite Energy, its prior non-existence, and its annihilation. 
It should not be asked again how there can be burning even in the close 
presence of apowerful jewel, because that supposition has been made 
only of the absence of jewels in genaral, which are powerful but remote. 
In the same way, Similarity alsu is not -A, different Predicable, but 
denotes that, while one thing is quite distinct from another thing, the 
one possesses the majority or the chief of the attributes belonging to 
the other ; as the Similarity of the moon in the face, means that the 
face which is quite distinct from the moon, possesses the cheerfulness, 
and other attributes belonging to the moon. This in brief. 

Chandrakdnta. (1) Dharma presents two aspects, that is, under 
the characteristic of Pravr-itti or wordly activity, and the characteris 
tic of A icritti or withdrawal from wordly activity. Of these, Dharma r 
characterised by Xicrittl, brings forth tattva-jndna or knowledge of 
truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes. 

(2) Here the separate enumeration of Sdmdnya, etc., is unneces 
sary, on account of their non-divergence; for, tidnidnya, etc., falling, as 
they do, within Substance, etc., do not differ from the latter. Their 
separate mention, however, is justified en the possibility of difference 
in* the mode of treatment adopted by the author. Systems, differing 
in their methods, are taught for the benefit of embodied souls, differing 
irom one another. This is, then, the Vaisesika System, of which the 
distinctive features are /Sdmdnya, etc., as are, in the other (Nydya\ 



VAIESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



System, Doubt, etc., although they are included in the Proof and the 
Provable, respectively. Accordingly, this System is enabled to stand 
apart by mens of Sdmdnya and the other Predicables; and so it is called 
the Vaiseiiika System. Otherwise it would be merely an Upanitsat 
teaching Adhydtma-vidyd, Philosophy of the Embodied Self. * * * * * 
4 Samanyam means possession of similarity. * * * Doubt and Error 
arise from (observation of) Sdmdnyam and from non-observation of 
Visesa (or distinctive) peculiarity. Observing the common properties, 
altitude and extension, of a pillar and a person, and remaining ignorant 
of their differentia, one feels the doubt whether it be a pillar or a 
person ; error also arises in this way : observing the common property 
only and in consequence of fault or imperfection, one mistakes a pillar 
for a person or a mother of pearl for a piece of silver. False cognition, 
again, is the root of all suffering. It is for this reason that Samfinyam 
has been separately mentioned, notwithstanding that it is included in 
Substance, etc. Visesa is that by which a thing is. reduced to itself. 
False cognition which springs from (observation of only) the common 
property is corrected by the observation of the distinctive property : 
whence arises correct knowledge, which is called tattva-jndnam. * * * 
For this reason Visesa is separately mentioned, although it is included 
in Substance, etc. If, again, it is a single reality that, being determined 
in particuiar ways, comes to be used as Samanyam and Visesa, 
then it falls within (the class ofj Attributes. Or, if these are mere 
technical names, then they are not additional Predicables. Samavaya 
means complete approximation, *. e., ^identification ; as it has been 
said, Samavaya is inseparable existence. * * * Samavaya is a:i 
attribute, which is the counter-opposite of Separateness, either character 
ised as pluarlity or characterised as difference in kind. It inheres in 
Substance, and does not possess Attribute; nor is it a form of Action. 
Now, birth means a particular conjunction (of the Self) with the body, 
the senses, and the feelings. Thereafter the Jiva errs that the Self 
has no separate existence from the body, etc., in consequence of which 
a person transmigrates and suffers a multitude of pains, and on the 
cessation of which he is liberated, the stream of his sufferings being 
dried up. Hence Samavaya , though included in Attributes, is 
separately mentioned. 

(3) There are other Predicables also, viz., pramdna, Proof ; 
prameya, Provable ; xamsaya, Doubt; prayojana, Purpose; dristaiita, 
Instance; siddhflnta, Tenet ; avayava, Member (of a syllogism); tarka, 
Confutation (or Reasoning) ; nirnaya, Ascertainment ; vdda, Discussion ; 
jalpa, Wrangling; vitandd, Cavilling; hetvdbhdaa, Fallacy; c.hhala, 
Equivocation ; jdti, Showing the futility of the mark of inference ; and 
nigraha-sthdna, Ground of Defeat or Opponent s Error. These too come 
under the Predicables of Kandda. 

(4) The Supreme Good results from knowledge of truth about the 
Self, etc., while knowledge of truth about the rest is auxiliary to it. 
False knowledge about the Self, etc., is of various kinds, e.y., the 
sense of Non-Ego in the Ego, the sense of Ego in the Non-Ego. 

Enumeration of Substances, 
fjpaskdra. Because as the souljit participates in salvation and is the support of all the 



KANADA SUTRAS I, 1, 5. 17 



Predicablei. therefore he now says by way of giving the division and particular reference 
nf the lirst mentioned Predicable, .Substance. 



lit in * ii 

Prithivi, earth, wq: Apas, waters. 3*1: Tejas, fire. srnj: Vuyuh, 
.air. 3117131 Akasam, Ether. *I$: Kulah, time, f^ Dik, direction, 

space. *JT?*Tl Atma, Self. J?H: Manas, mind, ffo Iti, only. 5Qlfqf Dravyani, 

substances. 

5. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and 
Mind (are) the only Substances. 5. 

Iti has tha sense of determination. Thereby the meaning is that 
Substances are nine only, neither more nor less. If it is doubted that 
the exclusion of a greater or less number having been secured by the 
force of the division itself, there was no need for the word. iti/ then 
it should be understood that it being possible to take the aphorism in 
A merely denotative, indicatory or enumerative sense, the word Iti is 
used to indicate that it has the object of division also, and that the 
word is used also to indicate that gold, etc., as well as God are included 
in them, a. id also that Darkness which may be apprehended to be an 
additional substance is a non-being. The fact that the words have not 
bee i compounded goes to show that they are all equally prominent. 
And the author of the aphorisms himself will point out their definitions 
or differentia; while treating of i difference. 

It cannot be said that gold is neither Earth as it has no smell, nor 
Water as it has no wetness and natural fluidity, nor Fire as it has weight 
and on the last account, nor Air, nor again Time, etc. ; therefore it is 
something over and above the nine. For, in the first two cases, there 
can be no comparison ; in the third case, that which has to be proved 
is something imaginary (i. c., that gold is not a transformation of 
Fire). After that there has been analogous argument, although there 
is no doubt about that which has to be proved, and also the mark of 
inference is fallacious. He will prove afterwards that gold is a trans 
formation of fire 5. 



Firfiii. It may be objected, " The writer of the Kandali and the 
Samkhya teachers have held that Darkness is a Substance. And it is 
right. For otherwise how can people have the perception of quality 
and action in it,- viz., Dark Darkness moves ? Now, being devoid of 
Smell, Darkness is not Earth ; as it possess dark colour it cannot be 
included in Water, etc. Therefore how is it right to say that the sub 
stances are nine only ?" We reply, It is not so, because it is illogical 
to imagine another Substance, when it can be produced by the a bsence 
of necessary Light. The perception of dark colour is, like the percep 
tion of the vault of heaven, erroneous. The perception of movement 
is also an error, occasioned by the departure of light, as the perception 
of movement by the passengers of a boat in respect of the trees, etc., 
standing on the bank of the river, is occasioned by the movement of 
the boat, etc. The supposition that Darkness is a substance will entail 



ls VAlfcSlKA PHILOSOPHY. 



the supposition of tlie antecedent non-existe.x-e and annihilation of a-i 
infinite number of its parts. Lii the opinion of the \\riter of the Kandali 
Darkness is included in Uarth. So that according To him there is no 
impropriety in the exclusion of a greater nninlier." 

Among these nine divisions of Substance. Kther, Time, anil Spacedo- 
n ot form anv class, since they have only a single individual existence. 
hut the rest form classes. 

Clta-uJrakflnta. The separate mention of Time and Space is inten 
ded to indicate the difference in the uses of these terms according- to 
the difference of the effects. Akdsa, though it is one. still admits of a 
variety of names and uses, according to the difference of effect. It is 
not that Time and Space are essentially different objects from Akdsn, 
Kther. 

rut ion of Attributes. 



I. iiiixk i m . He- gives the enumeration and division of Attributes immodiately aflei" 
nub-ttinco, because Attributes as such reside in all substancos which become their Mib-Urate, 
i-e manifested by substances, and themselves also manifest substances. 






* 



Uiijia-rasa-gaiullia-spai-si th. Colour. Ta>te. Smell . and 
Touch. ^f^qT: Saiuklivah, Numbers. ^nnji^ Parimanatii, Measures. K.\ten- 
sioiis. ^qsFr3fF r Prithaktvam, Separate, iess. ^TqtJTfear^ Samyoga-vibhagau, 
Conjunction "an d Disjunction. qc??riq<^ 1 arat vAj.arat ve. Priority and 
Posteriority. f^T. Hndiihayah. Understandings. 3J:^ Sukha-duhkhe. 
Pleasure and pain. f^T^qt Lchcliha-dvesau, Desire ;i:id Aversio:i 
1 raatnah, Volitions. ^ Cha. And. Jjmi: (rnuAh. Attributes. 



6. Atrributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Num 
bers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, 
Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure- and Pain, 
Desire and Aversion, and Volitions. 6. 

The word cha gathers up Weight, fluidity. Liquidity, Impression, 
Virtue, Vico and Sound ; they are well-known Attributes, it is hence 
that they have not been verbally stated. Their attribute;! ess, he will, 
in their" proper places, explain with respect to their nature and maik. 
The words Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are compounded into a, 
tim.iaxa in -order to show that they do not co-exist with contemporaneous! 
Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. But Numbers a<id Measures are not 
so compounded and are stated in the plural number, to show that they 
co-exist with contemporaneous Numbers and Measures. Although that 
which co-exists with, unity is not another unity or that which co-exist* 
with largeness or length not another largeness or length, still there is- 
in fact co-existence of duality, etc.. amongst themselves and: also of 
largeness, length, etc., with largeness, length, etc., of a different kind. 
Although separateness is cu-existent with the separatenes of Two, etc., 
and therefore should Le specified in the plural, like numbers, still us 



KANADA SUTRAS I. 1, 7- 19 



specification in the singular goes to indicate its difference from 
Numbers, namely, to be known or shown by its limits. Conjunction 
and Disjunction are stated i u the dual number to show that both of them 
are the effects of one and the same act. Priority and Posteriority are 
slated in the dual number to show that they are to be known in relation 
lo eacli other and tluit they are equally marks of Space and Time. The 
plural i.umber in understandings indicates the refutation of the theory 
of one and only one understanding held by the Samkhya thinkers, ou the 
ground of its division into knowledge, etc. The dual number in 
Pleasure and Pain is intended to point out that both of them are causes 
of one elTejt which is distinguished as experience (bhoya) and that they 
are equally instrumental to the inference of adristam, and also that 
even Pleasure resolves into Pain. The dual number in Desire and 
Aversion indicates that both of them are causes of Activity. The plural 
in Volitions is meant to show that ten kinds of volitions which comprise 
both permitted and prohibited acts, are causes of Virtue and that ten 
other kinds are causes of Vice. 

Or, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch have been shown in a va-nni#<t, 
form to teach that they are the means of the disposition of the elemental 
senses or sense-organs or to establish the operation or changes due to 
heat. Number is mentioned in the plural number to indicate a refuta 
tion of this that there is a contrariety in numbers, such as dualitv, 
plurality, etc. Separateness is separately mentioned to indicate that it 
is aUo plural on account of the plurality of Numbers, and also that its 
difference from Numbers lies in its being revealed by the knowledge of 
limits. In Measures or Exteasions the plural number is meant ta 
remove the contradiction of length, shortness, etc. The dual number in. 
Conjunction and Disjunction points out their mutual opposition. 
Priontv and Posteriority are mentioned also in the dual number lest 
it might be doubted that the division of Attributes is too narrow, 
because Priority and Posteriority may be four-fold by the possibility 
of their being different in kind by their difference as relating to 
Spa<-e and as relating to Time- 

He will give their definition as he proceeds. (j. 
Enumeration <>f Actions. 

L jtaxMra. Actions become the object of the sense by reason of their production by 

-Substances ami Attributes as well as of their Combination with Substances having colour. 

Therefore, immediately after the statement of Substances and Attributes, he states the 
enumeration and division of Actions. 



Utksepanam, throwing upwards, 313 qf (WTO Avaksepanam, 
throwing downwards. Sllf^^ Akunchanam, coutraction.flHTOlW PrasAra- 
uam, expansion. Jio^ G-amanam, going, motion, ffa Iti, namely. ^*tJM 
Karrninani, action ~? 

7. Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contraction 
Expansion, and Motion are Actions. 7. 



20 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Throwing upwards, Throwing, downwards. Contraction, Expansion. 
and Motion are Actions. Iti has the force of determination, as. 
.Rotation etc, are included in Motion. Here then there are five classes 
directly pervaded by Action-ness, namely, the quality of throwino 
upwards, the quality of throwing downwards, the quality of contraction. 
the quality of expansion, and the quality of motion (or throwiug- 
up ward-ness ,tlir owing-down ward-ness, con tract ion -ness, expansion-ness,, 
and motion-ness). 

Well, Imt this is disproved by the fa c t that Motion is a synonym of 
Action, because the consciousness of Going is experienced in all cases. 
The foiir classes, throwiug-upward-ness, etc, which have the co-exten 
sion or common field of the absolute non-existence of each in the others.. 
are not known to be co-existent; therefore the classes pervaded by 
Action-ness are only four. (To this objection we reply): It is tine that 
Motion is another name for Action. But it is separately mentioned with 
the object of collecting under one word Rotation, Evacuation, 
Percolation, Flaming upward, Bending, Uplifting, etc; which produce 
different states of consciousness and are known by different names. Or 
Going-ness also is really a fifth class pervaded by Action-ness. 80 
that the application of Motion to Rotation, Evacuation, etc .. alone is 
primary and if there is the application of Going to throwing upwards, 
throwing downwards, etc., then it is secondary or analogous. The 
common property of the primary and analogous instances is only this 
that they are the non-combinative causes (/. /. ., conditions) of Conjunc 
tion with and Disjunction from constantly changing places a .<]. 
^directions, and this belongs to Rotation and others, so that by the 
inclusion of Going these too have been included. 

The states of egress, ingress, etc. however, are not classes ; for. in 
respect of one and the same Action, c. <j., a person going from one room 
to another, one observer will have the consciousness, he enters ; while 
another, he comes out ; and thus there will result an intermixture of 
classes. So also in the case of Rotation, etc., on entering one water 
course after corning out by another, there will arise two states of 
consciousness, lie comes out and he enters ; therefore these should br 
resolved into relativity in general. 

In the case of throwing upwards, etc., however, the action of 
throwing upwards is caused in the hand by the volition produced by 
the desire I throw up the pestle, through the non-combiuative cause of 
conjunction with the soul exercising volition ; then from the non-combi 
native cause of motion in the hand thrown up, there appears the action 
of throwing upwards in the pestle also ; or, these two actions take place- 
simultaneously. Then through the conjunction of the soul exercising^ 
volition produced by the desire to throw down the hand and pestle 
which have been thrown up, and also through the motion of the hand 
there is produced in the hand and the pestle simultaneously the action 
of throwing downwards favourable to tha fall of the pestle within the 
mortar. Then towards the sudden going upwards of the pestle after 
conjunction with a harder substance, neither desire nor volition is the* 
cause, but the springing up of the pestle is due only to Re-action ; and 
this is only going and not throwing upwards ; the application of 
throwing upwards to it is only secondary. Similarly is the application 



K ^NADA SftTRAS I. 1, 8 21 



of the name of Throwing upwards to two bodies of Air as well as to 
grass, cotton, etc., carried by them, going upwards by the force of 
"the collision of two bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions. So 
also iu the case of the going up of water under the collision of two 
currents. Thus the usa of throwing npw r ards and throwing downwards 
is primary, only in the case of the body, its limbs and pestles, clubs, etc. 
in contact with them ; for there are such perceptions as he throws up 
the pestle, he throws up the club ; as also, he throws down. 

Contraction is action which produoes flexion in cloth and other 
things made up of parts and non-initial conjunctions of parts among- 
themselves even while there exist the initial conjunctions of those 
parts ; whence arise such perceptions as the lotus contracts, the cloth 
contracts, the leather contracts. Similarly, Expansion is action 
destructive of the non-initial conjunctions already produced, of parts ; 
whence arise such perceptions as the cloth expands, the leather expands, 
the lotus expands. Actions which are different from these four are 
forms of Going. Therein Rotation is action, favorable to oblique 
conjunctions, appearing in the hand, from conjunction with soul 
exercising volition, and in the wheel, etc., from revolving and from 
conjunction called nodana (molecular motion^ with the hand possessing 
Action. Evacuation, etc., should be similarly explained. He will also 
make them clear as he proceeds. 

Now it should be understood that in the case of prescribed 
sacrifices, baths, gifts, etc., these Actions are the products of conjunc 
tion with the soul exercising volition favourable towards the production 
of Virtue ; and in the case of going to a forbidden place, slaughter. 
eating- tobacco, etc., they are the products of conjunction with the soul 
exercising volition tending towards the production of Vice. 7 

Resemblances of Quittance, Attribute, and Action. 

L i><txkdra. After the enumeration of Substance, etc,, he begins the topic of the Resem 
blance of tl.e three. He states the Resemblance of the three even before the enumeration of 
the other three Predicables, Genus, etc., inasmuch as it is expected first of all i by the disciples, 
because the Resemblance of the three, Substance, etc., is favourable to the knowledge of 
reality. 



?Tc Sat, existent. ^factf Anityam, non-eternal, ^sq^ Dravyavat, con 
taining substance. mtii Karyyam, effect. q>miin Kuranam. cause. 5T*n?qf7- 
33^^ Sfnnunya-visesavat, being both Genus and Species. ff<r Iti, this. 
jfsqcjqpfrttfUTiH Dravya-guiia-karmmanam, of Substance, Attribute, and 
Action. 3rfr3r<i: Avisesah, resemblance. 



8. The Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action 
lies in this that they are existent and non-eternal, have Substance 
as their combinative cause, are effect as well as cause, and are 
both Genus and Species. 8. 

In the presence of the word l visesa the word l avisesa denote* 
Resemblance. Sat connotes the quality of being the object of the per- 



22 V A1SKS1K A PHI LOSOPH Y 



ception and r.aino in 1 he form of that which is existent, Because a]] the 
three have fitness for existence. Anityam connotes the qual-ty of that 
which tends towards annihilation. Although it is not common to the 
ultimate atoms, etc., still it is inte ided to denote the possession o f the 
uptldhi or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function 
or nature of that which tends towards annihilation. Dravyavat 
moiins that which contains substance as its combinative cause. This 
too is not present in the ultimate atoms, etc. Therefore the intention is 
to denote the possession of the /t/>d<l]it. or condition which distinguishes 
predicables having the function of that which contains substance as its 
combinative cause. Karyyam is intended to denote the possession of 
the upddhl or condition which distinguishes predicates having the 
Junction of that which is the counter-opposite of antecedent non-e.xis- 
tence (or potential existence). Karanam indicates the ])ossession of 
the npddhi. or condition which distinguishes predicables having tlie 
function of that which belongs to the class of constant (Mill s invariable 
and unconditional) antecedents of all effects except knowledge. Thus 
the definition is not too wide so as to include the Soul which is the 
object of Self-intuition, as a cause of Self-intuition, or to extend 
to the generic quality of being a cow, etc ; nor is it too narrow 
so as to exclude the ultimate atoms (///, perfect spheres) which are not, 
causes. Samanayavisesavat, means the possession of those charac 
teristics which though they are genera, still are species inasmuch as 
they serve to differentiate themselves severally, <.</., Substance, iess, 
Attributeness, Actionness, etc. It cannot be said that causality is too 
wide, because from " (rive a cow." " A cow should not be touched with 
the feet " and other texts of the Veda it appears that class or kind 
, snfa) also is a cause of virtue and vice ; for a class has the sole use of 
limitation. 

This aphorism is illustrative. It should be observed that the 
Resemblance of the three lies also in their being capable of being 
denoted by words having the meaning inherent in them. 

If it is said that the characteristics of being effects and non-eternal ity 
belong to those only which have causes, and that this is their Resem 
blance as laid down by Professor Prasastadeva in " And causality (ap 
pears) elsewhere than in the perfect spheres (ultimate atoms). 1 he;) 
according to the aphorism it cannot be specified by the possession of the 
upddhi or condition which distinguishes predicables. 

The characteristics of being the causes of Attributes and also the 
effects of Attributes belong to the three except the eternal Subs- 
tan ces. 8. 

Rc*<")u-ldain-<> f Snhtttancv and Attribute. 

I p i-fkilra. He now points out the Resemblance of Substance and Attribute only. 



: Drayya-guiiayoh, of Substance and Attribute ?HIT?riflt 
Sajatiyarainbhakatvam, the characteristic of being the originator of 
congeners. *n^**4 Sadharmmyam, Resemblance. 

9. The Resemblance of Substance and Attribute is the 
characteristic of being the originators of their, congeners.- 9. 



KANALM SUTHAS 1. 1.11. ^ 



Ke ai tkes clear this very aphorism in the following- one. . . 
Ij.i-nlii nation <>f the foregoing apl rixtn . 



Dravyuni, Substances. 5H?a* Dravyautarani, another Subs 
tance. ^ST*"*^ Arabhante. originate. J]HJT: Cnnuli. Attributes. ^ Cha. 
and. mn?<UH Guimntaram, another Attribute. 

10. Substances originate another Substance, and Attributes 
another Attribute, 10. 

rasi ra. The Resemblance in respect of the characteristic of being the originators of 
c-i" -cncrs should l>o understood or observed with the exclusion of universal Substances composed 
of final parts, the Attributes of what are composed of final parts, and also the Attributes of 
Duality, the Separateness of Duals, Priority, Posteriority, etc. Or the author means to 
indicate the possession of the njM lhi or condition which distinguishes predicables having the 
function of that which originates its congener, whereby Substances and individuals which an 
no . causes, arc also included. 10. 

Actions do not originate Action*. 

l~ t , .</.-, ,,. __ But it may he asked; Why do not Actions originate other Actions ? So lit, 



as : 



IH Itl II 

^w| Karmma,actio... zff^N Karmmasadhyam, j. 
action. ?T Na, not. f^?T^ Vidyate, is known. 

11. Action, producible by Action, is not known. 11. 

Here the root vid has the sense of knowledge, and not existence. 
The meaning is that there is no proof of the existence of Action which 
is producible by Action, as in the case of Substance and Attribute- 
originated by their congeners. 

Here the idea is this: If Action is to produce Action, then it will. 
like Sound, produce it immediately after its own production. Therefore 
Disjunction from substances in Conjunction having been completely 
caused bv the first Action itself, fuoin what will the second Action cause 
Disjunction? For Disjunction must be preceded by Conjunction, and 
u uew Conjunction has not also been produced in the subject m question. 
Hut the definition of Action suffers if there is non-production of Disjunc 
tion. It cannot be said that a new Action will be produced at another 
moment; because a patency cannot be delayed and because there is 
nothing to- be waited for. In the case of the production (of Conjunc 
tion) at the very moment of the destruction of the previous Conjunction, 
the production of Disjunction (by Action) will be surely not proved. 
The same also will be the result in the case of its production of the 
subsequent Conjunction. And after the subsequent Conjunction there 
is really destruction of Action. Therefore it has been well 
Action producible by Action is not known. 11. 

Difference of Substance from Attribute and Act u n. 
l ,.. : <:,->-:>. He mentions the Difference of Substance from Attribute nd Aotiou : 



24 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



ll ? i ?i ? R ii 



sf Na, not. 3*1 Dravyara, substance. Tl^ Karyyam, effect. 
TCaranam, cause. *g Cha, and. ^% Badhati, opposes ; annihilates. 

12. Substance is not annihilated either by effect or by 
cause. 12. 

Substance is not destroyed either by its own effect or by its own 
cause. The meaning is that the relation of the destroyer and the 
destroyed does not exist between two Substances which have entered 
into the relation of effect and cause, because, (and this is the purport") 
Substance is destroyed only by the destruction of the support or 
substratum and the destruction of the originative Conjunction. 

The form badhati (instead of the correct from hanti) is found 
in aphorisms. 12. 

Above continued. 

Vpaskdra. He says that Attributes are capable of being destroyed by eMecl ami o-mise. 

^TUT w in m mi 

<?q*JT Ubhayatha, in both ways, nqjj: (Junah, attributes. 

13. Attributes (are destroyed) in both ways. 13 

The meaning is (that they are) capable of being destroyed by effect 
as well as by cause. The initial Sound, etc., (in a series) are destroyed 
by their effects, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last but 
one destroys the last. 13. 



: An attribute sometimes destroys its cause (c. j/., in 
chemical compounds), and sometimes does not destroy it (c. <j. in physical 
compounds or masses). 

Above continued. 

Upanknra. After stating that Attributes arc opposed by (and so cannot coexist M ith> 
both their effects and causes, he mentions the opposition of effect to Action. 

II ? I ? I ?8 || 



Karyva-virodhi, whereof the effect is the opposite or 
contradictory. ffWj Karmina, action. 



14. Action is opposed by its effect. 14. 

Karyyavirodhi is Bahuvrlhi or adjective compound meaning 
that of which the opposite is effect, because Action is destructible by- 
subsequent Conjunction produced by itself. 

The non-opposition of effects and causes is uniform in the case of 
Substances only. But it is not the rule in the case of Attribute and 
Action. For what the author desires to say is that those Attributes 
destroy, which are the opposites of the destruction due to the destruc 
tion of the non-combinative cause of the destructio i of the sub 
stratum 14. 



KANADA SUTRAS I. 1, 15. 2$ 



Characteristics of /Substance. 

Upaskdra. After describing the Resemblance of the ithroe aooording to the wish of th 
disciples, he now goes on to state their marks. 



Kriyft-guna-vat, possessing Action and Attribute. 
Samavayi-karanam, combinative cause. faf Iti, such. 
Dravyalaksanaia, mark of substance. 

15. It possesses Action and Attribute, it is a combinative 
cause such (is) the mark of Substance. 15. 

Kriyagunavat means wherein Actions and Attributes exist. The 
word laksana, by the force of its derivation, viz. < By this it is marked 
out, denotes a mark as well as a particular differetiating mark or sign 
which divides off objects of like and unlike kinds. Therein by Action 
it is marked out that this is a substance. And by the possession of Attri 
butes, Substance, excluded from objects of like and unlike kinds, is marked 
out. Of these the like kinds, *. ., objects which resemble one another 
in being existent, are five, viz., Attributes, etc. The unlike kind how 
ever is Non-Existence. Therefore Substance is different from Attribute 
etc., because it possess Attribute. That which is not different from 
Attribute, etc., does not possess Attribiite, e.y., Attribute, etc. Although 
the possession of Attribute is not found in a substance made up of parts 
at the moment of its origin, still the possession of the opposite of the 
absolute non-existence of Attribute is meant to be stated, because the 
antecedent and the subsequent non-existence of Attribute are also 
opposites of the absolute non-existence of Attribuse. Similarly, the 
being the combinative cause also, which divides the six Predicables i 
a mark of the Predicable, Substance. 

Here the Sddliya, i. e., that which has to be proved, does not suffer 
from the fault of being unknown, for difference from Attribute, etc. is 
proved by perception in the water-pot, etc. Nor is here the fault of 
proving that which has been already proved, for although the difference 
of the water-pot as such from others has been proved, yet such difference 
remains to be proved in respect of it considered as a Substance. Some 
say that in the case of the difference of that which defines the paksa 
{i. <>.., the object in which the existence of the Sddhya is sought to be 
proved, e. y., the mountain when the existence of fire is sought to be 
proved in it), there can be no proving of that which has already been 
proved, as, for instance, in "Word and Mind are eternal." But this is not 
so, for that which has to be proved being proved in anything whatever 
determined by that which determines the characteristic of being a 
paksa, the paksa suffers in its essential, and hence that which has to be 
proved in such cases, must be proved as such, i. e., independntly. 

The word it, means others , Therefore tha possessoin of Number 
the possession of Measure, the possession of Separateness, the possession* 
of Conjunction, and the possession of Disjunction also are brought 
together. 15. 

Bhdsya : Although the soul is void of action, i. e. change, still it 
appears to possess action by the action of the mind or internal 



2>J 



VAISES1KA PHILOSOPHY. 



of souse, in the state of its phenomenal existence; and hence it is called 
a Substance. 

Characteristics of Attribute. 

("paskdra. Attributes having been enumerated after Subatancast, Be gives their mark. 



1 $ i W II 



n. M ,v.^., Dravyasrayi, 

not possessing Attribute. 

Iti, 



inhering in substance. ^HUnf^ Agunavan, 
^ iif^*riT)!f Samyoga-vibhugesu, in Conjunc- 
Akaranam, not a cause, ^p^fa: Anape- 
h. nuToTfmiT ( i n Uri-laks:i,uam, mark of 



suc 



tions and Disjunctions. 
ksah, independent. ffa 
Attribute. 

16. Inhering in Substance, not possessing Attribute, not an/ 
independent cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions,- such is 
the mark of Attribute. 16. 

Dravyasrayi means that of which the nut in e is 10 reside in Subs 
tance. This however pervades Substance also. Therefore he says 

* AgunavAn or Attributeless. Still it over-exte.ids to Action; so he adds 

* not a cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions. Yet it. does noi include 
Conjunction, Disjunction, Merit, Demerit, knowledge of Uod, etc.; so he- 
adds independent. After i independent, Attribute should be supplied. 
The moaning therefore is that Attribute is that which is not an indepen 
dent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions. Conjunctions and Disjunc 
tions, etc., are depended upon by Conjunction and Disjunction. Attribute- 
ness is the characteristic of possessing the genus pervaded by existence 
and residing in the eternals with .eternal functions. The revealer of 
Attributeness is the causality present in something possessing genus and 
devoid of combinative causality and non-combinative causality towards- 
Conjunction and Disjunction combined. Conjunction and Disjunction 
are severally caused by Conjunction and Disjunction, but not jointly. 
Merit, Demerit, knowledge of (rod, etc., have been included, 
because they are only occasional or conditional causes of both and 
are not their combinative causes or non-combinative causes. Or tlu- 
revealer of Attributeness is the characteristic, co-extensive with genus.. 
of being devoid of combinative and non-combinative causality towards 
Conjunction aifd Disjunction. Or the mark of Attribute is simply t he- 
characteristic of not possessing Attribute along with the possession of 
OVenus and of difference from Action. 16. 

Characteristics of Action. 

( / cttfA i /w. He stateN the mark of Action which ha,< been mentioned after Attribute : 



i n 

l iikadravyam, resting or residing in one substance only. 
Agunam. devoid of Attribute. ^JfTTJ^r^ lJt Samyoga-vibhagesu, in Conjune- 



KANADA SOTRAS 1, 1,18. 27 



-r.ions and Disjunctions. SHWlfNUO"* Anapeksa-karanam, independent 
rause. ^ftt Tti, su^h. ^rof^r^qf Karmma-laksanam, Mark of Action. 

17. Residing in one Substance only, not possessing Attribute, 
an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions- -such 

Ji> 4-Vi t-rri t-1.- /~4T A/ .J H ^n 



is the mark of Action. 17. 



{ Ekadravyam means that of which only one Substance is the subs 
tratum. * Agunam is that in which no Attribute exists. Samyoga 
etc/ means independent of something in the form of positive existence 
which comes to appear after its own production; so that it is not unesta- 
blished where there is necessity for or dependence upon the combinative 
cause and also where there is dependence upon absence of antecedent 
conjunction. Or independence of that which has its production after 
the production of Action itself, is meant, because the annihilation of 
the antecedent conjunction also has its production after the production 
of Action itself, and because as a non-existence it does not bear relation 
to its first moment. 

Action-ness is the possession of the genus directly pervaded by 
existence other than that residing in the eternals, or the possession of 
the genus determinative of the uncommon or specific causality which 
produces the perception that someting moves, or the possession of the 
genus residing only in what is devoid of Attribute and not being an 
Attribute, or the possession of the genus determinative of the causality 
towards Disjunction present at the moment immediately subsequent to 
the production of Action itself. 

And this again is a Predicable evidenced by the perception that 
something moves, which cannot be demonstrated by its production, etc., 
at places having no interval between each other, because the breaking 
up of a moment will be refuted later on. 

The manner in which the mark serves to distinguish it from others 
is the same as has been already described 17. 

Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action. 

Upaakdra. Now he begins the topio of the Resemblance of the three only by way of 
their cause : 



3lmr^**iqrf Dravya-gun.a-karmman.am, Of Substance, Attribute, and 
Action, jfni Dravyam, Substance, wraf Karanam, cause. 3wi?*i Saman- 
yam, Common, Uniform. 

18. Substance is the one and the same cause of Substance, 
Attribute, and Action. 18. 

Samanyam (common) means the same one, as in - These two have 
H common mother. The meaning is that Substance, Attribute and 
Action exist in one and the same Substance which is their combinative 
cause. 



28 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY 



The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus 
having the function of that which lias Substance as its combinapiv : 
cause -18. 

Above .continued. 

L pasktira. He states the Resemblance of the three a.s having Attribute a* their mvi~ 
oombi native cause : 

ii t m *. u 

Tatha, Similarly, gq[: Grunah, Attribute. 

19. Similarly Attribute (is the common cause of Substance,. 
Attribute, and Action). 19 

The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus- 
residing in that which has Attribute as its non-combinative cause. 
Conjunction is the non-combinative cause of substance. The possession. 
as their non-combinative cause, of Attributes which are the causes of 
their congeners, belongs to the Attributes of effects, ev/., Colour, Taste. 
Smell, Touch, Number, Extension or Magnitude, Separateness, etc. 
The Attributes oi the ulimate atoms of Earth have Conjunction with 
Fire as their non-combinative cause. The non-combinative cause of 
Actions, however, are Fire etc., internal vibration, impact, weight. 
fluidity, impression, conjunction with soul possessing invisible conse 
quences of Actions (adristam), conjunction with Soul exercising Volition. 
etc. These should be respectively understood by the reader. Sometimes- 
even one Attribute gives rise to all the three Substance, Attribute 
and Action ; for instance. Conjunction with a ball of cotton possessed 
of Impetus, produces Action in another ball of cotton, originates a 
Substance, viz., an aggregate of two balls of cotton, and the Exten 
sion of that aggregate also. Sometimes a single Attribute originates 
a Substance and an Attribute ; <>. [/., Conjunction which may be- 
described as an aggregation independent of Impetus, with a ball 
of cotton as well as its Extension. 19- 

Ithdsya : rcada I. i. 19, as Ubhayathd ytindh and, inttrpretn it to 
mean that Attributes sometimes become the cause of Substance, Attri 
bute, and Action, and sometimes do not. 

Effects of Action. 
Upaxkara. He bays that sometimes a single Action is productive of a multitude of effects : 



I ? | Ro II 

SaEayoga-vibuga-veganam, Ot" Conjunction, Disjunc 
tion, and Impetus. tf **l Karmma, Action. 53"*?!^ Saman am, Common. 



20. Action is the common cause of Conjunction, Disjunction^ 
and Impetus. 20. 

The word karanam should be supplied. Producing as many Dis 
junctions as the number of Substances in conjunction with the Subs- 



KANADA stTTRAS I, 1,22. 29 



stance in which Action is produced, it (Action) also produces an equal 
number of Conjunctions elsewhere. And the same Action again produce,* 
impetus in its own substratum. 

The word Impetus indicates Elasticity also 20. 

Difference beticeen Substance and Action. 

Upaikdra. But it may be argued that originative Conjunction having bean brought about 
by substance possessed of Action ; the substance which is originated thereby, is surely- 
produced by Action since Action has been ita antecedent as a rule, ( Hence he says : 



im * i ** n 

JT Na, not. a[5*nnjt Dravyanam, Of Substances. ^*4 Karmma 
Action. 

21. Action is not the cause of Substances. 21. 
The meaning is that Action is not the cause of substances. 21. 

Above continued. 
ara. He points out why it is so : 

n ? m RR n 



Vyatirekat, because of cessation. 

22. (Action is not the cause of Substance) because of its 
cessation. 22. 

Vyatirekfit means on account of cessation. Substance is produc 
ed, on the cessation of Action by the ultimate Conjunction ; therefore 
Action is not the cause of Substance. Neither is Action which has ceased 
to exist, a cause of Substance. Moreover if Action be such a cause, it must 
be either the non-combinative cause of Substance or its conditional cause. 
It cannot be the first, because then it will follow that Substance will be 
destroyed, even on the destruction of the Action of the parts, inasmuch 
as Substance is capable of being destroyed by the destruction of the non- 
combinative cause. Nor can it be the second, for in that case there will 
be a violation of the rule, since small pieces of cloth being produced just 
from the Conjunctions still existinig after the destruction of a large 
piece of cloth, it is seen that even parts which are devoid of Action, 
originate Substance. 22. 

fihdsya reads I, i. 21 and 22 as one aphorism, and interprets it 
thus : Action does not become the immediate cause of substances. 
"Why V In consequence of its cessation. For, when a Substance be 
comes what it is, at that moment cessation of Action takes place. Action 
in the constituent parts of a Substance ceases on conjunction, and 
the Substance becomes what it is. Action, therefore, is not an 
immediate cause in the production of Substances. What the author 
means to say is, as the expression shows, that the mediate causalitv 
of Action in the production of Substance is not refuted. 

Difference between Substance and Action. 

Upaskura. ;HaA ing stated that one may be the originator of many, he .now atates tht 
of or.e effect there may be many originators : 



80 V A l&SSIK A PHILOSOPHY. 



%&* ^r^r ^nrpj (in ? i ^ 11 



j Dravyanam, of many substances. Jfwf, Dray jam, a single 
aubstance. VP I, karyyam, effect. JTJRT tf, Samanyamjcommon. 



23. A single Substance may be the common effect of more 
than one Substance. 23. 

Of Substances, i.e.. of two Substances as well as of more than two 
Substances. Thus by two threads a piece of cloth consisting of two 
threads is originated, so also by many threads one piece of cloth is 
originated . It cannot be ; said ; that a piece of cloth consisting of one 
thread is seen where the warp and woof are supplied by one and the 
same thread, for owing to the mtn-exi stance of the Conjunction of a 
single object there is no non-combinative cause here. Nor again can it, 
be said that the Conjunction ot the thread and the iibres is the 
non-combinative cause, because the relation of such parts and whole 
being naturally established there can be no Conjunction between them, also 
because the relation of that which is to be originated aad the originated 
is not perceived, and also because of the impenetrability of condensed 
bodies. It cannot be said that this is commonly observed. For here, as 
a matter of fact, cloth is produced by the mutual conjunction of many 
small pieces of thread, produced on the destruction of a long thread by 
the impact of the loom, etc., whereas from the nature of things there 
arises the false notion of unity in respect of threads which are really 
many in number. 23. 

Abocn continued 

Upaskdra. -Well, it may be asked, ae a single Substance is the effect of many Substances, 
a also a single Attribute of many Attributes, BO is a single Action the effect of many Actions ? 
Henoe he says : 



M-*i<uf ^**T II t I f I 



Ghina-vaidharmmyat, on account of the difference of 
Attributes, f Na, Not. qrofan, Karrnmanam, of Actions. IFI? Karmma, 
Action. 

24. Action is not the joint effect of many Actions, on account 
of the difference of their Attributes. 24. 

4 Karyyam is the complement. It has been already stated that 
the resemblance of Substance and Attribute is that they originate their 
congeners-. Also it has been already denied that Actions are productive 
of Action, in the aphorism " Action producible by Action is not known" 
(I. i. 11). This is here repeated. This is the idea. 24. 

Difference between Attribute and Action. 

Upaakdra. Now, pointing out that Attributes which reside in aggregation are originated 
h\ many Substances, he says : 



i n 3 ^ ii 

Dvit-va-prabhritayah, Duality, etc. q^qi: SaEtkhyAh T 



KANADA StTTRAS I, 1,26. 



Numbers. S4^sqtnfa<*nm: 1 mhaktva-samyoga-vibhagah, Separateces*. 
Conjunction, and Disjunction. ^ Cha, And. 

25. Duality and other Numbers, Separateness, Conjunction, 
and Disjunction (are originated by more than one Substance).- -25. 

" Originated by more than one substance " This is the complement. 
The word Separateness appearing together with Duality, etc., also 
denotes Separateness of two, etc. Thus Numbers beginning with Duality 
and ending with the highest arithmetical figure, Separateness of two, 
etc.. Conjunctions, and Disjunctions are originated by two as well as by 
mure than two Substances. So that the characteristic of residing in 
more Substances than one belongs to them. And this characteristic- 
again is the same as co-extension with the mutual non-existence of 
combinative causes. 25. 

Above continued. 

I uaxhii u. Well, it may ba asked, as Substances which are made up of parts, as welf 
B Attributes already mentioned, have the characteristic of aggregation, so does not that 
characteristic belong to Ac ions a]o ? So he says : 



Asamavfxyat, on account of non-combination. 
S; A unanya-karyyam, common effect, ^ffl, Karmma, action, f, Na, 
"Vidyate, is known. 

2(j. Action which is the joint result (of an aggregate of two 
or more substances,) is not known, as it is not found in combina 
tion with them. 26. 

On account of non-combination should be joined with in two- 
substances/ and in more than two substances/ Thus a single Action 
does not combine in two substances; nor does a single Action combine- 
in more than two substances ; so that Action which is the effect of an 
aggregate, is not known. Here too the root vid in vidyate has the 
sense of knowledge and does not denote existence. If Action resided in 
aggregation, then one substance moving, there would arise the consci 
ousness It moves/ in respect oi tw r o substances and more than tw< 
substances ; but it is not so ; therefore Action does not reside in aggre 
gation. This is the meaning. 

It cannot be argued, The Action of the body and its parts art- 
certainly originated by many substances, namely, the body and its parts ; 
otherwise, the body moving, how can there be the consciousness, It 
moves , in respect of the hands, feet, etc.? Similarly in the case of other 
objects made up of parts." For such consciousness is due to the fact 
that the quantity of the Action of the parts is pervaded by the quantity 
of the Action of the whole made up of these parts. The contrary is not 
the case, because the part moving there does not arise the consciousness. 
4 It moves, in respect of the entire whole made up of the parts. Other 
wise from the conjunction of cause and not-cause, the conjunction of 
effect and not-effect also will not follow, since there can be conjunction 
of an effect also, only with the Action of the cause. 26 



32 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Resemblance of Substance, Attribute and Action. 
UpasMra, He again mentions a single effect of many (causes) : 



f, SaAyoganam, of Conjunctions. ?sqq, Dravyam, substance. 
27. Substance is the joint effect of many Conjunctions. --27. 

The meaning is that substance is the single effect of many Conjunc 
tions. It should be observed that here Conjunctions should be taken 
to the exclusion of the conjunctions of touch-less substances, substances 
made up of final parts or ultimate formations, and heterogeneous sub 

stances. 27. 

Above continued. 

Cpaskdra. _ Now he says that many Attributes produce one Attribute as their effect : 



ri, Rupanam, Of colours. ^<T, Rupam, colour. 
28. Colour (is the joint effect) of many colours. 28. 

* Colour is the single effect this is the con: ection. The w >rd 
< colour in both the instances are indicatory, and its indicative power 
is such that it does not abandon its own meaning. And die common 
property of the intrinsic and the indicatory significance is dependence 
upon the relation of the product and producer by means of the proximity 
known as combination with an object which is one and the same as the 
cause. Hence Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Liquidity, Natural Fluidity, 
Unity, and Separateness of one are brought together. For these, being 
present in the cause, originate in the effects only one Attribute of the 
same kind. In fact the operation of non-combinative causes is two-fold- 
Some produce their effects by pioximity to the object which is one and 
the same as the cause. Here the cause is the combiaative cause and it 
is the cause of the effect, namely colour, etc., which have to be produced. 
Thus Colour which is present in the potsherd originates the Colour of the 
pot by means of the combination, known as combination with the object 
which is one and the same as the cause, with the combinative cause, 
namely pot, etc., of the effect such as Colour, etc. Similarly Taste, etc. 
In some places, however, there is an operation of non-combinative causa 
lity by means of proximity to the object which is one and the same as 
the effect. For instance, Sound, although it is a cause, originates in the 
skv another Sound, although it is an effect. In the sky itself Colour, 
etc., also are produced by Conjunction of Fire with the ultimate atoms 
of Earth by means of the proximity in the form of combination with the 
object which is one and the same as the effect. 28. 

Above continued. 
L r paskdra.H.e says that a eiogle Action may be the effect of many oauses : 

n 3 1 3 1 



KANADA SOTRS 1,2, 1. 33 



Gurutva-prayatna-samyoganA,m, of Gravity, Voli 
tion, and Conduction, ?^7lf UtkSepanain, Throwig upwards. 

29. Throwing upwards (is the joint product) of Gravity, 
Volition, and Conjunction. 29. 

The meaning is that Throwing- upwards is their single effect. Here 
Weight residing in the hand, stone, etc., is the conditional cause and 
Conjunction of the Soul exercising Volition is the non-combinative cause, 
of the Throwing upwards seated in the hand, whereas the non-coinbina- 
ive cause of the Throwing upwards seatel in the stone is the internal 
movement or vibration of the hand. 

Here also the term Throwing upwards is indicatory of Throwing 
downwards, etc. 20. 

Causality of Action upheld. 

Upask .ira. But it lias been said that Attributes which have taken a shape, (i.e., by 
appearing in some Substance) are, as effects, preceded (and so caused) by the Attributes of 
the causes ; it has also boen .said tnat they are preceded by the Attributes of that in which 
they reside ; therefore it follows that Action produces no effect >vhatever. That being so, 
even the inference of ultrasensual phenomena such as the movements of the Sun, etc., becomes 
impossible in the absence of any mark of inference. For this reason, merely reminding the 
reader of what has already been said in the aphorism " Action iw the common cause of Con 
junction, Disjunction, and Impetus," he says : 



<nui: Samyoga-vibhagah, Conjunctions and Disjunction*. 
Cha, and. ^ijjqj f Karmmanam, of Actions. 



30. Conjunctions and Disjunctions also (are individually 
the products) of Actions. 30. 

* Products is the complement. The plural number is for the 
purpose of individual reference. Imprerssion* also should be taken at 
indicated 

Vivriti. The word cha implies Impetus and Elasticity in addi 
tion (to Conjunctions and Disjunctions). 

Above continued. 

Upashira. But it has been already said that Substance and Action are not the effsoti 
of Action. Conjunction and Disjunction again are the effects of Conjunction and Disjunc 
tion alone. So that the i affirmation of the Causality of Action here seems to bo self-con 
tradictory. So he sas : 



in i \ I \\\\ 

Karana-samanye, under the topic of causes in general. 
f Dravya-karmmanam, of Substances and Action. V R Karrnma, 
Action. Wfnw Akaranam, not cause. 8rK Uktam, said. 



31. Under the topic of causes in general, Action has been 
stated to be not a cause of Substances and Actions. 31. 



34 YAISL-SIKA PHILOSOPHY 



The word Karanasamanya denotes the topic of causes in ge.ieral. 
Thus in the topic of the statement cf causes in general. Action has beea 
aid to be not a cause of Substance arid Action, and not that it is alto 
gether a not-cause only, whereby ihe aphorism " Conjunctions and Dis- 
junctioi.s also are individually the products of Act in: s " might be 
destroyed. M 

Here ends the lirst chapter lesso;i of the Kirsi Book in ihe Co 
tarv of Srtnkara (;i the VaiAesika aphorisms. 



KANADA SUTRAS I, 2, 1. 



HOOK FIRST, CHAPTER SECOND. 



L jia*kiii U. Well, in the previous section the Resemblance of the three 1 rediuable.s has been 
stated as constituted by the identity oi 1 sameness of their efl euts and causes. Rut this is riot 
OHtablished as tho relation of effect and cause itself lias not been proved. Therefore the 
author says : 

M I * I ? M 

Karanabhavat, from the uon-.existeuce of cause VT33WT7: 
Karyyabhavah, non-existence of effect. 

1. Non-existence o>f effect (follows) from the non-existence 
of cause. 32. 

Whereas it is seen that in spite of earth, wheel, water, putter, 
thread, etc., being brought together, there is non-existence of the pot, 
if there is non-existence of the; potter s staff, and that in spite of earth, 
water. etc.. being brought together, there is non-existence of the shoot 
if there is non-existence of the seed : it (/ . e., non-existence) cannot be 
explained without the relation of effect and cause between the potter s 
staff and the pot or between the seed and the shoot. Otherwise there 
will be non-existence of the pot even on the non-existence of the loom, 
etc., and there will be non-existence of the shoot even on the 110.1 exis 
tence of pieces of stone, etc. Moreover it is seen that the pot, a piece 
of cloth, etc, exist for a time only. That even cannot be explained 
without the relation of cause and effect. For they being non-existent 
at one time, their temporariness in the form of existence at another 
time is not possible but by the dependence of existences upon causes. 
For if there were no dependence upon causes, then a thing could only 
be or not be; but could not be for a time only; since an existing thing 
cannot be non-existent, nor can it come into existence from that which 
is not its cause, nor ca i it come into existence from one knows not 
what, nor can it come into existence from unreal things such as tho 
horn of a hare, etc., but from a really existing limit or beginning like 
the potter s staff, the loom, etc., as is seen in such effects as a pot, a 
piece of cloth, etc. Now the limit or beginning is nothing but the cause. 

Thus if the relation of effect and cause did not exist, there would 
be no inclination or disinclination to activity. Then the world would 
become desireless, inert. For there can be no activity without, the 
knowledge that this is the means of attaining that which is desired ; 
nor can there be forbearance without the knowledge that this is th 
means of avoiding that which is not desired. 1. 

Vii-riti _ Tho Sankhya thinkers argue as follows : A water-jar, 
etc., existing in an enveloped state in earth, etc., from before, develop 
into visible existence, and again by being struck with a cudgel, etc-, are 
enveloped therein and exist. So that production and destruction are 
not real, but merely development and envelopment. This being so. why 
should not a water-jar be produced fruin yarns ? It cannot be said that 
the existence of eft tct in causes prior to their production is without evi- 



36 VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



dence, for the proof is supplied by such texts of Veda as < Only the 
existent, Dear One, was at the beginning/ (ChandogyaG, 2, ],) etc." 

This view should be considered. The admission of the development 
b f development will entail non-finality. If on the other hand, develop 
ment be previously non-existent, then it will be necessary to admit pro 
duction from the non-existent, and hence the supposition of the prior 
existence of the water-pot, etc., will become groundless. Thus causality 
is the belonging to the class of invariable and unconditional antece 
dents which cannot be otherwise accounted for, or the quality of that 
which fails to produce an effect on account of defect in the eontribu- 
tories, or an additional Predicable, being a particular relation arisino- 
out of its own nature. 

JBhdtya. Predicables called Substance, Attribute, and Action have 
been mentioned. Their tidmdnya or common characteristic has been 
stated. Their Visesa or distinctive characteristic, again, follows from 
its contrariety to the common characteristic. All this is sufficient for 
the production of tattva-jndna. The Supremo Grood results from tattva- 
jfidna. This is apavarga, Salvation. But what is its characteristic 
form ? How does it appear ? All this is no\v here described. 

Non-existence of the effect, e.. y.. the faults (namely, desire, aversion, 
and infatuation), etc., (results) from non-existence of the cause, e.j/., 
false knowledge (?.. /., the idea of the Self iu the Not-Self), etc. li Thus, 
Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false knowledge, on the successive 
annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next 
before the other/ (Xydya ti&tram, I. i. 2), the ultimate consequence 
being Emancipation, the return of the Self into its own nature. 

Above continued. 

Upatkdra. II may bo objected that only the existent is produced, and not the 
non-existent, according to the authority of the Veda, e. g., " Verily the existent was at the 
beginning, calm one!," etc. Otherwise in the case of undifferentiated non-existence there 
will be no such uniformity that a piece of cloth is produced front t breads only and not from 
potsherds. If it is so then, we reply, this uniformity must be accepted by the advocates of 
the doctrine of transformation (*?f^IJT*T3T i v) who admit the theory of causes ; otherwise 
how it happens that the manifestation of the pot is only in the potsherds, ai.-d not in 
thread ? Moreover if the manifestation or development also really existed from before, then 
that too being eternal, it comes to this that production and destruction are merely develop 
ment and envelopment. Now, development and envelopment depend upon causes. There 
fore it results that a pot, a piece of cloth, etc., also surely depend upon causes arid also that 
there is production ol that which was not before. The objection that there is no proof of 
the uniformity towards the cause is answered by the uniformity of the nature of the cause, 
and this uniformity of the nature of the cause (to produce the effect) becomes known by 
the method of agreement arid difference. For it if> a universal experience that no pot is 
produced without a potter s staff and tnat a pot is produced when there is the potter s staff. 
Thus causality is the quality of that which belongs to the class of invariable and uncondi 
tional antecedents, which cannot be otherwise established or explained, or the characteristic 
of being attended with the non-production of the effect due to defect in some contributory 
oause. Although there is no invariable antecedence in such places as " one should perform 
sacrifice with barley or with paddy," etc., because the sacrifice with paddy is not an 
antecedent of the result producible by the sacrifice with barley, still a oause ordained in the 
alternative is truly a oause, as causality is proved in the case of both even though th 
results are similar in kind. Tiius the characteristic of being attended with the non-produc 
tion of the effect due to defect in some contributory cause, forms the causality which is 
common to both secular and scriptural practices ; whereas invariable antecedence known by 
the method tf agreement and difference is (he causality which 1* secular onlv. For in such 



KAN AD A SUTK AS 1, 2, o. 



cases as " He who desires heaven should perform sacrifice," etc;., the difference or negative 
side is not required, because knowledge of the agreement or positive side alone is sufficient 
to induce activity. For this reason also, if the alternative is assumed, then both lo.se their 
significance in the code, for the result of the same kind being secured by one alone, the 
performance of the other becomes futile. Hence also it has been rightly said : " The result 
ncceBsarily A follows from practices taught in the Veda, if performed in all their parts." 
When the Acharyya (preceptor) says " And this object proceeding from the Veda, breach of 
uniformity is no fault," he only means to refer to ordinary objects. In the case of grass, 
igniting wood, and jewel, however, heterogeneity of effect is necessary ; because there 
causality being inferred by agreement and difference, non-existence of the effect is necessary 
from non-existence of the cause. If heterogeneity of effect is supposed in alternative oases, 
causality will be in the alternative in Rajasuya, Vajapeya, and other sacrifices. For these 
reasons he goes on establishing the same law of the relation of effect and cause. 

. n \ I * I * u 

* Na, not. g Tu, but. qntrfWffit Kuryyubhuvat, from non-existence 
of effect. qWQWI?: Karanabhavah, non-existence of causes. 



2. But non-existence of cause (does) not (follow) from the 
non-existence of the effect. 33. 

If the la.v of the relation of effect and cause do not exist, the non- 
existence of cause will follow also from non-existence of effect. Non- 
existence of effect is not instrumental towards the nou-existeuce of 
cause ; but non-existence of cause instrumental towards non-existence 
of effect. Thus the application of this introductory section of two 
aphorisms is that persons desirous of nwksa, (salvation) are concerned 
in non-existence of birth for the sake of non-existence of pain, m non- 
existence of activity for the sake of non-existence of birth in, non- 
existence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity, in preven 
tion of false knowledge for the sake of non-existence of faults, and in 
spiritual intuition of tho Self for the sake of prevention of false 
knowledge. 2. 

Dlulsya : The aphorism is meant for them who think that apacuryii 
is mere absence of pain. 

Non-existence of the cause, viz., birth, etc., does not follow from 
non-existence of the effect, viz., pain. Birth, etc., therefore, may still 
take place even when no pain exists. If birth, etc., are thus possible, then 
there is possibility of pain also, in consequence of the appearance of 
the causes of pain. Apavarga, accordingly, does not lie in the mere 
absence of pain, but in the permanent impossibility of pain, resulting 
in the order of the successive non-existence of false knowledge, etc. 

Genus and Species relative to understanding. 

Upaskdra. After the irarks of the three Predicates in the order of their enumeration, 
h now states the mark of the Predi cables, Genus, which has also boon mentioned 

in I * H n 

Samanyam, Genus, fe^H: Visesah, Species- fft Iti, thse. 
Buddhyapeksam, relative to understanding. 



VAISJ^IKA PHILOSOPHY. 



3. The notions, Genus and Species, are relative to the 
Understanding. 34. 

Genus is two-fold, high and low, of which the first is Existence 
and the second is Substanceness, etc., pervaded by Existence. The 
Understanding itself is the mark of Genus and its Species : the cogni 
tion of re-appearance or recurrence, of Genus, and the cognition of 
disappearance ur reversion, of species. The word ill takes thorn 
singly, and hence the word < buddhyapeksam has been used in tho 
neuter gender. The writer of the -vrltti however applies it to species 
only and explains its use in the singular number and neuter gender 

the rule. < A word in the neuter gender used with a word not in 

the neuter gender optionally entails neuter gender and singlar num- 

Buddhyapeksam means that, of which the understanding or 

cognition is the mark or the definition. < Genus in the aphorism 

means that which is external and resides in more individuals than one. 

enus, whether high or low, is, while it is eternal, co-existent in 

a me substratum with the mutual non-existence of its own situation 

Moreover Genus also takes the name of Spe-ies, as for 

example, at the same time that there is the cognition of re-appearance 

or recurrance, namely, < This is Substance, < This is Substance/ and 

s > on, there is the particular cognition that it is not Attribute, that it 

t Action, etc. So that the nature of species belongs to the genera 
themselves, c. <j.. substanceness, etc. 

It may be objected, " Genus (/. t., the Universal), as an objective 

reality, is a non-entity, since the consciousness of recognition can be 
explained (without it) by the absence of reversion or divergence. For 
the object of the cognition. It is a cow," is that it is not different 
from a cow. Even the advocate of the doctrine of kinds (jAti} admits 
that this is the subject-matter of the concrete cognitions of bovineness, 
et;- ; for coiicreteness or particularity is not "something other than 
absence of difference from itself ; it is the absence of divergence from a 
-ow, etc., which is also the occasion of the use of the words cow. etc. 
Moreover, where does the Genus of bovineness reside V Not surely in 
the bovine animal, because the animal is non-existent prior to the 
appearance of bovineness. Nor in anon-bovine animal, because there 
will be then contradiction. Whence does bovineness come to reside in 
the body of a bovine animal when such a body is produced? It did 
not surely remain in that locality, for that place also will then possess 
bovineness. Nor is bovineness even produced then and there, for it (a 
Genus) has been observed to be eternal. Xor can it come from else 
where, for it (a Genus) possesses m> activity. Nor again does one eternal 
possess the characteristic of appearing in many individuals, for there 
is no proof that it (a Genus) optionally appears in part and as a whole. 
For the whole does not appear in a single place, siuco then it would 
follow that there would be no concrete cognition of it in other places. 
Nor does it appear in part for a > class is not confined to one part. 
So it has been said. ; < It does not move, nor was it there. Nor is 
it produced, nor has it parts. Nor does it leave its former residence. 
Alas! the succession of difficulties." Genus exists and that is manifested 
by situation or organisation only like bovineness. potriess, etc, But it 



KAXAOA SftTRAS T, 2. 



does not belong to Attribute and Action also." Such is the quarrel of 
kind rod thinkers. 

To this ft is said, "Genus is eternal a:id pervasive ; and pervasive 
ness consists in lieing 1 related to all place by its own form. It does not 
arise that places should be treated in. the terms of bovineness, for the 
use of bovineness is obtained by the relation known as combination; as 
^Time possesses form or clour such cognition and use do not arise, 
because Time does not possesses form or colour, etc. Xor can it be said 




pervades !a parl 

cular spot, combines with the organism which is produced in that verv 
place, as it is found that it is produced and it is combined (with 
bovineness)," refer to the same moment of Time. Hereby " where does 
it reside ? " is answered by where it is perceived ; " "where is it 
perceived ?" by where it resides ;" and what sort of a body it was 
prior to the appearance of bovineness ?" by u It did not exist at all." 
Similarly It does not move, nor was it there, etc.," is so much .cry of 
despair. The Genus of bovineness is nothing but non-divergence of 
cognition from what it has been, this is obstructed or contradicted bv 
the real or positive cognition It is a cow or ox." For the cognition 
also is not explained, as it has been said that the cognition of a real 
existence does not help the understanding of negation, nor does diver 
gence from a cow or ox come to light in the cognition " It is a cow or 
ox." The option of whole and part can arise only if a single Genus 
appear as a whole or as a part. Wholeness means multitude and infini 
ty, and it is not proved in an individual. This is a cow or ox such 
cognitions arise in respect of n on -entities and are not capable of esta 
blishing entities "to this the reply will be given afterwards. 

The followers of PraltJirtkam (a thinker of the Mimarasa School) 
however say that Genus is manifested by its situation (?!. c.,the organism 
where it resides). If it is evidenced by reeognitive understanding, then 
what offence has been committed by Genera belonging to Attibute and 
Action ? For there arises consciousness of recognition or knowing 
again in respect of Colour.. Taste, etc. ; and this consciousness surely 
establishes a class (jV W)- si ^e there is no obstruction. As it is in the 
case of Ether-ness, identity of the individual is not the obstruction in the 
class attributes of Colour, etc. Nor is co-extension the obstniction 
here as it is in the case of Understanding and Knowledge or in the case 
of the classes of water-pots and water-jars, because of the multiplicity 
of individual Colours, Tastes, etc. For co-extension is denotation of 
neither more nor less individuals : and the class attributes of colour, 
etc., have a narrower denotation than Attribute-ness, and have a wider 
denotation than blue-ness, etc. For this reason also, there is no over 
lapping or intermixture (which is also an obstruction to the existence 
of Genus), as there is in the case of the characteristics of being 
material and ponderable substances, because although their mutual 
absolute non-existences co-exist in the same substratum, yet there is no 
co-existence with any other class. Xor is here instability or infinite 
regression, because other Genera included in Colourness. etc., are not 



40 vAisEsriwv PHILOSOPH 



recognised. Xor is here loss of form or transformation as in the case 
of species. If species, while residing in substances, possess classes or 
jdti then they will become either Attributes or Action ; if while appear 
ing in Universals(V. </., Time, Spaca, Ether, and Son!) they possess classes 
or jdti, then they will become Attributes. The transformation which 
thus takes place in the case of the Predicable, Species, is absent in the 
case of the subject under enquiry. Xor is here non-relation, as in the 
case of Combination. Let there be non-relation in the case of Combina 
tion, seeing that the supposition of Combination of Combination will 
entail infinite regression ; but in the case of the subject under enquiry 
the relation of Combination itself is recognised. Although identity of 
the individual itself is an obstruction to Combination being a Genus 
yet the view of those also should be considered, who hold that Combina 
tions are many in number and undergo production and destruction. 
Or it (absence of combination or identity of the individual" is the 
obstruction to Xon-existe.ice, etc.. being (ienera. 

The learned writer of the Yt ltti has said : li The point in dispute, 
namely, recognitive understanding, because it is an unobstructed, 
recurrent consciousness, is explained by a recurrent property, as the 
consciousness, garland-flowers (covers all the flowers making up a 
particular garland and is explained by the common property of lulojio-- 
ing to that garland, whieh recuis in eyery one of those J|o\y<>rsV This 
requires consideration. "">. 

] irriti : The Xyaya teachers have recited the obstructions to 
Genus : " Identity of the Individual, Similarity or Co-extension, Over 
lapping or Intermixture, Instability or Infinite Regression. Transfor 
mation, and Non-relation, this is the collection of the obstructions to 
Genus. Xow, Ether-ness is not a Genus, as it denotes only one individual. 
Pot-ness and Jar-ness are not two genera, because* the individuals 
denoted by the one are neither more nor less than by the other. 
Material-ness and ponderableness are not genera, because, by appearing 
in the same individual, the substrata of their respective absolute non- 
existence would then intermix. Genus-ness is not a Genus, on account 
of infinite regression. The transformation of Species which is by nature 
exclusive, is an obstruction to its being a Genus. If Particularity be a 
Genus, then, itself possessing Genus, it will not be possible for it to distin 
guish itself and therefore its special property of self-distinction will 
suffer. Therefore Particularity or Species is not a Genus. Or trans- 
formation may mean change of nature. So that if Species, while appear- 
ing in ponderable things, possess Genera, then they would be either 
Attributes or Actions. If while appearing in the universals (e. #., Ether, 
Space, Time, and Soul) they possess Genera, then they would be Attri 
butes. In this way change of nature of the Species is the obstruction 
to Species possessing the characteristic of Genus. Combination or 
Co-inherence is not a Genus, as the relation of combination does not 
exist in it, since the admission of combination into combination would 
entail infinite regression. This applies to the view that combinations are 
many in number and undergo production and destruction. Otherwise 
from the identity of the individual also Combination cannot be a Genus. 
Similarly the absence of the relation of Combination is an obstruction 






KANADA StTRAS I, 2, 5. 



41 



to Non -existence being a Genus ; and other instances should be 
understood. 

Existence is Genus only. 

Upaskdra. Proving the two-foldness which has boou stated above of Genus and Specios, 
lie says : 



n \ \ 



n 



I^: Bhavah, existence, being. 1133^: Anuvritteh, of recurrence, 
assimilation or extensive denotation. ^ Eva, only, t^f^ Hetutvat, 
being the cause. flT*r ?4 Sfimanyam, Genus. ^ Eva, only. 

4. Existence, being the cause of assimilation only, is only 
a Genus. 35. 

Bhavah, i.e., existence, is the cause of assimilation only, and not 
of differentiation also. Therefore it does not take the name Species. 4, 

Genera-Species. 
UpasMra. What Genera take the name of Species ? To meet this expectancy he say j 

\ 

Dravyatvam, substance-ness. J*ir?3 Gunatvam, attributeness. 
Karmmatvam, action-ness. ^ Cha, and. ^W^l^T Samanyjini, 
Genera. f?nfr<?T: Visesah, species. =g Cha, also. 

5. Substance-ness, and Attribute-ness and Action-ness are 
both Genera and Species. 36. 

The word cha collects Earth-ness, and other genera belonging to 
Substance, Colour-ness, and other genera belonging to Attribute, Throw- 
ing-up-ness, and other genera belonging to Action. * Substance-ness, 
etc./ have been left uncompounded in order to indicate the absence of 
the relation of that which pervades and that which is pervaded, 
from amongst them. Genera and Species have not been compounded 
so that it may be understood that these are Species also even while they 
possess the characterises of Genera. Otherwise (if the words were 
compounded) there might be a mistake that the compound was a genitive 
one and then the being Species would not have been perceived in the 
presence of Genus-ness. 

It might be objected, " Substance-ness cannot be something which 
penetrates into or inheres in the forms of substance and is beyond the 
cognizance of the senses, because if it somehow exists in Earth, etc., it* 
existence is impossible in the case of Ari, Ether, etc. It cannot be estab 
lished as something which constitues the combinative cause of an effect 



42 VAT&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



determined by Attribute-ness, because Attribute-ness, as it appears in 
eternal and non-eternal objects, is not the determinant of being an 
effect. The rejoinder that it is required for the sake of Attribute-ness 
does not improve the situation." The objection however does not arise, 
for Substance-ness is established by the way of constituting the combi 
native causlity of an effect determined by the characteristic of Con 
junction. This causality cannot be constituted by the class attribute 
of Earth-ness, which is of a narrower comprehension, nor by Existence 
which has a wider denotation; and there must be something to constitute 
or define it, as otherwise suddenness or chance would bo the result. 
Now Conjunction must necessarily be recognized in the case of ultimate 
atoms, as supplying the non-combinative cause of a molecule of two 
atoms ; in the case of molecules of two atoms each, as supplying the non- 
combinative cause uf a molecule of three atoms ; in the case of the four 
universals ( .</., Time, Space, Ether, and Soul), through their being its con 
junction with all ponderable things ; in the case of Mind; as the ground 
for the conjunction of Mind and the Senses ; in the case of Air, as the 
support fur the movement of grass, etc. ; in the case of perceptible 
Substances, through their very perceptibility. On the other hand, 
there is no un-uriginated Conjunction so that it could be said 
that the quality of Conjunction even, appearing in effects and 
not-effects, could not be the determinant of being an effect. Li 
like manner, it is easily demonstrable that substance-ness is 
established also by the way of constituting the combinative 
causality of Disjunction also. Attribute-ness again, it lias been 
already said, is proved by its being the deterininat of the causality 
which exists in a thing possessing Genus and not containing the non- 
combinative causality of the combinative causality of Conjunction and 
Disjunction. The class attribute of Actions also, is, in the case of 
perceptible Substances, cognizable by the cognition, It moves, but 
in other places can be inferred from Conjunction and Disjunction, for 
Action-ness is required to be established also by its being the deter 
minant of the non-combinative causality of both Conjunction and 
Disjunction. For this reason also it is possible to infer the movement 
(f the sun from its reaching another place. Here although the other 
place, P.<J., of Sky. etc., is beyond the reach of the senses, yet the Con 
junction and Disjunction of the solar rays are perceptible by the solar 
zone, and it is from these Conjunctions and Disjunctions that the 
inference of the movement of the sun can be drawn. The learned 
Uddyotaliura has said : " The inference of the movement of the sun is 
by its reaching a different place, which again is also a matter of 
inference in the following way : The sun which is perceived by a man 
when facing eastwards, is also perceived by him when facing the west, 
and is recognised by him. This fact together with the fact that the 
sun is a substance and is not destroyed and produced again at every 
moment, is proof that the sun has reached a different place from where 
it was before." 5. 

Final Species excluded. 

Upa*k<"n-a. -But is it the same Species which has been enumerated as a Predicable, 
which IK here described as both Garni B and Species ? Removing this curiosity of the disciples 
he says : 



KANADA SUTRAS I, 2,8. 



Auyatra, elsewhere. 3J ?3*q: Antyebhyah, iiiial. 
Viiesebhyh, than species. 

6. (The statement of Genus and Species has been made) 
with the exception of the final Species. 37. 

The meaning is that the statement of Genus and Species is to the ex 
clusion of those final Species* residing in eternal substances, which have 
been mentioned above. l Antyah/ i. e. < final/ means those which exist 
or appear at the end (of the division or dissolution of compounds.) The 
teachers say that they are final/ because after them there is no 
other principle of differentiation. According to the Vrittikdra they are 
final Species/ because they exist in enternal Substances, t. e. Sub 
stances which exist at the end of production and destruction. They 
are really Species only, the causes of the consciousness of differentia 
tion, and not of the form of Genus also. 6. 



]x tsti iicc dcji 
. -A j^ood many men doubt that Existence it a (.ronus.. So lie ^ ives its proof : 

R i vs n 



g-^ Sat, existent. ffa Iti, thus. q?T: Yatuh, whence. 
Dravyaguna-karniasu, in respect of Substance, Attribute, and 
Action. 5ETT Sa, that. ^(^\ Satta, existence. 

7, Existence is that to which are due the belief and usage, 
namely (It is) existent/ in respect of Substance, Attribute, and 
Action. 38. 

By the word iti he teaches the mode of belief and usage. Thus 
Existence is that which causes the belief in this way that this is 
existent, that that is existent, in the case of the triad of Substance, etc., 
or on which depends the application of the words in the from of it is 
existent/ it is existent/ 7. 

Existence not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action. 

Upaskdra. But Existence is not perceived as being separate from Substance, Attri 
bute, and Action. Therefore Existence is nothing else than one or other of Substance, etc, 
Because that which is different from something else is perceived by means of its difference 
from that, as a water-pot from a piece of cloth. But Existence is not perceived by mean* 
of its difference from them. Therefore it is identical with them. To meet this objection 
he says : 



Dravya-guna-karmmabhyah, from Substance 

Attribute, and Action. ft|!?a< Arthantaram, a different object. *r 
Satta, existence. 

* It is th introduction of these " final species," which is the reason why the 
of Kunad* i. called th Vai&ttta philosophy of final species. 



VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



8. Existence is a different object from Substance. Attribute, 
and Action. 39. 

Substance, etc., are non-assimilative but Existence is assimilative. 
Thus Existence is a different, etc., because its difference from them is 
established by the consideration of the opposite properties charac 
terised by assimilativeness and non-assimilativeness. That, however, 
it is not perceived elsewhere than in them, is due to the virtue of their 
primary or natural inter-relation, whereas the relation of a pot and 
a piece of cloth is derivative or artificial. 

The intrinsic form of the individual is not Existence, for in 
dividuals do not assimilate themselves or form themselves into classes. 
If the inner nature be assimilative, then the same is nothing but 
Existence. If non-assimilative inner natures or essences be the means 
of classification, then the class attributes of bovineness, etc., are also 
gone. This consideration also dismisses the objection, "When the 
practice of classification is established by those very objects in which 
as substrata Existence inheres, then what is the use of Existence ?" 
For the same reason also it is not valid to hold that Existence is the 
property which makes an object and its action possible, or that Ex 
istence is reasonableness or reliability ; for the cognition l It is 
existent/ arises even in the absence of any enquiry in those res 
pects. 8. 

Bhasya: Existence is a difierent object from Substance, Attri 
bute, anb Action Substance, Attribute, and Action are called objects 
(VIII. ii. 3). Existence is, therefore, included amongst them. But it 
is not contained in the ascertained classes of Substance, Attribute, aad 
Action. Hence it is said to bo a different object from them known 
classes). 

Above continued. 
U paskdra. K.c points out another differentia: 



Guna-karmmasu, in Attributes and Actions =g Cha, 
and. WI=Uqf, .Bhavat, from Existence, sf Na, not ^4 Karmma, Action. 
*r Na, not gqp Gunah Attribute. 

9. And as it exists in Attributes and Actions, therefore it is 
neither Attribute nor Action. 40. 

" Neither Attribute nor Action" this being the matter to be ex 
pressed, their individual mention (i. e. } the words being not compound 
ed) indicates that Existence is not Substance also. For an 
Action does not exist in Actions, nor an Attribute in Attributes, nor 
does Substance exist in an Attribute or Action. Existence however 
resides in Attribute and Action. Therefore on account of its Difference 
from Substance, Attribute, and Action, Existence is really different 
from them. 9. 

Above continued. 

l T pet,sk6r*. H* mentions nothr cliflfartnti*: 



KANADA SUTRAS I, 2, 12. 45 



=3 ii ? i R i ?o n 

Samanya-visesabhavena, by reason of the absence 
of Genus-Species ^ Cha, and. 

10. (Existence is different fom Substance, Attribute, and 
Action), also by reason of the absence of Genus-Species in it. 41. 

If Existence be Substance, Attribute, or Action, then it would 
contain in it Genera which are Species also. But in Existence these 
Genera-Species, namely, Substance-ness, etc., are not perceived. For 
nobody ever has the perception that Existence is Substance, Attribute, 
or Action. 10. 

Substance-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action. 

Upask lra. Having thus stated the distinction of Existence from Substance, Attribute, 
and Action, he states the distinction of Substance-ness from them. 



in i R ! ?? II 

Aneka-dravya-vattvena, by means of its containing 
more than one Substance. ?^^ Dravyatvam, Substance-ness. 3tfi 
Uktam, explained. 

11. Substance-ness has been explained by means of its 
containin more than one Substance. 42. 






Anekadravyavat means that to which belong more than one 
Substance as its combinative causes. The term more than one here 
denotes all. Hence it is distinguished from Earth-ness, etc. Its eter- 
nality is obtained simply from its being a Genus ; hence its distinc 
tion from wholes made up of parts. And anekdravyavattvam means 
the being combined with more than one Substance in general ; hence 
its distinction from Existence. Therefore Substance-ness is eternal and 
combined with more than one Substance in general, Hence it is 
implied that conjunction is not desired. And Substance-ness also has 
been verily establshed. Substance-ness explained , means that Subs 
tance-ness also has been explained in the very same way as Ex 
istence. 11. 

Above continued- 

Vpaskdra. But Substance-ness is also a class, and can bo quite non-distinct from it 
own ground. What is the fault here ? So ho says. 



II ? 



N Samanya-visesbhavena, by reason of the absence of 



Genera-Species. ^ Cha, and. 

12. (Substance-ness is distinct fyom Substance, Attribute, 
and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species 
in it. 43. 

If the cl& of Substance-ness be really identical with Substance, 



46 VAJ8ES1KA PHILOSOPHY. 

etc., then iu it will exist Earthness, AVaterness, Firenesa, and other 
Genera which arc also Species. The sense is that nobody has th 
perception that Substance-ness is Earth, Water, or Fire. Hence it is 
distinct, etc 12. 

Attribute-ness not identical icitli tiubstancc, Attribute or Action. 
kdra. He states Attributonos.s. 

I n R i s\ \ 



Tatha, in like manner, fjnrg Gnnesu, in Attributes. 
Bhavat, from its existence. 3m?3f (Junatvam, Attribute-ness. 
Uktam, explained. 

13. (That Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attri 
bute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Attributes __ 44. 

The meaning 1 is that in the very sumo way as Existence, Attribute- 
ness is explained to be distinct front Substance. Attribute, and Action 
from its existence in /. p., combination with) Attributes onlv. ___ 13. 



Upaskdra. He points out another <lill urontiu : 

^ n 



Sumanya-viseHAbhAvena, by reason of the absence of 
benera-bpecies. ^ Clia, and. 

14. (Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and 
Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it. 45. 

If Attributeness be n.t something over and above Substance, Attri 
bute, and Action, then it, should be perceived as containing Substance- 
ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness, and their sub-classes. This is the 
meaning. 14. 

Action-ness not identical icith tiubatanre, Attribute, or Action. 

Upask&ra. He points out that which distinguishes Action-ness from Substance, Attributt 
and Action : 

swfsj *Rng; ^wf<ggrB^ n \ i R ni n 

STi?g Karmmasu, in Actions. -*TT^Tc^ Bhavat, from its existence. p*tfcf 
Karmmatvam, action-ness. grE Uktam, explained. 

15. (That) Action-ness (is distinct from Substance, Attri 
bute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Actions. 46. 

Like Existence, Action-ness also, which is another class/ is ex 
plained as distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action from iti 
xistence in (i. e., combination with) Action only. 15- 



KANADA SIJTTUST, 2, 17, 47 



AliM? f-ontinued, 

f T j>asl irc(, He mentions another differentia : 

^ II? I 



SfunAnya-visesabhuvena, by reason of the absence of 
Genera-Species. =* Clia, and. 

16. (Action-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and 
Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it. 47. 

The meaning is that if Action-ness be identical with Substance, et~., 
then the Genus-Species of Substanceness, etc., will combine in it. 

It should be noted that these four aphorisms identical in form, are, 
stated so as to form one section for explaining the distiction from 
Substance, Attribute, and Action, of the four classes Existence, Subs 
tance-ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness. 16. 

Exitence is one. 

Upasb ira. But why should not Existence which ia present in substance, Attribute and 
Action, be rendered different by the difference of the determinants of Substance-ness, etc. ? 
So he says : 



^ Sat, existent. ?f?l Iti, this. fagnfMhl^ Lingavisesat, from the 
non-particularity or uniformity of the mark. fsreNf^Wm^ Visesa- 
lingSbhavat, from the absence of a particular or distinctive mark. ^ 
Cha, and. w Ekah, One. *nT: Bhavah, Existence. 

17. Existence is one, because of the uniformity of the mark 
viz., that it is existent and because of the absence of any distin 
guishing mark. 48. 

The knowledge or the use of words in this form that it is existent, 
ie the mark of Existence. And it is the same, i.e., non-particularized, 
in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Therefore one and the 
same Existence resides in them. Otherwise, Existence having the same 
denotation or manifestation as Substance-ness, etc, either it whould not 
exist or they would not exist. Visesaliiigabhavat Cha/ means that there 
is no diference, as inference which is the mark of visesa,i. e. difference, 
does not here exist. As in the judgment, This lamp ia verily that, 
the mark of distinction ia the difference of measure such as length, 
shortness, etc., so here there is no such mark of distinction. This is 
the idea. 17. 

. Bhdsya. read* T, ii, 17, with the omission of the word linga in vijteso,- 
Ifnyd-abhdvflt. 

Here ends the second chapter of the First Book in the Commentary 
by Saiikara. on the VaiseBika Aphorisms of KanAda of great powers 



48 VAI&K8IKA PHILOSOPHY. 



BOOK SECOND CHAPTER FIRST. 
Characteristics of Earth. 

Upaakdra. The subject-mabtor of the Fir,st chapter of the Second Book is the description 
of the nine Substances. Herein there are three sections : description of Earth, Water, and 
Fire ; proof of God ,- and inference of Ether. Of these the anther states the characteristic of 
Karth which hag been mentioned first of all. 



Rupa-rasa-gandha-spai sivati, Possessed of Colour, 
Taste, Smell, and Touch. sM* Prithivi, Earth. 



1. Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. 49. 

Manifold Colour such as blue, yellow, etc., belongs to Earth alone. 
Thus the characteristic is the possession of the class pervaded by Subs 
tance-ness and co-extensive with blue colour. Similarly manifold Taste 
such as bitter, sour, etc., resides in Earth alone. Thus the (second) 
characteristic is the possession of the < class pervaded by Substance- 
ness and co-extensive with bitter Taste. In like manner other charac 
teristics should be understood by the substitution or interpolation of 
the words l sour, etc. Smell is of two kinds, fragrant and non-fragrant. 
Thus the (third) characteristic is the possession of the class pervad 
ed by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Smell. It will be therefore 
seen that Earth is a Substance which is the substratum or location of 
class which is co-extensive with Smell but not co-extensive with 
n Attribute which is not co-extensive with Smell. It must not be 
objected that as Smell and Taste are not perceived in a stone, etc., 
therefore both of them fall short of being universal here. For, though 
Smell and Taste are not perceived there in the first instance, still 
they are found to be present in their ashes ; and the very same parts 
which originate the stone do also originate its ashes. Hence there is 
no want of universality. How then is there such perception as " The 
air is fragrant," " Water mixed with Kdravella (Momardica 
Charantia, Hairy Mordica) is bitter V" The question does not arise, be 
cause that Smell and Taste are due to the external condition formed by 
(particles of) Earth. Touch also which is neither hot nor cold and which 
is produced by the action of heat, belongs to Earth only. Thus the 
(fourth) characteristic is the possession of the class pervaded by Sub 
stance-ness and co-extensive with Touch produced by the action of heat. 
And the quality of being produced by the action of heat, which is reveal 
ed by a distinctive peculiarity, belongs to the Touch of Earth alone ; 
and a distinctive peculiarity is very manifest in the peculiar Touch of 

the flowers of Sirtsa (Acacia Lebbec) and Lavanyi (clove-creeper) ; but 
it is not so in the Touch of Water, etc. Although in a whole made 
up of parts Touch, etc., are not produced directly through the con 
junction of Fire, from heating, yet there too a particular heterogeneity 
hould be recognised by the way of its being the product of a series 
of parts and wholes. 

" But," it may be objected, " this mark or characteristic is what 
is called a mark of disagreement or a negative mark which is the 
proof of its difference from others or of the mode of its treatment. Now, 
Earth is distinguished from othersbecause it has Smell. That which is not 



KANADA &OTKAS n. i. i. 40 



different from others, does not possess Smell, e. </., Water, etc. And 
Earth is what has Smell which is the counter-opposite of the non- 
existence of the porvader of the non-existence of the difference from 
others than itself. Therefore it is different from others than itself. 
Hero supposing that the major term, the quaasitum, namely, difference 
from others, is a well known object, if the mark of inference disagree 
with it, then the inference will have the fault of incommensurability, as 
the minor term will in that case fall outside the class of ascertained 
similar objects and of un-uscertained objects ; and if it does not 
disagree, then the mark will be what is called a mark of agreement 
or a positive mark. On the other hand, if the major term is not 
well known, then the minor term will contain an -unknown major term. 
In that case there can be no expectation, nor any desire for inference, 
nor again any inference in the shape of knowledge in particular about 
it. Moreover, absence of the mark or the middle term and absence 
of the quEesitum or major term are universally related by agreement. 
Thus there will arise the contradiction that the absence of the major 
term will not have the characteristic of being the mark nor will the 
mark have the characteristic of being the absence of the major term. 
By this alone the futility of the minor premiss is explained, but not the 
object, the universal relation of which has not been obtained. So it 
has been said : " The faults of an inference by disagreement or by the 
method of difference, are ignorance of the major term, contradiction, 
futility of the minor premiss, and proof by the method of agreement." 
So also if the mark is intended to establish usage. Here the usage 
consists in being the object of reference of the word Earth, and that 
belongs also to the class of Earth-neas and therein the mark Earthness does 
not exist. Although therefore incommensurability may appear to exist 
here, yet there is no incommensurability, the quantum or major term 
being the characteristic of being the object of reference of the word 
Earth, which is the occasion of the significance of Earth-ness. 
Or again Earth-ness being, as a class. proved in a general 
way, like pot-ness, to be the occasion of the significance of an 
accidental word, the word Earth contains the occasion of the signi 
ficance of Earthness. If it contains the occasion of not signifying 
others not-Earth-ness, then as it appears together with that which 
is the occasion of the significance, it should be proved in the way, vix. } 
4 That which is not so, is not so. Thus here too there is surely the fault 
of ignorance of the qusesitum, etc." 

It is not so, the author replies, difference of others such as Water, 
etc., being manifest in the pot itself, because the difference, i. e., the 
mutual non-existence of Air, and other super-sensuous objects also i* 
proved by sense-perception itself in the pot, etc., in as much as only the 
fitness for the location or ground or substratum governs the apprehen 
sion of mutual non-existence, as is seen in cases like "The column is not 
a piid -Jia (a ghost-like being)." 

It should not be said, < This i" not the case. Let then the pot 
only be the analogue or example. What is the use of a negative mark ? 
Who will prove in a roundabout fashion a conclusion arrived at in 
a itraight way ? " If the non-negative mark be not a mere simulacrum. 



VAIE$IKA PHILOSOPHY. 



then this path too is unobstructed to him who is described as arguing 
in a round-about way ; because with the removal of the fault of 
ignorance of the queesitum, all other faults which arise out of it, are 
also removed. There is no contradiction, because the positive 
pervasion or the relation in agreement is apprehended along with 
the negative relation ur because the positive pervasion is 
inferred by the negative pervasion. Nor is there futility of tho 
minor premiss, because the very mark of which the pervasion* has boon 
_ obtained, is proved in tho minor term ; as has been said : < Whatever 
" relation of the determinate and the determinant subsists between 
two existences, just the reverse of it is to be understood in the case of 
the corresponding non-existences." Usage again follows from tho 
teaching Earth possesses Smell, " in the same wav as what 
possesses a^ narrow, twisted neck, etc., is the object of reference of the 
word < pot. Thus that by which, anywhere and everywhere, in the case 
of clarified butter, etc., clay, etc., the being the occasion of the force 
of the word Earth is derived, from the above teaching, in Earth-ness by 
means of the indication, namely, the possession of Smell, also operates 
as a negative mark in this way that that which is not this, is not this, 
because everything which possessess Smell is the object of reference of 
the word Earth, through its possession of Sinoll, by means of Earth- 
ness which is the occasion of the force of the word. " 

The objector cannot say " In the case of the negative mark or per 
vasion which will prove difference, the difference must be either diffe 
rence in property, or difference in nature, i. e., otherness, or mutual 
non-existence. Now it cannot be the first two, because they are known 
by sense perception itself. Nor can it be the third, because when tho 
difference of non-existence also comes to bo the quajsitum, its mutual 
non-existence is not present there, and therefore the difference of that 
which is other than non-existence coining to be the quantum the 
qunesitum is not found/ For mutual non-existence, of which the 
counter-opposite is non-existence, is also a quantum. So that if it is 
something additional then it verily exists ; if not then being reduced to 
itself, it is in reality something different, because its difference in 
property is pervaded by its mutual non-existence. And here there is 
unsteadiness or want of no finality, because the non-iinality remains 
only so long as there is perception or cognition, whereas in other cases 
iinality is obtained by perception. 

It is also said that thirteen kinds of mutual non-existence well 
known in thirteen cases are jointly proved in Earth. This is nonsense 
because the knowledge of every one of them being not in point the 
knowledge of them jointly disappears. Whereas mutual non-existence 
With counter-opposition determined by non-odorousness should be 
proved, because the difference of non-existence by means of the 
difference of that which determines counter-opposition is necessary and 
bec.ause it has been already said that this difference of non-existence is 
proved by sense-perception in the pot etc., also. 

If it is asked " What is the solution in the case of Ether, etc ?" the 
author replies that Ether is difierent from others than itself, by being 



KANADA SflTTBAS II, 1, 2. 



tlie seat of Sound. Although in " That which is not thus, is not thus," 
and cases like this, where the minor term is one-sided, the qusesitum, 
i. e. } the major term, is not well known, still that which possesses differ 
ence iu property from something else, possesses the mutual non-existence 
of which that something is the counter-opposite. So that by virtue of the 
pervasion brought into play in this general way, the mutual non-existence 
the counter-opposite of which possesses the absolute non-existence of being 
the seat of Sound, having- been already proved, hero it is only shown 
as being connected with the minor term, like fire being connected with the 
mountain. This is our other conclusion, its difference in quality being 
pervaded by its mutual non-existence. If it is said that only the pos 
session of the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound is not 
found in objects of the unascertained class, then the being the seat of 
Sound is neither the definition nor the description, because it is attacked 
with the fear of belonging to unascertained objects. I. 

Viv-rtf __ The revered Sankara Misra himself knovis what the 
necessity was of carrying the investigation here, leaving aside the 
possession of Smell, up to the possession of the < class pervaded by 
Substance-ness co-extensive with Smell. 

Characteristics of Water. 
Ho states the characteristic of Water mentioned after Earth : 



: Rupa-rasa sparftavatyalj, possessed of Colour, Taste, 
and Touch, sntf: Apafo, Waters. %*\: Dravah, Fluid. fa**!: Snigdhah, 
Liquid, viscid. 

2. Waters possess Colour, Taste, and Touch, and are fluid 
and viscid. 50. 

The Colour, Taste, and Touch are respectively White, Sweet, and 
Cool only. Fluuiness is constitutional bat Viscidity is by nature or 
essential. 

Objection. But it is no I.- correct to say that the Colour of Water is 
only White, because blueness is observed in the water of the river 
Yamund, etc. That the Taste is only the sweet is also not correct, 
because acidness, bitterness, etc., are observed in the juice of the 
blackberry, karavlra, etc.. That the Touch is only the Cool one 
is also not proved, because at mid-day hotness also is observed. Con- 
stiutional Fluidity again is too limited, as it is absent in ice, hail-stone, 
etc. Viscidity also is not proved as essential and is too wide, as it is 
not perc^ved in Water, and is perceived in clarified butter and other 
terrene objects. Moreover Water-ness is not a class even, which may 
be the characteristic of Water, because it is not proved on account of 
the non-existence of that which will establish it. Nor is it proved by 
the characteristic of the determinant of its being the combinative 
cause. of Viscidity, because the nature of Viscidity, appearing in both 
the effect and what is not the effect, is not the determinant of the state 



52 VAI&E8IKA PHILOSOPHY. 



of the river .1 around, etc, is due to the condition or enviro 
ment formed by the receptacle, and whiteness is observed in ^he Water" 

W 6n thrU in th 









however the observation of the canvas itself is the proof. The oria 

8 1 ?"^ aUd noi ;- fra ^ ant P arts rem 4d ^7 the conflfct o 
;> Inthe f case 1 fm 1 ai ? lf old Smell, there is absence of proof 
the sveetness nch 1S obsr 



Prn f11 

ere ore te svyeetness ^nch 1S observed in Water immediately after 
the eating of yellow myrobalan, belongs to Water only. Its manifeta 

M^m^fwT^ 8 ^ 01 ; the ? r ximity f S me P^Ucular Substance 

sand.l wood Thl ll -H "tf " ter Brises fpom its "Bociation with 
mdalwood. The bitterness that is perceived immediately after the 

b! g , 1 >; ^ (a . cuc r bei -] ike frui *) bclo ^ s to the JrfcaW alone! 

because bitterness is observed in its parts even without the drinking 

~\Tt tLnS^ ^ ^ 1 bi "~ of the bilious Substancf 
at the tip of the tongue is felt there. Hence the second charac- 

bv Snb,?a "" ^ i PT 6 ? 1011 f the claSS Wlucl1 iB dll * ect1 ^ P^ded 
b.> Substance-ness and which is co-existent with Taste which is not 

" * ier ^ Taste ^ Hke manner the thirl 



claacristi f . ner e r 

Jiai actei istic of water is the possession of the class which is pervaded 
by Substance-ness and which is co-existent with cool Touch The 



co-exsen w coo Touch The 
hotness that appears at mid-day is really of Fire, as it depends upon its 

ourtTcliar 1 , T S T- CC - ^^ """titntional Fluidity ? 8 bv itsdf the 
fourth characteristic ; in other words, Water-ness is the possession of 
the cl ass wh]ch ls pervaded b Substance-ness and which ii present in 
what possesses constitutional Fluidity. Liquidity or Viscidity P however 
- 10 ^"^^ not * Genus whi 



Genus which is 

- ness ; becaus e the distinction of iscid 

noo aa n T C 1 iS obser ved, but such distinction 

A? bt ^ 6 n e ? a I 1 * 88 Jt Cannot be said " Let Viscidity 
for it it in1i f 11 1S th evide ^ ce that ^ is Present in water ? 
inferred from the mixing or compounding of barley, sand, etc., 
A compound is a particular combination or conjunction 



KANiDA SUTRAS II, 1, 3. 53 

caused by Viscidity and Fluidity. It is not due to Fluidity alone, "be 
cause no compounding is established by the Fluidity of glass or gold ; 
nor is it due to Viscidity alone, because no compounding is established 
by condensed clarified butter, etc. Therefore by the method of agree 
ment and difference it is proved to be caused by A T iscidity and 
Fluidity. And this compounding, being seen to take place in barley, 
sand, etc., by water, confirms Viscidity in Water. This argument is 
based upon wide experience itself, as Viscidity is an object of sense- 
perception. Viscidity which however is found in clarified butter, etc., 
is of the Water which is the occasional cause of that clarified butter, 
and it appears as though belonging to the clarified butter through 
combination with the conjoint. So also in the case of oil, juice, etc. 
And Water which is the occasional cause of clarified butter, contains 
a preponderance of Viscidity ; therefore owing to this very prepon 
derance of Viscidity, this Water does not counteract Fire. If Viscidity 
were a particular Attribute of Earth, then, like Smell, it would have 
been present in all terrene objects, hastly, Water-ness is a class 
which is directly pervaded by Substanco-ness, because it has been 
proved that a class which determines the being the combinative cause 
of the conjunction present only in objects possessing Viscidity, is 
common to the ultimate atoms. 2. 

Characteristics of Pire. 
a. Following the order o{ enumeration, he states the character istic of Fire : 



&W: Tejas, fire. ^T^sjfcj llupa-sparsavat, possessed of Colour and 
Touch. 

3. Fire possesses colour and Touch. 51. 

The meaning is that Fire possesses Colour which is luminous, and 
Touch which is hot. If it be objected, "Luminousness is the being the 
illuminator of other bodies, and such Colour is not found in heat or in 
Fire as it exists in gold, in a frying-pan, or in Water. White Colour 
also is found nowhere in these, nor is hot Touch found in moonlight or 
in gold. How then is this so ?" We reply that ther can be no such 
objection, because luminous Colour may be inferred in hotness, etc., 
by means of Fire-ness. If it be objected that Fire-ness itself is not 
proved there as such, we reply that it is inferred in them by their 
possessing hpt Touch. If it be asked, "How is it proved in gold ?", 
our reply is that the author desires to say that it is moved because, 
even in tho absence of luminous Colour in it, Fire-ness is inferred by 
the negative., mark, viz., the characteristic of being the substratum or 
ground of Fluidity which is produced but not destroyed by the closest 
Conjunction of fire. And in the case of Fire as existing in the frying- 
pan, etc., Fire-ness is inferred from their possession of hot Touch. 

Fire is four-fold : that in which both Colour and Touch are partly 
developed, as the solar, etc.; that in which Colour is partly developed 
but Touch is undeveloped, as the lunar; that in which both Colour and 
Touch are altogether undeveloped, as the ocular ; and that in whioh 



54 VALESIKA PHILOSOPHY 



Colour is undeveloped and Touch is developed, as of the summer season 
and also lire present in Water, frying-pan, etc. He will prove the 
ocular Fire later on. 3. 

Characteristic of Air. 

UpntUra. He states the characteristic of Air which is the next in oH.r: 



nfar^ Sparsavcan, possessed of Touch. ?rn: VAyuh, air. 
4. Air possesses Touch. 52. 

The characteristic of Air is the possession of tlio -r-UcV 
with Touch which, does not co exist \vith O.lonr, o, tl e pos^ ion o 
the clM , oo-e X i.to.t with Touch w h,ch is neither hot /or To d and 

c w 2; & T^hS i, n ? hHo Sd 9 t of ii ; fl 

not co-exist with Smell, or the > 



The above characirrixtic* do not belong to Ether. 

" I)osse 9i " of c 



I ? I V, II 



5. These (characteristics) arc not in Ether. 53. 

Hero the root < -yid, in vidyante means to perceive. The meaniu* 
hen that because they are not perceived therefore they do not exist 
in Ether, and other substances, either uniformly or by nature, or ooUeo- 
ively or accidentally. If it bo asked,- How does the perce, lion arise 
that Ether is as white as curd ?" we reply that it is due to the impression 
created by the perception of the white colours of the ravs of the sun If 
it be asked, " How then does the perception arise that Ether is blue ?" 
we reply that it is duo to the impression created in the niinds of the 
observers who are looking at the radiance of the emerald rfcak lyin ff 
largely extended over the south side of Sumeru mountain. If has beer 
opined that it is due tt the impression created by the eye when after 
travelling to a long distance it turns back and reaches its own puiul 
inis is not a sound opinion, because those who possess jaundiced eves 
also have such impressions. J 

From the perception, Here now there are Colour, etc.," it cannot 

be argued that Colour and the three other Attributes belong to Space 

ime also, because they have been already stated to be the charac 

teristics of Earth, etc., only by the relation of combination and not bv 

any other relation also. Here now there is absolute non-existence of 



KANiDA SUTK AS II, 1,7. 55 



Colour" from this perception again it follows that Space and Time are 
the substrata or grounds or foundations of all things. 5. 

Objection t j Fluidity beinij a characteristic <>f Wntcr, answurud. 

Ui>askv.i-u t If it be argued tliat it is not correct to say that Fluidity i.s thf character 
istic of Water, because Fluidity is observed oven in Earth ; so he replies : 



i^T Sarpir-jjatu-madliuchchhistanani, of clarified butter, 
lac, and wax. *jfiTwffTl^ Agni-saEiyogat, through conjunction of Fire. 
&&C Dravatvam, Fluidity. ffe: Advih, with Waters. SW^T Samunyara, 
similarity, Commonness. 

6. The Fluidity of clarified butter, lac, and wax, through 
conjunction with Light is similar to that of Water. 54. 

The Fluidity which belongs to clarified butter, etc., results from 
conjunction of Fire which is its occasion, and is not constitutional; 
whereas constitutional Fluidity is the characteristic of Water. There 
fore the similarity of Earth to Water is in respect of mere Fluidity, 
and not in respect of constitutional Fluidity also. Hence the charac 
teristic or the definition is not too wide. This is the meaning. 6. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. But still, because that condition, t. e., Fluidity, appears in tin, lead, iron, 
and other modifications of Firo, therefore that condition itself is an instance that tho d- 
finition is too wide. To this objection he replies : 



n * i n v$ 



!n*T Trapu-sisa-loha-rajata-suvarnamim, of tin, lead, 

iron, silver, and gold. SffrwtiTi^ Agnisamyogat, through Conjunction 
of Fire. ^?3 Dravatvam, Fluidity. *lf??: Advih, with Waters. 8WI*W 
Samanyam, similarity. 

7. The Fluidity of tin, lead, iron, Silver, and gold, through 
conjunction with Fire, constitutes their similarity to Water, 55. 

This is an indication ; bell-metal, copper, brass, etc., are also im 
plied. The characteristic which is common to those which have been 
mentioned and those which are implied, is that they are the foundation 
of the Fluidity which is produced but is not destroyed by tne closest 
Conjunction of Fire. Thus the Fluidity of gold, etc., also is only occa 
sional, the occasion which is the Conjunction of Fire, being proved by 
the method of agreement and difference. Moreover there is this 
distinction ; in the last aphorism the word agni denotes Light 
tejas possessing an excess or abundance of heat, but here it 
denotes fire. 

If it be objected, " Gold, etc., also must be either modifications of 
Earth or different Substances; because yellowness, weight, etc., establish 



PHILOSOPHY-. 



terreneness, and because the non-annihilation of Fluidity which 
constitutes their difference from Earth, is perceived in them, and be 
cause this h capable of establishing of Substance. r Wo reply that 
gold is a modification of Fire, and its fieri ness is proved in the negative 
way, namely, " That which is not thus, is not thus, as Earth, " by the 
characteristic of its being the foundation of Fluidity which is not 
annihilated oven at the closest Conjunction of Fire. 

Again there is no contradiction in the ultimate atoms of Water, 
because Fluidity should bo qualified as being 1 non-eternal. Nor is there 
incommensurability, as the mark does not appear in the lamp and other 
objects of the ascertained class, because the fact which is to be proved 
is that gold is not a modification of Earth. Nor is there any obstacle to 
the receptacle of weight becoming the minor term hero; the foundation 
or substratum will not be proved if something else were the minor term, 
as the minor term must be foundation of Fluidity. Nor is it hard to 
ascribe ultra-finality or absoluteness, because it is desired to be said that 
it is tho foundation of temporary Fluidity which is not annihilated even 
at the closest Conjunction of Fire for three hours. If it be objected that 
the annihilation of Fluidity must be concluded from the destruction of 
the foundation and the perception of more and less; we reply that it is 
not so, because the mark of inference is the possession of the Fluidity 
containing the Genus of Fluidity which does not appear in the countei- 
opposite of the annihilation produced by that Conjunction of Fire which 
is not combined with the totality of non-existent Fluidity. Or the 
foundation of yellowness and weight, conjoined as it is with Fluid 
Substance which excludes all Colour different from yellow Colour, does 
not therefore become fhe foundation of any Colour different from yellow 
Colour even at the Conjunction of Fire for three hours, like a piece of 
yellow cloth placed inside Wider which is conjoined with Fire. If it be 
objected, The Colour of gold will then be visible in darkness as 
there will be nothing to cloud or overpower its Colour, because, 
overpowering means the non-apprehension caused by the apprehension 
of a more powerful like object," we reply that overpowering denotes 
the mere relation with a like object which is more powerful by the 
power of the effect produced by it. 80 it has been said, u Other Colour 
does not at all shine under the influence of the association of the earth. * 
This is our view. 7. 

Use of Inference. 

Upaskara. Having thus finished the section on the characteristic of the four Sub 
stances which possess Touch, the author, seeing that the characteristic of Air is net 
proved by its foundation or with a view to avoid this, at the outset introduces the method 
of ] roof by inference, and then first of ull establishes tho probative force or value of 
inference itself, according to experience, and thereby begins the section of demonstration 
>f Air : 



l * I \ I c II 

Visani, possessing horns. VJsH H Kakudvan, possessing a hump. 
Prftnte-valadhih, with a tail hairy at the extremity, 



KANADA SftTRAS II, 1, 9- 57 



Sasuavan, possessing a dewlap. ?fa Iti, such, nt?^ G-otve, in cow-ness, 
of being a CUNY, ^f Dristam, observed admitted, fajpn Lingam, mark. 



8. That it has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity, 
and a dewlap such is the admitted mark of being a cow. 56. 

The import is that as horns, etc. are the marks, the pervasion, or 
universal or invariable relation of which is well-known or recognised, 
towards the proof of cow-ness, so also the commonly-observed marks of 
the five super-sensuous Substances,, Air, etc., assume the form of proof. 
Here although the mere possession of horns is not the mark of cow- 
ness, since it is also found in the buffalo, etc. ; nor is the possession of 
the dew-lap, etc., the distinction or differentia, since in that case the 
name will become senseless ; still with them who can discern in the 
horn of the cow difference in characteristic in comparison with the 
horns of the buffalo, the sheep, etc., all those distinctions truly assume 
the nature of marks. And all those distinctions such as straightness, 
crookedness, hardness, softness, shortness, length, etc., which are 
capable of being known by observers of superior skill, do really exist 
in horns also. Thus in respect of the body of a cow at a distance 
standing by itself, the inference is altogether unobstructed that it is a 
cow because like the body of a cow which has been previously perceiv 
ed, it possesses peculiar horns. Similarly, the possession of a hump 
also is a mark of being a cow. The possession of a tail hairy at the 
extremity, is also a truly independent mark of being a cow. Prante- 
valadhib means that in which hair are placed at the extremity, that 
is, a particular tail. From the use of the aluk compound (i. c., that form 
of compound words in which the inflection of the first word is not 
elided), the tail of the cow only is denoted by the word Antevaladhi^- 
For the charaeteristic of the tail hairy at the extremity, which is found 
in the tails of cows, does not belong to the tails of the horse, sheep, etc., 
as these tails are covered with hair all over. In the tail of the buffalo, 
etc., there is not so much prolongation. From this difference in charac 
teristic, the possession of a tail hairy at the extremity is also a mark 
of being a cow. The dropping of the inflection conveying the sense of 
possession (i. e., the use of the word tail only instead of tail-bearing) 
shows that only the body of the cow has been in view. Thus (the 
inference) " It is a cow" because, like the body of the cow which has 
been previously perceived, it possesses a tail which is hairy at tho 
extremity. The possession of a dew-lap, again, is simply a well-known 
mark of being a cow. 8. 

Touch infers Air. 

Upaskdra. Having thus pointed out, according to observation, the probative value of 
Infereiioo by which all human affairs are carried on, ho, intending to begin tie Heotion of 
proof of Air, says: 



: Sparsah, Touch. ^ Oha, and *T*ft: Vayob, of air, 
9. And Touch (is a mark) of Air. 57. 



58 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Lirigam, mark, is the complement of the aphorism. By the word 
cha Sound, upholding, and quivering are brought forward. 

It cannot be said, " The Touch which is being perceived must be 
of Earth itself of which the Colour is not yet developed," because the 
developed Touch of Earth cannot be separated from developed Colour. 
Henco the Touch which is perceived, being Touch, must reside somewhere, 
like the Touch of Earth, etc. Some foundation of Touch being thus proved 
by inference, by analogy, (Samanyato dristam), the foundation of Touch 
is not identical with the triad of Earth, etc., because it does not possess 
Colour, nor is it identical with the pentad of Ether, etc., as it possesses 
Touch. Therefore by the inference together with the exclusion of others 
a Substance over and above the eight Substances is proved. In like 
manner a particular Sound also is a mark of Air. Thus in the absence 
of the impact of Substances possessing Colour, the series of Sounds 
(arising in loaves, etc.) which is heard amongst leaves, etc., must be 
occasioned by the impact of substances possessing Touch and Impetus, 
like the series of sounds produced in a drum by the percussion of the 
drumstick, because it is a series of sounds which is in relation to a subs 
tance the parts of which are indivisible. The absence of the impact of 
Substances possessing Colour, is, again, known by the non-perception 
of what might be expected or the co-relative. And from exhaustion that 
Substance possessing Touch and Impetus is verily an addition to the 
group of the eight substances. Similarly, a particular upholding also 
is a mark of Air. Thus the steadiness or flotation of grass, cotton, 
cloud, and air-ship in the sky, is due to the conjunction of some subs 
tance possessing Touch and Impetus, since it is the flotation of substance 
which are not presided over by a conscious being, like the flotation of 
grass, wood, boat, etc., on a stream ; whereas in the flotation of poison, 
etc., caused by thought directed towards it, human and other influence 
is without doubt present. So also in the upholding of the bird, the 
branch of a tree, etc. Nor is the distinctive mark not proved on account 
of its being influenced by God, because by the word conscious all else 
except (rod is meant. Similarly, quivering too is a mark of the exis 
tence of Air. Thus this Action in grass, etc., without the impact of 
Substances possessing Colour, is due to the impact of some Substance 
possessing Touch and Impetus, because it is an Action which is not 
produced by Weight and Conjunction of Soul exercising Volition, like 
the Action of a cane-bush when struck by the waves of a river. The 
word l weight implies Conjunction of Soul attended with adristam 
(invisible after-effects of past acts), Fluidity and Impression ; hence the 
being an action not produced by them is the mark. 

r It cannot be said, " Air is only an object of sense-perception and 
that therefore there is no need of the investigation of its marks ;" for, 
Aic is not perceptible ; only its supersenusousness is proved by theinfer- 
enne : " Being a colourless external Substance, it is like Ether." It 
canot be replied " Its perceptibility is inferred in this way that being 
the seat of Touch Air is perceptible like the water-pot ; " for the posses 
sion of developed Colour is here the condition, upddhi. If it be objected, 
" In the case of Colour, etc., as well as Soul, it is not pervasive of the 
major term, since it pervades the major term when the latter is deter 
mined by the being the external substance which is the minor term 



KANiDA StiTRAS II, 1-10 59 

containing the middle term, or is determined by the middle term which 
is the moans of inference. Nor does it govern a body s being an object 
of visual perception, because it is there that its presence and absence 
are observed as a rule. On the other hand, a body s being an object of 
tactual perception is governed by the mere possession of an adequate 
Touch." We reply, that both the presence and absence of Colour govern 
here; for perceptibility only by means of Touch proved by both posi 
tive and negative marks, has not been observed without the perception 
of Colour. Moreover, if Air were an object of sense-perception, then it 
would govern also the apprehension of general Attributes, e.y., Number, 
etc. If it be objected, u Perceptibility does belong to Number in 
blowing by the mouth, etc., to Measure or Extension, e. y., cubit, span, 
etc., and to Separateness as well as to Priority and Posteriority of two 
Airs existing on both sides. On the other hand, it is not the rule accor 
ding to you also that they are perceptible by means of there being 
individual masses of Air, because they are not observed in the cloth, 
etc., lying on the back." We reply, that it is the rule that they are 
perceived by means of there being individual masses of Air. Number, 
etc., are obtained in the cloth, etc., fixed upon the back, if they lie 
straight ; if they are not obtained, it is because of the defect that the 
latter do not lie straight. " Developed Colour and Touch govern the 
perceptibility of external substances, only when they operate jointly. 
Light, the yellow substance within the eye, and the radiation or heat 
of the moon are not perceptible because their Touch is undeveloped. 
Hotness as in summer, heat and Watery Substances the parts of which 
havo been dispersed (steam.) are not perceptible, because Colour is un 
developed there." This is the view of the commentator of Nyaya-Vartikaa. 
" But light, etc., are really perceptible although Touch is undeveloped. 
Therefore the Conjunction and Disjunction of the bird and the branch 
of the tree are really perceptible in the sky under moonlight." So say 
those who know the traditions of the system. Nor can it be said that 
the possession of developed Touch (universally) excites to the percepti 
bility of universally external Substances, for then the light of the 
emerald would be non-perceptible. Nor is only the possession of the 
developed distinctive Attribute the governing condition, for then Ether 
too would become perceptible. Nor again is the possession of the deve 
loped distinctive Attribute co-existent with the ensuant or resulting 
magnitude, such condition, for the bilious substance existing at the tip 
of the tongue is imperceptible in spite of the development or manifesta 
tion of bitterness. Therefore only the possession of developed or 
manifested Colour governs the perceptibility of all Substances except 
Soul. And this is not present in Air. Hence Air is not an object of 
tense-perception 9. 

Touch which infers Air, cannot be explained by visible objects. 

Upatkdra. It may be objected, " Here there ii no mark which can be known by senee- 
peroeption. For here the pervasion or universal relation is not obtained by sense perception 
like that of fire and smoke. Moreover thia will be also the Touch of one or other only f 
Earth etc." Therefore he says. 



II ^ I t i *< u 

r Na, not. 5| Cha, and. ref^t Drigtanam, of the observed or visibl* 



60 VAUEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



or seen, W$: Sparsah, touch. ||?l Iti, hence. Siseftn?: A-dri$ta-lingah, 
not-containing-the-mark-of-the-visible sfl^: Viiyuh, air. 

10. And it is not the Touch of the visible (Substances) ; 
hence the mark (of the inference) of Air is not the mark of the 
visible (Substances). 58. 

The Touch which is made the subject of enquiry does not belong to 
visible Substances, viz., Earth, Water, and .Fire, because it ig not 
accompanied by Colour. Therefore the inference is that this Touch 
resides somewhere. Hence in virtue of the middle-term, i. <\, the mark 
of inference, being contained somewhere, we get Air although the mark 
is not the mark of the visible Substances, i. e., although the mark is 
observed in analogous Substances. This is the meaning. Although 
only the quartet of observed Touch, etc., are the mark, yet because 
their relation with Air is not apprehended, therefore it is said that the 
mark of Air is 7iot the mark of the visible Substances. For it is not 
possible to prove Air after first proposing that this which possesses this 
or that property is Air. Therefore the import is that the proof of Air is 
by inference from analogy together with the exclusion of (possible) 
others (i. e.,by hypothesis^). 10. 

Air is a Substance. 

Upaskdra.H&ving proved Air as a whole made up of parts, which is the foundation 
of Touoh capable of being perceived, he says, with a view to prove Air oharauterised a 
ultimate atoms : 



R i n ?m 

A-dravya-vattvena, by not containing Substance (as iti 
support). jfi Dravyam, Substance. 

11. Air is a Substance, because it does not contain or reside in 
Substance. 59. 

Dravyavat means that which has Substance as its support. 
Adravyat/ i. e., net i dravyavat, means not resident in or suported 
by Substance. Thus like Ether, Air characterised as ultimate atom is 
a Substance, because the other Predicables reside in substances; 
because it has been stated that the being resident, i. p.. dependence, 
applies elsewhere than in eternal Substances, and because the origina 
tion of a large whole made up of parts is capable of being demonstrated 
by the evolution of dyads, etc., from the formation of a dyad by two 
ultimate atoms, and so on. 11. 

Air in a Substance. continued. 

Upatkdra. Bringing forward two (more) marks or grounds of establishing tha Substnuoo- 
ne8 of the ultimate atoms of Air, he says : 



II R i ? i ?^ II 

Kriya-vattvat, because of possession of Action. 
Gunavattvat, because of possession of Attribute, ^r Cha, and. 

12. (Air is a substance), also because it possesses Action 
and Attribute. 60, 



KAN AD A StiTllAS II, 1, 13. 6l 



The ultimate atom of Air is a Substance this is the complement 
of the aphorism. Although there is this mutual dependence or correla 
tion that Substance-ness being proved, the possession of Action and the 
possession of Attribute are also proved and in their proof the proof of 
Substanceness lies, yet the possession of Action is proved by this that 
the ultimate atom which is the constituent element of the composite 
whole which is the foundation of the Touch which is being perceived, 
cannot be established otherwise than by the Conjunction of the non- 
combinative cause ; and the possession of Attribute is proved by the 
rule that the Touch, Colour, etc., of the composite whole are preceded by 
like Attributes in its cause ; and by these two Substance-ness also is 
proved ; so that here there is no fault, namely repetition or vicious 
circle. Of these the possession of Action extends to a portion of the 
objects of the same ascertained class, while the possession of Attribute 
pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class, which the posses 
sion of Attribute pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class. 
The word cha brings forward the characteristic of being 
combinative cause, which proves Substance-ness. 

If it be objected, " There is no proof (of the existence) of the 
ultimate atoms themselves. Then the Substance-ness of which is being 
proved ?," we reply that by the maxim of the division, etc., of the 
action of dense effects, a body which is being divided and sub-divided 
becoming smaller, smallest, etc., that than which no smaller unit can be 
obtained, the same is the ultimate atom. If the relation of part and whole 
w r ere unlimited, then it would follow that the mountain Suineru and 
a mustard seed, etc., will have the same Measure or Mass, because in 
that case they would resemble one another in possessing infinite parts, 
and because without the distinction of the number of causes (i. e., 
constituent elements), measure and magnitude, mass and volume, do 
not rule the difference of Measure. It cannot be said that this relation 
of part and whole continues only up to the limit of destruction for that 
which remains at the end having no parts, its destruction is not 
possible ; and if it contains parts, then non-finality will be the result, 
and its defect has been already pointed out. If it is said, " Truti 
(i. e., a minute part) is the limit, because it is visible and there is no 
reason for the supposition of something invisible," we re-join that as 
it is a visible Substance it must possess extension or largeness and 
many Substances. 

Hence as in the case of Earth, etc., so also in the case of Air, the 
part of the part of a combination of three atoms, is really the ultimate 
atom. Thus the ultimate atom of Air is proved. 12. 

Air is eternal. 

Upaakdra. It may be said that because Air possesses Action and Attribute, therefore, 
like the water-pot, etc., it should be inferred to be non-oternal. Hence he says : 



i R i \ i \\ i) 

Adravyatvena, by not residing in or combininig with other 
Substances. fr?q?^ Nityatvam, oternality. *E^ Uktam, said. 

13. The etemality (of Air) is evident from its not combin 
ing with other Substances, 61, 



62 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

" Of Air characterised as ultimate atom " this is the complement 
of the aphorism. A Substance is destroyed by the destruction of the 
one or the other of its combinative and non-combinative causes. But 
the ultimate atom containing no parts, both of these causes do not 
belong to it. Therefore there being nothing to destroy it, it is not 
liable to destruction. Where the possession of Action and Attribute 
is the cause of non-eternality, there the possession of parts is the 
condition, upddJii, and this condition pervades the major term which 
is determined by the Substanceness of the minor term ; whereas the 
condition which is pervasive of the major term as such, is the charac 
teristic of being the counter-opposite of prior non-existence. 13. 

Vivriti Some read the first word of the aphorism as adravyadravy- 
atvena (instead of l adravyatvena ), (meaning " by its being a Sub 
stance which does not contain any other Substance)." 

Air is manifold. 

Upatkdra. In order to prove, in a different manner also, the plurality of Air which 
has been already proved in the proof of its origination by the course of dyas etc., h 
says : 



H 

l: Vflyoh, of Air. su^ix^sf Vayusainmurchchhanam, concur 
rence or collision with Air. irin?4f3r3F Nanatva-lingam, mark of diversity 

or plurality. 

14. The collision of Air with Air is the mark of its 
plurality. 62. 

VAyusaiiimurrhchanam means the collision, /. e. t a mode of con 
junction, of two or more Airs. It is the co-incidence, the falling in 
together, of two Airs of equal Impetus, flowing in opposite directions 
and producing contrary Actions. And it is inferred from the flying 
upwards of grass, cotton, etc., because the flowing upwards and also 
the falling in together of two Airs, are beyond the reach of the senses, 
whereas the perceptible Action characterised as flying upwards of 
grass, etc., which are perceptible, is inferred to be produced either by 
the impact or the vibration (i. e., the molar or the molecular movement) 
of Substances possessing Touch, and Impetus. Thus the flowing up 
wards of Air the nature of which is to flow obliquely, not being capable 
of proof or possible without mutual collision, proves the mutual colli 
sion, the same being observed in the case of the water and the wave of 
the river. Their going upwards also is to be inferred by the going 
upwards of grass, etc. For the going upwards of grass, etc., is not 
possible without either the collision or the internal vibration of 
Substances possessing Touch and Impetus. 14. 



No visible mark of Air. 

mar 

says 

5 



Up&skara. It has been stated that the mark of Air is not like the mark of the visible 
Substances. But how is it so ? Hence he says : 



KAN AD A StiTRAS II, 1, 16. 63 

Vayu-sannikarse, in contact or association with Air. 
Pratyaksabhftvat, from the absence of perception, re Dristam* 
visible, fa^ Lingam, mark. ^ Na, not. ftI^ Vidyate, exists. 



15, There being no preception of the association (i. e., 
universal relation) with Air, there is no visible mark (of the exis 
tence of Air). 63. 

There the mark is said to be visible where the universal relation is 
grasped by perception, as smoke is of fire. But in the case of associa 
tion with Air, there is no perception of the appearance of the mark in 
accompaniment with Air. For Air itself not being an object of eense- 
perception, nobody can have the perception. " Things which give 
Touch, quivering, etc., are Air." Therefore the meaning is that no such 
mark exists the pervasion of which can be grasped by perception. 15. 

Air is inferred not as such but as a Substance in general. 

UpasMra. How then can there be any infernoo at all of Air ? Henoe to strengthen 
what lias been already stated, he says : 



II R H I W II 

Samanyato-driftat, from the method of inference known 
as general inference or inference by analogy, g Cha, and wf^K: Avi- 
desah not in particular, General. 

16. And, by inference by analogy, (Air is proved) not a a 
particular substance, (but as Substance only). 64. 

Inference is three-fold : from cause to effect, from effect to cause, and 
from the commonly observed to the unobserved, or from analogy. Thus 
this Touch which is being felt, must reside somewhere, because it is a 
Touch or because it is an Attribute. From this analogy or common 
observation or experience, accompanied by the exclusion of other possi 
bilities, its residence in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances, 
is proved. This is the meaning. 

It cannot be said that the inference from effect to cause is then 
gone. For after the exclusion- of other possibilities, where analogy 
prevails, there proceeding upon the proved qualification of the minor 
term that it does not reside in the eight Substances, the proposition that 
this) Touch which does not reside in the eight Substances must reside 
somewhere, does not result except 011 the assumption of its being resident 
in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances. There fore the pro 
posed object being not explained otherwise, it is proved by inference 
from cause to effect alone. But where analogy arises from the appea 
rance of exclusion at the very beginning, there the proposed object 
results at last and the mode of inference is found to be inference from 
effect to cause. It is not sound to hold that inference from effect to 
cause only shows the manner, for in the case of being accompanied by 
the exclusion of other possibilities, inference from cause to effect itself 
comes to show the manner. The rule also that inference merely shows 
the manner which determines the pervasiveness, is not valid, for the 
appearance of a different manner is possible from the association of 
particular materials. 16. 



VIA&2IKA PHILOSOPHY. 



The name Air is derived from Scripture. 

nn Jv r? Ut i f Jt - lH in i t I1<lc(l to bo Sftid that according to not aa a particular Sub*. 
the last aphorism there is no inference in the form, This i,s Air," but that Air is 
1 by way cf the mark being resident in a Substance in addition to the eight Substance*, 
ien what is the evulenco of that Substance being called by the name of Air ? So ho eayfi ; 



. 
e., the Veda. 



) R \ \ 

herefore intf** Agamikam, proved by revelation, 



17. Therefore the name, Air, is proved by the Veda. 65. 

Because there is no inference in the particular form, therefore the 
name Air is proved by dyama, i. c., the Veda. This is the meaning. 

Air is the moving deity," " One should offer a white goat to Air," 
And this Air is all colour, the carrier of all smells, and pure/ from these 
and other recommendation, which have acquired the force of regulations, 
the name, Air, is obtained. As the name, heaven, is obtained from 
the recommendation < That which is not pierced with pain nor is 
clouded afterwards ;" the name, barley, from the recommendation, 

Ine leaves of all crop-plants fall off in spring. But the barley plants 
possessing ears of corn thrive in it as if with joy ;" the name, cane, 
from the recommendation, " cane is born in water ;" and the name, 
bear, from the recommendation, " cows run after the bear/ Otherwies, 
in the case of such instructions as "He who desires heaven should 
perform sanfice," etc., in the non-appearance of the particular 
happiness for the time being, men desiring heaven will not be inclined 
towards the performance of sacrifice, etc. Nor will there be any 
arrest of activity according to the usage of the Mlechchhas, i. e. the 
impure, in respect of His becomes a mess of barley." " He kindles 

v?f re ** ive tire n a oane mat " " Shce of bear-skin," etc., for the 
Mlechchhas apply the words barley, bear, and cane, to yellow paddy, 
crow, and black-berry (of jackal,) respectively. Thus there will be room 
for doubt without those recommendations. Therefore their respective 
meanings are known from the Veda only. This is the import. Only 
the name is proved by the Veda ; the proof of the Substance, however, 
is really by analogy. 17. 

Existence of God. 

.UH^?;r*ftT i ^ gthu8 ? niril ! dihesecti011 " Air, he establishes that the Veda Is th 
by the All-knower, in order to answer the objection, Is then the name, Air, also, 
e the names dtttha and davtttha (i. c., the gibberish or abracadabra), uttered by a mad 
? , and with a view to open the section on Igvara or God, he says, 



* I? I te n 

T SaAjfla-karmma, name and effect, g Tit, on the other hand. 
But. wf|[tiiei;rf Asmad-visistanam, beings distinguished from, other 
than, or superior to ourselves, f^r^ Lingam, mark. 



18. But name and effect are the mark (of tho existence) of 
beings distinguished from ourselves. 66. 



KANADA StiTHAS IT, 1, 19- 05 



The word tu has the sense of differentiating from such other 
marks as Touch, etc. i Smjfia i. ., name, ; karmma effect, c. </., Earth, 
etc. -both of tliem aro the mark^ of the existence also of being-;-; dis 
tinguished from ourselves, namely, Isvara and great ^ages. 18. 

Etviatoncn of God. continued. 
Ho explains how it i wo : 

: II R I ?l U II 

Pratyaksa-pravrittvat because they follow from \ orcop- 
tioii, STITI flSRm: . Samjna-karnunanali, of name and effect. 



19. Because name and effect follow from perception. 67. 

Here also tho singular form or the resolution into one, of name 
and effect/ from the copulative compound meaning collection, is 
intended to indicate the indentity of the author of the name and the 
author of the universe. Thus he only is competent to give the names 
heaven, opjU ya (i- <\> that which was not before, that is to say, 
adrstam*), etc., with whom heaven/ i fii>0.i ca^ etc., are objects of sensu- 
peioeption, as in the giving tho names, Chaitra. Maitra, etc., 1> the 
bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., which are perceptible, by their lather 
imd others. >Srmlarly, the application of the names, pot. cloth/ 
etc., is only midei tho direction of Isvara. The word which has been 
directed by tsvara in a particular place, the same is appropriate there ; 
c. #., all those herbs which have been touched by the edge of the mon 
goose s tooth, counteract the venom of the snake. Such direction is the 
mark. 1. e., the means of inference, of beings distinguished from our 
selves. And tho name, -Alaitra/ etc., which the father gives to the son, 
that also is surely directed by Isvara by such rules as vi The father 
should give a name (lo the son) on the twelfth d;iy. J 

Thus it is proved that naming is a mark of tho existence of Isvara. 

In like manner action, /. u., effect, also is a mark of the existence of 
tsvara ; for, thus, Earth, etc., must have a creator, because the} aro 
effects like a pot, etc. 

, Here Earth, etc., do not m^an a product producible by the body, 
nor a product producible by the volition of another product, nor a pro 
duct which has become tho subject-matter of dispute as to whether il, 
has been produced by an agent or not, nor a product the production of 
which by an agent has been the subject of doubt, because Earth, etc., 
also are producible by the volition of another product by means of 
adfista (i. e., invisible after-effects of voluntary acts), and because 
dispu te and doubt, being too wide, do not determine the minor term. 
.Moreover, if by the expression that they have a creator, it is meant, 
that they are the products of an active principle, then production 
in question may be explained by reference to ourselves, etc., for tho 
causality of ourselves also is productive of Earth, etc., by means of 
adrisf-a (the invisible aftcr-olTocts of past acts). It is the same al.,o if 
the product be producible by an active principle operating upon given 
materials, for the acts or ourselves, etc., also are relative to some given 



VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



in < _r 



material. Then if the being effect, on the other hand, means the ben." 
the counter-opposite of prior non-existence (or potential existence)! 
then it will include annihilation also. I5ut notwithstanding all this 
earth must have a creator because it is an effect, Here tlie havin a 
creator means the being the product <>f an active principle indepSn- 
tlc " ll . v m " ?/" !llul heing an effect means the being the CM. unter- 
"pposite of existence determined by prior non-existence. In the case 
of sprouts, etc., there is no fault of doubtfulness or multifariousness, 
For these faults arise where there is doubi as to the existence or non- 
existence of the middle term whe-i the non-existence of the major teim 
to be ascertained ; for otherwise ail inference will have to be 
Nor should it be said that this is the fault beyond tho 
t \\ill entail the command of the king : f,, r it is not the 
glory or a fault that it does not attack the minor term. Therefore at 
itago of sprouting, the proof of the existence of) the major term (in 
nior term) by the mark or middle term the universal relation ,,f 
ascertained, being unobstructed, wheie is the doubtful* 
ness or multifariousness ^ And a fortiori at the stage of non-sprouting, 
those faults verily do nut exist. Thus in brief. 10. 






Xi^kramauam. egress. SI^H Pravesanam, ingress, ffa III, 
h. UTITflW Akasasya, of Kther fy$ Lingam, mark. 

20. Egress and Ingress such is the mark (of the existence) 
of Ether. 68. 

The word - it signifies manner and brings forward Actions, 



, 

namely, Throwing upwards, etc., also. Egress and Ingress are tho 
movement of Substances possessing Touch. Tha 



t is t he mark of tho 
not an effect. This 

I In u.lmr, n IT mi 



ossessng ouc. a s t e mark of tho 

existence of Ether, which is not an effect. This is the view of the 
feankhy n philosophers 20. 



i ? i ^? n 



(as ico 

iln.r^ombn,^^ canTT il} 8> **<> > ^ ot at all infer Ether as 
lliLrvvoid 1, 7 U80 > l ^"u Action < has but one Substance/ 
>**\y corporal Substance a, its oombiualivt o 



KANADA StJTRAS II, 1, 23. 07 



Adion also, it has bean already stated, duos not simultaneously appear 
in more than one place, nor Joes it appear in non-corporal Sul-s- 

t ances. 21. 

Alini i continual. 

r ptxbira. Lost it mitfht he said that ogress, ingress, etc., will i 
iion-romhinat ive cause, so he says : 



KAranA:ita^m.-klnptivaidli : n-niyAt. on account 
f difference from the characteristic or sign of .another cause. ^ 

an (1. 

22. And also because they differ in property from Un 
characteristic of another (i.e., the non-combinative) cause. 70. 

Anuklripti means characteristic or sign, by the etymology that 
by which a thing is made known/ The meaning is : on account of 
difference from that which is the characteristic of another cause, /. P., 
the non-combinative cause. 

Substance does not surely at all become a non-combinative cause. 
Now non-combinative causality arises by proximity in the same object 
with the cause, or by proximity in the same object with the effect. The 
first is illustrated in the case of the colours of the yarns towards the 
colour of the cloth. And this non-combinative causality is calletl great/ 
as it. produces a larger effect. The second is as that of the conjunction 
of $<m"l and Mind towards knowledge, or cognition, etc. And this 
non-combinative causality is called small. as it produces a smaller 
effect. But Ether is neither the combinative cause nor, again, the 
non-combinative cause of egress, ingress, and other Actions. Hence 
Action is not a mark of the existence of Ether. 22. 

} i, v rltl. _ He says that Action does not infer Ether even as iis 
n on -combinative cause. 

On the maxim that a verbal affix signifies an object, i annklnpti 
(agroament) means anuklripta/ 1. <-., that which is agreed to by i he 
opposite disputants ; and such a different caused is the non-combina 
tive cause, ri".. Attribute and Action. Therefore the meaning is Iliat 
oo-ress, etc., do not warrant the inference of Ether as Iheir non-coni- 
bTnative cause, because difference from Attribute and Action ( which 
are non-combinative causes), in the form of Substance-ness, exists 

in Ether. 

77/o (tltorr art v marl s continue d. 






?>" .-,/.:<;/ .It may be said, " Let Ether he the occasional cause of Action, for the move- 
its tit birds and arrows, etc.. are seen in Elhciv So In- s-ivs : 



H 

R 

23. Action is not produced on account of Conjunction. -71, 



Samyogat, on account of Conjunction. *R!f: AbhAvah, 
non-roduction. ^TRflJ: Karmmanah of .Action. 



VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



The uou-produotion of Action is due to the obstruction of Impetus 
Gravity, etc., which are the causes of Action, by Conjunction with 
jorporal substances, and is not due to the non-existence of Ether 
which is all-pervasive. Therefore the meaning is that the presence 
of or agruemo.it with Sky which should be really explained otherwise 
does not prove that Ether is the occasional cause of Action __ 23. 

Inference of Etlu-r ly tiounfl. 

UpntMyt, Having thus discredited the Saiikhya view, and going to prove Sound w 
the mark of hther lie prepares OH; ground for inference by exhaustion, l.y saying : 



^KArana-giimVpflrvvakah, preceded by the Attributes 
of the cause, vicqgq: KAryya-gunah, Attribute of the effect. & : Dristali, 

is seen or observed. 

Tho Attribute of the offoct is soon to ho proccdod by 
the Attribute of the cruiso. 72. 

Tho particular Attributes such n.i colour, etc., which exist in the 
effect characterised as Earth, etc.. are found to be preceded by like 
Attributes in their causes. Sound also is a particular or distinctive 
Attribute, for in spite of its being a class, it is, like colour, etc.. 
apprehended by only one of the external senses. Thus the meaning ia 
that such" effect is not observed in which sound preceded by a like 
Attribute in the couse thereof may appear. ____ 21. 

Sound not an. Attribute of tamjll>l>: tliinya, 

Upashira. It might bo said that Sound is observed in a lute, flute, tobonr, conchsh -ll 
d.sum. etc., which are elleets and that consequently it is precod by a like Attribute in their 
" 

u * i \ \ ^ n 



^^ c^ KAryyantarapradiirbhAvAt, because of the non- 
appearance of another or a different effect. ^ ( ha, and. JQS^: $abduh 
sound, ^isnflnq; SparflavatAra, of thing possessing Touch. 1T^:, Aguunh, 
not attribute. 

25. Sound is not an Attribute of things possessing Touch, 
because of the non-appearance of (similar) other effects. 73. 

It would have bean so, if, as when Colour, Taste, etc., are observed 
in yarns, potsherd, etc., other Colour, Taste, etc., homogeneous with the 
former, are also observed in a cloth, pot, etc., so the congener of the 
sound which is observed in the constituent parts of a lute, flute, tabour, 
etc., were also observed in the wholes made up of those, /. P., Into, 
11 nte, tabour, etc. But this is not the case ; for, in fact, it is seen that 
a lute, etc., are originated by constituent parts which are destitute of 
all Sound, whereas it is not seen that a cloth, a pot, etc., have their 
origin in yarns, potsherds, etc., which are destitute of Colour. More 
over if Sound were a particular Attribute of tangible things, then the 
relation of high and low and lower tones, etc., would not be observed 



KAN AD A StiTPvS IT, 1, 27. 



in it. For Colour, etc., which appear in a single composite whole are 
not observed to be varying in degree. Therefore Sound is not a dis 
tinctive Attribute of tangible tilings. -25. 

Bhasua. reads II. I. 25 as two aphorisms, t>., Also because of the 
non-appearance of different effects (Kdrya-anto.ra aprddurbhdvdt 
and Sound (is) not an attribute of tangible tilings tfabda* sliartawtfin 

rt/0, the meaning, however, remaining the sai 

Xo> of tfoid, nor of ]\[lii(l. 
^a.Wra.-But, it might be ,aicl, Smn,l will he cither an Attribute of Sou! or an Attri- 

f Mind. So ho says : 

: n * I 



Paratra, elsewhere, with other objects. aTOUI* Samavayat be- 
combination. ^^^ I ratynk.atvAt, because it is an object of 
-perception. ^ Oha and ; al 8 o. -f Na not. *W*\ n <\^? f 
an Attribute of Soul. ^ \a. not. ^: N[ano-miah, an Atl 



Mind. 

95 Because it combines with other objects, and 
is an~ object of sense-perception, therefore jiound is neither an 
Attribute of Soul nor an Attribute of Mind. 

If sound were an Attribute of Soul, then there would be such staten 
of oonSsuWB as I am filled (with Air),-; T am sounded/ I give 
out Sound " etc., as there are such state as 1 am happy, 
1 ow " - I desire " etc. But it is not the case ; on the contrary, the 
exnei-ieuce of a 1 men is that a conch-shell is filled with Air a lute is 












Tl.o f-ict that the words iHr.niu and manas have not 

The r ft ore oj ^tlier. 
n)ff , / , ( ; / ,,,._Ho states why this mothod of exhaustion has been appli- 



H 



Parisesat, from exhaustion, ft* Lingam, mark. 
Akasasva, of Ether. 

27/ By the method of exhaustion (Sound) is the mark of 



70 V AI&ES1K A PHILOSOPHY. 



in tins way that, being an Attribute, Sound, like Colour, etc., must 
reside somewhere. And it is an Attribute, because, like Colour, 

^tel g S o 1 )!l ,> SS < !M>ilMC " ll . eill "JM-ehended by only one 
external sense. Being non-eternal, it resembles knowledge, etcs both 
of which are combined with Universal Substances. And its no 
oternalny will he shown later on. The Substance, proved by exhaustSon 
nal,as there ,s no reason for the supposition of constituent parts 
s also universal, because Sound is observed in a,l! places 27. 
/^/"-. The idea ,-f Knnfrln is that Time as well ns S.-ac 



. 
really identical with Kther. 



K.i./. ct;^^ 

\^^ n 3 | ^ i ^ n 

Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternalitv 
.-lyiiiui. by Air s^nq^ VyAkhyate, explained. 

28. The Substance-ness and eternalitv of Ether have been 
explained by (the explanation of the Substance. ness and eter 
nality of) Air. 76. 

As Air is eternal because it duos not possess any other Siibst-inc 
as its combinative cause, so also is Kthor. As Air is a Substance 
[^possesses Attributes, so also isEthor. This is the 

l ]l In ] /N rnir,. 
r ,<,].,>,, .]* i i H . n , ,],,. ulu . ]. : , h(M . ,. ftro (horo nian Rlhoi . s , rii ]i . 



n 

Ki Tatt.yain,tliat-iiPHS. O e-ness. rniiy.^^ BliAvona, liy exists 

Hie unity (of lUhcr is explained) by (the explanation of 
the unity oij Existence.- 77. 

The agreemont of tho words in tlio aphon sn, is with < vyakhyatam 
(or explained ),/.,, the same word as in the last aphorism, with ,| 
inflection changed. Tho meaning- is that as - lU.Aval, / a Exis L 
is one. so also Kthor is only one and not man v. 29. 






I R I ? I ^o n 

a^% Ir r^q^ Sabdaling-Avisesat, because there is !10 difference 
Sound which ia the mark- fwftawmi VisefalingAbhivat, beea 
there exists no distinguishing mark. ^ CLa, and. 



KAN ADA SUTRAS II, 1, :31. 71 



30, (Kther is one), because there is no difference in Sound 
\vliich is its mark, and because there exists no other distinguishing 
mark. ---78. 

Tho sense is that i.lio unity of Ether is proved. Fthei being 
ubiquitous oi- uui versal, all founds are explained by their having that 
one and the same foundation or seat. Therefore to suppose a different 
basis will lie shewing ;in exuberance of: imagination. Besides the very 
same Sound must be the mark of the different I .lther which is to be 
supposed. ;ind thai, / . - .. Sound, is tin differentiated ; nor is there any 
other mark which can prove the differentia or the difference or 
division. It will be stated after-wards (III. ii-20 ) that ;il though the 
mark. <-. / knowledge, etc., of Souls is really non-differentiated, still 
the plnralitv of Souls is proved ly other marks, according to 
difference o[ conditions or circumstances. oO. 

I iiTitL- Plurality of Souls is proved by the differences of Lite 
products "f the Soul, r/.v.. pleasure and pain, seeing that at one and (lie 
same time an ofl ect in the form of pleasure is produced in one Soul, 
while in another Soul an effect in the form of pain is produced. Bui, 
in the case of Fther there is no d ifferenciation of Sound which is its 
mark, whereby a multiplicity of Ether might be established. Nor is 
there any other mark which can establish a plurality of hither. So 
that no account of the alisence of proof, and no account of simplicity, 
Ether is one and not many. 

Individuality of Ether. 

I-.H^I-U H. It 1 iuv hi *;u<l. " L A unity l>y all iuc;ms Vlcm;, to Klher, LuL. it ,-,1,-u h;m; 
xtreme largencBS as it is imiveral. Let Conjunction aud Disjunction also belong to it as 
t is the non-ooinbinativo cause of Sound, JJut how oau individuality belong l 



extr 

it 



lad-jniii-bidhaiiMt. because it follows or accompanies 
t i y. qs<Jf V~3 Eka-prithaktvani, separafeness of one 

individuality. =4 (Mia, aiid. ffa Iti. finished 

31. And individuality uiso belongs to Ether, since indivi 
duality follows unity. 79. 

Individual ! v is proved by this that individuality regularly gu o 
together with unity. - Hi indicates the end of the chapter. 

The subject-matter of ihe chapter is the definition or statement, 
of the characteristics possessing particular Al tributes and which are 
not the objocts of mental perception or perception by the internal 
organ. Hence the characteristics of ICarth, "Water, Fire, Air, and 
Ether and. in passing, of the divine Soul also, are stated in this 
chapter. Thus Earth possesses fourt on Attributes, and these Attribu 
tes are Colour. Taste, Smell, Touch. Number. Measure. Separateness, 
Conjunction, Disjunction. Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity, and 
.Impression. Faa-Ml y I lie same number of Attributes, with tho^exception 
of vSmell and addition of Viscidity, belong to Y\ ater. These sauio 
Attributes, with the exception of Taste, Smell , Viscidity, and Gravity 



VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY, 



belong to Fire, and with the exception of Smell, Taste, Colour, Gravity, 
Viscidity, and Fluidity, belong 1 to Air. With tlio addition of Sound, 
the five Attributes beginning with Number, belong to Ether. Only 
the five Attributes beginning with Xumber belong to Space and Time. 
The live Attributes beginning with Number, together with Priority, 
Posteriority, and Impetus, belong to Mind. The live Attributes 
beginning with Xumber, and Cognition, Desire, and Volition belong to 
fsvara. 31, 

Here e ids the iirst chapter of the second book in the Commentary 
given by Sankara to the Vaisesika aphorisms of Kanada of great 
powers. 

Vlci Ui.Tlie subject-matter <>f this chapter is the delinition of 
Substances possessing particular Attributes which do not appear in 
that which possesses - bhavana. i. e., impression or meditative tinder- 
standing. Substances are the live elements and (Jod. 



KANiDA SftTRAS II, 2, 1. 73 



BOOK SECOND CHAPTER SECOND. 

Smell may be essential or accidental, 

Upaskdra. Now the author dosi res to examine the characteristics, such as Small, etc., 
of the " elements "< bhuta). Therefore, byway of establishing that Small, eto., may be 
essential or natural as well as accidental or conditional, he saya : 



Puspa-vastrayoh, of a flower and a cloth, tffa Sati, 
-existing. Qfotq* Sannikarse, contact. JJUn^WJHfa: Gunantarapra- 
durbhavah, non-appearance from another Attribute. fj& Vastre, in the 
cloth. iTOMmfaiF!; Gandhfibhava-lingam, mark of the non-existence of 
Smell. 

1. The non-production (of the smell which is perceived in 
the cloth), after or during its contact with a flower, from the At- 
tribnte (of the constitutive cause of the cloth), is the mark of the 
non-existence of smell in the cloth. 80. 

Where Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are produced from the 
corresponding Attributes in the cause, there they become essential and 
so acquire the nature of being characteristic marks, and not otherwise. 
For, the fragrance which is perceived in the breeze, or the cold which 
is perceived in a tablet of stone, or the warmth which is perceived in 
water, does not become a characteristic. Therefore he says. 4 Of a 
flower arid a cloth. For the fragrance of the golden ketaki (Pandanus 
Odoratissimus), which is perceived in the cloth when the cloth has been* 
brought into contact with the golden ketaM flower, does not belong to 
the cloth, because it is not produced according to the ( corresponding ) 
Attribute of the cause ( i. e., yarns ). What, then ? It is accidental or 
conditional, because due to the proximity of the golden ketaki ; for the 
non-existence of Smell in the ketaki is not the mark of the non-existence 
of Smell in the cloth. What is the mark ? So it has been said, " Non- 
appearance from another Attribute," i. e. } non-production from the 
Attribute of the cause. For, if the Smell, which is perceived in the 
cloth, were essential to it, then it would be percieved in the cloth also 
before the constituent parts, i. e., the yarns of the cloth, are brought 
into contact with the ketaki but it is not so. This is the meaning . 
Thus the Smell in question is not inherent in the cloth, because, like 
cold and hot Touch, etc., it is a particular Attribute which is not 
produced by the Attribute of the constituent parts. 1. 

Vivfiti. It has been already stated that the possession of Smell, 

-etc., are the marks of Earth, etc. But this would not be proper. For 

Smell being perceived of Air, etc., combined with fragrant parts, the 

mark becomes too wide. For this reason he shows that the perception. 

^of Smell, etc., in Air, etc., is accidental. 



74 VAIESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Smell is essential in Earlh. 
UpatkAra. He Bays that essential Small is tho mark of Earth 



Vyavasthitah, established. ?fqcji Prithivyam, in Ear L h. 
: Gandhah, Smell. 

2. Smell is established in Earth. 31. 

Established in the Earth i. c., determined by absence of connec 
tion as well as connection with other objects. * The meaning is that 
Smell is the mark, because it serves t > differentiate Earth from objects 
of similar and dissimilar classes. For Earth has Sme .l only and only- 
Earth has Smell. It is therefore established that Smell which differen 
tiates Earth from the eight similars beginning with Water, and th 
five dissimilars beginning with Attribute, is essential to Earth __ 2. 

Vivriti. Established/ i. e., ascertains 1 or undoubted, as there i* 
nothing to oppose it. 

Heat may be essntial or accidental. 

Upaiklra. Extending the mode of establishing Smell IBS an ewswntial Attribute, to- 
Hotnesg also, which is the characteristic of Firo, lie says : 



^?U Etena, by this. iUHl UsnatA, Hotness. Warmth, 
VyakhyatA, explained. 

3. By this hontness is explained. 82. 

This extension or analogy should be understood also in the case- 
of coldness, etc., which are the characteristics of Water, etc. 3. 

Heat in essential in Fire. 
He examines tho characteristic of Firo : 



II R I R I tf II 

: Tejasah of Fire. f:nM! UsnatA, Hotness. 
4. Hotness (is the charateristic) of Fire. 83. 

^The meaning is that natural or essential Hotness is the characte 
ristic of Fire. Colour, white and luminous, is also implied. _ 4. 

Coldness is essential in Water. 
UpatlcAra. He examines the characterise of Water : 

1 ^ ! tfTrTrlT II \ \ R { * II 

Apsu, in Waters, jftnrni &itata, Coldness. 



" Absence of connection as well as connection with other objects." i. e., Smell is always- 
found in essential agretment with Earth and in essential di/erenct from Non-Earth. 



KANADA SftTRAS II, 2, 6. 75 



5. Coldness (is the characteristic) of Water. 84. 

The meaning is that natural or essential coldness is the character 
istic of water ; s> that it is not too wide, by over-extending to a stone- 
tablet, sandal-wood, etc. Colour and Taste also are said to be the 
characteristics of Water in the same way as coldness which also implies 
Viscidity and constitutional Fluidity. 

It cannot be asked, " Why is there this breach in the order of the 
characteristics according to the enumeration of Earth, etc ? " Because 
it is intended to indicate that the Touch of Fire overcomes or over 
whelms the Touch of Earth and the Touch of Water, and so the exami 
nation of Fire should of course come in between them. Or, the order has 
not been observed in order to introduce the examination of Air. Thus it 
should be inferred that Touch, which is neither hot nor cold and is not 
due to be the action of fire or heat, is essential to Air, and, as such, is 
its characteristic This is the import.- 5. 

VLvritl. The order of enumeration has been abandoned with the 
object of indicating that the mark of Air, i. e., the possession of a 
heterogeneous Touch, should be investigated in the same way. The 
explanation, given by the learned writer of the Upaskara, namely that 
the violation of tha order is intended to show that the Touch of Fire 
overcomes the Touches of Earth and Water, is not satisfactory. For it 
is known to all that in gold as well as in moon-light, etc., the Touches of 
Earth and Water overcome the Touch of Fire. 

Marks of Time. 

Upaskdra. Thus it has boon stated that particular Attributes suoh as small, etc., of 
tangible things, which are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, are the oharaohteris- 
tios of Earth, etc., Now he bogini the suction on the characteristics of Time, brought in by 
the order of enumeration, by sayii-g : 

R R K u 



Aparasmin, in respect of that which is posterior, 
Aparam, posterior. ^ITT^. Yugapat, simultaneous, f^i Chiram, slow. 
f%si Ksipram, quick, ifi Iti, such, ^l^i^^i l^ Kala-lingani, marks of 
Time. 

6. Posterior in respect of that which is posterior, simul 
taneous , slow, quick, _ Such (cognitions) are the marks of 
Time. 85. 

The word iti which shows the nude of cognition, relates to each. 
individual word ; so that the meaning is that the cognition it is pos 
terior the cognition l it is simultaneous, the cognition it is slow or 
late, the cognition i it is quick or early, are the marks of Time. By 
posterior in respect of that which is posterior, we are also to uuder 
stand l prior, in respect of that which is proir. Therefore the sense is 
this : If we make a youth our point of view of starting point, then the 
oog.iition of Priority is produced in a:i old man, whosa birth has been 
^distanced by a large number of the revolutions of the sun ; and thia 



76 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Priority depends upon some non-combinative cause. Now. Colour, etc., 
cannot be the non-combinative cause, owing to their variable presence. 
The three, beginning with Smell, do not produce Priority in respect of 
Air. Touch also, rendered different by the difference of hot, etc., is in 
ach case variable in its presence. Nor is a fixed Measure the non- 
combinative cause, for it does not originate a heterogeneous object. 
Therefore it remains at last that, the revolutions of the sun being 
connected with a different substratum, conjunction with a Substance 
determined by those revolutions is really the required non -combinative- 
cause. And that Substance, being conjoint both with the lump of matter 
on earth (e. g., the body of a youth) as well as the sun, must be- 
universal. If the characteristic of that Substance be supposed to be- 
belonging to Ether, then it would follow that the beating of a drum 
at any place will produce Sound in all drums everywhere. Thus 
the Conjunction of Time alone, which is conjoint with the sun, 
with the lump of matter in question, is the non-combinative cause of 
Priority. It is Time which demonstrates the action of the sun, because, 
for the purpose of the determination of a different Substance in the case 
of the properties of a different Substance, the Soul is dependent upon 
an affinity in addition to its own propinquity, otherwise the redness of 
a kusumbha flower at Varan asi (Benares) would entail redness in a 
crystal at Patna also. But Time being supposed to be of that very 
nature, this (i. e., dependence upon another affinity) is no fault here. 
If it be asked, why Time also would not transmit colour, we reply, it 
ia because Time has been established only as that which always 
demonstrates action. 

In the same way, the production of Posteriority should be ascer 
tained in a youth, with an old man as tl e starting point. Simultane 
ous : They are born simultaneously, They exist simultaneously, 
1 They act simultaneously/ in such cognitions, simultaiieously means 
at the same time, during the same movement of the sun, in other words, 
at the same time as determined by the movement of the sun. It is not 
unconnected movements of the sun, which undergo the qualifications, 
e. g., l simultaneously born, etc. ; nor are these connected by their 
own nature. Therefore, these specific cognitions being incapable of a 
different proof, the Substance which establishes the specification,. 
is Time 6. 

Like Air, Time is a substance, and is eternal. 

UpatkAra. It may be said, " Let Time bo proved. But there is no proof that it is 
a Substance, nor that it is eternal." So he says : 



II ^ I R I V3 II 

Dravyatva-nityatve, substanceness arid eternality. 
VAyuna, by Air. qitqi?T Yyakhyate, explained. 

7. The Substance-ness and eternality (of Time) are explained 
by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) 
Air. 86. 

The meaning is that, as the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance,, 



KANADA SfrTRAS II, 2,8. 77 



1 ecause it possesses Attributes, and is eternal, because it is a Sub 
stance which does not contain any other Substance, so also is Time. 7. 

Like Existence, Time is one. 

UpaskAra. " Even then," it may be said, " there may bo a plurality of Times." So h* 
nays : 



II R i ^ i s 11 

Tattvam, unity. Tl^f Bhtivena, by Existence. 

8. The unity (of Time is explained), by (the explanation of 
the unity of) Existence. 87. 

The aphorism has grammatical connection with the word 
* vyakhyfite in the last aphorism, reduced to the form vyakhyatam/ 
The meaning is : Time, like Existence, is one, because, in spite of 
their multiplicity, the marks of Time, viz., the cognition it is slow or 
late, etc., are the same in all places, and because no distinguishing- 
mark, like those of Souls, exists. 

It may be objected, " Time is manifold according to the difference 
of moments, two-moments, hours, three-hours, days, days-and-nights^ 
fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. How then can it be 
one ?" We reply that ii is not so, because the appearance of difference 
is due to upddhi or an external condition. For, it is found, that as the 
self-same crystal appears to be different according to the reflection 
thrown upon it by the external condition or upddhi of a China rose, 
tdpinja (Xanthochymus Pictorius), etc., so also does the one 
and indivisible Time appear to be different according to the limit set 
by the movement of the Sun, etc., as well as according to the limit 
imposed by their respective effects. Thus moment (ksana) is the- 
external condition of Time, which does not pervade or cover another 
external condition of Time, or it is Time which is not the receptacle of 
the counter-opposite of the prior as well as posterior non-existence of 
what is placed or contained in it ; and this should be understood from. 
the production of something and the destruction of something at every 
moment. It is proved by the Veda that a i lava/ is an aggregate of 
two moments, and so on. 

" Yet," it may be objected," " Time must be at least three-fold, 
according to the difference of the past, the future, and the present ; for 
it is heard, The three times return, < The three Times are not accom 
plished or proved, etc." We reply, it is not, for the use of three-fold 
Time is due to the limits of (the existence of) a thing, its prior non-exis 
tence, and its total destruction. The Time which is determined or deli 
mited by a thing, is its present ; the Time which is delimited by they 
prior non-existonce of a thing, is its future ; and the Time which ia 
delimited by the total destruction of a thing, is its past. Thus the use 
of the threefoldness of Time depends upon thethreefoldness of tho deter 
minant or that which delimits. 8. 

Time, a cause of non-eternal Substances. 
a. H.fire he says that Time is the oaue* of all that is produced. 



VATES..:A PHILOSOPHY. 



n * R mi 

Nityogu, in eternal Substances. SHT^ Abhavat, because it does 
not exist. *f<?4!J Anityesu, in non-eternal Substances, u sr q; Bhfivat 
Because it exists. cir$ Orane, in tho cause. *iil*<n KalnkhyA, the 
name of Timo. ffa Iti, he:ice. 

9. The name Time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it 
does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non-eternal 
substances. 88. 

The word iti is used in the sense of be.-auso. For this roaso-i 
the name Tim 9 is applicable to < cause, i. e., tho cause of all that i* 
produced. He states the reason : " Because it does not exist i-i eter 
nals, aid because it exists in non-eternals." The meaning is this : 
cause in tho case of the eternals such as Ether, etc., there do not 
arise the cognition, " produced simultaneously," produced slowly or 
ate/ "produced quickly or early," "produced now," "produced during 
the day, * produced at night," etc., whereas cognitions of simultaneity 
etc., do arise in the case of tho non-eternals such as the pot, cloth etc 
therefore, by the methods of agreement as well as difference, Time is 
proved to be a cause. It is to be understood that Timo is tho occasional 
or efficient cause of all that is produced, not only in virtue of the cogni 
tions of simultaneity, etc., but also in virtue of the application of the 
terms, hibernal, vernal, pluvial, etc., to flowers, fruits, etc. 9. 



i.In fact, scriptural texts such as " All is produced from 
Time," etc., are proof that Time is the cause of every thing that is 
an effect. 

Mark of /Space. 

Upaskdra. Having finished the section on the mark of Time, ami goin,- to ba in the 
-aeotion on the mark of Spaoo, he says : 



f <T 



HO || 



in: Itah, from this, j^ Idam, this, ifr Iti, such. q<: Yatali, whence 
If q; Tat, that. ft*q" Disyam, relating to Space. ftf^flC Lifigam, mark. 



10, That which gives rise to such (cognition and usage) as 
"This (is remote, etc.) from this," (the same is) the mark of 
Space. 89. 

1 Disyam that which belongs to Space, i. e., is the mark of the in 
ference of Space. The meaning is this : Space is that substance 
4 from which/ in respect of two simulaneously existing bodies which are 
also fixed in (direction) and place, such ..cognition and usage arise 
that this/ i- e., the ground or substratum of the conjunctions of a com- 
partively large number of conjoint things, is prior to/ (other than or 
distinct from) this i. e., the substratum of the conjunctions of a com 
paratively small number of conjoint -things, and also that this/ i.e., 
the substratum of the comparative smallness in number of the conjunc 
tions of the conjoint, is posterior to this / iS-to, the substratum of the 



KANADA StiTRAS II, 2, 10. 70 

comparative largeness in number of the conjunctions of the conjoint^ 
For, without the existence of such a substance, there is no other means- 
of establishing a comparatively large or small number of the conjunc 
tions of the conjoint in the two bodies ; nor, without such establishment,, 
can there be any particular or concrete understanding about them res 
pectively ; nor, without such understanding, can Priority and Posteri 
ority arise ; nor, without their appearance, can. there be concrete 
cognition and usage about them. 

It cannot be said, " Let Time be the means also of establishing the 
conjunctions. What is the use of another Substance?" For Time is 
proved only as the means of establishing constant or unchaiigeable 
actions. If, on the contrary, it is supposed to be the means of establish 
ing the inconstant or changing property of Remoteness, then it would 
establish the colouring of the paste of the saffron of Kasmira (Cashmere) 
on the breasts of the women of Karnata (the Carnatic). The same will 
be the implication if Ether and Soul also are similarly made to be the 
means of communicating the prcperty of Remoteness. Whereas Space 
being proved only as the invariable means of communicating the pro 
perty ( f Remoteness, there is no such absurd implication. In this way 
Space, which establishes conjunctions, is really separate from Time,, 
which establishes actions. 

Moreover, these cognitions, namely " This is east of that/ " This- 
is south of that," " This is west of that," " This is north of that/ 
" This is soufh-east of that/ This is south-west of that/ " This is north 
west of that," " This is north-east of that," " This is below that/ "This, 
is above that," are brought together by the statement " This from 
this," because it is not possible for these cognitions to have another 
occasional or efficient cause. Further, Time establishes external con- 
ditiors or upddhis which are constant, while Space establishes external 
conditions or upddhis which are not constant. For, when one thing 
is present (in Time) with reference to another thing, that other 
thing also is l present with reference to the former : but in the case 
of the external condition OP upddhi of Space, there is no such rule or 
fixity, because that which is east in relation to a person, the very 
name sometime becomes west in relation to the same person. The same 
is to be observed with regard to north, ete., also. The direction or 
quarter which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun rises, with 
reference to another direction, is east in relation to the latter ; the 
direction which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun 
sets, with reference to another direction, is west in relation to th 
latter. Nearness, again, is the fewness of the conjunctions of the 
conjoint ; and these conjunctions with the sun, whether they be a few 
or many, are to be established by Space. In like manner, the direc 
tion, which is determined by the portion of Space falling on the left 
of a person facing towards east, is north ; the direction determined by 
the right division of such a person, is south ; while Tightness and left- 
ness are particular < classes residing in the constituent parts of the 
body. The direction, which is the support of the conjunction which is 
produced by an act of which Weight is the nou-combinative cause, is 
below ; and the direction, which is the support of the con junction which 
ia produced by the conjunction of Soul possessing adrigtam (invisblfr 



VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



consequences of conduct) or by the action of fire, is above. In this 
way, from their reference as east, etc., they are also otherwise referred 
to, as m the statement, " Directions are ten in number, as marked out 
by their being presided over by Indra, Agni, Yama, Nirrita, Varuna 
Vayu, boma, iSina, Naga, and Brahma." _ 10. 

Like Air, Space is a Substance, and is eternal. 

1 also eternality b3long to Sijac in thc 



n R i ?? n 

Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternality. 
Vayuna, by Air. sq^gi^f Vyakhayute, explained. 



11. The substanceness and eternality (of Space are) explained 
by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) 
Air. 90. 

The meaning is that it possesses Substance-ness, because it posses 
ses Attributes, and eternality, because it is independent of or non 
resident in any other substance. 11. 

Like Existence, Space is one. 
Upaskdra. Extending or attributing unity (to Space), he says : 



n ^ \ \ i n n 

Tattvam, unity. *Tlfr Bhavena, by Existence. 

12. The unity (of space is explained) by (the explanation of 
the unity of) Existence. 91. 

Unity is proved in Space, as in Existence, by the absence of differ 
ence in the marks of Space together with the non-existence of any 
differentiating mark. Separateness. of one, i. e., individuality, also 
belongs to Space, because individuality constantly follows unity. 12. 

Bhdsya. According to Kandda, it appears, there is but one Subs 
tance, variously called as Ether, Time, and Space. For, he has take:i 
much pain to establish the difference of Ether from tangible things, 
Self, and Mind, but he has made no attempt to prove the difference of 
Ether from Time and Space as well. Nor has he attempted to prove the 
difference of Time and Space themselves from any other Substance. It 
may be, therefore, considered that with the difference of Ether, the 
difference of Time and Space also has been established. But it may be 
asked, if there be one Substance only, how does it come to be variously 
called as Ether, Time, and Space ? He replies that this is due to the 
variety of effects produced by it (II ii. 13) and also to the variety ol 
external conditions attending it (II, ii, 14, 15, and 16.) 

Above continued. 

Upasklra.It may be asked, " If Space is only one, how then can there b3 its cognition 
use as ten quartern or directions ?, So ho sayj : 



KANiDA StTTRAS II, 1, 15. 81 



II 

Kuryya-visosena, owing to difference or distinction of 
effects, Tilled Nanatvain, multiplicity or diversity. 



13. The diversity (of Space) is due to the difference of 
effect 92. 

The meaning is that the attribution of multiplicity is due to the 
divergence of effects. 13. 

Directions explained. 
Vpaskdra. Showing the aforesaid divergence of effects, he says : . 



Aditya-saayogut, from the conjunction of th.3 sun. 
^ Bhuta-purvvat, past and gone, vffsfsqff: Bhayisyatah, future. 
Bhutfit, what has taken place or come into existence ; present. ^ 
Cha, and. Ri^ft, Prachi, east (lit. Orient). 

14. (The direction comes to be regarded as) the east, from 
the past, future, or present conjunction of the sun 93. 

The east (prfichi) is so called, because the sun first (prak) moves 
(anchati) there. Thus that direction is called the east, wherein the first 
conjunction of the sun took place, or will take place, or is taking place 
in the course of its circulation round Mount Meru. 

Here the reference to the three times rests upon the difference, of 
the conceptions of the present (i. e., the observer). For with some one 
on the morning of the previous day, the conjunction of the sun first 
took place in this direction ; therefore it is the east ; so the use of the 
word, east. With some other, the next day, the conjunction of the sun 
will first take place in this direction ; so, in view of this, the use of the 
word, east. With some other, again, at this moment, the conjunction 
of the sun is taking place in this direction ; so, in view of this, the use 
of the wcrd, east. In the word, l bhutat, the affix, l kta/ is used in the 
sense of incipient action. Therefore, no fixed point being invariably 
necessary, the repetition of the use of the word, east, is proved also in 
those cases, even where tbere is no conjunction of the sun, as at night, 
or at mid-day, etc. This is the import. 14. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. Extending the same method to the use of the other directions also; 
he says : 



?T-11 Tatha, similarly. ^f%UTl Daksina, south. R?fH), Pratichi, west. 
Udichi, north. ^ Cha, also. 

15. South, West, and North also are similarly (dis-tin- 
guished). 94. 



82 VA1ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



In the very same way, the use of the term, South, arises from the 
past, or future, or present conjunction of the sun with the mountain 
situated in the south direction. The use of the \Yest and North also 
is to be similarly understood. Kightness and leftness (have their 
technical or recognised meanings, or) have been explained above. 15. 

Aliovr continued. 

Vpask tra. Extending the very same method to the intervals of direction also, 
he lays : 



Etena, by this. f;Ji?f l?nf*, Digantaralani, intervals of Space or 
Direction. *tff??Jl?Tlfr, N^yakhyatani, explained. 

16. By this, the intervals of direction are explained. 95. 

The use of South-East arises from the intermixture of the mark 
of the East and. the South direction. Suuth-West, West-North, and 
North-East are to be similarly understood. 

It has been explained at length in Kantida-Raliasyam (lit-, the 
secret of Kauada) that Space or Direction is that universal Substance 
by which the above conjunctions of the sun are established. 16. 

Cause* of .Doubt or Disbelief. 

UpatMra. It has been already established that the characteristics, e. g. Colour, etc., 
of the four elements are essential, if they are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, 
and if not, then they are conditional or accidental. The marks of the universal substances* 
which are devoid of any distinctive Attribute, have also been stated. Now, the mark of 
Ether, . e. y Sound, should bo examined. And hero wo meet with the contradictory conclu 
sions of the Tantrikas. Some say that Sound is a Substance, and some call it an Attribute. 
Even when they call it an Attribute, it is eternal according to soive, while according to others 
it is non-eternal. Others, again, distinguish even in Sound another Sound, which they call 
by the name, ">9?>&ota." Accordingly, to begin the examination of Sound, he first of all 
establishes Doubt itself, which is the first element or mombr of an examination, by its 
characteristic and cause, and says : 



IR R I 

Samanya-pratyaksat, from the perception of the Genus 
or g* 3ral property. fejfaltWsncT Visesapratyaksat, from the non-precep- 
tion of the Species or special property or differentia, fsra^pj^:, ViSesa- 
smriteh, from the recollection of particulars, i. e,., alternatives. "9, Cha, 
and. ^1: Samsayah, doubt. 



17. Doubt arises from the perception of (the object contain 
ing) the general property, the non-perception of the differentia, and 
the recollection of the alternatives, all at once or in one act of 
thought. 96. 

Samanyapratyaksat means from the perception, i. e., apprehen 
sion, of the object which possesses the general property, the affix 
* matup, signifying possession, having been elided. Visesapratyaksat 
means from the non-perception or non-apprehension of the property 
which is the means of mutual differentiation, e. g., crooked, hollow, etc., 



KANADA SUTRAS II, 1, 17. 83 



and also head, hand, etc. Visesasmriteh means from tlie recollec 
tion of the particulars, i. t>,., the alternatives characterised as a trunk 
and as a person. Recollection also includes apprehension by sense, 
because, in some instances, bodies which are being perceived also 
become the alternatives. The word l cha brings together adfiatam 
(invisible consequences of voluntary conduct) etc., which are also the 
causes of Doubt. 

It has not been said that an individual or particular property is the 
source of uncertain knowledge. Nor has it been said that a particular or 
special property, being the means of discrimination, is such a c ause, 
and that this differenciation from similar and dissimilar objects is 
really the common property. Contradiction, again, consists of two 
propositions arising from two opposite conclusions ; one being Sound 
is eternal/ and the other being Sound is non-eternal. Both of them as 
well as both the forms of knowledge produced by them, do not together 
become the source of Doubt, since they do not exist simultaneously. 
Hence it has not been separately stated that there the cause of Doubt 
is either the non-common property, such as Soundness, or the 
common property, such as the being existent, the being the subject of 
proof, etc. 

Uncertain knowledge finds no place in the kindred system of 
Gautama (i. e., Nyaya Philosophy), and so a non-common property 
has been mentioned there as a cause of Doubt. Contradiction, i. e., 
two opposite propositions, containing as a rule a positive and a 
negative statement, has been mentioned as a cause of Doubt. In the 
commentary on Nyaya, Doubt has been described as five-fold, accord 
ing ay the fact that something is being perceived, or the fact that 
something is not being perceived, is the cause of Doubt. Thua 
Doubts may arise whether what is being perceived be existent, 
whether what is being perceived be non-existent, whether this 
thing which is being perceived be existent or non-existent, whether 
what is not being perceived be existent, such as a radish, a latch, 
etc., and whether what is not being perceived be non-existent, at 
a lotus in the air. But all these are really of the same kind, being 
explained in the very same way by the expression from the perception 
of the common property. Again, the three-foldness of Doubt, according 
to differences in its cause, as taught in the Nyaya-Yarttika, is also not 
possible, as tbe three, viz., common property, etc., themselves cannot be 
causes on. account of their variability. For heterogeneity should not 
be supposed here, like heterogeneity in fire produced from grass ; a 
strike-stick (arani) (i. e., where fire is kindled by striking two sticks 
against each other), and a gem, because ex hypothesi the causality 
consists of the common property of producing an effect defined by the 
characteristic of Doubt. The heterogeneity which is said to appear in 
the form of referring primarily to the positive alternative, or primarily 
to the negative alternative, etc., does not serve the purpose of a diffe 
rentia, as it is not sufficiently extensive, or wide. 

Thus Doubt is neither three-fold nor five-fold, but is of one kind 
only. The writer of the aphorisms, however, will himself explain its 
two-foldness in another respect. 



Universal Substances arc Ether, fcjpaue, Time, and Soul. 



VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



It may be objected, Doubt is knowledge which produces the desire 
to know. This is not the definition, as it overlaps uncertainty. Doubt 
is knowledge which does not produce impression (samskara). This too 
is common to unmodified or undiliereritiated knowled ge or state of cons 
ciousness ; for, if it is a concrete knowledge, then Doubt also produces 
an impression. Again though it is a class/ yet the quality of Doubt is 
not a characteristic, for as the quality of Doubt does not reside in the 
object containing the property (the perception of which is the occasion 
of the Doubtj, the class also does not appear there, since it is not found 
that a, class appears elsewhere than in what it classifies." To this our 
reply is that from the definition of Doubt it follows that Doubt is know 
ledge of diverse and contradictory forms in respect of one and the same 
object 17. 

Cause* of Doubt or Disbelief continued. 

Upashira. Doubt is two-fold : that which relates to external objects, and that which 
relates to internal objects. And that which relates to external objects, is also tow fold : 
where the object is visible, and where the object is not visible. Of these, Doubt, in which 
the object is visible, may be illustrated as the uncertainty whether it be a post or a person, 
which arises on seeing some object distinguished by height ; and Doubt, in which the object 
is not visible, is such as when on seeing the horns only in the body of a cow or a gayal (Bos 
gavseus), etc., which is concealed by the intervention of a bush, etc., the uncertainty arises, 
"whether it bo a cow or a gayal." In fact, in the latter case also the Doubt really relates 
to the property of the horn, i. e., whether the horns are the horns of a cow or of a gayal. The 
statement of the two-foldness of Doubt is however, a figure of .speech. Now, the (ieiius (. e., 
Common property) which is the source of Doubt, raises Doubt by being observed either in 
more than one object or one object. He explains the first kind : f- 



fg Dristam, that which is seen. <g Cha, and sg^ drista-vat, Like 
that which was seen. 

18. And that which is seen, resembles that which was seen 
(this also is the source of Doubt.) 97. 

Height, which is seen, is the source of Doubt. Dristavat is formed 
by yati/ i. e., the affix of similarity. Thus, something similar to the 
previously seen post and person, lies before. The meaning is that the 
height, which is observed in what lies before, is a source of Doubt, be 
cause it has been previously observed (in more than one object). 18. 

Causes of Doubt or Disbelief. continued. 
Vpaskdra, Ho illustrates the observed common property which relates to one object : 



Yathu-dristam, that which has been seen in a certain form 
t A-yatha-dristatvat, because it is not seen in that form, g 
Cha, and. 

19. (Doubt also arises), where that which has been seen in 
one form, is seen in a different form. 98. 

" The source of Doubt" this completes the aphorism. The word 
1 cha understands what has been said before. The meaning is that 



KAN AD A StiTRAS II, 1, 20. 85 

because an object is seen in a different form, therefore that which was 
seen in a certain form, also gives rise to Doubt, as Chaitra who was seen 
in a certain form, * . e., with hair on his head, is at another time seen not 
in that form, i. e., with the hair removed. Then afterwards when the 
very same Chaitra is seen with his head covered with a piece of cloth, 
Doubt arises whether this Chaitra has hair or not. Here the identity 
of Chaitra is the common property which gives rise to Doubt, and it is 
seen in one object only. Therefore what is here the source of Doubt is 
seen in one, undifferentiated object. 19. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. He says that the very common property of being (cognised or) the object of 
thought is the cause of Doubt : 

n 

Vidyu-a-vidyata, from science and uescienc. g Cha, 
and. ?j<m: Sarksayali, Doubt. 



20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience. 99. 

Internal Doubt really springs from science and nescience. For 
instance, an astronomer predicts correctly, and predicts incorrectly 
eclipses of the moon, etc. Accordingly Doubt arises in his mind as to 
his knowledge, whether it be accurate or not. Or knowledge is some- 
- times science, and sometimes nescience, f. e., wanting in proof ; and 
consequently, Doubt arises with respect to something, whether, ivas- 
tnuch as it is known, it be existent or non-existent. 

The retention of the word, Doubt, in the aphorism, indicates that 
here, too, Doubt arises only from the perception of the common property, 
and not from any other source. Thus the opinion held by some that 
he uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition alluded 
to in the definition of Gautama, "Doubt is deliberation in expectation 
of a differentia, due to the proof of the common properties as well as 
of the properties of similar and dissimilar objects, the non-proof of, 
or uncertainty as to, these properties, and also the uncertainty or in 
constancy of cognition and non-cognition, " (Nyaya-Sutras I. I. 22), is 
a different source of Doubt, is hereby refuted. 20. 

Vivfiti. Here the affix tasi in vidya-avidyatas is used in the 
genitive sense. Therefore the expression means "of true knowledge and 
false knowledge." And the doubt is whether it be true knowledge or 
false knowledge. From the word cha/ and, it follows that Doubt 
as regards the object of knowledge also arises from the perception of 
the common property. Thus, The mountain contains fire/ The lake con 
tains fire/ in these and other causes of true or false knowledge, the 
Doubt, whether such knowledge be true or false, arises from the know 
ledge of the common property of their both being knowledge. In like 
manner, after such Doubt, Doubt also arises whether the mountain con 
tains fire or not, whether the lake contains fire or. not, etc., from the 
knowledge of the common property of their being objects of knowledge. 
Now, .a contrary certainly, the proof of which has not been obtained, is 
opposed to Doubt, and the Doubt whether it be true knowledge or false 



86 VA1SESIKA PHILOSOPHY 



knowledge operates to dispel such contrary certainty. And not that 
such Doubt of itself gives rise to Doubt about the object of knowledge. 

Sound wliat ? 

Upajkdra. Having thus elucidated the nature and characteristic of Doubt v.-hioh is the 
first member of an examination, he now explains the object Sound which is the subject matter 
of examination, and says : 

*fts*f: *T J?JS3[: II R I R I R? II 



: Srotra-grahanah, of which ear is the organ of apprehension. 
Ij: Yah, which, ?JJ: Arthah, object, tf: Sah, that. qs: Sabdah, sound. 

21. Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehen 
sion is the Ear. 100. 

Srotragrahanah means that of which ear is the organ or instru 
ment of apprehension. Arthah means that which contains properties. 
So that the definition has not the defect of over-extending to Sound 
ness, loudr.ess, etc., Attribute-ness, Existence, and other properties 
residing in Sound and capable of being perceived by the ear. By the 
word arthah meaning that which contains properties, the possession of 
a class property is intended ; hereby it is indicated that Sound called 
/Sphota (i. e., by which the words of a sentence can convey a complete 
sense), inherent in Sound, does not exist. 

It may be argued as follows ; Sphota must be postulated on the 
Strength of the intuitions, ore word/ one sentence. for the intuition, 
of unity does not arise in a word composed of several letters, nor in a 
sentence composed of several letters. And the word spliota forms a 
name or nominal on which the elucidation of the sense depends. The 
letters individually do not at all produce the intuition of the meaning 
of the whole sentence; their combination again is impossible, because 
they speedily disappear, being uttered by one speaker ; therefore the 
intuition of the sense of the whole arises from sphota only, because 
elucidation of the sense does not take place without the knowledge of 
it. And this sphota,, although it is present in one and all the letters 
standing as words, yet becomes manifest in the last letter. " We reply 
that it is not so. Conventional letters form words. Thus the sense 
being intuited from the word in virtue of convention alone, what is the 
use of sphota? The use of the expression one word is a pretence, inten 
ded to denote the one property of making up one sense, possessed by a 
large number of letters. So also in the case of a sentence. If some 
inner meaning of the word, beyond that of its component letters, could 
be apprehended by perception, then the same might have been admitted 
to be sphota. Therefore the author of the aphorisms has overlooked this 
doctrine of sphota as being of no consideration 21. 

Causes of Doubt with respect to Sound. 

Upaskura. Sound having thus appeared as an object which,contains properties, its being 
the mark or Ether depends so-lely on its being an Attribute. Therefore to establish its Attri 
bute-ness, he brings out the trilateral Doubt, and says : 

RR I II 



KANADA SUTRAS II. 2. 23. 87 



Tulya-jatiyesu, in homogeneous tilings. 3p4! ? fT J ^f Arthan- 
t&rabhiites ii, in heterogeneous things ff^R^ ViSosasya, of the par 
ticular, i. e., the difference, or differentia. 3^-11 Ubhayathu, in both. 
CEW^ Dristatv&t, the being observed ; because it is observed. 

22. (Doubt arises in respect of Sound), because its dif 
ference is observed both in (from) homogeneous objects and in 
(from) heterogeneous objects. 101. 

" Doubt arises in respect of sound/ is the complement of the 
aphorism. Sound-ness and perceptibility by the ear are observed in 
Sound. And this gives rise to Doubt whether Sound be an Attribute, 
or a Substance, or an Action, because ihe partcular/ i. e., difference 
or divergence is observed both in homogeneoiis objects, namely the 
twenty-three Attributes, and in heterogeneous objects, namely Subs 
tances, and Actions. But Doubt, whether it be a Genus, or a Species, 
or a Combination, does not arise, inasmuch as difference in point of 
being existent, being produced by a cause, etc., is observed. 

It may be said, " A non-common property cannot be the cause of 
Doubt by being the cause of indecision or uncertainty. And Sound 
ness as well as perceptibility by the ear is really a non-commou pro 
perty." We say : Truly its difference or divergence is common to homo 
geneous and hetrogeneous things, and so only this common difference 
or divergence has been stated to be the cause of Doubt. Difference or 
divergence, which is the counter-opposite of Sound-ness, is tho common 
property ; and the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of the 
difference or divergence belonging to both, in other words, Sound-ness, 
is the non-common property. Therefore it has been said : " From the 
observation of the difference in both. Here the observation of parti 
cular, i. e.j the difference, in both, i. e., in homogeneous and heterogene 
ous things, constituting tho cause of Doubt, it becomes really the 
common property. 22. 

Sound not a Substance. 

Vpaskdra. -Showing Doubt in this way, he says, in order to eliminate the alternative 
of Substanoe-ness : 

H 

Eka-dravyatvat, because it resides in one Substance. *T 
Na, not. 3*tf Dravyam, Substance. 

23. (Sound) is not a Substance, since it resides in one Subs 
tance only. 102. 

Ekadravyam J is that which has one Substance ouly as its combi 
native cause. And no Substance whatever contains a single Substace 
as its combinative cause. Therefore, owing to this difference in property 
from Substances, this Sound is not a Substance. This is the meaning. 
23. 



88 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Nor an Action. 

Upaskdrct.T.t may be said, !: Action is surely uni-.sub^tantial. Therefore Sound may 
be an Action," So he says : 

* i R i w u 



f Na, not. nf( A pi, also ^rT Karmma, action, sl^f^JTOiq; Acluiksu- 
satvut, not being visible*. 

24. Nor (is Sound) an Action, because it is not an object of 
visual perception. 103. 

Because the intuition of perception of Sou, id is not visual, i. ^., is 
produced by an external so.iso-organ other than the eye. So that the 
import is that, like the quality of Taste, etc., Sound-ness also does not 
reside in Actions, because it is a l class wbich does not reside in the 
objects of visual perception. 24. 

Round iy tranxittn!, and not eternal. 

"Upasltdra. If it is said that, as it speedily disappears, liko Turowing upwards, etc , 
therefc.ro Sound is an Action ; so ho sayo : 



Gunasya, of Attribute. ^T^: Satah, being. 3JTW i : Aj)avargah, 
speedy destruction, frwffa; Karmmabhih, with Actions. tfN^q Sadharm- 
myara, resemblance. 

25. The resemblance (of Sound), although it is an Attribute, 
with Actions, consists in its speedy destruction. 104. 

Apavargah means speedy destruction. And this, eveu in the case 
of Attribute-ness, is dependent upon the incidence of a rapidly appearing 
destroyer, in the same way as duality, etc., are. This constitutes only 
its resemblance to Actions, and not its Action-ness. The quality of 
undergoing rapid destruction which you (i. e., the objector) advance as 
as an argument, is not one-pointed i. e., multifarious, because it is found 
in Duality, Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, etc., as well. This is the 
import. 25. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. It may bo said, " Lst Sound be proved as an Attribute. Still it cannot be 
the mark of the existence of Ether. For it would justify the inference of Ether, if it were 
an effect of it. But it is eternal instead Its occasional non-cognition, however, is duo to 
the absence of something which could reveal it." With this apprehension, he says : 

n * i R 

fl-fl : Satah, of (Sound as) existent. fir^PTWi; Lingabhavat, from the 
absence of mark. 

26. (Sound does not exist before utterance), because there is 
no mark of (Sound as) evistent (before utterance), 105, 



KANADA SftTRAS II, 2, 29. 8fr 

For, if Sound were existent (before and after utterance), then there 
would be found some mark, i. e., additional proof, of it as existent. 
But in the state of non-hearing, there is no proof that Sound exists. 
Therefore it is only an effect, and not something which requires to- 
be revealed only. 26- 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. He says that for this reason also, it (Sound) Is not something which only 
requires to be made known : 



Nitya-vaiadharmmyat, owing to difference in property 
from what is eternal. 

27. (Sound is not something which only requires to be 
brought to light), because it differs in property from what is 
eternal. 106. 

The difference of Sound from what is eternal, is observed. Where 
as, as in " Chaitra speaks/ the existence of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., even 
though they are covered from view, may be inferred from their voice ;. 
and whereas that which reveals, e. g., the lap, etc., is never inferred 
by that which is revealed, e. y.. the water-pot, etc. ; therefore Sound 
is only a product, and not something which requires to be brought to 
light. This is the sense.- 27- 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra Pointing out, the objections to |itB being something to be revealed only he 
now states the ground of its being non-eternal : 



: II R I R I 

vf^3l: Anityah, non-eternal. ^ Cha, and. ?nq Ayaru, it. qswiTft: Kara- 
natah, from its having a cause. 

28. And Sound is non-eternal, (because it is observed to be 
produced) by a cause. 107. 

" Because its production is observed," this is the complement. 
For Sound is observed as issuing out of the (temporary) conjunction 
of the drum and the drum-stick, etc. So that it is non-eternal, because 
it has a production (or beginning). Or " From a cause " may imply 
the reason that it has a cause. 28. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. Lest it might be said that the possession of a cause is disproved in Sound by 
its very nature, BO he says : 



IM i * i *& u 



n Na, not. ^ Cha, and. ?jfe^ Asiddham, disproved. fcnVTTOl Yikarat 
from change. 



VAIESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



29. Nor is (the dependence of Sound upon a cause) dis 
proved by its modifications. 108. 

From observing the loudtiess, softness, and other modifications, it 
should not be concluded that the possession of a cause by Sound is 
thereby disproved. For a loud or soft sound is perceived according 
to the hardness or softness of the beating of the drum with the drum 
stick, and the like ; whereas the loudness, etc., (. e., the intensity) 
of that which is made known, is not dependent on the loudness, etc., 
(t. e., the intensity) of that which makes it known. Hence from its 
undergoing modification according to the modification of the 
cause, it is inferred to be a product, and not something to be revealed 
only 29. 

Above -continued. 

Upaikdra. It may bo argued, " It is the virtue of that which reveals, that it reveals 
in the form of intensity, softness, eto. And it is Air impelled by the drum and the drum 
stick, etc., which, being intense and soft or slow (in velocity and volume), produces lik 
perceptions," Hence he says : 



n * i * v> u 

Abhivyaktau, in (the theory of the) manifestation or revela 
tion (of Sound). iVn^ Dosat, from defect. Because there will be a defect. 



30. (Sound is not eternal), because the theory that it requires 
to be revealed only, will entail a defect. 109. 

On the theory of the revelation of Sound, the defect will arise that 
(in each case) an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed 
will have to be admitted in respect of things co-existent and caj able 
of being perceived by the same sense. But the invariable relation-ship 
of the revealer and the revealed is nowhere observed of such things. 
If it be not assumed here, then it will follow that on the manifestation 
of one letter, say ka, all the letters will become manifest. The rejoinder 
that an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed is in fact 
observed to obtain among the characteristic of being existent, the 
characteristic of being a man, and the characteristic of being a Brah- 
mana, which are also co-extensive and are revealed by their individual 
difference, situation, and origin, is invalid. For they lack in beii g 
co-extensive, inasmuch as the extension of the characteristic of being 
a man, or of the characteristic of being a Brahmana, is not so large as 
that of the characteristic of being existent. 30. 

Above continued (Production of Sound.) 

Upasfcdra. He says that for the following reason also Sound is not something which 
requires to be revealed only : 



n R i ^ i \\ n 

amyogat, from Conjunction. ft<rt?mf Vibhagat, from Dis 
junction. j Cha, and. <I5$1^ 6abdat, from Sound. ^ Cha, and. 
frT: Sabda-nigpattih, production of St und. 



KANlDA SUTRAS II, 2, 33. 91 

31. Sound is produced from Conjunction, from Disjunction, 
and from Sound also. 110. 

From Conjunction i. e., from Conjunction of the drum and the 
drum-stick. From Disjunctio., i. e., when a bamboo is being split up. 
Here Conjunction is by no means the cause of the fiist Sound, because 
there is then no Conjunction. Therefore the Disjunction of the two 
halves of the bamboo is the efficient or conditional cause, and the Dis 
junction of the halves and Ether is the non-combii,ative cause. And 
where Sound is produced in a distant flute, and the like, there Sound 
which is produced in the order of a current, reaches the portion of 
Lther limited by the hollow of the ear, and thereby becomes heard. 
1 heref ore Sound is produced from Sound also. 31. 

Abcve continued. 
Upaskdra. He brings forward another ground of its being non-eternal : 

II 



ffl^:^ Lingat, from its mark. BT Cha, and. Slfac 1 *: Ariitya^? non- 
eternal. fl5^: oabdah, Sound. 

32. Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark. 111. 

The meaning is that Sound, consisting of letters ( i. e., articulate 
Sound), is tion-eternal, because, while possessing a class/ it is capaple 
or beii.g perceived by the ear, like the Sound of a lute, etc. 12. 

Arguments for the eternality of Sound. 

Upaxkura. No\v, in order to confute the arguments, advanced by the conclusioniat (tha 
Minuimsa thinker), in support of the eternality of Sound, he says : 

u * i * i ^ u 



tt(: Dvayoh, of both. Tu, but. S,^t: Provrittyoh, of the activities 
-or occupations. ^>JjEU<l Abhavat, from the non-existence or absence. 

33. (Sound is eternal), because (otherwise) the occupations 
of both (the teacher and the pupil) will vanish out of exis 

tence. 112. 

The word tu cuts off connection with the context, and introduces 
the statement of an objection of the first party. The occupation or em 
ployment of both/ i. *., of the teacher and the pupil i, teahing and 
learning respectively, is observed. " From its non-existence or absence," 
i e.y from the entailment of its non-existence. For teaching is an act of 
gift or donation. The teacher makes a gift of the Veda to the pupil. If 
it is something constant or fixed, then a donation of it is possible. The 
second party may say, " A cow, and the like which are being given away, 
are perceived as standing between the donor and the donee ; whereas 
the Veda, etc., are not perceived as lying between the teacher and the 
pupil. Therefore teaching cannot be a donation." Our (i. e., the first 
party s) reply is that they are perceived in the interval between the 



92 VAlgEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

teacher and the pupil by the ear of a person standing there. Moreover, 
the eternality of Sound follows from recurrence also. As in " He sees 
the colour for five times/ the recurrence or persistency of colour which 
is constant or permanent is observed, so the recurrence or persistency 
of Sound in " The anuvdka or paragraph has been read ten times, 
twenty times," is proof of the constancy or permanence of Sound. And 
constancy or steadiness being proved, since nothing is known which 
can destroy it, its eternality also is necessarily proved, on the principle 
" What will afterwards destroy it which is constant or lasting all this 
time ?" This is the import. 33. 

Arguments for the eternality of Sound continued. 
UpasJcdra.-~ He translates another reason urged in favour of the eternality of Sound : 



Prathamasabhfit, from the word the first. 

34. From the word, trie-first, (it follows that Sound is 
eternal). 113. 

The meaning is that the thrice recitation of the first and the last 
mantra for kindling a sacrificial fire, as enjoined in the text, " The first 
should be recited three times, the last three times/ is not justified or 
accountable without the steadiness of Sound. 34. 

Bhdsya reads H- A ii- 34 as Prathamd-ddi-/Sabddt while the meaning 
remains unchanged. ( Adi = and others, e- </., the second). 

Above continued. 

Upakdra.So translates another reason advanced by the oonolusionist for the eternality 
of Sound : 



II ^l R I * II 



Sampratipatti-bhav&t, from the possibility or existence 
of recognition. ^ Cha, and. 

35. (The eternality of Sound follows), also from the pos 
sibility of recognition. 114. 

Sampratipatti-bhavat i.e., from the existence of recognition. 
The word pratipatti (cognition) alone would have conveyed the sense 
of recognition which is a particular kind of the former ; therefore the 
prefix Sam (in the sense of thorough-ness) implies certainty. Thus, 
" He is reciting the very same poem which was recited by Maitra," 
" He is reading the same verse over and over again," " You are repea 
tedly saying the same thing which has been said before/ " You are 
veu now making the very same statement which was made by you last 
year and the year before," " It is that same letter ga," on the strength 
of the recognition of Sound in such cases, the steadiness or permanence 
of Sound is proved. 35. 



KANlDA SftTRAS II, 2, 37. 93 



The same refuted. 
Upaskdra.~ Confuting all these reasons, he says : 



m 

(: Saridigdhah, Doubtful. Uncertain. Inconclusive, flfa Sati, 
existing. qgf Bahutve, plurality. 

36. Plurality (of Sound) existing, (these arguments are) 
inconclusive. 115. 

Sandighah, i. e., not one-pointed. So it has been said, " Kailyapa 
taught that a contradictory, unproved, or uncertain mark was no mark." 
Thus it is oberved that there can be learning, repetition, and also re 
cognition, also if there is a plurality of diversity of Sound, therefore 
these arguments are inconclusive. For, "He learns dancing," "He prac 
tises dancing." "He danced the same dance twice/ "You are dancing the 
ame dance to-day, which you danced the other day," "This man also is 
dancing the same dance which was danced by another dancer," in 
these cases, learning, repetition, and recognition (of Action) are obser 
ved. But you (the conclusionist) too do not on this account admit the 
permanence (or eternality) of dancing which is a particular kind of 
Acti ng 36. 

Bhdsya : reads II. ii. 36 as simply sandigdhdh, supplying for him 
self the reason for the declaration there, and joins the latter part of it 
to II. ii. 37, a-id interprets it to mean that in spite of plurality of indivi 
dual sounds, their definite enumeration is possible by means of reference 
to their genera or types. 

Counter objection stated and answered. 

Upaskdra.lt may be objected, Fifty letters ; an eight-lettered mantra ; a three-lettered 
mantra ; the eight-lettered raetra, anustubk ; ete. How can there be suoh uses of members, 
when, the letters being non-eternal, there is a possibility of their being infinite in number 
according to the difference of utterance ? " So he says : 



IM i * i ^ u 

Samkhyabhavah, the existence or application of Number. 
s Samanyatafyjfrom Genus. 

37. The existence of number (in Sound) is with reference 
to the Genus. 116. 

The meaning is thab the existence of the number, fifty, etc., arises 
from the class notion of fca, ga, etc. Although there might be an infini 
ty of ka Sj etc., the letters determined by the notions of fca, ga, etc., are 
fifty, three, or eight, in the same way as Substances, Attributes, etc., 
are nine, twenty-four, etc., although there may be an infinity of them 
according to differences within the group of each of them. This is the> 
import. 



94 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



The objector may say: " This is that ga," This recognition itself 
proves the permanence of Sound. Nor is it opposed by the perception, 
* Loud ga, soft ga, which conveys, contrary properties ; because loud- 
ness, etc., are there due to external conditions. Nor is it to be main 
tained that there cannot appear any difference from the difference of 
the external condition also ; for, then, the crystal also will not shine as- 
different, developing in the form of blue, yellow, etc., from the con 
junction of the China rose tdpinja, etc., nor will the face also, when 
reflected as elongated, etc., in the sword-blade, jewel, and looking-glass, 
appear to be different. If it be asked, To what does this property of 
loudness, etc., belong, which influences ga ? We reply : It may be the- 
property of Air, or of utterance, or of resonance. What is the use of 
fixing upon the particular one amongst them ? You also admit that 
loudness, etc., are natural distinctions, as the relation of high and low 
amongst them cannot be established or explained by the notions of 
ka, ga, etc." 

We reply : It is not so. Because even when such contrary percep 
tion exists, viz., ga is produced, <ja is destroyed, < ga which was just 
heard, does not exist, the noise has stopped, etc., if this recognation 
d jes not then cease, then it must be supposed to relate to class-notions. 
Otherwise such recognition coming to rest upon the permanence or 
steadi-ness of individual Sounds, the above contrary perceptions. 
themselves would not be produced. Nor is this the property of Air,,, 
because the properties of Air are not the objects of aural perception. 
Nor again is it the property of the utterance ; for if utterance is only 
Air, then the defect has been already pointed out ; if it is something 
else, then nobody, can say what it is. Nor again is it the property of 
resonance, for loudness, etc., are perceived also in the resonance from, 
the conch, etc., even though ya is not found there. The naturalness of 
loudness, etc., however, does not involve an intermixture of classes, for 
its diversity is obtained from its being pervaded by the class-notion of 
ga, etc., Moreover, there is a very distinct mode of distinguishing 
forms in the ga s, etc., utterer by male and female parrots and man, 
as also in those uttered by a male and a female, as well as in those 
uttered by those who are neither males nor females ; by which a parrot,, 
etc., concealed from vision by branches, a screen, etc., are inferred. 
But their being produced by external conditions does not arise from 
external conditions which can be perceived, as in " a young woman 
looking yellow with saffron." Nor is their being produced by external 
conditions proved by argument, for no proof of such a conclusion 
exists. So far in brief. 37. 

Here ends the second chapter of the second book in ^ankara s- 
commentary on the Vaisesika aphorisms. 

Vivrtti Some explain the production of Sound on the principle- 
of ripples and waves. According to them, the first Sound is produced 
from the impact of a drum and a drum-stick, etc., within the limits of 
that particular Space. Then outside that circle and within the confines. 
of the ten quarters the second Sound is produced from the first, and 
extends it. After that, beyond this second circle, and within the confines- 
of the ten quarters, the third Sound is produced from the second. And 



KANlDA SfiTRAB II, 1-10. 95 



in the same way the production of the fourth and other Sounds should 
be understood. Others, however, hold that the production of Sound 
takes place on the principle of the ball of the kadamba flower. In their 
view, the second and other Sounds are neither single nor confined to 
the ten quarters take;i together, but are produced ten-fold in ten-quar 
ters. (Thus the one is the theory of the successive production of single 
Sounds, while the other is the theory of the simultaneous production of 
multiple Sounds). " This is the difference. 



VIA&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



BOOK THIRD CHAPTER FIRST. 

Objects <f the senses. 

Upaskdra. Having thus in the second book completed he examination of the external 
Substances, the another following the order of enumeration, now proceeds to construct a basis 
for an inauiry respecting the Soul. 



: II \ I \ I ?ll 

: Prasiddhah, universally known, perceived, ff^qisrf: Indri- 
object of the senses. 
1. The objects of the senses are universally known. 117. 

The objects of the Senses, c. <j., Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch, and 
Sound, are capable of being apprehended by the several external sens 3- 
organs. Amongst them, the universal cognition or experience of S mnd 
having been shown by the aphorism, " Sound is that object of which the- 
organ of apprehension is the ear " (II. ii. 21). it is in like manner 
demonstrated that Smell, etc., ending with Touch (i.e., Smell, Taste, 
Colour, Touch) are universally known. Thus Smell is that object of 
which the organ of apprehension is the olfactory organ ; Taste is that 
object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of taste ; Colour 
is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the eye alone ; 
Touch is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of 
touch alone. And by the word, object there is, in all these cases, 
denoted a real entity possessed of properties, and therefore the defini 
tions cannot be too wide by over-extending to Smell-ness, etc., and to 
the non-existence of Smell, etc. Hence Smell-ness is the possession of 
a sub-class of Attribute-ness, appearing in what is apprehended by the 
olfactory organ. So also with regard to Taste, etc. Consequently,. 
supersensuous Smell, etc., are not left out. 1. 

yivfiti __ Prasiddhah, means subject of ascertainment by per 
ception. 

Mark of supersensuous object. 

UpasTcdra He explains the application of the universal (experience o" the objects of the 
aenses to the inquiry respecting the Soul. 



indriyartha-prasiddhih, the universal experience of 
the objects of the senses. ff^ JTsfc T: Indriyarthebhyah, from the senses- 
and their object, sjsifar^q Arthantarasya, of a different object. \$j: 
Hetuh, mark. 

2. The universal experience of the objects of the senses is 
the mark of (the existence of) object different from she senses and 
their objects. 118. 

Hetuh/ t. e. t Mark, Arthantarasya, i, e.. of the Soul. Indriyar 
thebhyah, i. e. t from the senses as well as their objects. The meaning- 
is that it is the mark of the Soul which is a different object from Colour^ 



K ANADA SUTRAS III, 1, 4. 97 



etc-, as well as from those which possess them. Though it is implied here 
that only knowledge is the mark of the existence of the Soul, yet inas 
much as there being a universal experience of the objects of the senses, 
the immediate presentation to the mind of Colour, etc., is more com- 
monly known, the mark of there being a Soul is described as constituted 
by tliat universal experience. Wow this universal ex] erience must 
: reside somewhere, either as an effect as a water-pot, or as an Attribute, 
or as an Action. This universal experience, again, since it is an act in 
the same manner as cutting is an act, must be produced by an instru- 
ment. That which is the instrument of the universal experience is the 
senses ; and the latter, being an instrument, must be employed by an 
agent, as an axe and the like, are employed. Thus, that in which this 
universal experience resides, and which employs the olfactory and other 
organs for its instruments, is the Soul. 2. 

The body or the st-nses are not the seat of perception. 

U,pax\idrQ. Lest it be said, "Let the body or the senses be the foundation of the universal 
experience or perception, because their presence and absence are more manifest as determin 
ing perception. What is the use of the ^supposition of any other foundation? Thus, consci 
ous-ness is an attribute of the body, being its effect, dike its Colour, etc. The same should be 
understood in tne case of its beirg an attribute of the senses ; " so he says : 



M I ? I ^ II 

^T: S:ih, that, i. e., perception. 3H<T^3r: Anapadesah, the semblance 
or simulacrum of a mark ; a false mark. 

3. Perception (as a mark inferring the body or the senses as 
its substratum) (is) a false mark. 119. 

( Anapadeiah mea^s the appearance or semblance of an apadesa/ 
i. e., mark. Thus the meaning is that the being an effect of the body or 
the senses is the mere semblance of a mark, inasmuch as such an argu- 
jm,ent applies to the cognition produced by a lamp is therefore not-one- 
.pointed, i. e., multifarious 3. 

BTidsyd The sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference 
of ; the geif. 

Above continued. 

!.}..:., ii 

Upaxkdra. It may bo rejoined, " By the being an effect of the body or the senses is 
meant the being an effect of them only in so far as they are determined by the characteristic 
of consciousness ; whereas the whole of consciousness is not the effect of the lamp, eto. There 
fore there is no indeterminateness of fluctuation." So he says : 



II ^ I ? I S II 

Karanajnanat, because the causes or constituents are 
devoid of cognition or consciousness. 

|, 4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), 
because there is no consciousness in the causes (i.e., the component 
parts, of the body). 120. 



98 VAI&ESIKA. PHILOSOPHY. 

It is mea,nt (that the body or the senses cannot be the seat of per 
ception), because of the absence of consciousness in the hands, feet, etc., 
or in their parts, which are the causes, i.e., components of the body. For 
it is observed that the particular attributes of Earth, etc., are preceded 
by like attributes in their causes. In like manner, if there existed 
consciousness in the components of the body, it might possibly exist 
also in the body. But this is not the case. It cannot be urged that 
consciousness may exist also in the components of the body ; for it 
would entail the absence of uniformity in the actions of the body, since 
uniformity is never observed amongst a plurality of sentient beings. It 
would then alsj follow that, after the amputation of the hand, there will 
be no more recollection of that which was experie iced within the limit 
of the hand, according to the maxim, il One does not remember that 
which has bean experienced by another." Moreover, the supposition 
would entail that, after the destruction of the body, there would be no 
experience of the Cv> isequences of the acts performed by the body, e. (/., 
causing hurt, etc., for certainly Maitra does not suffer the consequences 
of the sins committed by Ohaitra. And hence there would be a i anni 
hilate) i of acts performel, a id a i acce-ion of acts not performed. 4. 

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continue l- 

Upaskdra. It may be added in objection that consciousness exists in a minute degree in 
the components of the body, whereas it is manifest in the body, and that therefore it cannot 
be said that it is not preceded by a like attribute in the cause, nor does there arise the impos 
sibility of uniformity. Anticipating this, he says : 

\\\ m * n 



Karyesu, in the effects. 3TT*U^ Jfumat, (because there would 
be consciousness. 

5. Because (there would be) consciousness in the effects. 
121. 

If, as a matter of fact, consciousness existed in the primary causes 
of the body, namely the ultimate atoms, then it would also exist in the 
water-pot, etc., which are the effects originated by them also. Moreover, 
consciousness would exist in products such as water-pots, etc., also 
because the particular attributes of Earth pervade all terrene ex 
istence. But consciousness is not observed to exist in these 
products. 5. 

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued. 

Upaskdra. In anticipation of the further rejoinder that consciousness) ray in reality 
exist, in an imperceptible degree, in the water-pot, etc., also, he saya : 



Ajnanat, because it is not known. *% Cha, and. 

6. And because it is not known (that any minute degree of 
consciousness exists in the water-pot, etc). 122. 



KANADA SftTRAS III, 1, 7. 99 



The meaning is that there is no consciousness in the water-jar,. 
etc., inasmuch as it is not known by any means of knowledge. If you 
admit that which is beyond the range of all means of knowledge, then 
you will have to admit also that a hare has horns, and so on. For, by 
no kind of evidence, is it known that consciousness exists in the 
water-jar, etc 6. 



Titi. It is more proper to conceive some one other substance as 
the seat of consciousness than to imagine a plurality of consciousness 
iu various portions of matter. This is the import. 

On the theory that consciousness resides in the body, recollection 
of what is experienced in infancy, will be impossible in youth, etc t 
because of the non-existence of that which had the experience, since 
the destruction of the infant-body must be observed by the destruction 
of its material. Similarly, there would be no activity at sucking the 
breasts on the part of a child just born, because of the impossibility 
at that stage of the understanding that this is the means of attaining- 
the desirable which is the cause of activity. According to the advocate 
of the existence of a separate conscious being, the activity explained by 
the possibility of reminiscence due to the impression produced by the- 
understanding in the previous birth that this is the means of attaining 
the desirable. Recollection of other experiences in the previous birth. 
does not take place owing the absence of appropriate extern nl 
stimuli. 

Bhdsya. reads III. i. 5 and 6 as one aphorism, and explains it in 
the sense that as cognition is found within one effect, e. g., the body, 
and is not found within another effect, e. g., a jar, therefore, it follows 
that there can be no cognition in their combinative causes (which must 
be same in both cases). 

Fallacious mark. 

UpaskAra. It may be urged, " It has been affirmed that an employer (a presiding soul) 
is inferred from the organ of hearing tand other instruments. But this is not a legitimate 
inference, for the auditory and other organs are neither identical with, nor are produced 
by, the Soul, and, unless one of these alternatives be admitted, there|is.no proof of the universal 
concomitance or inseparable existence of these organs and the Soul ; and, unless there be suck 
inseparable existence, thero can bo no inference." So he says in reply : 



\ 



I ? I vs n 



Anyat, something else. ^ Eva, certainly. \?j: Hetuh, make. 
jfr! Iti, hence. W^nflf:. Anapadesah, no mark. 

7. A mark is certainly something else (than that of which 
it is a mark). Hence (a mark, which is identical with the thing 
of which it is a mark, is) no mark (at all.) 123. 

The mark or means of proof can but be something else than that 
which is t-> be proved. It cannot be identical with that which is to be 
proved ; for, were it so, it would follow that the thing which is to be 
proved, would have no differance from the means of proof. Therefore, a. 
means of proof, constituted by identity with that which is to be proved, 
is no means of proof, i. e., no mark at all. 7. 



100 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Bhdsya. Something quite different is the mark of inference of the 
Self; the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this 
* something quite different is, is declared in the eighteenth aphorism 
of this chapter. 

Fallacious mark continued. 

UpaskAra. It be may said, "As the Soul is not identical with the auditory and other 
organs of sense, so there is no production of the latter from the former. For the senseorgans 
of hearing, etc., are not produod from the Soul, as smoke is produced from fire " So he says : 



II ^ I ? I c; || 

fcrc Arthantaram, any one thing : ft Hi, because- 9rafcTC9T Arlh- 

antarasya, of any other thing. ^TT^T: Anapadesh, not a mark. 

8. (Although a mark is quite different from that of which 
it is a mark, still they are not wholly unconnected), for, any oi.e 
thing cannot be a mark of any other thing. 124. 

Because, as the effect, e. g., smoke, etc., is a different thing from 
an ass, so it is also a different thing from its cause, e. g., fire, etc. So 
that i i the absence of any distinction in respect of being a different 
object, a particular nature is the regulative principle here, whereby 
the smoke does not infer an ass, but only fire. And if that nature 
belongs to any thing other than the effect, then that too really becomes 
a mark. Thus an effect cannot be a mark, if it is devoid of the parti 
cular nature intended here. Thus, identity and causation only cons 
titute inseparable existence or universal concomitance ; these two are 
reduced into inseparable existence ; or, it is co-ordinate with them as 
the principle of inference ; or, its apprehension is dependent upon 
the apprehension of the above two only. Hence the aphorism is only 
the statement of an argument for causing confusion to the disciples 
in the above way. This is the import. 8. 

Marks of inference. 

Upaskdra. Now, in order to make it clear that universal concomitance or inseparable 
existence may be found elsewhere than in the cases of identity and causation, he saya : 



n \ i ? i s. i) 

Sariayogi, the conjunct. ^Mlfa Samavayi, the combined or in 
herent. ijTr^^TT^rf^ Ekarthasamavayi, the combined together in oi.e 
thing, or co-inherent. R<tf^I Virodhi, the contradictory. 



9. The conjunct, the combined, the con-combined, and the 
contradictory also (are marks of inference). 125. 

" The body has skin, because it is the body" here the mark is 
the conjunct or the contiguous. For skin is described as a natural in 
tegument of matter capable of growth and decay. And it is neither an 
effect nor a cause of the body, but merely produced together with the 
body and in invariable conjunction with it. Similarly, the combined is 
also a mark. For instance, " Ether possesses Magnitude or extension, 
"because it is a Substance, like a water-pot, etc." ; here Magnitude or 



KANADA StfTRAS III, 1, 12. 101 



extension which is to be proved is proved by the property of Substance- 
ness which is in essential combination with Ether. Or, to take another 
example. Tho extension of an atom, a particular form or limit of exten 
sion or Magnitude is proved by this that the relativity or degree of 
-extension or Magnitude must somewhere cease ; whereby the ultimate 
atom is inferred as that in which the limit of extension rests. 

The inference of Ether by Sound, etc., and the inference of the Soul 
by knowledge, etc., are inferences of the cause by the effect ; so that 
they are not i-istanced here. 9. 

Marks of inference continued. 
Upask ira Tae author of the aphorisms illustrates the co-inherent or co-existent 



II \ I ? ( ? II 

q Karyyam, an effect. ^TT^qfaTC^ Karyyantarasyi, of another effect. 
10. One effect (may be ^he mark of inference) of another 
effect. 126. 

An effect 6. g., Colour, is the mark of another effect, e. g., Touch. 
This is merely illustrative. Thus, that which is not an effect, e. g., the 
unity of Ether, is a mark of the individual separateness of Ether, and 
so in the case of its extreme largeness. 10. 

Above continued. 
Upaskdra. He illustrates the contradictory mark. 

II \ I ? I \\ II 



Virodhi, the contradictory. ^PJrf Abhiitam, the non-existent, 
or non-product, or that which has not taken place. ^cT^T Bhutasya, of 
the existent, or that which has taken place. 

11. The opposite, i.e., the non-existent (is a mark) of the 
existent. 127. 

That which has not taken place, e. g., a shower, [is a mark of that which 
has taken place, e. g., the conjunction of air and clouds, (where clouds 
l^eing dispersed by air, showers do not take place). So also is the 
recitation of a mantra which is the contradictory or counter-agent of 
a tumour, etc. Thus that which has not taken place, i. e., has not been 
produced, e. g., a tumour, etc., is the mark ef that which has taken 
place, e. g., the recitation of a mantra or sacred text, (where a tumour is 
prevented by the recitation of the appropriate mantra"). 14. 

Marks of inference continued. 
[7pa8kdra.T3.e gives another illustration of a contradictory mark : 

II \ I ? \ ?R II 



v$3 Bhutam, that which has taken place. ^T*|?T^T Abhutasya, of that 
which has not taken place. 



102 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

12. That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which 
has not taken place. 128. 

That which has taken place, e. g , a tumour, etc., is a mark of that 
which has not taken place, e. </., the, recitation of a mantra. So also that 
which has taken place, e. y., the conjunction of air aid cloudsis amark 
of that which has not taken place, e. g., a shower. Similarly that which 
has taken place, e. g., a burn, is a mark of that which has not taken 
place, e. y., the application of a gem, etc., to destroy the burning pcwer 
of the fire. Similar instances should be understood. 12. 

iLbove continued. 
Upaskdra. He illustrates another contradictory mark : 

n * m 



ijjr: Bhufcah, that which has taken place *$3^T Bhutasya, of that 
which has taken place. 

13. That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which 
has taken place. 129. 

There is sometimes inference of an existing contradictory from an 
other existing contradictory ; as when, on seeing a snake swelling with 
anger, it is inferred that there is an ichneumon behind a bush. In this 
case, the snake excited is that which is, existet t, ai d the ichneumon 
hidden by the bush is also in existence. Therefore, an existent r 
as the mark of another existent object. On the other hand, a shower 
cannot exist at the same time as the conjunction of air and clouds, 
nor can tumours, etc., co-exist with the recitation of mantras. 13. 

MarTfs of inference continued. 
UpaskArc. Now he shows the importance or use of the above recapitulation : 



I ^ I f I tVHI 

Prasiddhipurvakatvat, because preceded by (the re 

collection of) the pervasion or universal relation. 3n^R3J Apade6asya r 
of the mark. 

14. (These are valid marks), because the characteristic of an 
inferential mark is that it is preceded by (the recollection of the) 
universal relation (of itself and of that of which it is a mark). 
130. 

Prasiddhi means recollection of universal relation. Apadesa r 
denotes a mark. Therefore the mark attended with the recollection of 
universal relation, is described by that member of an argument which 
states the mark, or by that member which states the deduction ; so that 
the mark is, as has been stated, preceded by recollection of universal 
relation. Thus universal relation, (i. e. } a true major premiss) exists- 
in all these cases of inference of an agent by the instruments suchas- 

organ of hearing, etc., and of the Soul as their substratum by th& 



KANADA StTTRS II, 1, 14. 103 

attributes such as knowledge, etc.; whereas there is no universal rela 
tion in the inference by which you (i. e., the opponent) have sought to 
establish knowledge as a i attribute of the body, through the mark 
that it is an effect o? the body. This is the import. 

It may be asked, what is this universal relation ? It is not merely 
inviolable relation /for, in the case of inference from cause to effect, 
it is not known that inviolable or invariable concomitance is the being 
not the ground of the co-existence of the absolute non-existence of 
ihat which has to be proved, and because inference from cause to effect 
it is impossible that invariable concomitance is the not being the seat 
-of that which is not the seat of that which has to be proved, and 
also because smoke, etc., are the seat of that which is not the seat of 
that, whatever it may be, which has to be proved. 

Nor is it inseparable existence, for that is either the non-existence 
-of the mark i i the absence of that which is to be proved, or existence 
of the mark after deduction has been drawn from that which is to be 
prove 1. It cannot be said that because sometimes there is non-existence 
of smoke, also where no ass exists, and there is existence of smoke also 
where an ass exists, therefore uniform agreement and uniform difference 
-are intended here ; because the very same uniformity is the subject of 
enquiry. 

Nor is it relation to a whole. If it be the relation of the whole of 
the major term to the middle term, such relation does not exist even 
in the case of smoke, etc., which are not equally pervasive as their 
corresponding major terms. Let it be relation of the whole of the 
middle term to the major term ; but this is impossible, for there does 
not exist in the whole of the middle term relation to a single major 
term- Let it be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole 
of the middle term. This also is not valid, for it is nowhere possible 
-that there should be relation of the whole of the major term to the 
whole of the middle term, inasmuch as the individuals denoted by the 
major and ths middle term are related each to each. And in the 
case of the terms being unequally pervasive, there would be a want 
of pervasion or universal relation. 

Nor is the relation essential. For essence means either the nature 
or condition of a thing, or (condition in itself, or production by itself). 
Now, if the nominal affix which converts * essence into the form 
4 essential, has the sense of production thereby, then the definition 
will be too narrow to apply to universal relation characterised as 
-Combination. If the affix bears the sense of dependence upon it or 
-residing in it, in that case also the definition will be too narrow to 
-apply to Combination, for combination does not reside in, i. e., depend 
upon, anything whatever ; and also because even Conjunction neither 
resides in, nor is produced by, smoke-ness, etc., which are the pro 
perties of the middle term. 

Nor is the relation, non-accidental or non-coditional. For an 
up&dhi, accident or external co idition, itself is difficult to ascribe, and 
were it easy to ascribe, would be difficult to conceive. And were it 
asy to conceive, it would still involve mutual dependence or 



104 YAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

* reciprocity or argument in a circle, for there being pervasion of 
the major term, the conception of the non-pervasion, etc., of the middle 
term would depend upon the conception of the universal relation. 

Nor is universal relation mere relation. Fcr, though variable 
relation also appears as universal relation, though its reference to 
particular place and particular time, yet, as the knowledge of it does 
not govern the inferential process, it is, therefore, required to deter- 

-mine that universal relation only which, by being known, will become 
the means of inference. . , , . 

Nor is universal relation co-existence with the major term which 
is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence appertaining to 
that which contains the middle term, (i. e., the rniuor term; For fire- 
also is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence, presort -ih 
that which has smoke, since it is not that in a kitchen hearth there is. 

not the absolute non-existence of volcaiii c fire. In such a,n intance 
as "This has conjuncetion, because ii is a Substance," the definition 

would become too narrow, as the absolute non-existence of Conjunction 
would be co-extensive with the mark or means of inference. It cannot 

l be said,- Universal relation is co-extension with the major term which 
is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence which is 
co-extensive with itself and which is the contradictory of the countpr- 
opposite, because the absolute non-existence of conjunction falls short 
of being the contradictory of the counteropposite." For the absulute 
non-existence of conjunction also is the contradictory of the counter- 

. opposite ; otherwise, it would be useless to imagine differences of 

/delimiting circumstances for differences , of delimitations are not 
imagined for the purpose of showing the states ;of -being produced and 

.non-eternal. ; 

Nor is universal relation the not being the foundation or substratum 

of non-co-extension with the major term ; for in the inference from 

cause to effect, there is not konwn any such non-co-extension with the 

-major term. It is in fact another form of being th^ foundation of that 

which is not the foundation of the major term. 

Nor is the universal relation of a thing the possession of the form 
which determines its relation to something else, for the characteristic 
,of fire also has the function of, determining relation to or the co- 
extensioji of smoke. It cannot be sait that because of wider extension 
this is not the case ; for it i,s o^sevred that, that which determines the- 
pervasion (e. g., fire) has a wider extension (in other words, fire exists- 
where there is no smoke), and the characteristic of Smoke also has a- 
wider extension inasmuch as there exists smoke pendant on the surface 
of the sky e. g., in clouds;. If therefore, a qualification be added for 
the purpose of excluding such instances, then it must be allowed that, 
that which determines the characteristic of being the middle term. 
(yy&pycC) the same is intended to determine the characteristic of being 
co-extended, and hence there is the fallacy of self-dependence (Atmdsra- 
yo). The view also that two things are universally related, when the 
One possesses the form of determining the co-existence of the other in a. 
common substratum, is fallacious in the same way. 

In reply to the above objections, we may proceed to state as- 
follows: pervasion or universal relation is a non-accidental relation; 



KANADA SftTRAS III, 1, 14. 105 



while by the being non-accidental is meant co-existence in the same 
substratum with a variably present sddhya or that \\hich has to be 
proved (i.e., the major term which is predicated of the minor, in the con 
clusion), of all those in which the mark or middle term is sometimes 
present and sometimes absent, or co-existence in the same substratum 
with a yddhyd co-existent with the absolute non-existence of the counter- 
opposites of all those which are the counter-opposites of the absolute noi - 
existence co-existing in the same substratum with the mark. The mean 
ing of the two expressions is co- existence in the same substratum with 
the sddhya which is not pervaded by anything that does not pervade tie 
sddhana or the middle term ; in other words, it is the characteristic < f 
being pervaded by all that which is jervasive of the sddhya. It may 
be said that this is difficult to understand from the relative com 
pound which has been employed here. For this reason there is i. eed of 
observation and argument also. In other words, pervasion, vydjiti, is 
co-existence in the same substratum with the sddhya which is i. ot the 
counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same 
substratum with the sddhana. By absolute non-existence is intended 
that which possesses the counter-opposite determined by the genera of 
fire-ness, etc., Therefore, even though in the smoke of the kitchen 
hearth there is co-existence in the same substratum with the absolute 
non-existence of mountain fire, yet it is no fault, because there never 
Arises the intuition that there is not fire in that which has smoke. 
Substanceness, however, is never co-existent in the same substratum 
with the absolute non-existence of the charateristic of being in con 
junction, for we never have the intuition that substance is not con 
junct, because, although conjunctions singly do not appear in that 
which is the subject of pervasion, yet the generic quality of being 
conjunct appears in that which is the subject of pervasion, and is 
itself pervasive. 

Objection. But the being non-accidental implies the absence of 
accident or adjunct, upddhi ; and upddhi itself is difficult to obtain. 

Answer. It is not so. Because the characteistic of upddhi belongs 
to that which does not pervade the sddhana, i. e., the middle term, while 
it does pervade the sddhya, i. e., the major term. So it has been said, 
" upddhi is that which is dependent upon another upddhi, (for determin 
ing non accidentally), in the case of the sddhana, and which is not 
dependent upon another upddhi, (for determining non-accidentality), 
in the case of the sddhya." 

Objection. But the definition does not include an upddhi which is 
only non -pervasive of the sddhya. For example, A iris perceptible, because 
it is the substratum of touch which is perceptible. Here the possession 
of developed colour is such an upddhi. So also is the characteristic of 
being produced by eating herbs (which might produce blackness), in, 
* He is black, because he is the son of Mitr& " (a low-born woman). For, 
the possession of developed colour is not pervasive of perceptibility, 
since it does not exist in the perception of the Soul as well as of Attri 
bute and Action ; nor is the characteristic of being produced by eating- 
herbs pervasive of blackness, since it does not exist in the case of the 
blacki.ess of the black crow, cuckoo, cloud, black-berries, etc. 



106 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Answer The objection is not valid. For, that which is non-perva 
sive of the sddhana, while it is pervasive of the sddhya as finally deter* 
mined, the same is intended as the upddhi. And a sddhya becomes 
finally determined, when it is determined by a property, by determina 
tion by which the pervasiveness of the upddhi remains unbroken. In the 
instances given the possession of developed colour is pervasion of per 
ceptibility by the determination or limitation of external substantiality, 
and is apprehended by agreement and difference. As regards the second 
instance, it has been ascertained in the works of Charaka, SuSruta, and 
other medical writers, that the characteristic of being produced by 
eating herbs is pervasive towards the sddhya determined by the black 
ness of a person, which can be produced (artificially). Other cases 
should be similarly understood. 

Objection. Still it is not the meaning of the word, updplii. An 
upddhi is something the property of which shines in another object, t-g-, 
a China rose, etc., in reference to a crystal, etc. In the case of an un 
equally pervaded upddhi, there being absence of the characteristic of 
that which can be pervaded, its property cannot shine in the approved 
sddhana. 

Answer. This is true. The primary use of the word, upddhi, is 
only where it is equally pervaded (as the sddhya), e. g-,in the possession 
of fire produced from moist faggots, (for wherever there is such fire r 
there is smoke, and vice versa). In other places, its use is secondary. 
The secondary sense infers variation, or deviation, according to the 
rule that, that which deviates from the pervader of something, also 
deviates from that thing. And there exists sddhana which deviates fyom 
the upddhi which is pervasive of the sddhya. Hence, that the sddhana 
deviates from the sddhya, and that, that which is not pervaded by that 
which pervades an object, is also not pervaded by that object, together 
infer that there is no proof of the characteristic of being pervaded, or 
brings forward a contrary argument, satpratipaksa* there being proof 
of the non-existence of the sddhya from the non-existence of the upddhi, 
which is pervasive of the sddhya, in the paksa, i. e., the subject, which 
is the minor term). So it has been said, u The disputant may bring 
forward an upddhi, governing the sddhya finally determined, even 
though it be divorced from the rule or determination of the sddhya 
maintained by the speaker, such upddhi being equally (a means of 
discrediting the conclusion, or) a source of xatpratipaksa." And such 
upddhi is brought forward by arguments adverse to the absence of 
arguments in favour of bddha obstruction, (i. e., the certainty of the 
non-existence of the sddhya), and deviation (i. e-, the non-co-existence 
of the sddhana with the sddhya). 

It has boen held that by the non-co-existence of which the non-cc- 
existence of the sddhana with the sddhya arises, the same is upddhi. But 
here the instrumental case-ending is used to express neither instrument, 
nor means, mode, nor mark. Nor is the construction to be completed 
thus, By the non-co-existence of which beingknown, the non-co-existence 
of the sddhana with the sddhya becomes known ; for the definition, not 

* satpratipaksA has boen defined as " an argument which contains a counter-mark capable 
of demonstrating the non-existence ef that which has te be proved," (vide Tarka-samgrahaj. 



KANADA StTTRAS III, 2, 16. 107 

applying to an unknown upddhi, would not apply to upddhis in obvious 
cases of non-co-existence. It is diffcult to ascertain it (i. e., upddhiy 
significatively or by its significance, since it is impossible to formulate 
or invent, an upddhi without (first) establishing the characteristic of 
being the means of the inference of non-co-existence. The characteris 
tic of being other than the paksa (or the subject of the conclusion), 
again, though suffering from the characteristic of an upddhi, is yet not 
an upddhi ; for, it would involve obstruction to itself, e. g., dubiousness 
and not-one-pointedness in the paksa. For if there is no doubt about 
it, then it is not a paksa ; if it is a paksa, then doubt is necessary, and 
consequently, dubiousness and not-one-pointed-ness become certain. 
That which remains to be said on this topic, may be sought in the 
Mayukha. 14. 

Enumer ration of fallacies. 

Upaskdsa. Now. with a view to distinguish (logical) marks (of inference) which have 
gone before as well as those which will come hereafter, from fallacious marks, he begins the 
section of fallacies, ardisays : 



: II ^ I ? I 

Aprasiddhah, unproved, ^jsfq^l : Anapedesah, a fallacious 
mark. ?^r^ Asan, non-existent. tff?5*>*: Sandigdhah^, dubious. *3 Cha, and. 
i =*H c ffol: Anapadesa^i, A fallacious mark. 

15. The unproved is a false mark ; the non-existent and the 
dubious also are false marks. 131. 

1 Aprasiddhah, means that which is not pervaded or in universal 
relation, and that the universal relation of which has not been observed, 
and that which is in opposite universal relation, i. e., the contradictory. 
The word includes the two forms of the unproved, in point of universal 
relation or being pervaded, arid the contradictory. Asan means non 
existent in the paksa or the minor term, i. e., that which has not the 
property or possibility of residing in the paksa or subject. And this is 
due sometimes to the unreality of the form (attributed to the mark), and 
sometimes to the absence of uncertainty and the desire to prove as) in 
the proof of that which has been already proved. Sandigdhah means 
that which causes the doubt whether the sddhya be existent or iion-exist- 
ent (in the subject of the conclusion). And this arises sometimes from 
the observation of common property, sometimes from the observation of 
a non-common property, and sometimes from the observation of the 
mark accompanying the sddhya as well as its non-existence. The first 
is general multifarious, the second is particular multifarious, and the 
third is inconclusive. 15. 

Bhdsyi. splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms: " Aprasidhah 
anapadtsak " and Asanasandigdhah cha anapadesah." 

Fallacy illustrated. 

Upaskdra. Of the above-mentioned false marks, he gives an illustration or a mark which. 
is fallacious because it is not pervaded by the denotation of the major term, also because it is 
contradictory, and also because it is not known to exist in the form attributed to it : 



: M 1 1 1 1* u 



108 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Yasmat, because. ftmqft Visani, (It) has horns. ?npn^. Tasmat, 
therefore. 9J>^: Afivah, a horse. 

16. Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a horse. 132. 

Where, the hody of an ass becoming the paksa or subject of the 
conclusion, such confusion, as u This is what is a horse, because it has 
horns," due to the observation of the negative co-existence (or, simply, 
disagreement) that that which is not a horse is not horned as a hare, 
a jackal, a man, a monkey, etc., prevails, there it is an example of the 
not-pervaded, the unreal, and the contradictory marks (i. e., the 
fallacies of noa-pervasion, unreality, and contradiction). 16. 

Above continued. 
Upaskdra. Ha illustrates multifariouenesa : 



Yasmat, because, fa^mft VisjXni, (it) has horns. <T^Tct Tasmat, 
therefore. ft: Gauh, a cow. fft Iti, such, this. "^ Cha, and. 

Anaikantikasya, of a not-one-pointed or many-sided mark. 
Udaharanam, an example. 

17. And, "Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a cow, * 
such is the example of a many-sided (mark). 133. 

Where, taking a buffalo as the paksa or subject, it is concluded that 
it is a cow because it has horns, there is general many-sided-ness. But 
when it is concluded that Ether is eternal because it is the seat of 
Sound, then there is particular many-sided-ness. So also in such ex 
amples as " Sound is non-eternal because it is sound," there being no 
universal relation, there is only particular many-sided-ness. But when 
the sddhya or the middle term is proved (to exist) only in the paska or 
the minor term, by bringing forward arguments which exclude vipaksa* 
or contrary instances, it is then, that is, when co-existence with sapaksa^ 
(or objects of the same class as the paksa), becomes known, that the 
mark of inference is a valid mark, for a paksa j also must be a sapakxa. 

There, (i. e., in the fifteenth Sdtram above), the unproved is that 
which is not proved by pervaded appearance in the paksa. And it is 
three-fold : (a) unproved in point of being pervaded, (6) unproved as 
such or by itself, (* . e., in respect of the form attributed to it), and (c) 
unproved by substratum or situation. Of these, the unproved in point 
of being pervaded, is that of which the pervasion or invariable co-exist 
ence has not been observed, whether from the non-observation of 
actually existing pervasion, or from the non-existence of pervasion. 
Hence the non-existence of favourable arguments, etc., are different 
kinds of the unproved. And this invalid mark has a thousand divisions 
according to the diversity of impossibility of predicate, impossibility of 

* Vipaksa is that wherein the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is certain. 
t Sapaksa is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is certain. 
t Paksa or subject, is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, i 
doubtful. 



KANlDA StfTRAS III, 1, 16- 109 



subject, impossibility of both, uncertainty and impossibility of predicate, 
uncertainty and impossibility of subject, uncertainty and impossibility 
of both, and so on. And in all these cases, only absence of proof can be 
-discerned. 

Here the idea is this : The mark of inference is of three kinds only, 
according to its division into the purely positive, the positive-and- 
negative, and the purely negative. Amongst these, the purely positive 
is an attribute belonging to all subjects of attributes, (i- e., objects) ; 
.e.g., knowableness, nameableness, qualifiability, predicability, absolute 
non-existence of annihilation in attributes etc., destructible by the 
destruction of the subtratum of the absolute non-existence of eternal 
substances, etc. For, no such thing exists, as that in which these 
attributes do not exist. The characteristic of the purely positive, there 
fore, is that it penetrates everywhere, or that it is the counter-opposite 
of absolute non-existence. Though these exist in themselves also, 
(and so that uniformity of the mutual distinction of the container and 
the contained, is violated), that is no fault ; for it has been said, li In 
the case of appearance or existence (of one thing in another), recourse 
should be had to proof, and not to that which establishes difference and 
non-difference." 

That mark is purely positive, of which the sddhyaia purely positive. 
Of this there are four forms, namely, existence of the paksa } existence 
of the sapaksa, unobstructedness, and the not being confronted with a 
.satpratipaksa or equally valid argument to the contrary, which are the 
means of leading to inference. The same, together with the non-exist 
ence of the vipaksa, are the five forme of the positive-and-negative. 
With the exception of the existence of the sapaksa the remaining are 
the four forms of the purely negative. That mark, therefore, is a mere 
semblance, i. e., a false mark, which is void of one or another of all the 
forms which, as a true mark, it might possess as the means of leading 
-to ait inference. Accordingly, the characteristic of being a false mark 
or fallacy, is the being void of One or another of the forms which are 
the means of leading to an inference. Hence doubt also, like certainty, 
about the voidness of one or another of these forms, is an obstruction 
to inference, and proof of the inconclusiveness of the mark put forward 
by the speaker. But the purely positive and purely negative mark? do 
not become fallacies by being void of one or another of their forms ; 
because, in the case of the purely positive, non-existence of the vipaksa, 
and in the case of the purely negative, existence of the sapaksa, lack 
the characteristic of being the means of leading to an inference. Simi 
larly, the unproved by situation (e. g., a castle in the air), the unproved 
by itself (e. g., a golden lion), and the unproved in part, are fallacies 
by reason of the absence of that form which is existence of the paksa ; 
the unproved in point of being pervaded, the contradictory, and the 
; general many-sided, are fallacies by reason of defect in that form 
which is non-existence of vipaksa; the particular many-sided and the 
inconclusive are fallacies by reason of defect as regards existence of 
the sapaksa ; the obstructed and the confronted with an equally valid 
argument to the contrary, are fallacies by reason of the absence of 
the characteristics of not being obstructed and of not being confronted 
with an equally valid argument to the contrary. So also, accidental- 



110 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



ness and inapplicability do not lead to inference, because of the 
absence of certainty of tlje non-existence of the vipaksa absence of 
favourable argument, and unfavourable argument, also do not lead to 
inference because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of 
the vipaksa. In like manner, apparent (but fallacious) examples^ 
inadequate in regard to the sddhya, or in regard to the yAdhana, 
or in regard to both, if invalid as being fallacies, are so through the 
uncertainty of the existence of the sapaksa. If they are fallacious by 
themselves as being examples in appearance only, yet they are so 
mediately through the mark which is the same uncertainty of existence- 
of the sapaksa. 

Marks of which the positiveness or agreement is not manifest, and 
marks of which the negativeness or difference is not manifest, however,, 
are resolved only into the insufficient, the inopportune, and the ground 
of defeat. 

Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circle in an argument, and 
infinite regression, by unsettling the certainty of universal relation or 
pervasion, become deficient in respect of one or the other of the forms 
of existence of the sapaksa and non-existence of the vipaksa, and there 
by acquire the nature of fallacies. 

Amongst these fallacies, that is accompanied with non-co-existence,. 
which causes doubt alternating between the existeace and the non- 
existence of the sddhya. The contradictory is that fallacy which pro 
duces certainty of the non-existence of the sddhya. The unproved is 
that which is void of pervasion, existence in the paksa and proving. 
According to Kasyapa, obstruction and an equally valid argument to 
the contrary are not independent fallacies. Of these, obstruction 
resolves itself either as the unproved by situation, or as the many- 
sided ; as it has been said, " In obstruction (bddhd~), the mark is either 
non-existent in the paksa, or is many-sided." An equally valid argu 
ment to the contrary, also by causing doubt in respect of pervasion or 
invariable co-existence, etc., in other places, really resolves itself into 
the many-sided, etc. 

The writer of the vritti, however, says that the word, cha/ in the- 
Sutram, ^MRi^tSTq^fts^T^ ^V^^FH^T: (III, i, 15, ibid ), has the sense of 
bringing forward bddhd (obstruction} and satpratipaksa (an equally valid 
argument to the contrary), and thereby follows the view of Gautama 
as expressed in thosdtram, " Fallacies are five, that which is accompanied 
with non-co*existence, the contradictory, that which is identical with 
the paksa that which is identical with the sddhya and that which is 
post in time,"(Nyaya Sutram, 1. ii.4). But, from such statements as 
" The contradictory, the unproved, and the dubious, declared Kasyapa, 
are no marks," it appears that the Sutrakara, i. e. } Kanada), himself 
was inclined to uphold the threefoldness of fallacy. The word cha/ 
however, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated 
before. 

This ; s the idea. I have not dilated upon it for fear of increasing; 
the bulk of the book. More details should be sought in Maytikha. 17. 

Mark of Inference of Soul. 
. H.Q now points out the result of the analysis of fallacies : 



KANADA SUTRAS III, 1,18. Ill 



i ^ i ? I ?c; ii 

Atma-indriya-artha-sannikarsat, from contact 
of the soul, the sense, and the object. ^ Yat, which. f^|T^ Nispadyate, 
is produced. ?TJ Tat, that. ?TI^ Anyat, other, different. 



18. That (i. e., knowledge) which is produced from the 
contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false 
mark). 134. 

From the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, it is know 
ledge that is produced. And it is a mark of the existence of the soul, 
and, as such a mark, is different from the unproved, the contradictory, 
and the many-sided, that is to say, is not a fallacy. Thus, knowledge 
is, in two ways, a mark of the existence of the soul ; either by the 
inference that knowledge must reside somewhere, because it is an effect, 
like colour, etc., or by assuming the form of recognition, e. </., " I who 
saw am the same as I who am touching." In. the former case, effectness 
belonging to knowledge is not unproved, because of the assertion 
" (that) which is produced ;" nor it is contradictory, for here, as in all 
other instances of analoguous inference or inference from a sdmdnya- 
todrista, or commonly -observed mark, there can be no contradiction ; 
nor is it many-sidod, for the very same reason. So that by means of 
the commonly observed characteristic, appertaining to it, viz., of being 
an effect or an attribute, knowledge truly becomes a mark of the 
existence of the soul. Recognition, again, resiling from other agents, 
resolves into having but one agent or cause. 

(The Bauddha theory criticised.) 

Objection. Recognition may be also due entirely to the relation of 
effect and cause subsisting between understanding and consciousness. 

Answer. This cannot be, as it would entail recognition also, of the 
understandings of the disciple and the preceptor. 

Objection. But relation of the matter (i.e., knowledge which causes 
activity or inclination) and the form does not exist there; and that 
relation is the exciting cause of recognition. 

Answer. Matter, having the property of Substance, cannot 
possibly exist in the understanding (which is an attribute). Even if 
its existence were possible, understandings being momentary, recogni 
tion of what was perceived before, would not be possible. For, no 
impression is thrust into subsequent understandings by a previous 
understanding, since you do not admit the existence of an abiding 
impression. And if it consists of the form of a stream of temporary 
understandings, it cannot be the cause of recollection at another time, 
nor of recognition. 

Objection. The stream of subjective consciousness, which is really 
different from the stream of objective consciousness, is that which ra 
collects as well as that which recognises. 



112 VAlSESxJiA PHILOSOPHY. 

Answer If it is permanent, then our obeject is fulfilled. If it is of 
the form of a stream of temporary understandings, then it has not yet 
freed itself from the fault already pointed out ; for then even there- 
can be no permanent impression. Moreover, proof is wanting that it 
is something different from objective consciousness. 

Objection Proof is supplied by the stream of understandings, I 
am, am/ and so on. 

Answer. May be. But if here states of objective consciousness- 
take in or receive as their matter, only the subjective consciousness, 
then, in the absence of the characteristic of being the matter, from the- 
states of objective consciousness, their efficient causality also will, 
disappear ; for efficient causality is derived from the characteristic of 
being pervaded by the characteristic of the material cause. 

Objection. Let there be no efficient causality also. 

Answer. In that case, their existence also is gone. For the cha 
racteristic of an entity or real substance is that it is the means of 
serving necessary purposes. 

Objection. Both the streams are received, as material, jointly by 
the stream of objective consciousness and the stream of subjective- 
consciousness. 

Answer. If it is so, then what fault has been committed by con~ 
junction of wholes made up of parts, etc., when you also admit that 
a cause can operate at a different place ? 

Therefore, recognition proves, as being permanent, the soul which 
is inferred by knowledge, as its substratum. Hence nothing remains- 
unproved. 

Or, the stitram, <i||cHP4^m*<jfilhMf^ qfasq^ W5R; is calculated to- 
refute the Saiiakhya theory that the understanding, being eternal, is- 
not fit to infer the soul as its cause. It should be, then, interpreted 
thus : what you call the principle or entity, viz., the understanding, is- 
nothing but knowledge ; for, there is the statement of synonyms, 
namely, " understanding, comprehension, knowledge." And it is- 
produced from the contact of the soul, etc., and is really other than 
the inner sense the existence of which you admit. This is the meaning. 
The import, therefore, is that that does become the mark of the ex 
istence of the soul 18. 

Vivriti He gives another proof of the existence of the Soul : 

From contact, i.e., of the mind with the object of the sense, which: 
is the soul, in other words, from the conjunction of the soul and the- 
mind, the knowledge which is produced/ in the form of "1 am happy/ 
etc., is different/ i.e., other than inference, as a proof of the existence- 
of the Soul. This is a roundabout way of indicating that knowledge- 
produced by the cognition of the soul and the mind, is perceptual,, 
since the definition of perception is knowledge produced from the* 
contact of the senses ond objects. Altough such perception does not- 
prove the soul as different from the body, etc., yet, as it proves the 
aoul in general, it is unobstructed. This is the import. 



KANADA StTTRAS III. 1. 19. 113 

Or, the s&tram states that the mark which infers the soul, is not a 
false mark. 

Marks of Inference of other Souls. 

Upaskdra. Having described the inference of one s own soul, he now shows the 
inference of other souls : 



I 3. I \\ 

Pravritti-nivritti, activity and inactivity, occupation and 
withdrawal. ^ Cha and. HWrifufr Pratyag-atmani, in the in-going or 
in-dwelling soul, in one s own soul, IE Driste, observed. *W* Paratra, 
elsewhere, of other souls, f^ff^ Lingam, mark. 



19. And activity and inactivity, observed in one s own soul, 
are the marks of (the existence of) other souls. 135. 

Pratyag-atmani means in one s own soul. Pravritti-nivritti are 
particular volitions caused by desire and aversion. By them are 
produced bodily actions, characterised as ^&\ or muscular motion, of 
which the objects are the acqisition of the agreeable and the avoidance 
of the disagreable. So that, on observing muscular motion in another 
body, the inference of another soul takes place in the following man 
ner. This muscular motion must have been produced by volition, 
because it is muscular motion, as is my muscular motion. And that 
volition, is the product of a soul, or is seated in a soul, because it is 
volition, as is my volition 19. 

Here ends the first chapter of the third be ok in the Commentary 
of Sankara upon the Vaifiesika Aphorisms, 



114 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

BOOK THIRD CHAPTER SECOND. 

Mark of the existence of Mind. 

Upaskdra. Distinction of real and fallacious marks is the subject-matter of the (prece- 
dirg) chapter. Now, going to bring the examination of the Soul to a close, the author, by 
a transgression of the order of enumeration (of the Substances) (vide I. i, 5;, introduces th 
examination of the Mind, and says : 



Atmendriyarthasanriikarse, on contact of the Soul 
with the senses and their objects. STT fi?! Jnanasya, of knowledge. m&: 
Bhavah, existence, production, appearance. ?nrfW Abhavah, non- 
existence, non-production, non-appearance. (Bhdsya. reads the words 
bhdvah and abhdvah in a compounded form as bh&vdbhdvah. ) ^ Cha, 
and. *H*T: Manasah, of the Mind. f^JT Lingam, Mark. 



1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on 
contact of the Soul with the senses and the objects are the marks 
(of the existence) of the Mind. 136. 

He will say that the movement of the Mind is the mark (of tha 
Soul). If, therefare, Mind is found on examination to be the instrument 
or means of knowledge, and as being dense, moulded, or ponderable 
( ifa* )> then it becomes proved that the Soul is that, being directed 
by which, the Mind comes te be connected with the sense apprehensive 
of the desired or agreeable object, rather than with any other 
sense. This is the reason of the violation of the order of enumeration. 
The meaning is that the Mind is that which, while there is contact of the 
soul with the sense and its object, being connected with the sense, there 
is production ef knowledge, and which not being so connected with the 
sense, there is non-production of knowledge. 

Objection. Mind is all-pervading or universal. Nevertheless, non- 
simultaneity of knowledge can be inferred from this alone that Mind 
possesses the property of an iastrument. Moreover, Mind is universal 
because, like Time, it is a substance void of any distinctive attribute; 
because, like the Soul, it is the substratum of Conjunction which is the 
non-combinative cause of knowledge ; and because, like Ether, it pos 
sesses the absolute non-existence of Touch ; and there are similar other 
proofs of its universality. 

Answer. It is not so. If Mind were universal or all-pervading, 
then as it would be connected with all the senses, there would be only 
one cognition including all the senses (i. e. } omui-sensuous). If it be 
replied that (objection} such is not the case, because there is a contrariety 
amongst the effects ; we deny this, (answer} for a complete cause does 
not take notice of contrariety and non-contrariety whereby it might be 
apprehensive of the contrariety of the characteristics of belonging to 
perception by the eye, organ of taste, etc. It cannot be said, (objection) 
"Or, it (cognition) may be of a variegated form like variegated colour, 
as it is in the case of eating some pudding," (where perceptions of 
taste, flavour, etc., take place all together) ; for (answer} even there 



KANiDA SftTRAS III, 2, 2. 415 

attention or attachment to a particular object (i. e., taste or flavour, 
etc.,) is observed. Nor can it be asked, (objection) " How then does the 
complex belief arise, viz., i I perceive Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch 
simultaneously "i" ; for, (answer") it is merely a sense of simultaneity 
in respect of the five cognitions, produced by the swiftly moving Mind 
and presented in memory. It cannot be objected that attention to 
particular objects is also dependent upon the property of the instru 
ment, for the answer has already been given. If it be maintained 
(objection ) that attention depends upon the desire to understand ; we 
deny this, for, (answer*) on that supposition, it would follow that when 
there was a desire to understand all, there would be a total presenta 
tion of all objects, wliereas the only result of a desire to understand is 
connection of Mind with the sense percipient of the oject desired. 
Inasmuch, therefore, as non-simultaneity of cognition is otherwise 
impossible, the Mind is proved to possess a minimum of divisibility. 
Consequently, the marks of universality are obstructed by proof which 
comprehends or infers the subject. Moreover, if the Mind were all-per 
vading, then there would not be such local character of pleasure, etc., 
as in " pleasure in my foot," " pain in my head," etc. ; for, the effects of 
universal substances uniformly appear in places delimited by their 
non-combinative causes. It cannot be said that in our view also it 
follows that pleasure, etc., are confined to the place of the atom ; for, 
the rule is that a non-combinative cause really produces an extensive 
effect at its own place, so that there is no opposition to their produc 
tion even beyond the limits of their instrumental causes, e. g., sandal- 
wood, etc. It cannot be urged, " Mine too is request for remoteness 
from ths instrument causes ; " for, it would entail a breach of the above 
uniformity. Further, how will there be conjunction of the universal 
Mind with the Soul ? It cannot be replied that it is without beginning, 
for then disjunction will also necessarily become beginningless. It canot 
be said that owing to the difference of their limitations (i.e., substrata 
wherein they take place), both of them remain uncontradioted ; for, the 
difference of the limitations of conjunction and disjunction depends 
upon their own causes, whereas in the case of the difference of things 
which have no beginning, such dependence does not exist. This is the 
direction. 1. 

Mind is a substance, and te eternal. 

Upnskdra. Now, it may be asked, The perception of pleasure, etc., is producible by 
an instrument, because it is an act, like the perception of Colour : from inference in 
this way, or by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, Mind is proved as the instru 
ment of that perception. But whence does it derive its Substance-ness, and eternality?" 
Hence he says: 



II \ I R I R I! 

Tasya, its, of the mind. 5*^=1 fa?T& Dravyatva-nity atve, substance- 
ness and eternality. ^nTH Vayuna, by Air. -m<?^lci Vyakhyate, ex 
plained. 

2. The Substance-ness and eternality of Mind are explained 
by (the explanation of the Snbstance-ness and eternality of) 
Air. 137. 



116 VAI!EIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



As the ultimate atom of Air, inferred from Substance made up of 
parts, is a Substance, because it possesses attribute and action; BO 
Mind, inferred by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, IK & 
Substance, because it possesses attribute. For it is not productive of 
cognition, withont conjunction with the sense, whereby it might appear 
that possession of attribute does not belong to it. Moreover the pre 
sentation of pleasure, etc., (to the Soulj must have a sense as its 
instrument, because it is a presentation, like the presentation of Colour, 
etc. Hence Mind is proved as an instrument or sense. And the being 
a sense means the being the foundation or seat of the conjunction of 
the Mind which is the instrument of cognition ; so that the Subtance- 
ness of Mind is proved without much ado. And its eternality follows 
from its not being made up of any other Substance. Arid this latter 
characteristic follows from the absence of any proof for the supposition 
of its being made up of parts 2. 

Mind is one. 

Upaskdra.- Then the doubt arises whether there be one Mind, or more than ons Mind, 
existing in eaoh individual body. He states the means of decision : 



II ^ I R I ^ II 

. atnayaugapadyat, from the non-simultaneity of 

volitions. STPTqtTTfn^ Jfianayaugapadyat, from the non-simultaneity of 
cognitionjs ^ Cha, and. ^r*j Ekam, one. 



3>. From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the non- 
simultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is only) one 
^Mind) (in each organism). 138. 

" Mind in each organism " is the complement of the Sutram. 

If there were many Minds in a single organism, then cognitions and 
volitions would be simultaneous. It is not a valid conclusion that 
many volitions are produced at one and the same time, because simulta 
neous actions are observed in the fingers of the hands and the toes of 
the feet of a dancing girl ; for, that being explained or possible by the 
swift movement alone of the Mind, simultaneity of necessary or corres 
ponding particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state, 
is not obtained. Hereby (t. e., by the necessary particular attributes of 
the Soul in their indestructible state), the theory that in one and the 
same body there are five Minds, and that on the conjunction of two, 
three, four or five of them with their respective senses, two, three, four 
or five cognitions are simultaneously produced, is refuted, as it would 
entail a superfluity of suppositon ; while the sense of simultaneity is 
upheld ( as an illusion). The implication of the simultaneity of two 
cognitions, e. g., the cognitions " bitter treacle," produced by the 
connection of the Mind with the sense-organ of Touch, undr the limita 
tion of the sense-organ of Taste, also does not exist in view of the pro 
perty (t. e., of rapid transition) of the instrument or internal sense, (i. c. t 
Mind). Action also in the two parts of a lizard, snake, etc., cut into two 
or three pieces, arises from the impact of the chopper, etc., or the rapid 
transition of the Mind, or the invisible operation of another (and barren) 
Mind which has just slipped off from a liberated Soul. 



KANADA SftTRAS III, 2, 4. 117 



The view that Mind is really a whole made up of parts, like a leech 
and that by its contraction and expansion, like those of a leech, simul 
taneity and non-simultaneity of cognitions are respectively produced 
is opposed by the fault of redundancy in the supposition of its parts! 
This is the direction. 3. 

Marks of the existence of the Soul. 

ffpatkdra. Now, showing the purpose of the violation of the order of enumeration, he 
, with a view to complete the enquiry into the Soul : 



faftlft II ^ I R I II 



Prana-Apana-Nimesa-Unmesa- 
Jivana-Manogati-Indriyantaravikarak, ascending life-breath, descend 
ing life-breath, closing the eyelids, opening the eyelids, life, the move 
ment of the Mind, and affections of the other senses. g<Sf:^3fT^^SpJ5n: 
Sukha-Duhkha-Ichchha-Dvesa-Prayatna, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aver 
sion, and Volition, ^r Cha, and. ^n?*TT: Atmanah, of the Soul. 
f^jflf^r Lingani, marks. 

4. The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the 
closing of the eye-lids, the opening of the eye-lids, life, the move 
ment of the Mind, and the affections of the other senses, and also 
Pleasure, Pain, Desire , Aversion, and Volition are marks (of the 
existence) of the Soul. 159. 

It must not be imagined that cognition itself is the only mark of 
the Soul. There are also the ascending life-breath, etc., which are the 
marks of the Soul. Thus that is surely the Soul in consequence of the 
volition of which the upward and downward motions in the air moving; 
within the body and characterised as the ascending and the desceud- 
ing life-breath, take place, not being possible otherwise than by voli 
tion, just as the throwing upward and the throwing downward of 
a pestle, etc-, (in a mortar, etc.), are not possible without volition. 
For, Air, the nature of which is to blow obliquely, cannot undergo 
sush cha-ige of nature without volitioa. It cannot be said that two 
bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions and producing different 
effects may, like two similar bodies of water, have an upward 
motion. For, were this the case, there would be then the upward 
motion only but not the downward motion, nor oblique motion as 
in exsufflation or blowing by the mouth. There is then a being, 
who, by his volition, impels the air upwards or downwards. 
I cannot be asked how there could be upward and downward motions 
of the ascending and descending life-breaths in a state of deep or 
dream-less sleep ; for, at that time, though volition proper does not 
exist, there exists another kind of volition which is called volition the 
source of vitality. In like manner, the closing and the opening -of the 
eye-lids also infer a presiding agent in the organism. Thus the closing; 
of the eye-lide (nimesa) in an action which produces the conjunction. 
of the lids of the eye ; unmesa or the opening of the eye-lids is an action. 



118 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



which produces their disjunction. These two actions, being cons 
tantly produced without any visible cause such as molecular motion, 
impact, etc., are not produced otherwise than by volition. As the danc 
ing of a wooden manikin depends upon some one s volition, so also does 
the dancing of the eye-lids. Thereby an entity, possessing volition, is- 
inferred. Similarly, life also is a mark of the Soul. Thus by the 
word life the effects of vitality, such as growth, the building up of 
wounds, fractures, etc., are indicated by implication. So that as the 
owner of a house builds up a broken edifice or enlarges a building 
which is too small, so the presiding agent of the organism effects, by 
food etc., the increase of enlargement of the organism which is to him in 
the stead of a habitation, and with medicine and the like, causes what 
is wounded to grow again, and broken hands and feet to grow together 
again. Thus like the master of a house, at guardian of the body is also 
proved. In the same way, the movement of the Mind also is a mark of 
the Soul. Thus it has been proved, in the foregoing section, that the 
Mind is something moulded or ponderable (m&rto*) and that it is indivisi 
ble. Its application to a sense percipient of the desired object is 
dependent upon desire and attention. So that the inference is that the 
Soul is that being whose desire and attention direct the Mind, as a boy 
standing at the corner of a room sends a top or ball of lac hither and 
thither within the room itself. 

It may be objected, " The dancer of the wooden manikin, the 
master of a house, or the boy (referred to above) is not different from 
his body, 30 that he could be adduced as an example. Moreover, it is 
the body which is the seat of consciousness inasmuch as it is the object 
of the sense of I-ness (a/iam/cdra) ; for, there are tl lam fair/ " I am 
stout/ and the like intuitions which are co-extensive with I-ness. It 
may be urged that, on this theory, a man would not recollect in his 
youth or old age w r hat he perceived in his boyhood, because as in the 
case of a difference of bodies, like those of Chaitra and Maitra, so here 
too there would be no recognition, on the maxim, " One does not remem 
ber what another saw." Here we may point out that Chaitra and 
Maitra being two different currents, there may not be any correlatior, 
whereas (in the case of a single indvidual) in syite of the differences of 
boyhood and youth, the current being the same, correlation by means 
of the relation of cause and effect will be possible. To this argument 
we Mill reply that it would follow, on the above theory, that the son also 
would remember what was perceived by the father. If it be rejoined 
that perception of the difference of body prevents this, we reply that 
correlation (in the form of recollection) will not be possible also in the 
case of an old man who perceives his present body only as different 
from the body which he had as a boy, and also that there is no percep 
tion of the difference of body for a boy who has nevor known his 
father. In " My body," the sense of I-ness appears as identical with 
the sense of My-ness Cand not as identical with the intuition of the 
body). If it be replied that the same holds good in the case of " My 
Soul " also ; wo reply that it does not, because the use of My is there 
topical, since the genitive may be used even where there is no differ 
ence, as in " The head of Rahu " (Rahu being all head). The consequ 
ences of killing, etc., (i. e., Merits and Demerits) also will not result to- 
the agent or doer, as his body will be different and different (at every 



KANlDA SfrTRAS III, 2, 5. 119 

stage of transmigration). Further, (on your theory), consciousness 
being limited to the bhutas or elements (which constitute the body and 
are different at every new birth), if a man desires a sinful act, he will 
escape the consequences of his own acts, and there will be also the 
defect of the acquisition of the results of acts not done by him who 
experiences them- This is the point. 

" From the affections of the other senses." For surely is observed 
an overflow of the salivary juice , induced by a strong desire for the 
taste, of one who, after experiencing the particular taste, accompanied 
by the particular colour, of an orange or a chira-vilva, observes such 
fruit again. Now, this cannot take place without the inference of the 
acid taste ; nor the inference, without the recollection of the universal 
relation or invariable co-existence (of the taste and the colour); nor the 
recollection, without impression (Samskdra) ; nor the impression, with 
out the experience of the universal relation ; nor the experience, with 
out repeated observation. This concatenation of cognitions, standing 
to one another in the relation of cause and effect, cannot be possible 
without (the existence of) a selfsame agent. Thus there is the Sutram 
of Gautama. " From the affections of the other sense." (Ny ay a- Sutram. 
I1II. i. 12). 

Pleasure and the like also are to be regarded, like cognition, as marks 
of the Soul. Thus pleasure and the like must reside somewhere or must 
reside in some substance, because they are things which are produced, 
or qualities like colour, etc. Hence an inference by analogy, accom 
panied by an exclusion of other possibilities, takes for its subject 
inherence or residence in a Substance other than the eight Substances. 
For the proposition that desire which does not reside in Earth and seven 
other Substances, resides in a Substance, is not complete unless it assu 
mes as its mood the being resident in a Substance other than the eight 
Substances. Where, however, exclusion of other possibilities does not 
appear at first, there the being resident in a Substance other than the 
eight substances, will have to be proved by argument from effect to cause or 
negative reasoning. This is the distinction. It is absurd to say that 
inference has only the mjod of that which determines the universal 
relation ; for that alone is the mood there without which the intuition 
or inference would not result. Otherwise, in " A dyad not being 
resident in an effect, must reside somewhere, because it is a whole made 
up of parts," and such other cases, there would be no inference having 
for its mood the being resident in a noneffect. 4. 

Soul is a substance, and is eternal. 

Upaskdra. Well, granted that there is proof of a fixed Soul. But whenoa is it eternal 
and whence is it a Substance ? To meet this obj action, he says : 



M I * I VI 

Tasya, its, of the Soul. ^sqwf^Rq^ Dravyatva-nityatve, Subs 
tance-ness and eternality. ^T<HI Vayuna, by Air. 5qr<?q[^ Vyakhyate, 
explained. 

5. Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the 
explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air. 140. 



120 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

As there is no proof for the supposition of parts in the ultimate- 
atom of Air, and therefore Air is eternal, so also in the case of the Soul. 

As the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance, because it possesses- 
attributes, so also is the Soul. This is the meaning 5. 

Objection : I. Mark of the Soul, not visible. 
Upatkdra. Ho cites an objection of the opposite party to the foregoing conclusion : 



\: Yajnadattah, He is Yajnadatta. tffr Iti, this, sfa^ Sannikarese,. 
there being contact. M*ft!l*J|Ucl Pratyaksabhavat, from the absence of 
perception. Because there is no perception. eg Dristam, visible, 
Lingam, mark, f Na, not. fau^ Vidyate, exists. 



6. There is no visible mark (of the existence of the Soul),. 
because there being contact (of the senses with the body of 
Yajnadatta), perception does not arise that this Soul is Yajna 
datta). 141. 

There being contact, if no such perception take place as " This is 
YajSadatta," then there is no visible mark, i. e., no mark the universal 
relation of which with the sddhya or what has to be proved, has been 
grasped by perception. The meaning is that as smoke, perceived as 
accompanying tire which is perceptible, is a visible mark in the case 
of fire, so there is no such visible mark which can estaclish the ex 
istence of the Soul. 6. 



IJpaskdra. Lest it might be urged, " Although no visible mark exists, the universal 
relation of which has been observed by perception, yet a sdmdnyatcdrittam, or commonly- 
observed or analogous mark, will be the mark, for it is not that there can be no inference from 
that," therefore the objector says : 



: II ^ I R I v* 

Samanyato-dristat, from a commonly-observed or analo 



gous mark. ^ Cha, and. uf^fa: Avisesah, non-particular. Not a thing 
in particular or as such. 

7. And from a commonly-observed mark (there is) no 
(inference of anything in) particular. 142. 

A commonly-observed mark also becomes a mark of inference. But 
it does not prove the Soul as Soul, nor as a Substance over and above 
the eight Substances. It would only prove that desire, etc., must be 
resident somewhere. And this does not suggest the thought of a Soul. 
This is the meaning. Therefore it is stated, " Not a thing in 
particular." 7. 

3. Therefore Soul proved by Revelation. 



eins 



Upskdra.Are then the texts of the Vedas, for instance, " He is the Soul, in whom all 
are killed," etc., meaningless ? Apprehending this, the same objector says : 



KANlDA SftTRAS III, 2, 9. 121 



n ^ i R i c n 

Tasmat, therefore, because the Soul cannot be proved by 
reasoning. ^Tlf^: Agamikah, scriptural, proved by the revealed texts. 

8. Therefore (the Soul is) proved by Revelation. 143. 

The Soul is really proved by Revelation only, but not by inference, 
since visible and commonly-observed marks do not exist. Therefore, 
mental vision of the principles or essences of things results from the 
proper hearing of the Upanisads, and not from the course of intellec 
tion. So that this Regulation (i. e. } the Vaisesika system), which 
teaches intellection, is no regulation. For, it is observed in the case of 
" ten ghosts, swimming across the river," etc., that the cognition of the 
person who has representation of these things in his consciousness, 
arises only from the very instructions that ten ghosts dwell on this 
tree, that such and such an object floats across the river, etc.). 8, 

Objections answerd. 

Upaskdra. Toi this objection of the first party, set forth in the three foregoing sdtras, 
the upholder of the doctrine of inference replies : 



Aham. I. ff^T Iti, this, Jffs^T Sabdasya, of the word. 



Vyatirekat, exclusion, non-application, divergence, abhorrence, T Na, 
not, ^Hlfr^ J^ Agamikam, Scriptural. Proved by Revelation. 

9. (The proof of the existence of the Soul is not solely) from 
revelation, because of the non-application of the word T (to other 
designates or objects). 144. 

Revelation alone is not the proof of the existence of Soul ; but 

the Soul is proved also by the inference that the word * I/ or the word 

*Soul/ must have some designate (or objective reality corresponding- 

to it), because it is a word, like the word, water-pot, etc. Lest it 

might be said that it is Earth, etc., which are its designates, so he says,. 

"Because of non-application," in other words, because of the non-appli 

cation or divergence of the word i from Earth, etc. For, there never 

arises any such use of language or intuition as "I am Earth," "I am, 

Water," "I am Fire," "I am Air," I am Ether," "I am Time," I am 

Space," "I am Mind." If you object that such intuition or use arises 

with respect to the body, we reply that it does not, for it would then 

entail such intuition or use with respect to the bodies of others ; if, that 

it arises with respect to one s own body, we reply that it is not so, for 

*one s own or one s self, as different from the Soul, has no meaning or 

is not proved by etymology, and because the intuition, " My body," 

proceeds upon a difference of substrata. It cannot be said, (objection) 

"Well, but this too is an inference by analogy which however does not 

and with a particular thing, and is therefore defective ; " for, (answer) 

in the word I, I-ness or Soul-ness itself forms the specification or 

distinction. So that on the strenght of the property of its being an 



122 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



attribute of the subject of the argument (pafoa), it follows that I-ness 
is the cause of the inference of Soul, and as it is not common to any 
other object, therefore the particular object (or the Soul in parti 
cular) is proved. Similarly, there is proof of the particular object, 
from the analogous inference or commonly observed mark accompained 
with the exclusion of other possibilities. The objection which has been 
made, namely, " From hearing alone results realization or intuition 
of the Soul ; what is the need of all this proof ?", is not sound. For, 
without reflection or intellection, the dross of unbelief in wavering 
minds cannot be purged away ; without this purification, there can 
be no aptitude in them for constant meditation ; and without constant 
meditation, there can be no realization of truth or intuition of the 
Soul, which is capable of uprooting false knowledge together with 
desires or appetencies, as it is from habit only that a sad lover 
suddenly comes to have a mental realization of his beloved lady, and 
because verbal or inferential knowledge is not capable of uprooting 
false knowledge, as is seen in the case of delusion in respect of direc 
tion in Space, etc. This is the import. 

If it be asked, "Still how can a sign or indication (of its existence) 
be apprehended in the Soul which is imperceptible ?", we reply, "Who 
has ever said that the Soul is not perceptible ? On the contrary, the 
Soul is apprehended by its proximity through or in the form of con 
junction, to the Mind. Otherwise, how can there be such intuitions as 
I am happy, I know, I desire, I will/ I feel pain, etc ? For these 
intuitions are neither unsubstantial nor of doubtful substantiality, 
because like that of the perception of blueness, their substantiality is 
undoubted. Nor are they inferential or derived from marki, for they 
arise even without any knowledge of marks. Nor again are they 
derived from verbal information or authority, for they do not follow 
upon enquiry for that." If it be urged that they are appearances of 
perception (and not true perceptions), we reply that they must have 
then for their object something which is not apparent (i.e, real), for 
it will be shown in the sequel that that which is not object of certain 
knowledge, cannot be applied by metaphor to or superimposed upon, 
another object 9. 



The s&tram is illustrative. It should be known that 
inferences, as described above, by the marks of knowledge, etc., are 
also proofs of the existence of the Soul. 

Counter-objection stated. 

Upaskdra. "If this be so (i.e., if the Soul can be known by sense-perception)," the 
objector says, "then what is the need of inference ?" 



n ^ i ^ i to ii 

qft Yadi, if. $j Dristam, observation. 3T?5Rf Anvaksam, sensuous. 
*Tf* Aham , I. ^JrT: Devadattah, Devadatta. ST?" Aham, I qjTT?T : Yajna- 
dattah, Yajnadatta. ?f>r Iti, such. 



10. If (there are) such sensuous observations (or perceptions) 
as I am Devadatta, I am Yajfiadatta, (then there is no need of 
inference). 145. 



KANlDA StfTRAS III, 2, 11. 123 

The word iti marks the form of knowldge, In dristam, the affix 
<kta is used in a passive sense. Anvaksain means sensuous or per 
ceptual. Therefore the meaning is : if there is perceptual or sensuous 
observation in the form of This is Devadatta, This is YajEadatta/ 
then what is the use of taking the troule of making an inference ? 
"For an elephant being in sight or observation, those who infer, do not 
infer it by its screaming." 10. 

Above answered. 
Upaskdra.To this the advocate of Inference says : 



f*Tf 



II 



52 Driste, (lit. Seen), grasped by perception, sn^fr Atmani, the soul. 

Linge, being accompanied with marks. W: Ekah, one. ^ Eva, only 
Dridhatvat, because it becomes more firm or fixed. W9T*H<t. Praty- 
aksavat, like other percepts or perceptions. SRgq: Pratyayah, intuition. 
Belief. 

11. As in the case of other percepts, so, if the Soul, which is 
grasped by perception, is also accompained with, or comes at the 
top of, marks (from which it can be inferred), then, by means of, 
confirmation, the intuition becomes fastened to one and only one 
object. 146. 

Driste/ i. e., grasped by perception ; l atmani ; linge/ i. e., having 
all its marks or causes developed ; eka eva,, i.e., having one object only 
as its matter ; pratyayah/ Pratyayah implies the expulsion of all 
apprehension of error. " How can it be so ? " Hence he says, dridha- 
tvat/ i. e., because the current of proof is capable of removing the 
apprehension of its being otherwise. He gives an example, pratyksavat ; 
i. e., as even when there is perception of water from a distance, yet 
inference of water by the mark of the baldkds (water birds) is made for 
the purpose of corroboration. So it has been said, "Skilful logicians 
desire to understand by inference even what is grasped by perception." 
The import here is this : Although at times the Soul really shines in 
mental perception, yet, like knowledge, produced by the flash of light 
ning, it does not derive so much fixity or permanence being overclouded 
by such other conflicting perceptions as " I am fair," li I am lean/ and 
the like. Here another form of knowledge produced by marks which 
cannot but lead to their proper inference, confirms or fixes the very 
knowledge previously obtained from perception. Moreover, inference 
must be applied to the Soul owing to the desire to infer the knowledge 
that intellection of the Soul as taught in the precepts "(The Soul) 
should be heard about, reflected upon," and the like, is a means towarda 
the realization of that which is desirable, i. e., the Supreme Good. 
Because if there be no intellection of the Soul, then constant medita 
tion would be impossible, and consequently there would be no realiza 
tion of the Soul in the understanding, and so salvation would be 
impossible. This is the purport. 



124 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

The statement of the two separate intutitions, I am Devadatta, 
and " I am Yajnadatta," in the foregoing Sutrara, is intended to show 
that there can be only individual intutition of every Soul. 11. 

Counter-objection stated and answered. 

Upaskdra. " Well," it may ba objected, " if the intutition, I am Yajnadatta refers 
to the Soul, then the appearance (of the notion Yajnadatta) as co-existing in the samo snbs- 
tratum with Going, as in Yajnadatta goes, is impossible." So he says : 



: Devadattah, Devadatta. JT^fcf Grachchhati, goes. ?nr^rT: Yajna- 
dattah, Yajnadatta. JT^ajfa Gachchhati, goes. ffrt Iti, such. These. 
S*HKI?J Upacharat, by transference. SKft Sarire, in the body. R9iq: 
Pratyayah, intutition. Belief. 

12. Davadatta goes, Yajladatta goes, in these cases, the 
belief (that their respective bodies go) is due to transference. 147. 

For there are such intutitions as " I am fair," " I am stout," and 
there is also such differential intutitiou as " My body." Now, in 
" Devadatta goes," the perception of co-existence with motion, and 
the use of language to express it, are topical, whereas the intutition 
lt my " is real as carrying its own meaning. Although the property of 
being Devadatta is a jdti, kind or genus, existing in the body whereby 
the use of language as Devadatta goes " is in the primary sense and 
the intutition is true in its own meaning, yet if the term Devadatta be 
applied to the Soul delimited by it, it is then to be understood as a 
transferred epithet. 

Another objection. 
Upaskdra. Here he apprehends (an objection): 



: II \ [ * I 

Sandigdhah, doubtful. 3 Tu, however. ST^T*: Upacharah, 
Transference. 

13. The transference, however, is doubtful. 148. 

The word tu points out the opponent s view. The intutition and 
the use of the word, I, are observed both in respect of the Soul and 
body. Therefore the doubt arises which intutition and expression be 
the primary, and which the secondary ones. 13. 

Above answered. 
t7pAskdra." H.& solves the (doubt: 



Aham, I.ff^T Iti, this. U3(J||wPt Pratyag-atmani, in the in-going or 
individual Soul. *TRT^ Bhavat, because it exists. *&.% Paratra, other- 



KANiDA SftTRAS III, 2, 15. 125 



where. SRTWC Abhavat, because it does not exist. ?TO???TCSlW^r: Arthantara- 
pratyaksah, (Intuition) wherein the individual soul is the object of 
perception. 

14. Because the intuition T exists in one s own soul, and 
because it does not exist otherwhere, therefore the intuition has 
the individual Soul as the object of perception. 149. 

Arthantara-pratyaksah is that intuition in which l arthantaram,* 
i. e., the Soul itself, is the percept. The meaning is as follows : Since the 
intuition I arises in respect of pratyagatma/ i. e., one s own Soul, 
and since it does not arise paratra i. e., in respect of other Souls, 
therefore it is proper to regard the reference to arthantaram or one s 
own Soul as the primary reference. If, on the other hand, the primary- 
reference were to the body, then the intuition whould be produced by 
the external senses, for the body is not an object of mental perception, 
and the intuition This is I is mental being produced even without 
the operation of the external senses, since the mind takes in as its 
object the Soul as modified by appropriate particular attributes in the 
form of I am happy/ < I know, * I will, I desire, This intuition is 
not inferential, as it is produced even without seeking any mark of 
inference. Nor is it verbally communicated, since it is produced even 
without the apprehension of any authoritative text. Therefore it is 
only mental ; further because the mind, as it is not an independent agent 
-outside its own sphere, does not apply into the body and other external 
objects. Moreover, if it be urged that, if it referred to the body, it 
would refer to the bodies of others, and if it referred to one s own Soul, 
it would also refer to the Souls of others ; we deny this, for the Soul of 
one man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes 
have no fitness for or relation to, them, and since its fitness for or rela 
tion to, them arises from the taking on or super-imposition of appro 
priate particular attributes. Nor is this the nature of the Soul only, 
but of every Substance. For Substanc^ becomes perceptible only by 
the taking on of appropriate particular attributes. If it is said that 
Ether also should, for the same reason, become perceptible by the 
accompaniment of Sound, we reply that such would be the case, if the 
car were capable of apprehending Substance, or if Ether possessed 
colour. If it is rejoined that the Soul also is equally devoid of colour, 
we reply that it is in the case of external Substances only that posses 
sion of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. The word 
pratyag, in-going, points out divergence from others. 14. 

Another objection. 
Upaskdra. He apprehends another objection : 



I 11 U II 

Devadattalj, Devadatta. T5a[% G-achchhati, goes. tf$f Iti, thii. 
, from transference. Sfflwr rtfJ, Abhimanat, from fancy, 



126 VIAgESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

reference to Soul, Conceit, Egotism, or Self-identification. rTT^ Tavat r 
because, therefore, JU^fkuw^r Sarirapratyksah having the body as the 
object. ?T5"^n!: Ahankarah, ahamkara. The intuition of I. I-ness. 

15. The intuition of I has the body for its object. There 
fore to say that, in Devadatta goes, there is a transference (of 
epithet), is a mere fancy. 150. 

Ahankarah, i. e., the intuition of I. It is Sarirapratyaksah/ 
i. e., that which has the body as the percept or subject-matter. You 
have determined that the intuition or, for the matter of that the expres 
sion, " Devadatta goes, " is due to transference. Now, this transference 
is a fancied one, because such intuitions and expressions as " I am 
fair," " I am lean," " I am fortunate, my brith is a mere repetition/ 
and the like, cannot be reconciled on the theory of transference. This 
is the meaning. 15. 

Above answered. 

Upatkdra. He gives the solution: 

U ^ I Rl 



r: Sandigdhah, doubtful, g Tu, but. HHK Upacharah, trans 
ference. 

16. The transference, (as characterised by you), however, 
is doubtful. 151. 

The word Hu here points out the solution (of the foregoing objec 
tion). The meaning is that there is doubt even in what has been said 
(by you, . e., the opponent^), namely that the transference is a fancied 
one, whereas the intuition of I is in respect of the body itself. Since, 
therefore, the intuition is a false witness on either side, we must endea 
vour to find out a distinction. Since on making this endeavour, we 
observe that even a man, whose eyes have been closed, still has the intui 
tion of I, we must hold that it refers to an object different from the 
body, and beyond the cognizance of the external senses. If it referred to 
the body, it would reter to the bodies of others, and also would not take 
place in independence of the eyes. If it be asked how there can be 
such common measure or co-extension as in "I who am stout or thin,. 
am happy;" we reply that in this case it is possible that the body 
would appear as the condition of pleasure, etc., as in " This forest is 
resonant with the roar of a lion " (there is such appearance). Mere 
I-ness, presented by the Mind, is superimposed upon the body, just as 
heat, presented by the organ of touch, in the judgments, " The water 
is hot, " " The body is hot/ etc __ 16. 

Above answered continued. 
UpaslcAra. By elaborating the solution ihe says : 

: \\\ 

T Na, not. 3 Tu, but. *Ftt*ft$qRt $arira-vifiesat, perceiving the di 
fference of bodies, qv^foa^fa^: Yajnadatta-Visnumitrayoh, of Yajna 




KANADA StiTRAS III, 2, 18. 127 



datta and Visnumitra. $n*f Jnanam, knowledge, thought, fc^: Visayah, 

object 

17. But the thoughts of Yajfiadatta and Visnumitra do not 
become objects of perception to them, while they perceive the 
difference of their bodies. (Therefore consciousness is not an 
attribute of the body). 152. 

Jnanam implies sensible pleasure, pain, and other attributes of 
the Soul. As the bodies of Yajnadatta and Visnumitra are mutually 
different, so are also their knowledge, pleasure, pain, and the like 
different. Accordingly, as is this body of Yajnadatta, so also, though 
no knowledge, or pleasure, etc., be produced in \ ajnadatta, will the 
knowledge, etc., "I feel pleasure," "I know" " I will, " " I desire, " be 
objects (of perception) ; because the sensible body being an object of 
perception, knowledge, etc., which are (ex hypothesi) its properties, like 
its colour, etc., will have the possibility of being perceptible. But this 
i? imposible. Therefore Csuch is the import), it should be said that the 
seat or subject of knowledge, etc., is something really different from 
the body. l ^ariraviiesat means from difference of body. The fifth 
case-ending has been used in the sense of the infinitive. So that the 
meaning is that knowledge or thought is not an object of perception, 
while difference of body is being perceived. 17. 

Proof of Soul not from Revelation only. 

Upaskdra. It may bo objected as follows : " The Soul ia not perceptible, since, like 
Ether, it is a colourless Substance, or a Substance without component parts. Therefore th 
body itself should be affirmed to be the object of the cognition " I am thin, pale." If 
occasionally there arises also the consciousness " I feel pleasure," it is proper to suppose 
that pleasure and the like becoming manifest without a substratum, are transferred to or 
superimposed upon the body. As in " Hot, fragrant water," heat and fragrance appearing 
without a substratum are superimposed upon water, but for the sake of this the intuition of 
water also does not contain as its object anything except common water ; so 1-ness in "I 
am " is real only in reference to the body, whereas pleasure and the like are sometimes 
superimposed upon it. There is then, in respect of the Soul, no knowledge of it in the form 
of perception. That which has to be supposed as the substratum of pleasure, etc., must be 
established by revelation. There is no perception of it." In reply to this objection, he says 



II \ \ ^ \ 

Aham, I. $fr Iti, this, g^qfrq^f Mukhya-yogyabhyam, by innate 
or self-evident and perceptive or sensible cognition. 3^^ Jhbdavat, 
like sound. sqf^fojfsqfiRrTCT^ Vyatirekabyabhicharat, from the invari 
ability of absence or divergence, f^qfa^: ViSesa-siddheh, frcm proof in 



particular. ^ Na, not. ?Hqfa^r: gamikah, scriptural, proved by 
revelation. 

18. (The soul is) not proved (only) by Revelation, since, (as 
Ether is proved by Sound, so) (the Soul is) proved in particular, by 
the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of I, 
accompained by the invariable divergence (of such cognition from 
all other things), as is the case with Sound. 153. 



128 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

This is the meaning. The cognition, " I feel pleasure," or " I am 
in pain/ is neither scriptural, nor verbally communicated, nor in 
ferential, since it arises even without the help of verbal communication 
or of marks of inference- Whereas it has been said that colourlessness 
and simplicity (or the not being an aggregate of component parts) are 
obstacles to the perception of the soul, this holds true in the case of 
perception by external senses, for of this the possession of colour and 
the possession of more than one substance are the necessary conditions. 
or exciting causes, while mental perception is independent of these. 
It may be objected that this would be the case were there proof of the 
existence of the Soul, but that there is none. Accordingly it has been 
said, "From proof in particular by invariable divergence, as is the case 
with Sound." As in the Substances, Earth, etc., the absence of Sound ig 
invariable, i. e., uniform, and there is thereby proof of a particular 
Substance, namely Ether, in addition to the eight Substances, as the 
Substratum of Sound, so on account of the invariable divergence of desire 
froui Earth, etc., the substratum of desire also must be different from the 
eight Substances. Lest it be argued that all this goes to show only 
that the Soul is a subject of inference, not an object of perception, 
the words " by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the 
form of P are employed. By the word iti the form of the cognition is. 
indicated. Therefore the cognition, in the form of I/ which is pro 
duced, without the help of verbal communication and mark of inference, 
in one whose eyes are closed, should be explained by the innate idea, 
of Egoity or I-ness and its sensible or perceptible attributes, and not 
by reference to the body, and the like, since the divergence or absence 
of desire is invariable there. After "by the innate as well as the sensible 
cognition" the words "Should be established" are to be supplied. 
There are many proofs of the existence of the Soul. They are omitted 
here for fear of increasing the volume of the treatise. They should 
be sought in the Maytikha 18. 

Vivfiti. Vedantins, however, hold that the soul is nothing but 
eternal knowledge (vijnana) according to the Sruti, SlfsfawN S^S^ *J f ?H I 
^Tr*i JT s T*H ??f sHF, "Lo ! the Soul, imperishable, is truth, knowledge,, 
infinite, and all-pervading," (Brihaddrnyaka Upanisad IV. v. 14). 
Although, in reality, it is one, yet, owing to the diversity of its Upddhi 
or adjuncts in the form of the inner sense, which are products of Mdyd r 
i.e., limitation, it appears as manifold. That it is so, follows from such 

Srutis as yt>*HlRdlM*t "One only, without a second," Chhdndogya 
Upanisad, VI. ii. I), q^^sTI ^4^?TTrd<lr*4| ^T 5*f nRlfrMHffi "^o tne one " 
inner Self of all beings, for every form, became its counterform"" 
(Katha Upanisad, II. v. 9.) 

He discredits this view. 

The words, i object of perception are the complement of aham 
Hi/ I this. Thus, the object of such popular mental perceptions 
as I feel pleasure/ etc., is not agamika/ i. e., identical with tsvara^ 
the probandum, of such l agama or text of the Veda as " truth, know 
ledge, infinite, and all-pervading," (Taittiriya Upanisad, II. i. 1). He 
states the reason of this by g^pftn^vqf etc. ftfofe^: because difference 
from Isvara is established by pleasure and pain, which, though primary 



KANADA StiTRAS III, 2, 12. 129 

or instinctive or original or innate, are yet sensible. The instinctive- 
ness of pleasure lies in agreeables or desirables, since it is there the 
object of desire which is not dependent upon any other desire ; whereas 
the instinctiveness of pain lies in disagreeable, since it is there the 
objeet of aversion which is not dependent upon any other aversion. 
Sensibleness, again, is the being the object of perception (i. e. by the 
inner sense). This is mentioned for the purpose of removing the 
(possible) apprehension that the mark is an unproved or unknown 
mark, and also to prevent overeaten sion, in the case where eternal 
bliss is attributed to Isvara, because eternal bliss can never be an 
object of perception. Pleasure and pain, therefore, being products, 
are proof of the difference between the Jiva and fsvara. This argu 
ment is illustrative : it should be observed that knowledge, volition, 
desire, and also aversion, as products, establish difference from Isvara. 

It may be urged that in such inferences as, u The soul which is the 
object of the perception, I am/ is different from Isvara, because it 
possesses pleasure which is a product," there being no example, and 
consequently no observation of congruity of similar instances, know 
ledge of the universal relation is impossible. For this reason, it has 
been said wjfaVflJWfftraTT^ i- e., from the uniformity of difference. The 
use of the ablative inflexion has the object of denoting the (necessary) 
condition leading to the inference, and the syntactical connection of 
the word is with the word f^fa%3[: The import, therefore, is, that, 
even though there is no example by way of agreement, yet, Isvara 
being an example by way of difference, an inference with respect to 
the matter in hand is possible, through the observation of the universal 
relation of difference, dependent upon the concomitance or congruity 
of difference. 

It may be urged, again, that that a mark can establish difference 
from Isvara, by the universal relation of difference, has not been 
known before. To remove this apprehension, it has been stated JT^c 
i. e., like Sound, etc. The meaning is this : As the difference of Ether 
from Isvara is proved by the mark, namely Sound, which is known by 
the method of the universal relation, or uniformity, of difference, so 
the difference of the soul from tsvara is proved by the possession of 
pleasure, etc., which are products. 

Bhdgya: In III. ii. 6 17, the author gives, in the form of a 
dialogue, contrary arguments as to whether the Self be an object of 
perception only, or of inference only, or of both, and gives his own 
conclusion in III. ii. 18. 

Unity of Soul, as an objection. 

Upaskdra.- Having thus finished the section on the investigation of the Soul, he now 
begins the section on the plurality of Souls. Therein the following aphorism sti forth an 
adverse doctrine. 



I \ ( * \ 

% Sukha-du^kha-jnana-nispatti-avilesat, because 
there is no difference in the production of pleasure, painj and know 
ledge. f TRWf Aikatmyam, identity or unity of Soul. 



130 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

19. Soul is one, since there is no difference in the produc 
tion of pleasure, pain, and knowledge. 154. 

There is only one S:>ul, in spite of the difference of the bodies of 
Chaitra, Maitra, and others. Why ? Because of the non-distinction in the 
prodiiction of pleasure, nain, and knowledge, i. e., because the origin of 
pleasure, pain, and knowledge is really undifferentiated in this that it 
is determined by, or confined to, the body as a whole. If there were 
another mark to prove the difference of the Soul, the difference of the 
Soul might be proved, but there is no such mark. As Ether is only one, 
in spite of the production of Sounds within the limits of particular 
paces, since there is no distinction in Sound which is its mark ; as 
Time is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of simul 
taneity, etc., which is its mark ; s Space is only one, since there is no 
distinction in the intuition of East, West, etc., which is its mark ; (so 
the Soul is only one). 19. 

Vivirti. It may be urged that the identity of Jiva and Isvara must 
be admitted, on the strength of the texts of the Veda, " One only, with 
out a second. dH*4fa ^H%d1, " Thou, !vetaketu, art that," (Chhan- 
dogya Upanisad VI. viii. 7), etc. It cannot be held that difference is 
proved by the aforesaid inference ; because, pleasure, pain, etc. , being 
properties of the internal organ, are unproved by themselves (t. e., have 
no independent existence). Thus says the Brihadaranyaka Upanisnd, I. 
V. 3-, TW tf^ftfrf%for?ST3r3CTS9T3CT ^rdcT^fcfWfb^ H^ *nr^, "Desire, Inten 
tion, Doubt, Faith, Unfaith, Patience, Impatience, Modesty, Intelli 
gence, Awe, all this is verily Mind " Here the word Desire denotes 
pleasure, and the word Intelligence denotes knowledge in the from of a 
faculty. Moreover, pain, algo, appearing, as it does, in co-existence 
with pleasure, cannot be an attribute of the Soul. 

This he apprehends : 

The meaning is that, Tlft Stalc^ . e., becasue the difference of the 
Jivatma (embodied Soul) from fsvara is not proved, frR*TT, . ., by the 
certainty or ascertainment, g^r^TT TFTf , i. e., of pleasure, pain, and 
knowledge ; in other words, they, being proved in the mind by the 
above Sruti or Vedic text, are thereby disproved in the Soul. 

It* diversity explained. 
Upatkdra. H itatoi the solution or conclusion : 



5fWT M I R I Ro || 



: Vyavasthatah, from status. ^TTfl Nan a, many. 
20. Plurality of Souls is proved by status. 155. 

Souls are many. Why ? Because of status. Status means several 
conditions, at one is rich, another miserable, one is happy, another un 
happy, one it of high, another of low, birth, one is learned, another 
ignorant. These circumstances being impossible without a diversity of 
Souls, prove a diversity of Souls. It cannot be maintained that as the 
states of one and the same Soul is diversified by the difference of birth 



KANADA SftTRAS III, 2, 21. 131 

or by the difference of childhood, youth and old age, so also it will be 
in the case of the difference of the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and 
others, for it is possible to impose contradictory attributes (on one and 
the same subject) by means of change of Time (i. e. } at different 
times). 20. 



Vivriti. He removes the apprehension. STTTT means non-identity of 
the Souls, in other words, that the Jivatma is not identical withfivara. 
Whence ? 5T3^TT?T:, because of the certainty of the existence of pleasure, 
pain, and knowledge, in the Soul. For pleasure, etc., are not proper 
ties of the mind, because the mind not having largeness or large size, 
pleasure etc., Would be imperceptible; and minuteness or atom-ness or 
subtleness must be affirmed of the mind as determining the non-simul 
taneity of acts of knowing. The 5ruti, " Desire, Resolution, etc.," 
however, like "Life is clarified butter/ etc., demonstrates that the mind 
is the cause of desire, etc., but not that it is their receptacle, nor that 
it is identical with them. 

Its diversity explained continued. 
I7paskdra.-Ho gives another proof : 

l M I R I ** II 



^astra-samarthyat, from the authority (or force or signi 
ficance) of the Sdstras. g Cha, and. 

21. (Plurality f of Souls follows) also from the authority or 
significance of the Sdstras, 156. 

^astram means Yeda or revelation. Because difference of Soul is 
proved by it also. For it is heard. " Two Brahmans (i.e., Souls) have 
to be known," etc.; and also "Two birds, friends and kindred, embrace 
the same tree, etc." (Mundaka Upanisad III, i. I.) 21. 

Here ends the second chapter of the third book in the Commentary 
of !ri !ankara on the Aphorisms of Kanada. 



It cannot be asked. "What then will be the fate of these 
texts , viz., " Thou art that, O &vetaketu ! " " One who knows Brahman, 
verily becomes Brahman," etc. ? For the text, " Thou art That," conveys 
the sense of identity in this sense that what is devoted to, or, belongs to 
That, is not different from That. The text, "One who knows Brahman* 
verily becomes Brahman, ll does not convey the sense of identity, but thatr 
of similary of the Jiva (t. e., the embodied Soul), to Isvara (i.e., the Great 
Soul), in point of freedom from suffering etc. ; for, otherwise, the text. 
The stainless one attains to supreme similarity," can have no meaning. 
In popular language also there is the topical use of identity in the 
sense of resemblance, as when there is an abundance of wealth, it is said, 
"this priest has become a king," and so on. Nor should it be ma 
intained that identity is produced in the state of salvation, on the 
cessation of ignorance or false knowledge, since difference, being 
eternal, is incapable of destruction, and even if we admit the destruc 
tion of difference, then since there is necessity for the existence of two 
individuals. So much in brief. 



132 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Bhasya .Interpret* III. ii. 19, 20, and 21 in the monistic sens* 
namely, that there exists only one Self, variously differentiated on the 
phenomenal plane, as witnessed by such texts as " One only, with- 
out a second," " One ihitiing Being is immanent in all created things," 
< All Selves become one," "All Selves emanate from this, Same Self" 
Two birds," etc. 



:* : 



KANiDA StTTRAS IV, 1, 1. 133 

BOOK FOURTH CHAPTER FIRST. 

The eternal defined. * 

Upaskdra. Having finished the enumeration, definition, and examination of th nina 
Substances, Earth, etc., and desiring to refute the dootrine, held by the Samkhya philoso 
phers, that prakriti or Matter is the prime cause, and to establish that ultimate atoms are 
the prime cause and enter into the composition of earth, etc., the author first of all gives the 
definition of the Genus, eternality. 

u * i n m 

^ Sat, existent ^WTCJpTc^ Akaranavat not having a cause, uncaused, 

causa suifaff Nityam, eternal. 

1. The eternal is that which is existent and uncaused. 157. 

Akaranavat, means not having a precedent cause, on the maxim of 
the purity of words (which excludes other interpretations of the term). 
Hereby the water-pot, and the like are excluded. Still the definition 
may be too wide by including previous non-existence ; so he says, 
4 existent i. e., having connection with existence. In the case of the 
Predicables, Combination and Species, connection with existence is 
nothing but combination or inherence in one and the same object with 
existence. In the case of any other Genus and of existence connec 
tion with existence consists only in being the object of the cognition 
that it exists. This cognition ia not in respect of a thing as such. 
" Let.it be so; " it cannot be objected, " in other cases also. What is 
the use of existence ? " For, existence has already been proved as the 
cause of assimilative understanding. 1. 

Vivriti. Seme hold that the existent is produced from the non 
existent. What they have in view is this. Seeds, etc., are not productive- 
of effects such as shoots, etc. Were this the case, then seeds, etc., lying 
in a granary, would also produce shoots, etc. But since shoots appear 
only after the destruction of seeds sown on a field, by the disjunction of 
their parts, it follows that it is the destruction of seeds, etc., which is 
the cause of shoots, etc., So we have the stttram of Gautama, stating 
the argument of an opponent, " Production of exietence (is) from 
non-existence, as there is no appearance without destroying." (Nyaya- 
Sutram, IV. i. 14). 

Only to refute this view, he strengthens the theory of progressive 
origination by the series of ultimate atoms, etc. 

Sat/ means something in the form of existence ; akaranavat " 
means a non-product ; nityam means an entity which opposes an 
nihilation. The meaning is : the primary cause of compound bodies is 
not non-existent, that is to say, because, if causality of destruction were 
admitted, then it would entail the production of shoots even from pow 
dered seeds. 

Mark of existence of ultimate atoms, 

Vpaskdra. After describing the Genus, sternal, he now says with reference to ultimata 
atoms : 



134 VAIESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



* n i * n 

Tasya, its. Of the ultimate atom. pp^ Karyyam, effect, 
Lingam, mark. 

2. The effect is the mark (of the existence) of the ultimate 
atom. 2. 

1 Tasya/ i. e. of the ultimate atom ; karyyam, e. g., the water-pot 
and the like ; lingam. Accordingly the stitram of Gautama. " From 
the evolved is the production of the evolved, on the evidence of (ex 
perience by) perception," (Nyaya-sutram IV. i. II). Now the inter 
relation of parts and wholes is perceived. If it were unlimited, there 
would be no difference in size of measurement between mount Meru and 
a grain of mustard seed ; for, they wauld be without distinction, both 
being orginated by infinite parts. Nor can it be said that difference 
will be caused by the differences of the size of each part, and of the 
aggregation of parts ; for, without a difference of number, these also would 
be impossible. If it be said that pralaya or destruction of the creation 
may be the limit (of the series of parts and wholes) ; (we reply that) the 
final something ex-hypothesi) having no parts, pralaya itself would be 
impossible, for it is only disjunction and destruction of parts which can 
destroy substances. Nor is disjunction the limit, for it is impossible for 
it to have only one substratum. Therefore, a substance without parts,, 
must be the limit, and this the ultimate atom. A mote is not the limit ; 
for, being a visible substance, it possesses magnitude, and is composed 
of more substance than one ; magnitude, as the cause of visual percep 
tion, presupposes, or is dependent upon, multiplicity of substance ; 
else there would be no magnitude even, what then would be the cause ? 
Nor are the constituent parts of the mote atoms, for we must infer 
that they also, as originatfve of a substance possessing magnitude,. 
are compossed of parts, like thread, and like potsherd. Therefore. 
whatever substance is an effect, is composed of parts, and whatever 
substance is composed of parts, is an effect. So that from whichever 
part the nature of being an effect goes away, from it goes away also 
the nature of being made up of parts. This is the proof of the existence 
of indivisible ultimate atoms. So it has been said by Professor 
Prasastadeva, " Earth is twofold, eternal and non-eternal. 2- 

Law of Causation. 

Upaskdra Now he states an argument or proof, to prove that there are colour, etc., ia 
the ultimate atom : 



: II 3 I? I ^ II 

Karana-bhavat, from existence in the cause. 
Karyyabhava.i, existence in the effect 

3. The existence (of colour, etc.) in the effect, (follows) from, 
(their) existence in the cause. 159. 

The existence of colour, etc., in the effect, is due to their existence 
in the cause. For the attributes of the effect result from the attributes 



KANlDA SftTRAS IV, 1, 4. 135 

of the cause, the same being observed in the case of the water-pot, 
canvas, etc. This is the meaning. 3. 

VivTiti. He points out an objeotion to the primary causality of 
nonexistence. 

Bhavah/ i. e., the existence, of the effect/ i. e., compound bodies, 
follows from the existence of the cause, i. e., the primary cause (viz., 
ultimate atoms). Otherwise, like the quality of being clayey, of that 
which is made of clay, it would follow that effects, i. e r compound bodies 
would be non-existent, because they are constituted by what ia non 
existent. 

The eternal exists. 

Upaskdra. With a view to silenoa the advooate of the doctrine of the itransieney of all 
things, he now saj s : 

: H a i * i * 11 

Anityah, non-eternal, ffif Iti, such, t. e., such intuition and 
expression .f^RfaW: ViSesatah, of the particular, i.e., the eternal. srf^Nnrra 1 * 
Partisedha-bhavah, the form of negation. 

4. "Not-eternal" such (intuition and expression) can be 
accounted for only as the negation of the eternal. 160. 

In visesatah the affix tasi is used in the genitive sense. There 
would be negation of visesa i. e., the eternal, if there were not such 
intuition, and application of the word as non-eternal, because the 
prefix nan (non) has the force of negating the meaning of the word 
next to it. Therefore how can there be the intuition and expression, 
4 non-eternal/ in the absence (of that) of the eternal ? Hence it is 
proved that the eternal exists. Or, (the meaning of the S&tram may 
be), the negation of the eternal must be made by you in this way that 
(it is) " not eternal," i. e., that the ultimate atom is not eternal. But 
negation in this way is not successful, since it is frustrated by proof 
and disproof. (In this interpretation), the siltram should be rendered 
thus : The word ?f (not) will be a negative term by itself, as the rule, 
"SJ, TT, ft, and ^n are negative terms." Thus " non-eternal " will mean 
not eternal. Pratisedha-bhavah, means the nature or form of negative. 
Hence " not eternal" this is the form of the negation of visesa/ i.e. y 
the eternal, and it ( is not possible. This closes the argument. 4. 

Vivriti. He refutes the view that all is non-eternal, that there is 
nothing which is eternal. 

3tf (in the aphorism) is an indeclinable, having the same meaning as 
5T*T (non). Thus, not eternal such negation is i visesotah/ i. e., with 
reference to particular things. So that, there may be the negation that 
compound bodies are not eternal, but such whole-sale negation as every 
thing is not eternal, is not possible, because the eternal, which is the 
counter-opposite, is frustrated by proof and disproof. This is the whole 
meaning. 



136 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

The theory that atoms are not eternal, is erroneous. 

Upatldra, It may be objected as follows : The ultimate atom is not eternal, since it is 
corporal of ponderable, like a watei-pot. Similarly, the possession of colour, the possession of 
taste, etc., may be, one by one, adduced as so many reasons. So also by simultaneous conjunc 
tion with six (other ultimate atoms), an ultimate atom has six parts ; so that from its posses 
sion of parts, and from its being the substratum of the conjunction appearing in objects which 
it cannot pervade, (we may infer that the ultimate atom is not eternal). Moreover, if there 
be Ether within an ultimate atom, then being porous, it must have parts ; if there be no Ethr 
inside it, then it would follow that Ether does not penetrate every where. Further, (the 
ultimate atom is not eternal), because it casts shadow, and possesses circulation. Again, the 
inon-eternality of the ultimate atom follows also from the inference whi oh establishes transi 
ency, e. g., the inference, that all that exists is momentary. If then there be such a series of 
inferences, how can it be maintained that the ultimate atom is eternal ? 

To meet these objections, he says : 



n $ i n * n 

Avidya, ignorance, error. 

5. (It is) an error (to suppose that the ultimate atom is not 
eternal). 161. 

Every inference, which has for its subject the non-eternality of the 
ultimate atom, is ignorance, i.e., is of the form of error, since it springs 
from a fallacy, This fallacy is occasionally obstruction or opposition to 
the proof which comprehends the subject ; always absence of the 
characteristic of being pervaded (or being the mark), due to want of 
evidence preventive of its existence in the vipaksa (i. e., in which the 
non-existence of that which has to be proved, is sertain) ; sometimes 
unproof by itself ; and others which should be learnt from the kindred. 
system (i.e-, the Nyaya-Sutram of Gautamaj. 5. 

Bhdsya. Reads IV. i. 3.4, and 5 as two aphorisms only, viz., Icdrana- 
bhdvdt kdryabhdvo, nilya iti , and Visesatah pratisedhabhdvo l vidyd , and 
interprets them to mean, respectively, "The nature of the effect, 
(though) following from the nature of the cause (which is eternal) is 
non-eternal" and " It is an error to suppose that because things (e.g. r 
atoms) exist as effects (e.gr., compound bodies), therefore they cannot 
exist in the causal (or atomic) state", in order to explain the applica 
tion of the word "non-eternal in, I. i. 8 where the reference is to things 
which are products. 

Requisites of perception. 

Upaskdra. It may he objected, " Well, if the ultimate atom exits, why is it not per 
ceived by the senses ? It is you who have proved that the possession of colour, the possession 
of touch, etc., are exciting causes of sensibility." Hence he says : 



II tf I ? I $ II 



Mahati, in respect of an object possessing magnitude. 
Aneka-dravya-vattvat, by means of its possession of what is composed of 
more than one substance. ^TTrT Rupat, by means of colour. ^ Cha, and. 
YTftf^: Upalabdhih, perception. 

6. External perception (takes place), in respect of an object 
possessing magnitude, by means of its possession of that which 
is composed of more substances than one, and by means of its. 
colour. 162.n 



KANAUA SfiTRAS IV, 1, 7. 137 

M.aliati means in respect of a substance possessing magnitude 
the affix, , matup, denoting possession, among affixes denoting quality 
being elided after the word, mahat, denoting measure. l Anekadravyat- 
*-at mtans from the nature or state of containing that of which more 
substances than one are the substrata. This being so, Air also would 
be perceptible. Hence he says, " And by mean? of Colour/ i. e. as 
will be later on said, developed and un eclipsed or un obscured colo ur. 
Uj alabdhih " is complemented by the words, "by the external sense/ 
"Therefore it goes without saying that there is no external perception of 
the ultimate atom, since it does not possess magnitude. " The possession 
of that which is composed of more than one substance " means either 
the being constituted by a compound of more than one substance, or 
the being the substratum of the magnitude which is due to a multiplici 
ty of component parts. 

It cannot be said that the possession of that which is a compound 
of more than ore substance, is rendered futile (as a condition precedent 
of i erception), by the very possession of magnitude ; since the reverse 
is also i cssible. Nor can it be said, "Futility of the producer is caus 
ed by the producible,, but not that of the producible by the producer " 
for the agreement and the difference of the producible and the producer 
being simultaneously apprehended, there is no futility, since otherwise 
it would follow that the futility of the staff, etc., will be caused by the 
whirling of it, etc. Nor can it be said that there is a development of or 
rise in, perceptibility at a distance due to development of, or rise in 
magnitude; for a development of, or rise in, the possession of a 
compound of more substances than one being also possible, there can be 
no discrimination. Moreover, while a spider s web measuring four 
cubits, etc., is not perceptible frcm a distance, the perceptibility of the 
spider itself is certainly due to a development of the possession of a 
compound of more substances than one, since a preponderance of 
magnitude exists in the web. So also it should be observed that while 
^ a piece of cloth, constituted by five yarns, is not perceptible at a dis- 
jtance, is in spite of a preponderance of magnitude in it, a club of a very 
small magnitude is perceptible there __ 6. 

Cause of non-perception 

I j.atMra.- Such being the case, there should, it might bo urged, also be perception of 
tl e light of a t- hooting star at midday, of the light of the eye, or of Air, as well as of magnitude 
which ecu bintb -with colour by means of its combination with Touch. Hence ho says: 



H a i ? i vs ii 



i, there being. ^^ Api, even, in spite of. %sqf3( Dravyatve, 
substance-ness, *T5<% Mahatve, magnitude. ^T Rupa, colour. *f^K Saras- 
kara, impression, evolution, reformation. .SPTT^ Abhavat, on account 
of the absence or non-existence of. efPTt: Vayoh, of Air. Sljjq^fa: Anupal- 
abdhih, non-perception. 



138 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

7. The non-perception of Air, in spite of there being subs 
tance-ness and magnitude, is due to the non-existence of the evolu 

tion of colour. 163. 



By the term " evolution of colour " are intended combination or 
inhesion of colour, the development of colour to the degree of appre 
ciability, and the no.i-obscuration of colour. Though, therefore, i.i 
the case of Air, the selfsame combination of touch is alse the combina 
tion of colour, yet it is not qualified or determined by colour, for 
there is in it absolute non-existence of colour. In the light of the eye, 
there is no^evolution, that is, appreciability, of colour. In the light of the 
shooting star at midday, there is no ev<lnv.on, that is, non-obscuration, 
of colour. Of these, therefore, there is uo perceptibility. In like man 
ner, evolution of colour is to be analogously applied to the heat of the 
summer, the fire in a frying pan, gold, etc. 



The writer of the VTitti has, however, said that ^T^f^rR is a com 
pound of the words ^T and ^TCTC^TC, formed by tho elision of one of 
the tvvc ^T s, and that, therefore, the non-perception of Air is in conse 
quence of the non-existence of colour in it, while the non-perception 
of the ocular light, etc., is due to the non-existence of the evolution 
of col oar 7- 

Requisites of perception of colour. 

Upnskdra. -In this way having, itum3diatJly after t ae section on the eterpality of the 
ultimate ato:us, finished the section on fie perospfcibility of external objects, as a subsi 
diary topic, by their being the inferential marks of the ultimate atoms, and intending to 
sot forth, by introducing an example, the section on the perceptibility of Attributes he 
says : 



II 8 I ? I e; II 

Aneka, more than one. %zq Dravya, substance. ^nftr^T^ Samava- 
yat, from combination in. ?5*r Rupa, colour. fa^ftTci; Visesat, from some 
special characteristic of. 5^q[ Rupa, colour. ST^fsvr: Upalavdhih, 
perception. 

8. Perception of colour (arises) from its combination with 
a compound of substances more than two, and from (its possession 
of) some special characteristic of colour. 164. 

Rupaviiesa means the species or peculiarity inherent in colour, 
and that consists of the characteristics of being developed to the degree 
of appreciability, of being unobscured, and of being colour. From 
this, perception of colour takes place. Lest it might be said that, such 
being the case, the colour of the ultimate atom as well as of the dyad 
would be perceived, so it has been added anekadravya-samavayat. 
The word aneka denotes multitude ; hence l anekadravya means 
that to which many substances belong as its substratum, e. g., a 
molecule of the atoms, and the like. To term anekadravya-samavayat 
therefore, means from combination with such a compound substance. 
The water-pot, etc., although they are originated by two parts, (i- e. y 
potsherds, etc.), really contain a multitude of substances as their subs 
tratum, in the serial arrangement of the parts of these parts, and so 



KANiDA StiTRAS IV. 1. 9. 139 



on As taste, touch, etc., lack in the characteristic of colourness, so 
there is no ocular perception of them. In the case of ocular fire or 
light non-visibility is due to the absence of the degree of appreci abi 
lity. Development or appreciability is only a particular universal 
entity or l class belonging to the particular attributes of colour, etc., 
and is pervaded by, or included in, colourness, etc. 

Objection : _ This being so, no relation of higher and lower (classi 
fication) will be at all established even by whiteness, fragrantness, 
sourness, etc. If, however, you suppose a manifoldness of develop 
ment or appreciability, pervaded by, or included in, them respectively, 
then there will be a redundancy of supposition, and the term develop 
ment or appreciability, 33?5T also will have various meanings. 

Answer : _ It is not so ; for, development or appreciability denotes 
the ur.ddhi or condition, namely, the characteristic of the attribute 
cay.able of being apprehended by each individual external sense, 
while non-development or non-appreciability denotes only the absence 
of the upddhi or condition. Some say that appreciability is simply 
the non-existence of non-appreciability. This should be considered, 
since non-appreciability also cannot be similarly established. It may be 
said that non-appreciability is a particular attribute beyond the 
cognizance of the senses. If it be so, then it would follow that appre 
ciability is a particular attribute within the reach of the senses. If it 
be asked " What is the determinant of sensuousness ?," we reply that 
both of us, (i. e., the disputants) are equally at a disadvantage here. 
They also say that appreciability is the one and only one class 
present in all particular attributes, and that the non-establishment of 
the relation of higher and lower is no fault in the case of the class 
inhering in attributes. 8. 

Perception of Taste, Smell, and Touch. 

Uvaskdra Of the attributes other than Touch, co-exsistsnce in the same substratum 
with colour is "itself the nectary condition of their being perceptible by the external senses. 
For this reason, after having stated the conditions of perception of colour, he now extends 
them to other cases, and says : 



i s i ? 1 8. ii 

^srTena, by this,. ?3W?J*I3 R asa-gandha-sparsesu, in respect of 
taste, smell, and touch, srtf Jnanam, knowledge. sqriqra^ Vyakhyatam, 
explained. 

9. Hereby is explained (perceptual) knowledge in the case 
of Taste, Smell, and Touch. 165. 

1 Ten a means by the preceptual knowledge of colour. As precep- 
tion of colour arises from some special characteristic of colour,m z., colour- 
ness, non-obscuration, and appreciability, so perception of taste arises 
from some particularity of taste, characterised as tasteness, non-obscura 
tion, and appreciability. This should be applied to other cases. Com 
bination with a compound of more than two substances, should be also- 
extended. From inappreciabilitj to the organs of the ear, the tongue, 



140 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



and the skin, result non-apprehension of smell, taste, and touch Being 
undeveloped or inappreciable, smell and taste are not perceived in a 
stone, etc. ; for they are perceived in their ashes. Some maintain that 
they are perceived indeed in the stone, etc., but not distinctly The 
non-apprehension of the colour of a watery substance, the parts of which 
have been disjoined from one another, is due to non-developrae it of the 
colour. So also is the non-apprension of taste. In hot water, there is 
non-approhension of the colour of the fire, in consequence of its non- 
development, and of touch, in consequence of its obscuration. In com 
minuted camphor, the champaka flayer, etc., non-apprehension of colour 
taste, and touch is due to thoir non-djve 1 -pment or inappreciabilit/ 
In gold, and the like, colour is indeel do /eloped, but whiteness and 
lummousness are obscured. Some hold that colour also is obscured 
whereas the apprehension of gold takes place with the help of other 
colour. Obscuration, again, is non-apprehension caused by the appre 
hension of a more powerful like object, and not merely relation or 
connection with a powerful like object. For, since connection with a 
powerful like object has to be ascertained by non-apprehension it is 
the non-apprehension which is of primary importance. Whereas the 
powerful like object is not of primary importance, as the necessary 
condition of non-apprehension ; because neither non-apprehension, nor 
antecedent non-existence of apprehension, nor its absolute non-exis- 
tenoe is subject to its operation, while the annihilation of apprehension 
does not exist there. If it be objectei, Then your proposition also 
that obscuration is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a 
more powerful like object, is not proved," we reply, Let it be so- Still 
apprehension and non-apprehension alone are the necessary condition* 
of the strength or weakness of a like object, or of the existance of such 
a relation ; and the same is the meaning of the word, obscuration." 9. 

Gravity, not perceptible. 

Upaskdra.lt may be asked, " Since Gravity also is combined with a compound of more 
than two substances (. e. atoms), and appears in the sama substratu n with colour and ma- ni- 
tude, why then it is not perceptible ; " Henco he says : 



<fl^ Tasya, of this, i. e., the genus of colourness, etc., and develop 
ment or appreci ability. sroRT^ Abhavat, because of the non-existence 
^rsqfr^rc: Avyabhicharah, non-deviation. No breach of uniformity OP 
the rule. 

10. Because of the non-existence of this, there is no viola 
tion (of the above law of perceptibility in the case of Gravitv }- 
166. 

Gravity is not perceptible, because of the non-existence, in Gravity 
of this, Viz., the genus of colourness, etc., and development or apprecia- 
bihty. It might be said that granted that, colourness, etc., do not exist 
there, yet there may be perception of Gravity. To prevent this, he adds 
* avyabhicharah. There is < non-deviation i. e., unbroken uniformity 
of the five classes or universals, e. g., colourness, etc., towards. 



KANlDA SftTRAS IV, 1, 11. 141 

apprehensibility by each individual sense. Whenever there exists one 
or another of the pentad of colourness,etc., there also exists apprehensi 
bility by the respective external senses, as shown by the method of 
difference (that where the former are not, there the latter does not 
-exist). This is the meaning. 

Gravity, by reason of its being left obscure in tha sutram, as the 
topic of discussion, by Prasastadeva classed annng things supersen- 
suous, is by Vallavacharya said to be perceived by touch. 10. 

Where Numbers, etc., are objects of visual perception. 

LTpaskdra. Having thus st ited objects pjrc3ptible by the senses individually, he now 
enumerates objects porceptible by two senses jointly : 



<E <?3T: Saiiakhyah, numbers. TK^Tfiinfa Parimanani, magnitudes, exten 
sions. ^t>^ Prithaktvam, separateness. ^f4t J lf%* : IT i n Sanayoga-vibhagau, 
conjunction and disjunction. Tlr^lTi^ Paratva-aparatve, priority and 
posteriority. ^r*q c Karmma, action, "qr Cha, and. ^^sq^T^rT^T^ Rupi-dra- 
vya-samavayat, through combination with substances possessing colour. 
^T^rfifr Ohaksusani, visible, objects of visual perception. 

11. Numbers, Magnitudes, Separateness, Conjunction and 
Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, and Action become objects 
of visual perception, through their combination with Substances 
possessing colour. 167. 

The words have not been formed into a compound in order to indi 
cate their mutual independence in respect of their visual or tactual 
perceptibility. Although there is dependence upon JTff3T, i. e., largeness, 
yet it is not as upon a mode of extension or magnitude. The word cha 
hastheforce of involvingthe addition of Viscidity, fluidity and Impetus. 
The word ^T^^fa implies tactual perceptibility ; or the word l cha 
should be applied after the word ^T^ fflT also. The plural number in 
Numbers, comprehends all numbers, from unity upwards. If it be held 
that unity is only a Genus, and not an Attribute, then if it appear in 
substances only, its denotation will be neither more nor less than that 
of substanceness ; if, on the other hand, it be present in attributes and 
actions also, then its denotation will be neither more nor lesr than that 
of existence. " How, then," if it be asked," can there be perception of 
unity, etc., in attribute, etc. ?," it may be answered that it is by means 
of attributed unity ; or that by reason of the proximity known as 
combination or co-inhere:ice in one and the same object, the percep 
tion of unity is quite justified. This unity is eternal in eternal subs 
tances, and in non-eternal substances it has causal unity for its 
non-combinative cause. On the other hand, duality, etc., are the 
product of relative understanding. Relative understanding is the 
mental basis or support of various unities, when two homogeneous or 
heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye. 11. 



142 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Here they are not. 
Upaskdra. Having in view all the above things up to action, he says : 



Arupisu, in substances not possessing colour. .?r31^ITftr Achaksu- 
sani, not objects of visual perception. 

12. In substances not possessing colour, they are^not objects 
of visual perception. 168. 

Numbers, etc., up to action, are not objects of visual perception, 
when they are present in substances which are devoid of colour. It 
should be observed that they are not objects of tactual perception 
also. It has not been said that they are imperceptible ; for, if it were 
so, then the unity of the Soul also would not be an obiect of percep 
tion. 12. 

Attribute-ness and existence perceptible to all the senses. 

Upaskdra. Colour, etc., are uni-sensuous or perceptible by the senses individually. 
Numbers, etc., are bi-sensuous or perceptible by two senses jointly. Pleasure, etc., are 
mental or perceptible by the inner sense. So that it results that the two Genera, Attribute- 
ness and existence, are omni-sensuous. tSo he says : 



I 8 I ? I U H 

t$;f Etena, by this. flUF^T Gunatve, in regard to attributeness. *n3T 
Bhuve, in regard to existence. ^ Cha, and. ^o^f?^ Sarvvendriyam, 
omni-sensuous. Relating to all the senses. *rr;f jnanam, knowledge. 
Vyakhyatam, explained. 



13. By this it is explained that knowledge in regard to attri 
buteness and existence, is omni-sensuous or of all the senses. 169. 

Capability to apprehend the individuals, is itself the capability to 
apprehend the class. And if the individuals are respectively appre 
hended by all the senses, then it results that also the classes, vizr. f 
Attribute-ness and Existence, are apprehensible by all the senses. 
This is the meaning. 13. 

Here ends the first chapter of the fourth book in the Commentary 
of Sankara upon the Vai&esika Aphorisms. 



KANADA SftTRAS IV, 2, 2. 143 



BOOK FOURTH __ CHAPTER SECOND. 

Three-fold division of Earth, and other products, 

Upaskdra. la the fourth book, of whio a the subject-matter is the examination of 
tangible substances, intondin; to exa:nin3 only tangible sub.itanc3s by their effjots, im n> 
di&tely after the examination of tne ultimate atonic which are the root causes, he says : 



II 8 I ^ I ? II 

?Tcj; Tat, that. <$*: Pu iah, again. "jfa$<JfI^frf i? J 7 Piithivi-adi-karyya- 
dravyam, earth, and oth9r produat-substa-ice. frftsf Trividham, three 
fold. ^f^? 7R^Wir^^^arira-indriya-visaya-samjiiakam, named as body, 
Mease, and object. 

1. The aforesaid product-substance, Earth, etc., is, again, 
three-fold, under the names of body, sanse, and object. 170. 

Here corporeity or the characteristic of the body is a kind of upadhi 
or adjunct, namely, the characteristic of being constituted by final parts 
(i.e., atoms), possessing activity, of which the non-combinative cause is the 
conjunction of the soul exercising volition. But corporeity is not a class 
-or universal eatitiy, since in that case Earthness, etc., will establish 
no relation of higher and lower divisions. The characteristic of being 
a sense, is the being the seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is 
the cause of knowledge which produces no reminiscence, or the being a 
seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is the cause of knowledge, 
while at the same time it is not a substratum of appreciable particular 
attributes other than sound. 0;i the other hand, the light of the eye of 
animals that prowl at night, is really another kind of light. In regard 
to its being treated as forming the visual sense, the words " not being 
a substratum of appreciable particular attributes other than sound aud 
colour " should be added. The characteristic of being a sense, how 
ever, is not a l class/ for the a the characteristic of Earth, etc., will not 
establish the relation of higher and lower divisions without entailing 
cross-division). And objectivity, or the characteristic of being ari 
object, although it is the being the means of phenomenal experience, 
that is to say, the being the object of ordinary perception, common to 
substance, attribute, action, genus, and non-existence yet should be, 
in accordance with the aphorism, observed to be the characteristic of 
being a product-substance which is the object of ordinary perception, 
for the aphorism is this only that Earth and other product-substances 
*ire three-fold. Objectivity also, therefore, is not a class or universal 
entity. -1. 

Body is not a compound of Jive elements. 

Upaskdra. Now, in order to refute the assertion that the body is composed of three 
elements or four elements, he says : 



ii 8 i ^ i 



144 v AIESX_;A PHILOSOPHY. 



Pratyaksa-apratyaksanam, of perceptible and non-per 



ceptible objects. ?J4t*fl?T Samyogasya, of conjunction. ?IR?!fr?3T3; Apraty- 
ksatvat, on account of imperceptibility. TajfiJT^r Paiichatmakam, Penta- 
substantial. Constituted by five elements, !f Na, not. fifST^ Vidyate, exists. 



2. (Nothing exists, which is constituted by five elements, 
or) the body is not constituted by five elements, for the conjunc 
tion of things, perceptible and imperceptible, is imperceptible. 
171. 

Were the body, by reason of its odour, moisture, digestive heat, 
breath, and porosity, composed of five elements, then it would be imper 
ceptible. In the same manner as the conjunction of pen eptible and 
imperceptible objects, e.g., air and trees, is imperceptible, the body 
also would be imperceptible. Thus the aphorism employs an example. 
The word body is the complement of " penta-substantial does not 
exist." Moisture, digestive heat, etc., however, belong to the efficient 
causes or conditions of the body, namely, water and fire. The theory 
that the body is composed of four elements should be also similarly 
understood. Let it then, it may be urged, contain three elements, as 
there is perception of three elements. This cannot be, for an origina 
tion not of heterogeneous elements is denied. One attribute in a whole 
made up of parts is not originative of similar other attributes. If, 
therefore, the production were from Earth and Water, then that which 
they originate would be void of smell and taste. In like manner, if it 
originated in Earth and Fire, it would not possess smell, colour, and 
taste ; if in Earth and Air, it \\ould be destitute of smell, taste, colour, 
and touch. Other cases should be similarly understood. 2. 

Nor a compound of three elements. 
Upaskdra. Ho continues the same topio : 



II tf I R I \ II 

Gruna-antara-apradurbhavat, by reason of the non- 
appearance of another attribute. ^ Cha, and. sf Na, not. 3^[?JT^J3; Tri- 
atmakam, tri-substantial. Composed of three elements. 

3. And by reason of the non-appearance of another attribute,. 
it is not composed of three elements. 172. 

A body originated by Earth, Water, and Fire only, which are 
objects of perception, might be perceived, if there were manifested in 
it another attribute having for its antecedent a like attribute in the 
cause. But this can never be the case, as it has been already stated 
that a single smell, etc., is not originative. Therefore the body is not 
composed of even three elements, i. e., is not originated by the three 
elements possessing colour. 3. 

Bndsya reads IV. ii. 3 as two aphorisms, viz., "G-undntardprddur- 
bhdvdchcha," and " Na trydtmakam." 



KANADA StTTRAS IV, 2, .5 145 



Conjunction of various atoms, not denied. 

UpasMra. How then is there perception of digestive heat, etc., in one single body? 
He gfves the answer : 



II 8 I R I 8 II 

V3 

Anusaiiayogah, conjunction of atoms. 3 Tu, but. 



Apratisiddha^, not denied. 

4. But a conjunction of atoms is not denied. 173. 

A mutual eon junction of the five elements as (the basis or) condi 
tional causes of oue another, is not denied. But it is not desired that the 
conjunction of two heterogeneous atoms can be the non-combinative 
cause of a substance. Thus, as its conditional or efficient causes, 
digestive heat, etc., are perceived in the body- If it be asked, then, 
of what nature the human body is, the answer is given by the aphorism 
of Gautama : _ " (The body is) terrene, the distinctive attribute of 
Ether being perceived (in it)." Nyaya-Sutram III. i. 28(?} ). Smell 
which is the distinctive attribute of Earth, is observed in the human 
body as not departing from it till its dissolution, whereas digestive 
heat, etc., are not observed in the decayed body. These attributes, 
therefore, are accidental, while Smell is essential. Hence itsterreneness 
is established. 4. 

Body is two-fold: sexually produced, and asexually produced. 
UpasMra. He divides the body : 



fljf Tatra, therein, amongst terrene, aqueous, and other bodies, 
Sariram, body, terrene body, fefev* Dvividham, two fold, qtf^f Yonijam, 
sex-begotten, sexually generated. IRtfrsn^ Ayonijam, not sexually gene 
rated. <9 Cha, and. 

5. Of these, the body is two-fold : sex-born and not sex-born. 
174. 

Of these, i. e., among terrene, aqueous, and other bodies, the 
terrene body is two-fold. What are the two kinds ? In answer, he 
says, l sexborn and not-sex-born/ Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies, 
well-known in the spheres of Varuna, Aditya, arid Vayu, are entirely 
a-sexual. A-sexuality means independence of the commixing of semen 
and blood. The bodies of gods and sages are also a-sexual, according 
to the text of revelation, " Manu and others, the mind-born or desire- 
born of Brahma." If it be asked how there can be an effect without 
a cause, we reply that the female organ of generation is not a cause 
essential to or determining corporeity, as it does not apply to the 
bodies of worms, mosquitoes, etc., produced by warmth. The posses 
sion of a particular constitution also is not proved, since our bodies 
are different in appearance in comparision with the bodies of goda 
and sages. 



146 VAIESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



The sexaul body, again, is two-fold, womb-born and egg-born. 
Womb-born are bodies of men arid animals, wild and domestic, the 
womb being the name given to the receptacle of the embryo. The 
bodies of birds and reptiles are egg-born. Snakes, worms, fishes, etc., 
also are really reptiles, since it is their nature to crawl about. 

Trees and the like also are no doubt so many kinds of bodies, being 
the seat of experience (i. e., the field wherin particular souls reap the 
consequences of their acts in previous births). For without the charac 
teristic of being the seat of experience, life, death, sleep, waking, use 
of medicine, propagation of the seed, approaching the agreeable, avoid 
ing the disagreeable, etc., would be impossible. And growth and the 
healing up of wounds and fractures, which prove experience, are mani 
fest in them. There is also the sacred text : 



" The Sarala and Arjuna trees, which grow on the banks of the 
Narmada from contact with the waters of the Narmada, attain to the 
highest state hereafter," etc. And also, 



" In the cemetery grows a tree haunted by herons and vultures, 
etc.," etc. Yet germinant bodies do not evidently possess activity or 
movement and senses, and they are therefore not treated as bodies. 5. 

Vivriti. That trees, etc., are bodies (i. e., ground of the experience 
of the consequences of acts) is evidenced by the text of Manu, viz., "A 
man acquires the candition of an immovable existence, by faults of 
action, born of the body. 

A-sexual bcdies, how produced. 
Upasltdra. S.Q states the cause from whioh asexual bodies are produced : 



II $ 1 R I ^ II 

A-niyata-dik-desa-purvakatvat, because it(. ., 
a-sexual body) has for its antecedent ultimate atoms which are not 
constant in direction aud place. 

6. Because a-sexual bodies are formed by ultimate atoms 
inconstant in direction and place. 175. 

Ultimat atoms, inconstant in direction and place, possess activity 
or movement produced by a particular dharma or virtue. And they 
are tho antecedents of a-sexual bodies. 6. 



i. In the words of Varuna, etc., there exist a-sexual, 
aqueous, igneous, aerial, and mental bodies, which are not dependent, 
for their production, upon semen, blood, etc. Whence come the ultimate 
atoms which orignate them ? In the case of sexual bodies, it is observ 
ed that only the ultimate atoms of semen and blood are their origina 
tors. To remove this apprehension, the present aphorism has been 






KANADA SUTRAS IV, 2,8. 147 



formulated. Terrene, aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms exist 
in all directions and in all places. Since there is nothing to confine them 
to direction and place, there can be no scarcity of ultimate atoms in the 
production of a-sexual bodies For it is not the case that ultimate 
atoms other than the ultimate atoms of semen and blood, are not ori 
ginative of bodies, seeing lhat in that case there would be no produc 
tion of gnats, mosquitoes, trees, shrubs, etc. 

A-sexual bodies, how produced continued. 

Upaskdra. It may be objected, how there ean be preduction of a substance ( . ., a body), 
without conjunction which is the non-oembinative cause of substance, seeing that there can 
be no conjunction without the action of the ultimate atoms. Heuoe he says : 



H a i * i vs u 

Dharmnia-visesat, from a particular dharma or virtue. ^ 
Cha, and. 

7. And (the action of the ultimate atoms arises) from a 
particular dharma or virtue. 176. 

The sense is that, at the beginning of creation, action or motion 
arises in the ultimate atoms in consequence only of the conjunction of 
the soul carrying with it the invisible (adristam) consequences of its 
previous acts, and the ultimate atoms, having by that action come 
together, originate, in the order of binary atomic aggregate, etc., 
the a-sexual badies of gods and sages. 

The aphorism is illusrative. It should be also observed that, in 
consequence of particular adharma or vices, the tortured bodies of mos 
quitoes and other small insects, generated by heat, are produced. 7. 

Proof of their existence. 
Upskdra. He gives another proof that the bodies of gods and sages are a-sexual : 

n 8 i * \ * u 



Samakhya-bhavat., because name or definitions exist. 
^ Cha, also, 

8. Also because names or definitions exist. 177. 

^nn^ means a significant name, or definition, such as is well- 
known in Sruti, Itihasa, Purana, etc. Thus, Durvasas, and other sages 
were born from the mind (of Brahma) ; Angiras was produced from 
ahamkdra (the sense of * I") ; and so on. From this also it is known 
that there ar a-sexual bodies of gods and sages. 8. 

Yviriti. _ But whence do a-sexual bodies derive their names, in the 
absence* of parents, etc. ? For it is observed on earth that the names 
Chaitra, Maitra, etc., are affixed by parents, etc. Lest there be such an 
apprehension, so he says : 

1 Bhavat/ i. e., from the existence, of Samakhya, i. e., the name ; 
i even in the absence of the procreative parents, etc. is the complement. 



148 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



For, all names are not affixed only by parents, etc., as it is not the case 
with the names, water-pot, canvas, etc. Therefore, the import is that 
the names, Ma iu, Marichi, etc., have been put upon a-sexual bodies, by 
the very same Isvara by whom names have been affixed to the water-pot, 
canvas, and other unconscious objects. 

A-sexual bodies, how produced. continued. 
Upaslidra. Ho gives another proof : 

n s i ^ i s. n 

i-* Samjnayah, of name, ^fftc^ A-ditvat, because of the primitive- 



ness. 



9. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) from the 
primitiveness of the name. 178. 

By means of the name, Brahma, etc., which came to be the begin 
ning, i. e.j primordial, at the beginning of creation, it is known that 
a-sexual body exists. For then there were net parents of Brahma, by 
whom the name Brahma, etc., should be given. 9. 

Vivriti. But there being no proof of the existence of tsvara, how 
can it be affirmed that the names of the water-pot, the canvas, etc., have 
been given by Him ? So he says : 

Because livara, which is the complement of the aphorism, ia the 
beginning (adi), i. e., the cause or source, of names. Thus the proof of 
fsvara having been already stated, by the characteristic of His being 
the author of names, in the aphorism, " But name and effect are the 
mark (of the existence) of beings distinguished from ourselves" (II. i. 
18 Ibid;, being the author of names remains unobstructed. This is 
the sense. 

Conclusion : A-sexual bodies exist. 
UpasTcdra. He concludes : 



Santi, exist. SHftfr3T|: Ayonijah, a-sexual bodies. 
10. A-sexual bodies exist. 179. 

The words " particular forms of bodies " are the complement of the 
aphorism 10. 

Another proof that a-sexual bodies exist. 

UpasTcdra. In order to strengthen the above cooclu.sion all the more, he gives aiother 
proof : 



n s i ^ i \\\\ 

Veda-lingat, from the texts which throw light upon the 
mantra portion of the Veda, i. e., from the Brahmana portion of the 
Veda. =gf Cha, and. 



KANiDA StTTRAS IV, 2, 11. 149 

11. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) also from 
the Brahamana portion of the Veda. 18J. 

1 Veda means mantra. That by which it is linjyate, i. e., made 
known, is veda-lingam/ i. e. } Brdhmanam. From this also a-sexual 
body is proved. This is the meaning. Thus there is the Brdhmanam : 



" Prajapti (i. e., the lord of creation) created numerous creatures : 
He practised peaauce, with the desire, " I may be able to create 
creatures." He created the Brahmana from His mouth, King from his 
arms, the Vaisya from His thighs, the Sudra from his feet. " 

There is also the Veda : 



" His mouth became the Brahmana ; the arms were made the King 
i. e.j Kstriya) ; it was His thigh, which became the Vaisya ; the Sudra 
was born from the feet, etc." 

Thus terrene body, sexual and a-sexual, has been described in the 
above way. Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies can be only a-sexual, 
since semen and blood are, as a rule, terrene, and a terrene substance 
does not originate an aqueous one. 

The terrene sense is the organ of smell, common to all living beings. 
The organ of smell is originated by terrene particles unoverpowered or 
unobscured by water, etc. The organ of smell is terrene, because it 
causes manifestation of smell, while it does not cause the manifestation of 
taste, etc., like the excrement of the fowl which causes the manifestation 
of the perfume of the musk. Similarly, the organ of taste, the tongue, 
is the aqueous sense, as it causes the manifestation of taste only, while 
it does not cause the manifestation of colour, etc,, like water which 
causes the manifestation of the taste of the pudding. In like manner, 
the eye is the igneous sense, because it causes the manifestation of 
colour only, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc., like 
light. The skin is the aerial sense, because it causes the manifestation 
of touch only, while it does not cause the manifestation of smell, etc., 
like the wind blown by the fan which causes the manifestation of the 
coolness of the water (perspiration) sticking to the body. 

The object which is terrene, is characterised as earth, stone, and 
the immoveable. Therein the modifications of earth are the divisions of 
the land, wall, brick, etc., Stones are the troantains, jewels, diamond, 
red-chalk, etc. The irnm^veable are grass, herbs, trees, shrubs, 
creepers, and trees bearing fruits without flowers. Aqueous objects are 
rivers, seas, dew, hail-stone, etc. Igneous object is four-fold, differen 
tiated as terrestrial, celestial, abdominal, and mineral. Tlie terrestrial 
is that which is produced from fuel, such as wood. The celestial is not 
produced from fuel ; e. g., lightning, etc. The abdominal is the sto 
machic, capable of extracting the juice of rice, etc. And the mineral 
is gold, etc. .The aerial object is the wind wdich is the seat or support 
> -of touch which can be felt. The fourth effect of Air, which is called 



150 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Prdna; i.e., the life-breath, and which is the means of disposing of the 
essences (rasa), excreta; and the humours or \ital fluids (dhdtu ) within 
the body, though it is one, still acquires the names of Apfina (i.e., the 
ir which throws out) etc., according to the diversity of its func 
tions. 11. 

Here ends the second chapter of the fourth book in the Commen 
tary of Sankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms of Kanada. 



KANADA SfrTRAS IV, 2,2. 151 

BOOK FIFTH CHAPTER FIRST. 

Action in the hand, how produced. 

Upaskdra. The subject of the fifth book is the investigation of Action. The investi 
gation of Action, producible by volition, is the subject of the first chapter. In this there 
are sections treating of (1) throwing upwards, (2) throwing upwards effected without volition, 
<3) action which has virtue or merit as its cause, and (4) actions, goods, bad, and indifferent. 



II VI I t I t II 

Atma-seHa.yoga-prayatnabh.yslm, by means of con 



junction with, and volition of, the soul. f^" Haste, in the hand. 
Karmma, action. 

1. Action in hand (is produced) by means of conjunction 
with, and volition of, the Soul. 181. 

With reference to a particular form of muscular or bodily action, 
(e. (jr., in using a pestle and mortar), the author says : 

By means of conjunction and volition of the soul, Action (is pro 
duced) in the hand which is its combinative cause. And of this 
Action, conjunction with the soul exercising volition, is the non- 
combinative cause, aid volition is the efficient or conditional cause. It is 
this which is called muscular action , for muscular action is action which 
has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with the soul exercising 
volition, or action producible by volition of something other than, that 
which possesses touch and which is not combined with, and is additonal 
which to that in which the action appears (e.g., hand.) 1. 

Vivriti- Here 5^ in the hand, is an illustration. The meaning 
is that by the conjunction, and volition, of the soul, action, in the form 
of muscular motion, is caused in the body as well as in the parts there 
of. So it has been said. 



That which is produced by the Soul, may be called Desire. That 
which is prodnced by Desire, may be called first Impulse or stir. That 
which is produced by Impulse, may be called muscular motion. It it 
that which is produced by muscular motion, that may be called Action 
or physical change. 

Action in the pestle described. 

Upaskdra.A.Her describing the throwing upwards of the hand, he describes the throw 
ing upwards of the pestle, which depends upon the former : 



n * i n * u 

Tatha, similar. iJ^tf^HtTT^ Hasta-sarayogat, from conjunction with 
the hand. ^ Cha, and. g^f Musale, in the pestle, qpfff Karmma, action. 

2. And, from conjunction with the hand, a similar Action 
appears in the pestle. 182. 



152 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY 



The word cha implies gravity/ which is another efficient cause. 
* Tatha means like that/ i. e., of the form of throwing upwards. Or 
tatha and hasta-sasayogat may be taken as constituting a single 
term, which will then mean from conjunction with hand possessing 
upward motion. Here, again, conjunction of the pestle with the hand 
conjoined with the soul exercising volition, is the non-combinative 
cause ; the pestle is the combinative cause ; volition and gravity are the 
efficient causes. 2. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. He states the caiise of tho sudden motion upward which is produced in the 
pestle when struck by the mortar : 



: II * I ? I \ II 



Abhighata-je, produced by impact. gqfaT^ Musat.adau, in 
the pestle, etc. ^rwffiif Karmmani, in action, sqf^fri^ Vyatirekat, because 
of absence (of volition). 3T^TT?;*rf Akaranam, not cause. l^rT^ftr: Hasta- 
BaBayogah, conjunction with the hand, 

3. In the action, produced in the pestle, etc., by impact, 
conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because of the absence 
(of volition). 183. 

Here, though there is also conjunction of the hand with the rising 
pestle, yet that conjunction possesses no causality On the other hand, 
the impact of the mortar only is the non-combinative cause. It may be 
asked, u Why so?" Therefore he adds, * vyatirekat/ which means 
because of the absence of operativeness of volition." If there were 
volition at that moment, there would surely be no sudden upward motion 
in the pestle. By a volition to hold fast, there would be rather susten 
tion of the pestle ; or, the upward motion again of the pestle would be 
caused by muscular action. This is the import. 3. 

Vivriti. Conjunction with the hand is not the combinative cause. 
* Conjunction is indicative. Volition and muscular action also, it 
should be understood, are not the efficient causes. 

Action in the hand. 

"Upaskdra. With a view to specify a particular cause of the action of the hand, as it 
flies upward with tho pestle, and for the purpose of disproving the non-combinative causality 
of conjunction with the soul exercising volition, he says : 



u * i n 8 n 



Tatha, the same, i. e., not a cause. ^fTrfl^f^tT: Atma-samyogah, con 
junction with the soul. l^rRTWT c ftr Hasta-karmmani, in the action of the 
hand. 

4. In the case of action of the hand, ccnjunction with the 
soul is not a cause. 184. 



KANADA StTTRAS V, 1, 6. 153 

In the case of the action of the hand, as it springs upwards with 
the pestle, conjunction with the soul, i. e , conjunction with the soul 
exercising volition, is the same, i. e., not a cause. The term not-a- 
cause which appears in the preceding aphorism, is carried over here 
by ( tatha. the same. 4. 

Vivriti. Yhis too is illustrative. If shouln be understood that 
that volition also is not a non-common efficient cause. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. " Whence then at that time the upward motiou in the hand " ? In answer 
to this, he says : 



H U* I 3 I U> II 



Abhighatat, from impact. JjJW^nftTT^ Musala-sarayogat, from 
conjunction with the Beetle. 5^" Hoste, in the hand. ^WT^Karmma, action. 

5. The action (i. e., upward motion) in the hand is from 
impact, and from conjunction with the pestle. 185. 

As, when the pestle flies upwards, the iron-ring at the end of the 
} estle rises upwards, so the hand also at that time springs upwards. 
Here by the word, impact, re-action (i. e., recoil) produced by 
impact, is expressed by transference. By the vigorous action of the 
up-going pestle, accompanied with the impact, re-action or recoil is 
produced in the pestle itself which is the substratum of that subs 
tratum of that action. Subject to the re-action so effected, upward 
motion appears in the hand also, in consequence of the conjunction of 
the hand and the pestle, as its non-combinative cause ; and not that 
this upward motion has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with 
the soul exercising volition, for the hand rises involuntarily together 
with the pestle. This is the idea. 5. 

Action in the body. 

Upaxkara. " well," it may be asked, " conjunction with theisoul exercising volition is 
the cause of the action which is produced in the body or in a part of the body. Why is it 
ot so in the present instance " ? Henoe he says : 



II U. I t I 3 II 

Atma-karmma, action of the body, and its members. 
Hasta-samyogat, from conjunction with the hand, ^r Cha, and, also. 

6. Action of the body and its members is also from conjunc 
tion with the hand. 186. 

The word atma, by transference, means the body and its parts, 
For, impossibility of order or coherence in the text, is the germ of a 
transference of epithet. Thus the action which appears in a part of 
the body also, that is, in the hand, arises from the conjunction of the 
hand and the pestle. Th would l cha implies also impetus. In the- 
action of the hand, conjunction with the hand is really th non-combi- 



154 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

native cause. There is no deviation or breach of uniformity in this 
respect. This conjunction is sometimes conjunction with the soul 
exercising volition, and sometimes conjunction of the hand with pestle, 
etc., possessing impetus, as is the case with the action of the body and 
its parts, of a mad man. 6. 

Falling how produced. 
Upask&ra. Ho begins the section on action independent of volition : 



II * I ? I V9 II 

Sarayoga-abhave, in the absence of conjunction. 
Gurutvat, from gravity. WTflC Patanam, falling. 

7. In the absence of conjunction, falling (results) from 
gravity. 187. 

By the term, conjunction, every kind of impediment is indicated. 
Hence in the absence of impediments, in consequence of gravity as its 
non-combinative cause, falling i. e., an action resulting in conjunction 
below, is produced. Here in fruit, etc., possessing gravity, the impedi 
ment is conjunction ; in a bird, etc., however, volition to hold up is the 
impediment to falling ; in an arrow, etc., when discharged, it is the re 
action that is the impediment to falling. The meaning is that, in the 
absence of these, falling is caused by gravity. In the case of holding 
up of poison, etc., in the air, by thought-transference, etc., conjunction 
with the soul endowed with adristam (invisible after-effects of pre 
vious acts), or mantra, and the like are really the impediments. These 
also are included by the term conjunction. 7. 

Bhdsya. reads Samskdra in the place of Sam-yoga. 

Falling how produced continued. 

Upaskdra. Will, if falling is caused by gravity, then how can there be sometimes an 
upward, and sometimes a sideward motion in a stone, etc., when thrown up ? To meet this 
objection, he says : 



I \ I c: II 

Nodana-visesa-abhavat, owing to the absence of a 



particular movement or impulse. ?T Na, not. 3^>^ Urddhvam, upward. 
*f Na, not. ffc4f Triyyak, oblique, sideward. JUT^flC Gamanam, going. 

8. Owing to the absence of a particular molecular movement, 
there arises no upward or sideward motion (in the fruit, bird, and 
arrow). 188. 

The upward or sideward motion which takes place in a stone, arrow, 
etc., though they possess gravity, results from a particular i. ., a 
violent, molecular movement. So that in the case of the falling of a 
fruit, a bird, an arrow, etc., in the absence of conjunction, volition, 
3,nd re-action, there does not exist a particular movement, and conse 
quently there is no upward or sideward motion. This is the sense. 8. 



KANADA SftTRAS V, 1, 11. 155 

Above continued. 

Upnskdra.But, whenoo is particular molecular movement itself produced ? Ho gives 
the answer : 



II VI I t I & II 

. Prayatna-visesat, from a particular volition. 5 
Nodana-viSesah, particular molecular movement or impulse. 

9, Particular molecular movement (results) from particular 
volition. 189. 

Particular volition is caused by the desire " I will throw sideward r 
upward, far, or near." By this, particular nodana or molecular move 
ment is produced, from which upward or sideward motion is possible 
produced in a substance possessing gravity, a. </., a stone, etc. 9. 

Throwing far away, how produced. 
(Tpaskdra. Udasanara means throwing far upwards. 



, Nodana-viSesat, from a particular molecular movement. 
Udasana-visesah, particular throwing away. 

10. From particular molecular movement, (results) particular 
throwing away. 190. 

Vivriti. sftvrt^faRfc * > from a heterogeneous molecular move- 
tuont produced by the aforesaid volition, 33CTTq, i. e., throwing high 
upwards, going upwards, *Rfrf, e., takes place, which completes the 
aphorism. Thus, by agreement and difference, the causality of parti 
cular molecular movement toward upward motion, is proved. a^TT^, 
going upwards, is an indication. Sideward motion, etc., also should be 
understood. 

Non-volitional action, not a cause of virtue or vice. 

Upask-lra. The action which is produced in the hand together with the pestle, by th& 
impact of the mortar, is not at all preceded by volition, nor is it the source of virtue and vice. 
He extends a similar nature to the playful movements of the hands and feet, etc., of a child : 



541H9MMH II % I t I K II 

Hasta-karmmana, by the action of the hand. 3T<<$ <#uf Daraka- 
karmma, the action of a child. itWRlftfC Vyakhyatam, explained. 

11. By the action of the hand, the action of a child (has 
been) explained. 191. 

Although a child s movement of its hands, feet, etc., is surely pre 
ceded by effort, it has not for its result the acquisition of the good and 
the avoidance of the evil, nor is it consequently a source of virtue and 
vice. This is the meaning of the extension or analogy. 11. 



But how is action, in the form of sideward and upward. 
motion, of the hands and feet of a child lying on the lap, produced, in. 



156 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



the absence therefrom of the particular molecular movement or im 
pulse ? So he says ; 

By the action of the hand, of the form of throwing upwards, etc., 
simultaneous with the throwing upwards of a stone, the action, i, e., the 
throwing upwards of the hands and feet, of a child, is explained, i. e., 
proved. Thus, a particular molecular movement is not the cause of all 
throwing high upwards, but only of particular acts of throwing high 
upwards. Hence the throwing upwards of the hands and feet of a child 
is not unproved. Otherwise, the throwing upwards of the hands of 
one who throws up a stone, etc., will be also unproved. 

Certain volitional action altsn, not a cause of -virtue or vice. 

Upaskdra. Now, extending similarity to the action of a child to action which , though 
preceded by volition, is yet not the cause of a virtue and vice, he says : 



n *i i ? i ?R u 

Tatha, the same. ^T^J Dagdhasya, of a burnt person. 
Visphotane, in the case of a boil. 

12. The same (is action directed towards the killing of a 
felon), when (a house being set on fire by him) the body of a 
person burnt therein, is torn open by fire. 192. 

A house being set on fire by a felon and in it boils being caused to 
a person burnt by the fire, action which is produced in the hand, etc., 
by volition directed towards the killing of that felon, is neither a cause 
of virtue nor a cause of vice ; as it has been said, " In the slaying of a 
felon, there is no sin in him that slays openly or covertly : wrath 
encounters wrath. An incendiary, a poisoner, an assassin, a thief, a 
ravisher of wife and field, these six are felons. " 12. 

V ivriti Sometimes throwing upwards, etc., result also from parti 
cular molecular movements which are not dependent upon particular 
volition produced by the desires, " I throw upwards," etc. This he 
points out : 

5*\=r^T, of a burnt body, building, fruit, etc. ; f^rlte^, in the going 
sideward and upward of their parts ; <TIT ? molecular movement, caused 
by a particular volition, is not the cause. This is the meaning. 

Non-volitional action in the body described. 
Upaskdra. Now, he points out actions which take place without volition. 



n * i ? i ^ n 

Yatna-abhave, in the absence of volition. M^dfrU Prasuptasya, 
of the sleeping. ^FTJ^ Chalanam, movement. 



13. Movement of the sleeping (takes place) in the absence 
of volition. 193. 

The word prasuptasya implies the state of absence of conscious 
ness. Therefore, the movement caused by air in the unconscious state 
of a person in swoon, while living, should be observed here. 13. 



KANlDA SftTRAS V, 1, 15. 157 



Vivriti. Even in the absence of volition caused by the desire, " I 
throw up," etc., movement of the body, i. e., action such as the side 
ward and upward movements of the limbs of a person sleeping or 
attended with deep sleep, is produced. Therefore, a particular voli 
tion is not everywhere the cause. This is the import. 

Action in things other than the body. 
Upaslcdra. Having explained the actions of the body, he treats of other actions : 



n % i * i * 9 n 

rjjrfr Trine, in the grass. ^frwf Karmma, action. ^HJ^T^tTT^ Vayu-samyogat, 
from conjunction with air. 

14. Action in the grass (arises) from conjunction with air. 

194. 

By the term grass/ he implies trees, shrubs, creepers, and all such 
other objects 14. 



Vivriti. He points out .similar other actions also. 

Even in the absence of a particular volition, from conjunction with 
-air, action is produaed in the grass. 

Action produced by adristam. 
UpasMra. Enumerating actions dependent upon adcistam, he says : 



II % I 3 I ?V, || 

JTT^WfMani-gamanam, movement of the jewel. ^qfaspfqi Suchi- 
abhisarpanam, approach of the needle. ^TfgsRW^ Adrista-karanakam, 
have adristam, (i.e., the invisible consequences of previous acts) as their 
cause. 

15. The movement of the jewel, and the approach of the 
needle, adristam as their cause. 195. 

By the term jewel, bell-metal, etc., are implied. In the going 
which takes place, therefore, of the jewel, bell-metal, etc., informed with 
mantra or incantation, towards the thief, there, of that movement the 
jewel, etc., are the combinative cause, conjunction of the jewel with the 
.Sjul of the thief possessed of adristam, is the non-combinative cause, and 
the vice of the thief is the efficient or instrumental cause. By the word 
* needle, in the approach of the needle/ all metal as well as grass are 
implied. Thus, in the case of the movement of the needle, etc., towards 
that which is attractive of iron (i. e., the magnet), and of the movement 
of grass towards that which is attractive of grass, the needle, etc. are 
the combinative cause, conjunction with the soul of the person possess 
ed of adristam, who is affected for good or for bad by that movement 
of the grass, the needle, etc., is the non-combinative cause, and his 
yery adristam, is the instrumental cause. Other instances, e. g. the 
naming upwards of fire, the sideward motion of air, the action of the 
ultimate atoms at the beginning of creation, etc., should be similarly 
understood. 15. 



158 VAlgfiSIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Vivfiti. By the terra, jewel/ are intended vessels made of gold, 
etc., and filled with water. To such a vessel magicians apply incanta 
tions for the recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the ancients is- 
this. The vessel is set on the grou id, and some other person lays his- 
right hand upon it. The vessel accompanied with the hand, in conse 
quence of the efficacy of the incantation, moves towards the spot where- 
the stolen property has been deposited, and on reaching that place, 
stops. 

The reason of the movement of such a vessel is not a particular 
volition, but the efficient cause is the merit of the former possessor or 
the demerit of the thief. The non-combinative cause is conjuuction of 
such a vessel with soul possessing such adristam (or results of actions- 
done in previous states of existence) ; and the combinative cause is- 
such a vessel. In like manner, adristam is also the causa of the attrac 
tion towards a loadstone, which takes place in needles, i. e., iron-rods,. 
when in proximity with the magnet. If it be asked, in consequence of 
whose adristam motion takes place in needles, etc., the reply, is that it 
is the adristam of him to whom benefit or injury accrues by the motion, 
that is the cause. The term, needle/ is indicative, iro:i in general 
attracted by the load-stone being inte idel. It is to be understood that 
adristam is the cause of the motion of grass attracted by that which is 
attractive of grass (amber ?), of the upward flaming of fire, of the side 
ward motion of air, and of the aotiou of the ultimata atoms at the 
beginning of creation. 

Plurality of action. 

Upaskdra It may bo doubted whether an arrow, a bird, a wheel of burning charcoal, etc.,. 
have only one action, or many, till they come to a stop. To remove this doubt, he says : 



: n * i ? i ?$ u 



jq\ Isau, of the arrow. SinjTT^ Ayugapat, 

Samyoga-visesah, peculiarities of co iju ictio is. ^rfr:q?% Karmma- 
anyatve, in respect of diversity of action.^: Hetuh, cause. Mark 

16. Peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions of the 
arrow, are the mark of the diversity of its actioa. 195. 

In isau the locative inflection has bee i used in the se:ise of the- 
genitive. The sense of the aphorism is as follows : After conjunction 
with a wall and the like, of an arrow, etc., moving with impetus, a 
cessation of motion is observed, even though the arrow, etc., still exist;. 
Here it is not the destruction of the substratum which causes the- 
destruction of the motion, for the substratum continues to exist. A ly 
contradictory attribute is also not observed. It is, therefore, inferrel. 
that it is conjunction produced by itself, that destroys the action. And 
this conjunction, produced at the fourth moment, destroys action of 
the fifth moment. Thus, first there is production of action, then dis 
junction, next destruction of the previous conjunction, after it sub 
sequent conjunction, and lastly destruction of action. The meaning, 
therefore, is that peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions make- 
known the diversity of the action. * Saiayoga-viiesah means- 



KANlDA SftTRAS V, 1, 17. 15& 

peculiarity in conjunction, which is nothing but self-produced-ness. 
Otherwise, were conjunction, as such, destructive of action, action 
could not abide anywhere. 16. 

Action produced by Samskara. 

Upaskdra. After the section on Action producible by impulse, he begins the section on 
Action producible by resultant energy. 



K 



II V, I \\ \\3 II 

Nodanat, from impulse of molecular movement. 9TI^} Adyam, 
original, first, %q\: Isoh, of the arrow. *&*] Karmma, action. dcijfcw 



Tat-karmma-karitat, produced by that action. =5 Cha, and. fl frftKT^ Sams- 
karat, from resultant energy. HrfT Uttaram, the next. <TIT Tatha, simi 
larly. SflT Uttaram, the next. Sfrf Uttaram, the next. ^ Cha, and. 

17. The first action of the arrow is from impulse ; the next 
is from resultant energy produced by that (i.e., the first) action ; 
and similarly the next, and the next. 197. 

Of the first action, which is produced in an arrow, when discharged 
from a bowstring, drawn by the volition of a person, the arrow is the 
combinative cause, volition and gravity are the efficient causes. And 
by this first action, resultant energy, called impetus, and having the 
^ame substratum, is produced, it is proved even by perception, viz., 
" It (i. e., the arrow) moves with velocity." By that resultant energy, 
action is produced in that arrow ; of which the non-combinative cause 
is the resultant energy, the combinative cause is the arrow, while the 
efficient cause is an intense form of molecular movement. In like man 
ner, a succession of actions one after another is produced by the 
resultant energy which continues until the arrow falls. 

Since, on an action being destroyed by subsequent conjunction 
produced by (the action) itself, another action is produced by resultant 
energy, therefore, a single resultant energy only is productive of a 
succession of actions ; whereas, on the ground of redundancy, it is not 
proper to assume a succession of resultant energy, similar to the 
succession of actions. To point out this, he says " similarly the next, 
and the next," and also uses the singular number in " from resultant 
energy produced by that action." In the Nyaya doctrine, however, 
which admits a succession of resultant energies like the succession of 
actions, there is redundancy. The reason, again, that of two arrows, 
simultaneously discharged, the impetus of the one is swift and that of 
the other slow, is the swiftness andslownees of the impulse or molecular 
movement. 17- 

Vivrtti. The original action itself of a discharged arrow, etc., 
destroys, at the third moment from its own origin, its cause, viz.t 
molecular movement or impulse, given by the bow. Therefore, there 



VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



being absence of impulse, how will other actions be produced at the 
fifth, and succeeding moments ? In view of this objection, he states 
the aphorism. 

Falling of arrow, how caused. 

Upa*kdra.--Svt if only a single resultant energy be productive of a succession of actions 
there would be, under no circumstances whatever, a falling of the arrow, because of the 
the resultant energy which is productive of aciton. (To this objection, he 



Saiiiskara-abhave, in the absence of resultant energy (or 
propulsive energy generated by action). p^T^ Gurutvat, from o-ravity. 
Patanam, falling. 



18. In the absence of propulsive energy generated by action, 
falling (results) from gravity. 198. 

Gravity, which is the cause of falling, invariably follows (the- 
arrow), at every moment. That gravity, being counter-acted by resul 
tant energ/, could not cause the falling (of the arrow;. Now, in the- 
absence of the counter-active, the very same gravity causes falling. 
This is the meaning. 18. 

Here ends the first chapter of the fifth book in Sankara s Com 
mentary on the Yaiiesika Aphorisms. 



KANiDA SfiTRAS V, 2, 2. 161 



BOOK FIFTH CHAPTER SECOND. 

Causea of action in Earth. 

Upatibira. This is the section on the examination of Action producible by impulse, etc., 
Therein he says: 



Nodana-abhighatat, from molecular movement or impulse, 
and from impact. ^Tfi^^JlWC, Saiiayukta-Saikyogat, from conjunction 
with the conjunct. ^ Cba, and. ^fa^T Prithivyam, in Earth. sp,*i Kar- 
mina, action. 

1. Action in Earth (results) from impulse, impact, and con 
junction with the conjunct. 199. 

^\\*f is a particular form of conjunction : conjunction, action pro 
duced by \\hich does not Leccme the cause of the disjunction of conjoint 
things from each other ; or, conjunction which does not become the 
efficient cause of Sound. That j articular form of conjunction is called 
impact, \vhich becomes the efficient cause of Sound, and action produced 
by which becomes the cause of disjunction of conjoint things Irom 
each other. By each cf them also action is produced in. Earth called 
clay. In Earth action is produced from imrulse given by the foct, as 
weil as from the impact of the foot. Here clay is the combinative 
cause ; impulse and impact are respectively non-combinative causes ; 
gravity, imj etus, and volition are, so far as they are necessary, efficient 
causes. " From conjunction with the conjunct : " Because action is 
simultaneously observed in a water-pot, etc., lying on clay, when action 
is produced in that clay from impulse or from impact. 1. 

Above continued. 

l~ ],cn>l:ra. But \\hat is the non-combinative caute of earthquake, etc., which take 
place M ithout the intervention of impulse and impact ? He gives the answer : 



^ , Jl ^ I R I R II 

b, that, i. e., action in Earth. f^^^Jir Visesena, with a particu 
lar consequence. ^j^S^lfrcf Adrista-karitam, caused by adrisiam or 
destiny. 

2. (If action in Earth happens) with a particular conse 
quence, it is caused by adristam. 200. 

Tat alludes to action in Earth. Action in Earth alone, if it 
happens with a particular consequence, i. e., under the tendency (vdsand) 
of transmigratory souls towards birth, life, and experience (bhoga"), is 
then caused by adristam. Therefore, the non-combinative cause of 
earthquake is conjunction of the soul, possessing adristam, of a person 
whose pleasure or pain is produced by the earthquake ; the earth is the 
combinative cause ; and adristam is the efficient cause. 



162 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Or tat alludes to impulse and impact. i Visasa.i means absence. 
So that, the meaning is, action in Earth, which is produced in the 
absence of impulse and impact, is caused by adl istam. 2. 

JBhdsya. explains adrista in V. ii. 2 in the sense of unseen natural 
force, the causes of seismic disturbances, of the revolution of the ter 
restrial globe round the sun, and of other actions in Earth. 

Cause of rain. 

Upaskdra. Now, in the section on the examination of action combined with fluid (which 
includes liquid) substance, he says : 



t A pain, of waters. ^nTfiT^ra Samyoga-abhave ; in the absence of 
conjunction. JT^rSTT^ Gurutvat, from gravity. TrFTflt Patanam, falling. 

3. The falling of waters, in the absence of conjunction, is 
due to gravity. 201. 

The falling of waters, in the form of a shower, is caused by gravity, 
which is its non-combinative cause. It takes place in the absence of 
conjunction, *. c., conjunction with the cloud. Therefore, absence of 
conjunction is the efficient cause. This is the meaning. -3. 

Causes of flowing of ivater. 

Upaskdra. But how is action, productive of mutual conjunction amongst the drops of 
water themselves, produced ? He gives the answer. 



Dravatvat, from fluidity. ^Tr^rq Syandanam, flowing. 
4. Flowing (results) from Hudity. 202- 

By the mutual conjunction of drops of water fallen on earth, a 
large body of water, in the form of a stream, is produced. And the 
flowing or distant progression, which takes place- in it, is produced 
from fluidity as its non-combinative cause, and from gravity as its 
efficient cause, in water drops which are its combinative causes 4. 

Cause of evapc ration of water. 

Upaskdra. But the falling in rain, due to gravity, would be po&sible, if water lying on 
earth went up. But how does this take place ? fe o he says : 



Nadyah, the sun s rays. ^r^^TTr^Vayu-saKiyogat, through con 
junction with air. 3Tntr?<!IflC Arohanam, ascent. 

5. The sun s rays (cause) the ascent (of water), through 
conjunction with air. 203. 

The word, cause (verb), is the complement of the aphorism. The 
rays of the sun cause the going up of water, through conjunction with air. 



KANADA StTTKAS V, 2,7. 163 

In the summer, the sun s rays, being impelled "by air, cause the 
ascent of water. This is the meaning. 



Where the reading is Tlg^l3S qVlffi(. there it should be interpreted 
as conjunction with air related to the sun s rays. 5. 

Cause of evaporation of water, continued. 

Upaskt tra. But how do the sun s rays come to possess such power that they carry up 
water lying on the earth ? Hence he says. 



Nodana-apidanat, from concussion, or being violently 
shaken by or through the impulse. sfgflsf^TJTT^ Saihyukta-samyogat, 
from conjunction with the conjunct. ^ Cha, and. 

6. (Particles of water fly upwards), by means of concussion 
with impulse, and of conjunction with the conjunct. 204. . 

Particles of water fly up, being conjoined with the sun s rays, 
which are, in turn, conjoined with air, through concussion with the 
imj ulse of strong wind ; in the same way as the rays of fire, bestirred 
by air, carry up particles of water boiling in a cauldron. The word 
cha conveys the sense of as. And here only particles of water 
boiling in a cauldron should be observed to be the simile. 6. 

NOTE : Upaskdra compares the two processes of evaporation and 
ebullition of water 

Cause of circulation of water in trees. 

Upasl ura. Water peured at the root, gots up in all directions, through the interior of 
a tree. Neither impulse and impact, nor the sun s rays prevail there. How, then, is it 
caused ? He gives the answer. 



II * I R I V9 II 

qOT Vriksa-abhisarpanam, circulation in trees, ff^ Iti, this. 
Adrista-karitaro, caused by adfistam or destiny. 

7. The circulation (of water) in trees is caused by adristam. 
205. 

1 Abhisarpanam means flowing towards oV all over. That takes 
place in a tree, of water poured at its root. It is caused by adristam, i. e. f 
of those souls whose pleasure or pain is produced by the growth of the 
leaves, branches, fruits, flowers, etc. The meaning, then, is that action 
by which water rises up and causes the growth of trees, arises from 
conjunction with the above-mentioned souls, possessing adfistam, as 
its n on- combinative cause, and from adfistam, as its efficient cause, in. 
water which is its combinative cause. 7. 

Cause of condensation and dissolution of water. 

Upaxkara. Constitutional fluidity has been stated to be the characteristic of water. 
Upward, downward, and sideward motion of such water only has been proved. The aqueous- 
ness of snow, hail, etc., also are proved without a dispute, since they possess coldness. There 
fore, how do these possess condensation, i. e., hardness, and how dissolution ? Hence 
i\e says. 



164 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY 



TT Apara, of waters. ^-fHT: Sanghatah, condensation, fr^ppf Vilaya 
nam, dissolution. ^ Cha, and. ^3T:*f<ffmt Tejah-sarkyogU, from conjunc 
tion with fire. 

8. Condensation, and dissolution, of water, are due to con 
junction with fire. 206. 

Aqueous ultimate atoms, originating a binary atomic ao-aieo-ate 
in consequence of being impeded by celestial fire, do not originate 

fluidity in these binary atomic aggregates. Snow, hail, etc, void of 
fluidity, are thus originated, in the course of binary and others atomic 
aggregates, by constituent {.arts void of fluidity. Therefore hard iess 
is observed in them. 

Such being the case, it may be asked, what proof is there that s iow 
hail, etc., are modifications of water V Accordingly it has bea i said 
Dissolution also from conjunction with fire." By a more powerful 
conjunction with fire, aotion is produced in the ultimate atoms oricrj lia -" 
tive of s:io\v, hail, etc. Action produces disjunction. Froin the 
successive destruction thereby of originative conjunctions follows the 
destruction of the larger compounds, snow, hail, etc. In consequence 
of the departure therefrom of conjunction with fire, which was aa 
impediment to fluidity, the very same ultimate atoms originate fluidity 
in binary atomic aggregates; whence dissolution takes place of s lovv 
hail, etc., thus endowed with fluidity. Here also the subsequent ingress 
of a more powerful fire is the efficient cause. -8. 



xplils up V. ii. 8 into two aphorisms, viz., Apdm San jhdtak 
and vilayanclia tejah 



Above continued. 

UpaskAra. But what is the proof that thare i* sub.^iuent in jrojs into \v-ii v of a m ,rn 
powerful nro present in other ? So he says : 

I ^ I R | 8. II 

Tatra, there, i. e., in the case of the ingress of fire into water." 
^ Visphurjjathuh, the pealing of thunder. fafflC Lingam, mark. 
9. The pealing of thunder is the mark of that. 207. 

1 Tatra/ i. e., in the matter of the subsequent ingress of fire, present 
in ether, into water floating in ether, visphurjjathuh lingam/i.e. the 
pealing of thunder itself is the mark. This is the meaning. Par-reach 
ing flash of lightning is clearly perceptible ; thunder which iirnndiate- 
ly follows it, is also really perceptible. By this it is inferred that fire 
present in ether, in the form of lightning, has entered into the cloui 
from which hailstones appear. By its presence, as a condition, irn >edi- 
ment is caused to the fluidity of water-particles originative of hail 
stones. 9 



S&TRAS V, 2, 12. 165 



Cause of condensation of water, continued. 
Upaskdra. Of this he gives yet another proof . 



r u * i R i ?on 

T Vaidikam, Vedic, Derived from Veda. =g Cha and. 
10. (There is) Vedic (proof) also. 208. 

The meaning is that the ingress of fire into water is proved by the 
Veda also. Thus : 



" Those waters held fire in their womb, which held fire in their 
svomb," etc. 10. 

Cause of thundering . 

Upaskdra. But how is thundering produced, since conjunction and disjunction, which 
are the causes of Sound, are not observed ? Hence he says : 



i R i ? 

Apum, of waters. S qtJTT^ Samyogat, from conjunction, . 

Vibhagat, from disjunction. ^ Cha, and. ^crTft?%r: Stanayitnoh. of cloud. 

11. (Thunder-clap results) from conjunction with, and dis 
junction from, water, of the cloud. 209. 

" Visphuvjjathuh " is the complement of the aphorism. Conjunction 
with, and disjunction from, water, of the cloud, by becoming efficient 
causes, produce sound, i. e., thundering, in ether as the combinative 
cause, through the conjunction of the cloud itself with ether, as the 
non-combinative cause. Sometimes, again, conjunction with, and dis 
junction from, air, of the cloud, are the efficient causes, and conjunc 
tion of the cloud with ether, and its disjunction therefrom, are the 
non-combinative causes. This is collaterally mentioned in the topic of 
the causes of action. Or, since action is the leading topic here, it is 
indicated that, conjunction of the cloud and ether, or their disjunc 
tion, being the non-combinative cause of sound, the (efficient) cause is 
action produced from the impulse and impact of water alone 11. 

Vivriti- Thundering takes place from the conjunction of water, 
i. e., from the impact of air with it, and from its disjunction from the 
cloud. 

Causes of conflagration, tempest, etc. 

UpasMra. It has been stated that conjunction with soul possession adristam is a eauso 
of earth-quake. A; there, so in the case of the action which is produced in fire which causes 
sudden conflagration, and in air which eausos a sudden agitation uf trees and the like con 
junction with soul possessing adristam is also the non-combinative cause ; air and tiro are tha 
.combinative causes ; and adristam is the efficient cause. This is the meaning. 



II V* I R I 



166 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



n Prithivi-karmmana, by the action of Earth. ?HT:^wr Tejah- 
karmma, action of fire, sn^wf Vayu-karmma, action of air. =g Clia, and 
Vyakhyatam, explained. 



12. The action of Fire, and the action of Air are explained 
by the action of Earth. 210. 

The twice recurrence of the word action in the aphorism, has the 
object of indicating the action of meteors, etc. 12. 

Causes of initial action of fire, air, atoms, and mind. 

Upskdra. Ho mentions other actions of which conjunction with soul possessirg ailrixtam 
s the non-combinative cause. 



%: Agneh, of fire. 3^33^1 sf Urddhva-jvalanaiii, flaming upward. 
: Vayoh, of air. faafoTiryyak, sideward. T^ Pavan am, blowing. INgrj 
Anunam, of atoms, JTT^r: Manasah. of inind. ^ Cha, and. ^fr^4 Adyam, 
initial, first. q;| Karmma, action. *%%% ^TT^rTq Adrista-karitam, caused by 
adristam. 

13. The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial sideward 
blowing of air, and the initial actions of atoms, and of mind are 
caused by adristam. 211. 

Adyam means contemporaneous with, or existing at, the beginn 
ing of creation. At that stage, impulse, impact, etc., being non-existent. 
conjunction with soul possessing adristatii is in these cases the non- 
combinative cause. The adjective, initial, qualifies upward flaming, 
and sideward blowing also. It is proper to hold that impetus is the 
non-combinative cause of other (than initial) actions of fire and air, 
for there being a visible or known cause there is no occasion for the- 
supposition of an invisible or unknown cause 13. 

Cause of action of mind. 
Upaskdra. With reference to non-initial action, he says : 



r Hasta-karmmana, by the action of the hand. 
Manasah of mind or the internal organ. ^FFJ karmma, action. s^f- 
Vyakhyatam, explained. 

14. The action of mind is explaind by the action of the 
hand. 212. 

As in the throwing upward, etc., of the pestle, the action of the- 
hand has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with soul exercis 
ing volition, so the action of the mind also, for the purpose of coming 



KANADA StTTRAS III, 2, 12. 167 



into contact with the (external) sense receptive of the object desired, 
really has for its nou-corabi native cause conjunction with soul exercis 
ing volition. Although mind, the sense, is not directly subject to 
volition, still it should be observed that action is produced in mind by 
volition which can be reached by the nervous process by which mind 
travels. That the nervous process can be apprehended by the tactual 
sense-organ, however, must be admitted ; for, otherwise, assimilation 
of food, drink, etc., also will not be possible by volition which can be 
reached by the nervous process through which life or the vital energy 
travels. 14. 

Pleasure and pain are marks of action of mind. 

UpasMra. But, it may be objected, there is no proof that action is produced in the 
.mind. Hence he says : 



II 

1^ Atma-indriya-manah-artha-sannikarsfit, from 
contact of soul, sense, mind, and object. g<Sf:^ Sukha-duhkhe, pleasure 
and pain. 

15. Pleasure and pain (results) from contact of soul, sense, 
mind, and object. 213. 

Pleasure and pain is indicative ; cognition, volition, etc., are to 
he understood. The universality or ubiquity of mind has been already 
refuted and its atom-ness established. It has also been stated that the 
non-production of cognitions simultaneously is the mark of mind. 
There could, therefore, be no pleasure and pain at all, without the con 
junction of mind with the respective localities of the senses. The mean 
ing is that, did no action take place in mind, there could be no feeling in 
-the form of " Pleasure in my foot," "Pain in ray head," etc. Although 
all the particular attributes of the soul depend upon contact of mind, yet 
pleasure and pain are (alone expressly) mentioned*, because, on account 
of their intensity, they are very manifest. 15. 

Yoga described. 

Ifpaskdra. Well, if the mind is so fickle or restless, then there being no inhibition or 
restraint of the internal organ there can bo no ycga or communion, and without yoga there 
jan be no intuitive knowledge of the soul, and without it, there can be no moksa or salvation, 
Therefore, the undertaking of this treatise is futile. In anticipation of this objection 
he says : 

$ 
I 1 I ^ II 

Tat-anarambhah, non-origination of that, i. e., pleasure 
.and pain, or action of mind. ?TTr*T$f Atrnasthe, steady in the soul. JfTf^T 
ananasi, mind being. SETTta^ Sarirasya, of body, i. e., of the embodied 
;-soul. 5:^1^3": duhkha-abhavah, non-existence of pain. ^ Sah, that* 
Yogah, yoga, communion. 



168 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



16. Non-origination of that (follows) on the mind becoming 
steady in the soul ; (after it, there is) non-existence of pain in the 
embodied soul. (This is) that yoga. 214. 

When the mind of an indifferent person who has come to believe in 
the vanity of all objects of enjoyment, comes to stay only in the soul at 
that stage, owing to the absence of volition corresponding to its action 
action is not produced in the mind which then becomes comparatively 
steady. It is this (state) which is (called) yoga, since the characteristic 
I yoga is the inhibition or restraint of the internal organ, chittam. 

1 Tat-anarambhah, means non-origination of action of mind. Or 
by the word, Hat/ only pleasure and pain are denoted, being in the* 
context. < Duhkha-abhavah ; Being the means of the non-existence of 
pain, Yoga itself is (spoken of as) non-existence of pain as is the 
expression " Food is life." Or, it is a relative compound word mean 
ing where there is non-existence of pain, garirasya means the soul 
as limited or determined by the body. Sah yogah : here the word 
1 that / refers to a universally known object," (the meaning bein^ this 
is that Yoga. 

Or, by the word, fitma, life is here denoted by transference since 
soul is inferred by life. So that, by action in the nervous process 
which is the channel of tho life breath, action of the life breath 
(respiration ), is also produced. Or, the action of the life breath has for 
its non-combinative cause, conjunction of the life-breath with soul 
exercising volition the source of vitality. And volition, which is the 
source of vitality, is supersensible, and has to be inferred by the 
movement of the life-breath. Otherwise, ho\v can there be inspiration 
of air, even in the state of deep sleep ? This is the import _ 16 



i. 1 Atmasthe manasi, i. e., when, quitting the senses, etc. 
in virtue of tho six-limbed Yoya, mind abides in the soul alone, then 
< tat-anarambhah, i. e., anarambhah or non-production of action of 
mind. The mind then becomes fixed or steady. In this state, Sarlrasya- 
duhkha-abhavah, i. e., pain in relation to tho body is not produced. 
Sah, i. e., conjunction of mind, resiling from the outside, with soul 
is called Yoya. 

The following verses of Skandapurdnam also prove the same thino- ; 



i t 

" So also, (i . e. restkss) is Chitta, (i. e., the internal organ), smitten 
with air. Therefore, do not trust it Accordingly ; restrain air, for the- 
purpose of steadiness of Chitta. For the purpose of restraining air, 
practise Yoga, of which there are six angaa or limbs. Posture, Regula 
tion of breath, Abstraction or Inhibition of the senses, Concentration 
of mind, Meditation, and Absorption, these are the six anyas or 
limbs of Yoga or communion. 



KANiDA SftTRAS V, 2, 17. 169 

Therefore, there being cessation of false knowledge, etc., brought 
about by the manifestation of intuitive knowledge of soul, after the 
attainment of Yoga, final emancipation remains unimpeded. Conse 
quently a system of thinking about things (like Kandda Stttras} is not 
fruitless. This is the import. 

Other actions of mind, etc. independent of volition, 
and dependent on adristam. 

Upnskdra. But, if volition were the efficient cause of the action of life and mind, then, 
when life and mind go out from the body, in the state of death, and, on the production of 
another body, re-enter into it, there being no volition, both the.^e actions would ba impossible. 
How, again, can be produced action, productive of conjunction of even what is eaten and 
drunk, i. e., food and drink, which conjunction is the cause of the growth of the body and its 
limb*, as well as action %vhich causes conjunction and disjunction during life within the 
womb ? In anticipation of this objection, he says : 



n * i i i 

far Apasarpanam, going out, egress. gr<T?T*T<f?n; Upasarpanam, com 
ing into, ingress. ^ri^rnfa^frTT: Asita-pita-samyogah, conjunctions of 
what is eaten and drunk. ^T^fcdMJMlTI 1 Karyya-antara-samyogah, con 
junctions of other effects or products. =5 Cha, and. ^Tfg^ni^Trfr Adrista- 
karitfi ii, caused by adfistam. 

17. Egress and ingress (of life and mind, from and into, 
body), conjunctions (i.e., assimilation) of food and drink, and con 
junctions of other products, these are caused by adristam. 215. 

Here the neuter gender in the word adrista-kiiritani is according 
to the rule that word of the neuter gender, appearing together with a 
word of another gender, may optionally entail neuter gender in both. 
The word, Samyoga/ again, secondarily denotes action which is its 
cause. l Apasarpanam/ i. e., the going out of life and mind from the 
body alone, on the wearing away of action which originated the body ; 
* Upasarpanam/ i. e., the entrance of life and mind into another body 
as it is produced ; action which is the cause of the conjunction (i. e. f 
assimilation) of food, drink, etc. ; and action which is the cause of the 
conjunction (i. e., pulsation, etc.) of another product, i. e,, the foetus ; 
all these have as their non-combinative cause conjunction with soul 
possessing adTistam. The word, iti/ implies that the actions of the 
humours and excreta of the body are also caused by conjunction with, 
soul possessing adristam, as their non-combinative cause. 17. 

Vivriti- He mentions other actions dependent on adTistam. 

Apasarpanam/ i. e., egress of mind from the body at death ; ( Upa 
sarpanam, i. e., the ingress of mind into another body when it is pro 
duced ; action from which conjunctions of what is eaten and drunk, 
i. e., food and water, are produced ; action from which conjunctions of 
other effects, i. e., the senses and life, with the body, are produced : all 
these are caused by conjunction with soul possessing adristam, as th& 
non-combinative cause. 



170 VAIESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Moksa described. 

Upattkdra. But, it may be urged, if the production of another |body were necessary, how| 
-would there be Moksa ? Hence he says ; 



Tat-abhave, in the non-existence of that, i. e., the causal body, 
or potential body, or the subtle body of impressions and tendencies, 
acquired during life, which becomes the cause of re-birth, and in re 
birth, becomes encased, as it were,, in the gross, physical body. 5f4tTT*n^: 
Samyoga-abhavah, non-existence of conjunction, i. e., with the existing 
physical bodv. ?THTiHfe : A-pradurbhavah, non-re-appearanco, or non-re 
birth. g Cha, and. in^f: Moksah, salvation. Moksa. 

18. Moksa consists in the non-existence of conjunction with 
the body, when there is at the same time, no potential body exist 
ing, and consequently, re-birth cannot take place. 216. 

Here the idea is as follows: The power of Yoya produces intui 
tive knowledge of the self ; false knowledge, attended with desire, is 
thereby annihilated ; consequently, attraction, aversion, stupidity or 
irrationality or spiritual blindness (moha"), and other faults due to it, 
disappear ; then inclination or activity goes away ; birth, due to it, 
therefore, does not take place ; and, consequently, pain, bound up with 
birth, also vanishes away. This, then, is the nature of things. Now, 
in virtue of the power born of yoya, a yoyin, considering the entire 
mass of virtues and vices, or merits and demerits, which are the un 
common or particular causes of pleasure and pain to be enjoyed, at 
particular places and times, in the bodies of a horse, an elephant, a 
serpent, a bird, etc., in accordance with those merits and demerits, and 
then going through those several forms of physical existence, thereby 
wears away or exhausts his previously produced merits and demerits 
by experiencing them. His faults being thus neutralised, when other 
merits and demerits are not produced, and when there is in coi. sequence 
no production of another future or potential body, at that time, it 
is the non-existeuce of conjunction, which then exists, with the 
former body, that is (called) moksa. Tat-abhave means in the absence 
of conjunction, in the non-production of a future body. 

To meet the objection that this state is common to all at pralaya, 
or periodical dissolution of creation, he adds apradurbhavah. The 
meaning is, after which manifestation of body, etc., does not again 
take place. Sah moksah : that is, annihilation of pain, which results 
in that state, is Moksa. 18. 

VivTiti. _ It may be objected that the stream of bodies being with 
out beginning and without end, the impossibility of emancipation is 
also the same. Hence he says : 

Tat-abhave/ i. e., in the absence of adristam, that is to say, where 
future adristam is exhausted by intuitive knowledge of self, and existing 
adristam, by experience, bhoga ; samyoga-abhavah. i. e., a severance 



KANADA StiTRAS V. 2. 20. 171 

takes place from connection with the stream or succession of 
bodies ; following it, is apradurbhavah ; i. e., non-production of pain, 
since the causes, viz., body andfadristam, do not exist. It is then and 
there that emancipation becomes possible. Therefore, emancipation is 
notichimerical like the horns of a hare. This is the import. 

Darkaess is non-existence. 

Upaskdra. It may be objected : The action of a substanca is observed also in darkness^ 
there being the perception, " The shadow moves." Here there is no volition, no impulse or 
impact, no gravity or fluidity, no resultant energy. Therefore, another efficient cause should 
be enumerated ; but it does not fall within observation. Accordingly he says : 



t II <i I ^ I 33. H 



because of difference in production from Substance, Attribute, and 
Action. ?PTT^: Abhavah, non-being, non-existence. rR:Tamah, darkness. 

19. Darkness is non-existence, because it is different in its 
production from Substance, Attribute, and Action. 217. 

By this aphorism, the determination or delimitation that substances. 
are nine only, also becomes established. 

Now, the production of substance is dependent upon substance* 
possessing touch ; but in darkness, touch is not felt. It cannot be that 
touch is only undeveloped here , for development of touch is essential 
to development of colour. 

Objection. This is the rule in case of Earth, whereas darkness is 
the tenth substance. 

Answer. It is not- For no other substance is substratum of blue 
colour, and gravity is inseparable from blue colour, as also are taste 
and smell. 

Objection. As sound is the only distinguishing attribute of Ether,. 
so also will blue colour be the only distinguishing attribute of dark 
ness. 

Answer. It is not so, as there is contradiction to its visibility. For, 
if darkness were something possessing blue colour, or were it blue* 
colour itself, then it would not be perceived by the eye without the help 
of external light. 19. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. What, then, causes the perception of motion (in darkness) ? Ho giv th 
Answer : 

II H* I < I ** II 



: Tejasah, of light. jfiqi-flMl Dravya-antarena, by another subs 
tance. wnTOR^ Avaranat, because of obscuration. <9 Cha, and also. 

20. (Darkness is non-existence), also because (it is produced) 
from the obscuration of light by another substance. 218. 



172 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Light being obscured by another moving substance, non-existence 
of light is not observed in the places falling behind, and is observed 
n the places lying before. It is from this resemblance of the nou- 
xistence of light to the moving substance, that, motion is mistake i 
in it, but not that motion is real in it. This is the meaning, the -.orcep 
tion appearing so (i. e., erroneous) from agreement and diffjre >j 
(That is, whenever a body in motion obscures light, the shad ,\v caused 
thereby also moves ; and where the obscuring body is not iu nntiou 
the shadow also does not move). 

Darkness, (then), is non-e-iste ice of every trace of light possessing 
developed or appreciable colour. -2J. 

Space, Time, Ether, and Soul are void of action. 

Upasktra. Having thus finished the parenthetical action on darkness, in two aph iri- 
srm, ho bo^m.s t 10 section on voiati3ss of aoti m : 



Dik-kalau, space a-id time, srr^rtf Akasam, ether. ^ Clia, 
and also. ftarra^NcRlfet Kriyavat-vaidharmmyat, because of difference 
from that which possesses activity. fM^lffar Niskriyani, inactive. 

Space, Time, and also Ether are inactive, because of 
their difference from that which possesses activity. _ 219. 

The word Cha brings in the soul. Difference from that which 
possesses activity lies in the imponderable less or incorporiety of 
space, etc., for activity always accompanies cjrpoi-eity or form. __ 21 . 

Action, Attribute, Genus, Species, and Combination are v)id of action. 
Upaskara. Ho points out the inactivity of actions and attributes : 



H * i R i RR n 



!$* Etena, by this. ^n=ir!ftl Karmmaui, actions. JTqjT : Grunah, attributes. 
^ Cha, and. s^T^FTf: Vyakhyatah, explained. 

22. By this, Actions and Attributes are explained (as in 
active). 220, 

Etena means by difference from that which possesses activity. 
Difference from that which possesses activity, in other words, in- 
corporeity or imponderableness, belongs to attribute and action. They 
are, therefore, explained to be inactive. 22. 



iti; The worfl Oka implies Grenus, etc. 
Combination has no beginning, and so is independent of action. 



a.-^L^ may be urged : If attribute and action are inactive, how then can there 
be relation of substance with them ? Connection by conjunction may be possible ; but that- 
is dependent upon action. Hence he says : 



wrenr* *p* g: iru* i R i % u 



KAN ADA StTTRAS V, 2, 25. 173 



j Niskriyanaih, of the inactive, ^*r=nJj: Samavayah, com 
bination. ^Rp:q: Karmmabhyah, from actions. f%f^ Nisiddhah, 
excluded, beyond, independent. 

23. (The relation) of the inactive (i.e., Attribute and Action), 
(to Substance), is Combination, (which is) independent of actions. 

221. 

It is combination which is the relation of attributes and actions 
(to substance;. It is excluded from actions. The meaning is that this 
relation, i. e., combination, has no production even, and that its depen 
dency upon action, therefore, remains at a long distance. 23. 

Attributes are non-combinative causes. 

Upaskara. It may bo objected : If attributes, bain ; impondjrable, are nob the combina 
tive causes of action, then how are attributes and actions produced by attributes ? For 
causality, save and except in the form of combinative icausality, is not possible. To moot 
this objection, ho says : 



- II * I * I 

Karanaih, cause. Tu, however. ?RT*T5fTft*tt A-sainavayinah, 
non-combinative. JTOn : Grunah, attributes. 

24. Attributes are, however, non-combinative causes. 222. 

Attributes are non-combinative causes but not combinative causes 
also, whereby they might be receptacles or fields of action. And that 
non-combinative causality arises, in some cases, from combination in 
the same object with the effect, as that of the conjunction of soul and 
mind in the particular attributes of the soul, and of conjunction, 
disjunction, and sound in sound, and, in other cases, from combination 
in the same object with the cause, as that of the colour, etc., of pot 
sherds, etc., in the colour, etc., of the water-pot, etc. 24. 



vTiti. The use of l cause instead of causes, is aphoristic. 
Space is a non-combinative cause. 



. It may be objected : Action is produced here. Action is produced now. 
On the strength of such perceptions, Space andfTime also are surely combinative causes of 
action. How, otherwise, could they be assigned as the seat of action in these oases ? 
Accordingly he says: 



II 

-\ 

Trap Gunaih, by attributes. f^> Dik, space. STR^ffi! Vyakhyatah. ex 
plained. 

25. Space is explained by Attributes. 223. 

The meaning is that gravity, and other attributes, being impon 
derable, are not the combinative cause of action, so space also, being 
imponderable, is not the combinative cause of action. As to being the 
-.seat or receptacle, however, it can arise even without combinative; 



VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



causality, as in " cotton-seeds in a bowl," " curd in a bowl/ " the 
roaring of a lion in the forest/ and other instances. 25. 

Time is an efficient cause. 
Upaskdra. With the same object as already stated, he saya : 

II * R I 



Karanena, by cause, i. e., by way of efficient causality. 
Kalah., Time. 

26. By way of (efficient) causality, (the reference of action 
to Time as its seats, being explained), Time (is explained to be 
inactive, so far as combinative causality is concerned). 224. 

The syntactical connection of the aphorism is with " explained to 
be inactive," corresponding words in the preceding aphorism, with 
necessary changes. The use of Karanena/ instead of nimittakar 
auena/ is an instace of denoting an object principally as an existence, 
(i.e., without qualification). The meaning, therefore, is that Time, 
being the efficient cause, is only the seat of action, but is not its com 
binative cause. 26. 

Here ends the second chapter of the fifth book in the Commentary^ 
of Sankara upon the Vissesika Aphorisms. 



KANlDA SftTRAS VI, 1, 2. 175 

BOOK SIXTH CHAPTER FIRST- 
The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, 

Upaskdra. The subject, of the sixth book is th^ examination of dhar/na,, virtue or merit, 
and adharma, vioe or demerit, whiea are the root causes of transmigration, Dhartna and 
adharma, again, have to b-> supposed on the strength of such precepts aad prohibitions as 
" Let him who desire heavoa, perform sacrifices." " Let him not eat tobacco," etc., and their 
existence depends upon the authoritativaness of these perceptive and prohibitive texts. And 
that authoritativeness can be possible or arise from the speaker s previously possessing the 
attribute characterised as knowledge of the moaning of the sentences as corresponding to 
objective reality since authoritativeness per se is excluded. Hence the author, in the first 
place, commerces the demonstration of the attribute which clothes the Veda with authorita 
tiveness. 



g ^jo^^ Buddhi-purvva, preceded by understanding, ^,f^^%: Vakya- 
Kritih, composition of sentences. ^ Vede, in the Veda. 

1. In the Veda the composicion of sentence has been preced 
ed by understanding. 225 

1 Vakya-kritih/ i. e., composition of sentences, is buddhi-purvva/ 
i. e., preceded by the speaker s k lowledge of the meaning of the sen 
tences as corresponding to objective reality because it is composition 
of sentences, like composition by ourselves and others of such sentences 
as " There lie five fruits on the bank of the river. 

In the Veda means in the aggregate of sentences. Here the com 
position of aggregated sentences is the paksa (i. e., the subject of the 
conclusion). It cannot be otherwise established (as authoritative), 
namely by the characteristic of being preceded by the understanding 
of ourselves a-.id others ; for, in such instances as " Let him who desires 
heaven, perform sacrifices," the fact that performance of sacrifices is 
a means of attaining the desired object, or that securing heaven is an 
effect, is beyond th reach of our and others understanding. It is, 
therefore, proved that the Veda, as au effect, has for its antecedent an 
Absolute or Independent Person. And the characteristic of the Veda 
is that, while the subject of its mea.iing is not certain knowledge pro 
duced by proof other than the proof supplied by words and all that 
which depends upon them, it is word of which the proof or authority is 
not produced by knowledge of the meaning of sentences produced by 
words. 1. 

VivT iti- By this aphorism, the doctrine of Mimamsa philosophy, 
that word is eternal, is refuted. 

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, continued. 

Upaskdra. He shows in another manner that the sentences of the Veda have boon 
preceded by understanding : 



H n i R ii 



Brahmane, in the portion of Veda, so called. ^|<fc*V Samjna- 
Karma, attribution or distribution of names, f^fe^g^ Siddhi-lingam, 
mark of knowledge of things named, or of the conclusion that the Veda, 
is an intelligent production. 



176 VAI!ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



The distribution of names in the Brfihmana (portion of 
the Veda) is a mark of knowledge, (on the part of the framer of 
the names), of the things named (therein). 226. 

Here Brahmanaiii denotes a particular portion of the Veda. 
1 Samjna-Karmma, i. e , the distribution of names, which appears there, 
points to understanding on the part of the framer of the names, as in 
the world the distribution of such names as Long-ear, Long-nose 
Long-neck, does. 2. 

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, 

continued. 
Upaskdra. He mentions another form of proof : 

II $ I \\ \ II 

m Buddhi-purvvah, preceded by understanding. TOfr: Dadatih, 
giv f s, to give, gift. 

3. (Precepts enjoining) gift (are) preceded by understanding. 
227. 

The injunction of gift (as a source of dharma), which has been 
established in such text as " Let him who desires heaven, give a cow," 
has been made from the knowledge that it is the means of attaining 
the object desired. The conjugated form, < dadatih, gives, topically 
denotes gift which is the meaning of the root to give. 3. 

Above continued. 
Upaskdra He gives yet another proof : 

a $ i n a ii 

Tatha, so, the same. Slfwflf: Pratigrahah acceptance. 

4. The same is acceptance (of a gift.) 228. 

Texts of the Veda, enjoining acceptance of gifts, are also preceded 
by understanding. The word, "pratigrahah" indicates a Vedic text 
of which it is the subject. Thus, texts of the Veda, enjoining accep 
tance of land, etc., imply its efficacy to the welfare of the acceptor. 
Texts of the Veda, of which the subject-matter is the acceptance of the 
skin of a black-and-white antelope, point out or bring to light it* 
efficacy towards that which is not desired by the acceptor. And 
efficacy towards the desired and efficacy towards the undesired, or 
potencies for good and for evil, cannot, in these cases, appropriately 
fall within the cognizance of t,he understanding of persons later 
born. 4. 



i. Although all these have been already explained by the- 
Erst aphorism, still this much undertaking is for the purpose of point 
ing out some of the dharmas or duties. 



KANlDA SfiTRAS VI, 1, 5. 177 

Attributes of one soul do not produce effects in another soul : he 

reaps who sows. 

Upaskdra. Now, in justification of the aphorism of Jaimini, "Result (of action), 
indicated by the gastra, ( aocruse ) to the performer, " (Purva-Mlmariisa Sutram) he saya : 



$ I $ I Ml 

Atma-antara-gunanam, of the attributes of one sold. 
Atma-antare, in another soul. ^T^TW^ RC, A-karanatvat, be 
cause there is no causality. 

5. [" Result (of action) indicated by the Sastra, (accrues) 
to the performer"], because there is no causality of the attributes 
of one soul in (the attributes of) another soul. 229. 

Because the attributes of one soul, e. g., merits and demerits arising 
fromsacrifice, slaughter, etc., are not causes of the attributes, in the shape 
of pleasure and pain, of another soul. This being the case, pleasure 
and pain are produced by dharma and dharma appertaining to each 
individual soul, and not by dharma and dharma existing in different 
substrata. Otherwise, the fruits of sacrifice, slaughter, etc., will 
accrue to him by whom these were not performed, and hence, loss of 
the fruits of acts done, and acquisition of the fruits of acts not done 
will be the result. 

Objection. There is no such universal rule since there is a viola 
tion of it in the sacrifice for the birth of a son, sacrifice in favour of 
the departed ancestors, etc. Thus, it is heard that the fruits of 

jSrdddha or performance of obsequies, etc., performed by the son, accrue 
to the departed ancestor ; it is also heard that the fruit of the sacrifice 
for the birth of a son, performed by the father, accrues to the son. 
You connot say that here is really in these cases the co-existence of 
the performance and its fruit is the same subject, the agent-enjoyer, 
by means of the fruit accruing to the son and the departed ancestor ; 

in the one case, the fruit of the Sraddha accrues to the son in this way 
that he becomes the son of departed ancestors participating in the 
enjoyments of heaven and in the other case, the fruit of the sacrifice 
accrues to the father in this way-that he becomes the father of a. 
vigorous son. 

For this view his adristam becomes inoperative, conflicts with the 
Veda ; for, it is heard that the fruit is only the satisfaction, etc., of 
the departed ancestor, and the vigorousness, etc., of the son, the sup 
position of any other fruit being precluded by redundancy. 

Anwer. Let then dpurvam or adristam accrue to the agent as the 
fruit, while heaven accrues to the departed ancestor. 

Objection It cannot be so, since activity must in your theory, 
uniformly co-exist in the same subject with the fruit. Otherwise where,, 
immediately after the performance of the rdddha, the son is liberated 
and consequently, heaven will not accrue to the departed ancestor. 



178 VAlSESxKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Objection- It cannot be said that it " will not accrue," since it is 
the same in the other way, for, when the departed ancestor is already 
liberated (t. e., freed from the bonds of all enjoyment and suffering what 
ever) (prior to the performance of the Srdddha) then no such fruit will 
issue from the Sraddha, however perfect it may be in all its parts. 

Conclusion. But this is not the case. For, the declaration that 
u Result (of action), indicated by the Sastra, (accrues) to the performer, 
being a general rule, admits of exception, in the presence of a strong 
contradiction, and, in the matter in hand, it is the Sruti, or Revelation 
of the fruit accruing to the departed ancestor and the son, which is the 
contradication. 

Objecti(n. This being so, there is proving too much. 

Answer. Not so, for, the corresponding texts of the Veda them 
selves prevent any such too much proving. 

Another objection. In the case of the greatest gifts (mahdddnam, a 
technical term which denotes sixteen kinds of specially meritorious 
gift), heaven only (*. e., heaven without the mention of the enjoyer) is 
fruit, and in the name of whomsoever person they declared to be are 
performed, the fruit they produce, accrues to that person. 

Answer. This is an absurd argument. For, here there being no 
contradiction to the general observation, the general observation 
accompanied with the absence of contradiction or exceptional instance, 
becomes the rule, and hence, it would not follow that kings and such 
other persons need not observe fast, etc., though observance of such and 
such acts would be possible for them by means of other persons, with 
the intention or prayer that the fruit of those acts may accrue to the 
former. Moreover, it is the rule, that the thorough performance of the 
duties of a householder produces fruit in the form of attainment of the 
world of Brahmd, and thus the declaration in general terms has been 
made with the object of showing that fruit accrues to each individual 
agent. 

The writer of the Vfitti, however, says : " Result (of action), indi 
cated by the {astra," etc., is really a rule without an exception. On the 
other hand, the fruit which accrues to the departed ancestor, etc., 
results from the influence of benedictory mantras pronounced by 

Brahmanas entertained at the /Srdaddha, etc., the mantras in question 
being in the case of sacrifice for the departed ancestor, " May thy 
pitris or departed ancestors have their objects fulfilled," and, in the 
case of sacrifice for the son, " May a son be born unto thee, who will be 
vigorous, beautiful as the moon, and the feeder of all," in the same way 
as neutralization of the effect of poison on the body of a person bitten, 
by a snake, is produced from the recitation of mantras or incantation 
by foresters. 5. 

Vivfiti. " Result (of action), indicated by the Sastra, (accrues) to 
the performer, this aphorism of the system of Jaimini should be 
supplied at the end of the present aphorism ; for otherwise, the ablative 
in it will remain unconnected. 



KANADA SUTRAS VI, 1,8. 179 



Entertainment of impure Brdhmanas at a Srdddha is useless. 

Upaskdra. Those fruits accrue from the benediction of Brdhmanas who have been 
aatisfied with the entertainment, and who are not wicked, in other words, whose conduct is 
in accordance with the Sdstra, but not from the benediction of the wicked who have been 
excluded from the category of recipients, e g., an illegitimate son born during wedlock, an 
illegitimate son born after the death of the husband, etc. This is what he says here : 



n ^ I * i $ n 

fl^ Tat, that, i. e., the fruit of benediction. g4fcl% Dusta-bhojane, 
(Sraddha) in which impure (Brahmanas) are entertained. * Na, not. fcej^ 
Vidyate, exists, accrues. 

6. That does not exist where the impure are entertained. 
230. 

Tat alludes to the fruit of benediction. The meaning is that 

where at a Srdddha (i. e., the observance of obsequial rites) evil or 
impure Brahmanas are entertained there the fruit of benediction does 
not accrue to the departed ancestor, or the meaning is this that the 

fruit of the Srdddha itself does not accrue to the departed ancestor. 6. 

Impure explained. 

Upaskdra. Who are they that are called impure ? Accordingly he states the characteris 
tic of the impure. 



? I V9 

55 Dustam, wickedness, impurity. fl ^-TTTPl Himsayam, in killing. 
7. Impurity (lies) in killing. 231. 

Here himsayam is indicative of all prohibited acts whatever. 
The meaning, therefore, is that a person, given to or occupied in a pro 
hibited act, should be known as impure 7. 

Association with the impure is sinful. 

Upaskdra. He says that ,not only non-existence of fruit accrues from entertaining an 
impure Brahmana invited at a Srdddha, but sin also accrues. 

M I I I II 



Tasya, his, of the wicked or impure Brahmana. ^TTfasqTfrr/T: Sa- 
mabhivyaharatah, from companionship or association. $fa: Dosah, vice, 
demerit, adharma. 

8. Demerit results from association with him. 232. 

The meaning is that dosah, i. e., sin, accrues, Samabhivyaha- 
ratah, i. e., from association, characterised as eating in the same row, 
sleeping in company, reading in company, etc., with a Brahmana 
engaged in forbidden acts. 8. 

Entertainment of a pure Brahmana is not sinful. 

L r 2>at<kdra.Doen then sin accrue also from association with one who is not impure ? H 
sayi, No. 



180 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



II $ I ? I 8. II 

^ Tat, that, i". e., sin. "Sjjg A-duste, in the case of (entertaining) 
one who is not impure. ?f Na, not. frq^ 1 Vidyate, exists, accrues. 

9. This does not accure in the case of (entertaining) one 
who is not impure. 233. 

The meaning is that tat, i. e., sin, na vidyate, i. e., does not 
accrue, where a Brahmana, whose conduct is in accordance with the 
precepts and prohibitions of the Sdstra, is entertained at a Sraddha 9. 

Preference should be given to worthy recipients afterwards. 

Upaskdra. It may be asked, what should the rule of conduct be in a case where worthy 
recipients being not available, unworthy ones are at first invited, but gradually worthy recipi 
ents become available. To this he replies : 



: n ^ \ 



5^: Punah, again, afterwards, fafat Vifiiste, in or to a superior, or 
a qualified or worthy person, i. e , recipient. 5^%: Pravrittih, inclina 
tion, attention, preference. 

10. Preference (should be given), to a worthy recipient (who 
is available) afterwards. 234. 

At a Srdddha, or where gifts have to be received, if qualified per 
sons, i. e., those who do not transgress the rules of the Sdstra in their 
conduct, are obtained, then one should entertain them only, leaving 
aside the censurable ones, although invited. The rule, " One should 
not reject persons invited," refers to worthy recipients only. One should, 
however, gratify censurable persons, who have been invited, by giving 
money, etc. 10. 

Vivriti. But what is to be done where Srdddka, etc., have been per 
formed through the services of an impure Bramana ? He gives the 
reply : 

Attention should be given to the thing of quality, i. e., the, re-per 
formance of the tirdddha, etc., by a pure Brahmana, etc. The Srdddha> 
previously performed, is all useless. This is the import. 

Equals or inferiors, if pure , should be accepted as guests or recipients. 

Upaslcdra. He lays down the rule of conduct where, at a Srdddha, distribution of gifts, 
etc., recipients superior to the agent himself, are not obtained : 



H^ Same, in or to an equal, ffi Hine, in or to,an inferior. ?TT Va, 
or. ST^frT: Pravrittih, inclination, attention, preference. 

11. Preference (should be given) to an equal, or to an 
inferior, (if he is free from impurity or fault). 235. 



KANlDA SfrTRAS VI, 1, 13. 181 

r 

The meaning is that at Srdddha, charity, etc., attention or prefer 
ence should be given to a recipient, free from fault, who is equal, i. e., 
like oneself, or inferior, i. e., less than oneself, in point of merit, etc., 
because happiness accrues, to the departed ancestor, from blessings 
pronounced by them only. The import is that persons prohibited are 
by all means to be rejected, but not the pure, whether they be equals or 
inferiors. 11. 

Reception of gift i.y also a source of dharma, or } stealing is not sinful, 

in certain circumstances. 

Upaskdra. Having described the production of adharma, by the meritorious character 
of the donation at a Sraddha or charity, he extends production of dharma from reception also 
of a similar nature : 



n $ i n vui 

Etena, by this. fK^TM^=nfrT%T: Hina-sama-vifiista dharm- 
mikebhyah, from inferior, equal, superior virtuous persons. K^fT^T f 
Parasva-adanam, reception of property. sq^MId ^ t Vyakhyatam, ex 
plained. 

12. By this is explained reception of property from virtuous 
persons who are inferior, equal, or superior (to oneself). 236. 

The excellence of dharma, is in the order of its mention. The mean 
ing is that dharma, accrues from the reception of a gift of land, etc., 
from a virtuous person, whether he be inferior, equal, or superior to 
oneself. Parasvadanaia means reception of property from another. 

The writer of the Vritti, however, says : " Parasvadanam/ i. e. t 
the taking of another s property, by theft, etc., is explained. Thus, 
according to the fjruti, 5$jgf^ fl-c^f^qRiqq- ^ffaqi^ ^^ m^Tf^sn^f^j to 
save himself or his family, suffering from starvation, a man may steal 
the food of a Siidra, when he has not obtained food for seven days. 
Similarly, when he has not obtained food for ten days, or when he has 
not obtained food for fifteen days, or when life is in danger, to steal 
food from a Vaifiya, a Ksatriya, or a Brahmana respectively, does not 
tend to adharma or sin." 12. 

Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances. 

UpaskAra. -Not only is the taking of another s proparty, when life is in danger, nofc 

forbidden, but in such circumstances those who do nofc give anything to take away, may 

even be put to death. By all this there is no loss of dbar/na, or app3arano3 or production of 
.adharma. This is what he saya : 



II $ I n U II 

Tatha, likewise, frs^f^ Viruddhanam, of th*se wh stand in 
the way. &ni\: Tyagah, the making away with. 

13. Likewise the making away with those who stand in the 
Way, (is justified). 237. 



182 VAIE$IKA PHILOSOPHY. 

The meaning is that they are to be put to death who act in the con 
trary manner, (i. e., who play the enemy), in such circumstances. So it 
has been said : 



Let a man save his poor self by whatsoever deed, mild or cruel. 
When he is able, let him practise dharma or righteousness." 13. 

Vivriti. He points out that certain censurable deeds also do not 
produce sin : 

The meaning is that the killing of those who are about to take 
one s life, is likewise not forbidden, according to the saying " Let one- 
kill an aggressive felon without a second thought." 

Note. The author of the Upaskara gives up his own context, and 
here follows the Vritti quoted by him under the preceding aphorism. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. But is the making away with another to be resorted to with any distinction- 
whatever ? He says, No : 



r: II $ I \ [ ?8 U 

^% Hine, in an inferior. ^ Pare, in another. r*TTT: Tyagah r 
making away with, killing. 

14. Making away with another (is not sinful), if (he is) 
inferior (to oneself.) 238 

If another who does not give anything to take away, is inferior to 
oneself, he, the Sudra, or the like, maybe put to death. 14. 

Vivriti. Para means an enemy, (and not one who does not give 
anything to take away). 

Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances, continued. 
Upaskdra. With reference to an equal, he says : 



II 

^ Same, in the case of an equal. ?HcTrc*n*T: Atma-tyagah, self- 
abandonment. Suicide. TroW: Para-tyagah, destruction of another. 
m V a, or. 

15. In the cause of an equal, either suicide or destruction! 
of the other (may be resorted to). 239. 

Where it is a Brahmana, equal to oneself, who becomes the ad 
versary, theri destruction of oneself only by starvation, etc., is to be- 
committed. Or, if there appear no other means of preserving oneself 
or one s family, and the opponent be an equal, he is to be then made- 
away with. 15. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. If, then, a person, superior to oneself, become the adversary, should he ever* 
bo put to death ? He says, No : 



KANADA SftTRAS VI, 1, 16. 183 



I t I M II 



f % II 

Visiste, in the case of a superior. nr*T?^TT: Atmatyagah self- 
destruction. ff?t Iti, finis. 

16. In the case of superior, self-destruction (is to be com 
mitted). 240. 

In the case of a person, supericr to oneself, i. e., excellent by the 
study of the Veda, etc., becomming the opponent, destruction of oneself 
only is lawful. The meaning is that even when life is in danger, a man. 
may design only his own death, but must not slay a Brahmana. 

Iti indicates the end of the chapter. 16. 

Here ends the first chapter of the sixth book in the Gonimeatary 
of Sankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms. 



184 VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

BOOK SIXTH CHAPTER SECOND. 

Exaltation is the motive of actions of which no visible motive exists. 

Upaskdra.ThuB, in the first chapter, because the proof, supplied by the Veda, is 
produced by some attribute or quality, therefore, in connection with its production, a descrip 
tion of the attribute or quality then the consideration that " Result ( of action ), indicated 
by the S^stra, (accrues) to the performer," and also the consideration of this that under 
certain circumstances there is non-production of demerit, even on the performance of for 
bidden acts, have taken place. Now, the author, with a view to explain fehe second aphorism, 
" Dharma is that from which (results) the attainment of exaltation and the Supreme Good" 
(I. i. 2, above), is going to make an examination of the production of dharma or merit, in 
particular cases, and accordingly he says : 



t Drista-adrista-prayojananam, of which the motives are 
risible and invisible. ^gTHT^T Drista-abhave, where no visible motive 
exists. snftlR Prayojanam, motive. ^VH^F! Abhyudayaya, for the purpose 
of exaltation or knowledge of reality. 

1. (Of actions) of which the motives are visible and invisible, 
the motive, where no visible (motive) exists, (tends) to exaltation. 
241. 

Actions of which the motives are visible, are agriculture, com 
merce, service under the king, etc. Actions of which the motives are 
invisible, are sacrifice, charity, brahmacliarya or celibacy and devotion 
to learning, etc. Amongst these actions, where no visible object is 
observed, there an invisible object has to be supposed. And that is 
conducive to exaltation, i. c., knowledge of reality or truth. Or, in 
abhyudayaya/ the dative has been used in the sense of the nomina 
tive. The meaning, therefore, is that the fruit (of the action) is exalta 
tion. The invisible fruit is nothing but adristam (or potential after 
effects of past acts). If it is produced by yoga or holy communion, then 
the exaltatton is spiritual intuition of tho self. If it is produced by r 
sacrifice, charity, etc., then the exaltation is heaver.. Here, again, 
unlike the actions milking, cooking, etc., which bear fruit then and 
there but like the actions sowing, ploughing, etc., which bear fruit 
after a while, the actions sacrificing, giving alms, practising brahma- 
charya, etc., by no means bear fruit then and there, for no such pro 
duction of fruit is observed. Nor are gain, etc., through being known 
as virtuous, themselves the fruit ; for those who practise brahmacharya 
have no eye to such fruit. Therefore, heaven, etc., which will accrue 
in the distant future, are the fruit. And this is not immediately con 
nected with action which by nature speedily vanishes out of exis 
tence. Hence it results that there is an intermediate common sub 
stratum of the action and the fruit, and this is aptirvam or adristam. 

Actions of which the motive is invisible. 
[ UpasMra. He enumerates actions of which the fruits are invisible : 



II ^ I R I R II 



KANiDA StTRAS VI, 2, 3. 185 



Abhiseoha- 

naupavasabrahmacharyya gurukulavasa van aprastha~y ajnadana- 
proksana-dikasatra-kala-niyamah Ablution, Fast, Brahmacharya, Resi 
dence in the family of the preceptor , Life of retirement in the forest, 
Sacrifice, Gift, Oblation, Direction, Constellation, Seasons and Reli 
gious observances. ^ Cha, and. 5T^gT*I Adristaya, condusive to adristam, 
or invisible fruit. 

2. Ablution, fast, brahmacharya, residence in the family of 
the preceptor, life of retirement in the forest, sacrifice, gift, obla 
tion, directions, constellations, seasons, and religious observances 
conduce to invisible fruit. 242. 

1 Adrstfiya means for the purpose of the fruit characterised as 
adristam, or for the purpose of the fruit, characterised as heaven and 
salvation, through the gate of adristam. Hereby are included all actions 
or duties enjoined in the Veda and smriti and having adrtstam as their 
fruit. Here abhisechanam means ablution as enjoined in such precepts 
as " One should bathe in the Ganga (Ganges)." Fast denotes such as is 
enjoiued in such precepts as " One should abstain from food on the 
eleve ith day of the moon." l Brahmacharyyam means clutivation of 
dharma in general. Gurukulavasah/ is that of Brahmachdrins or stu 
dents for the purpose of studying the Veda the twelve-year vow called 
Mahdvrata, etc., Vanaprastham means the duty of those who have 
retired to the forest 011 the ripening of age. Yajiiah denotes Rdjaasuya, 
Vdjapeya, and other sacrifices. Dan am is as en joined by such precepts as 
One sbould give away a cow." Proksanam, is as enjoined by such 
precepts as "One should offer rice." Dik denotes such as is enjoined by 
the precepts., "One should perform sacrifice on an altar inclined towards 
the east," " One should eat rice, etc., facing towards the east," etc. 
1 Naksatram is such as Maghd (the tenth lunar asterism), etc., on the 
occasion of a sadddha, etc. Mantrali denotes " 0, ye waters, who are 
the sources of pleasures," etc. (Rig Veda X. ix. 1), and other sacred 
hymns. Kalah is as is enjoined by such precepts as " IVIonth after 
month food shall be given to theo " where one should offer food in the 
afteri 0011 of the day of new moon, " In summer let one be surrounded 
with five fires," " In spring let one deposit the sacrificial fires," etc. 
1 Niyamah means conduct, in accordance with the Sastra, of those 
who observe the distinction of caste and the four stages of holy living, 
i. e.) Varna and Asrama. 

Now, it will be seen that of the dharma, so produced, the soul is the 
combinative cause, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the non- 
combinative cause, and faith and the knowledge of the motives or objects 
characterised as heaven, etc., are the efficient causes. 2. 

Other sources of dharma and sources of adharma. 

UpasTc&ra. Having thus mentioned the sources of dharma, he now mentions them along 
with the sources of adharma also : 



186 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Chaturafiramyam, the observance of the four Asramas or 
stages of holy living, viz., the life of continence and scholarship, the 
ife of a householder, the life of retirement in the woods, and the 
life of absolute selfrenunciation, (lit. living on alms). STOl : Upadhah, 
defects in respect of faith, misbeliefs and disbeliefs. STg^T Anupadlui, 
non-defects in respect of faith, beliefs. =g Cha, and. 

3. The observance of the four Atramas (has been already 
mentioned) Misbeliefs and disbeliefs as well as beliefs are also 
(sources of adnstam or dharma and adharma}. 2^. 

That which is the means of dharma, common to the four Asramas, 
has been (and thus the sentence should be completed), e^haustivel^ 
denoted by the preceding aphorism alone. Upadhah means defects of 
bhdva (*. e sentiment; or faith ; anupadhfth, means non-defects of 
bhdva or faith 1 hey too should be understood to be the sources of 
dharma and adharma, according to themselves. By the word, < upadhAh 
all the means of adharma have been included. _ 3. 

Upadha and anupadM explained. 

purity, aa regards their 



Bhava-dosah, defect of feeling, impurity of emotion, or of 
the soul. *q*T Upadha, (cty.) that which is placed, or settles, upon or 
near anything. Impurity. ?r*fr: Adosah, non-defect. ?T 3 ^ T Anupadha, 
purity. Purity of emotion, or of the soul. 

4. Upadha or Impurity (denotes) impurity of emotion, or of 
the soul ; anupadhd (denotes) purity. 244. 

Feeling, desire, attraction, inattention, unfaith, vanity, conceit, 
envy, and other impurities of the soul are denoted by the word 
upadhd or impurity. Faith, complacence of mind, perseverance 
in the performance of prescribed actions, determination of what 
should be done in particular situation, (or presence of mind), and 
certitude are called anupadhd or purity of the soul. The efficient 
causality of all these towards dharma and adharma, is here de 
clared. 4. 

What objects are pure or holy. 

Upaskdra. (Purity and impurity may be internal as well as external, that is, may relate 
to thought as well as to things. In the preceding aphorism, purities and impurities of the 
soul have been mentioned. With regard to external objects it is said as follows). Things 
pure and impure are also called upadhd or purity and anupadhd or impurity. Here he 
distinguishes between pure and impure objects : 

R i^ n 






which. aVUyiT?SRW, Ista-riiparasa-gandha-sparsaci posse 
sses prescribed! colour, taste; smell, and^touch.sJtf^RfJProksitam, aspersed. 



KANiDA SfiTRAS VI, 3, 6. 187 

Sprinkled with water together with the pronunciation of mantras or 
sacred hymns. r*gf%rf Abhyuksitam, sprinkled with water without the 
pronunciation of mantras. The above rendering of the two words, 
prok^tarii abhyiksitani is in accordance with the view of $ankara 
misra. But, 



" Sprinkling of water with the pronated hand is called proksanam 
that with supinated hand is called abhyuksanam ; and the same with 
the inclined hand is known as avoJfsanam."- 

From the above saying of the Smriti, it would appear that the 
correct translations would be, sprinkled with water with pronation, in 
the case of proksitam, and sprinkled with water with supination, in 
the case of abhyuksitanV ^ Cha, and. ?Tcj;Tat. that gfe $uchi, pure, 
clean, holy. 

5. The pure is that which possesses prescribed Colour, Taste, 
Smell, and Touch, and is sprinkled with water along with the 
recitation of sacred hymns, and also without it, or is sprinkled with 
water both with pronation and with supination. 245. 

Whatever Substance possesses such colour, etc., as are istam/ i. e. 
prescribed by the Veda and the Smriti, the same is of that character 
(i. e., pure). Therein, Colour (is prescribed) in such texts as " He 
buys the soma drink for a cow, ruddy, one year old, with tawny eyes/ 3 
" He should obtain a white goat," etc. i Proksitaik, means sprinkled 
with water during the recitation of sacred hymns ; abhyuksitam/ 
means sprinkled with water without any sacred hymn. The word ( cha 
t implies that which is lawfully acquired, and that is brought out by 
such restraining percepts as " A Brahmana, should acquire wealth by 
performing sacrifices, by teaching, and by receiving presents, etc. 5. 

What objects are impure or unholy. 
Upaskdra. Ho states the characteristic of impure objects : 



Asuchi, impure. ffrT Iti, this Such, sgfrsrf?^: ^uchipratisedhah, 
the negation of exclusion of the pure. 

6. Impure, such is the form of the negation of the pure. 
246. 

The meaning is that the contrary of such substance as ia pure, is 
impure. In other words, a substance of unpraiseworthy colour, taste, 
smell, and touch, or not aspersed, or not sprinkled, or sprinkled with 
forbidden water, or unlawfully acquired, as the substance of a Brahmana 
acquired by agriculture and commerce, is impure. 6. 

What objects are impure or unholy, continued. 
He mentions oteher impure objects : 



VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



n $ i * { vs n 

Arthantaram, something else. Another thing. ^ Cha, and. 
7. (It is) also something else. 247. 

The meaning is that where a thing possesses praiseworthy colour, 
taste, smell, and touch, and is at the same time aspersed, sprinkled, and 
lawfully acquired, even there that thing also is impure, if it is vitiated 
by speech or vitiated by intention. 7. 

To produce .exaltation, purity must le coupled with selfres-traint. 
Upaskdra. Now ho points ont another contributory oauso of dharma and adharma : 



n 



Ayatasy, of the unrestrained. gfavft^Rt. uchi-bhojanat, from 
eating that which is pure. 3J**R?J : Abhyudayah, exaltation. ^ Na, not. 
fq^Yidyate, exists. Accrues. pnjJTpTRT^ Niyama-abhavfit, owing to the 
absence of self-restraint. RST^ 1 Vidyate, exists. Accrues. ^T Va, and. 
?JlfccTC?=rT3(. Artha-antaratvat, being a different thing, q*T^ Yamasya, of 
self-reatraint. 

8. To the unrestrained, exaltation does not accrue from 
eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence of self-res 
traint ; and it accrues, (where there is self-restraint), inasmuch as 
self-restraint is a different thing (from eating). 248. 

Ayatasya means void of restraint, or unrestraint. The eating of 
one, void of the restraints brought out in such precepts as. " A man 
should take food after washing his hands and feet, and rinsing his 
mouth, restrained in speech, while taking food, though restrained, he 
should twice rinse his mouth," does not tend to exaltation, but to sin. 
It may be asked, Why ? Hence he says, niyama-abhavat/ i. e., owing 
to the absence of self-restaint, which is a contributory cause. That 
which takes place where self-restraint exists, is now stated. Vidyate 
va,, i. e., exaltation verily accrues from eating by means of the accom 
paniment ef the self-restraint mentioned above. It may be asked, How ? 
So he says, Artha-antaratvat yamasya, i. e., because self-restraint is 
something else than eating. Therefore the meaning is that without the 
contributory cause there is no production of the fruit, and that with it, 
there is production of the fruit. 8. 

Bhdsya reads Vidyateva rthdntaratvdt yamasya as a separate 
aphorism. 

Self-restraint alone, again, is not sujficint for the purpose. 

Upaalc&ra. It may be objected, " If self-restraint .alone is the goveruing element, then 
eating is not a governing element at all," Aooordingly he says : 

u $ i R i a n 



KANlDA SfrTRAS VI, 2, 11. 189 



Asati, non-existing. ^ Cha, and. ^TffTTTc^ Abhavat, because of 
non-existence. 

9. (Self-restraint alone is not the cause of exaltation), for 
there is non-existence (of exaltation), where (the eating of pure 
food) does not exist. 249. 

Of exaltation is the complement of the aphorism. Abhavat/ i. e., 
since exaltation does not exist, asati, i. e., where the eating of pure 
food does not exist, although there is self-restraint. The meaning, there 
fore, is that it is both, of them, namely self-restraint and eating, which 
is the cause of merit. The word, eating, is illustrative Yama and 
Niyama, i. e., self-restraint, external and internal, are accessories also 
of sacrifice, charity, ablutions, oblations, and other actions prescribed 
by the Veda and the Smriti. 9. 

Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma. 

Updslcara. Having thus stated self -restraint as a contributory towards the production 
of dharma, he now points out the origin of fault, with a view to spocify fault as ian (accessory 
to adharma : 



Sukhat, from pleasure. ;TJJT: Ragah, (Lit. Colouration), Desire. 
10. From Pleasure (arises) Desire. 250. 

{ Sukhat," i. e., from pleasure derived from the enjoyment of gar 
lands, sandal-paste, women, and other objects, ragah/ i. e., desire, is 
produced successively for pleasue of a similar kind, or for the means 
of attaining it. It is also to be considered that from pain begotten by 
snakes, thorns, and the like, aversion arises with regard to such pain, or 
with regard to its source. Desire, aversion, and infatuation are called 
faults, inasmuch as they are incentives to activity (which serves to bind 
the agent down to this world). Accordingly there is the aphorism of 
G-autama, " Faults have for their characteristic incitement to acitivity 
(or worldly occupation)." (Nyaya-Sutram, I. i. 18), 10. 

Origin of desire which, being a fault , is an accessory to adharma, 

continued. 

Upaslc&ra. " Now," it may bo objected, " if only pleasure ani pain produced desire 
and aversion, how then can the latter exist after the destruction of the former ? " Hence 
ho says : 

cf-fnr^ig M i R i ** H 

W^T^^T^Tat-mayatvat from transformation into, absorption, or entire 
occupation of mind with, or habituation to, that, g Cha, and. 

11. (Desire and Aversion arise) also through habituation to 
.that. 251. 

Desire and aversion arise this is the complement of the aphorism. 
^Tat-mayatvam means a particular kind of comparatively powerful 
impression produced by constant or habitual experience of objects, 



190 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



through the influence of which, a sad lover, who does not win his mis 
tress, sees his beloved in every object ; audihe who has been once bitten 
by a snake, i i consequence of the strong impression regarding that, 
sees snakes everywhere. So it has been said, l Tat-mayatvam (lit, full- 
of-that-ness) means the manifestation of that both internally and 
externally." 11. 

Above continued. 

(Tpa,9kdra. He brings forward another source (of desire andjaversion) : 

II $ I R I & II 



Adristat, from destiny*or adristam. ^ Cha, and. Also. 
12. (Desire and Aversion arise) from adristam also. 252. 

Desire and version this forms the complement of the aphorism. 
Although adristam is a universal cause, still particular causality, to 
wards desire and aversion, sometimes attends it. For instance, it 
should be inferred by such cases as of desire for a (mistress or) woman 
on the breaking forth of youth even in one who has not in that birth 
enjoyed the pleasures of love, and of aversion towards snakes even in 
those who have not experienced the pain of snake-bites. Nor is it only 
samakdra or impression produced in a previous existence (that is to say, 
instinct), which supplies tlio missing link in these cases. For there 
being no proof for the supposition of its existence, or for thfc supposi 
tion of its resuscitation, the supposition of adristam becomes neces 
sary. 12. 

Origin of desire which, beiny a fault, is an accessory to adharma, 

continued. 
UpasMra. H.Q mentions another contributory cause (of desire and aversion) : 

n 5 i * i \\ \\ 



Rtaffit. Jati-visesfit, from particularity of race or racial distinc 
tion. ^ Cha, and. 

13. (Desire and Aversion arise) also from racial distinctions. 
253. 

Thus, human beings have desire for rice, etc., animals of the deer 
class, for grass, etc. ; those of the camel class, for briers. In these 
cases also, adristam which produces birth in such and such a race, is 
the governing principle, while race, i. e., distinction of birth, is only a 
means or medium. Similarly, pigeons, etc., possess desire for crops. 
In the same way, animals of ! the buffalo class possess aversion towards 
the horse ; dogs, towards the jackal ; ichneumons, towards snakes ; and 
from other instances, it is to be inferred (that racial distinction is a 
means of desire and aversion). 13. 

Desire and aversion produce dharma and adharma through inclination. 

Upvskdra. Having thus enumerated the efficient causes of desire and aversion, desire 

and aversion being the efficient causes of dharma and adharma, he now points out that the 

causality of fault towards dharma and adharma operates through the medium of activity or 

inclination. 



KANADA SftTRAS VI, 2, 15. 191 



I R I * II 



Inhchha-dvesa-purvvika, preceded by, or having for 
its antecdents, desire and aversion. >iWrfcrRT*5i<|;f^r : Dharma-adharma- 
pravrittih, Activity, tendency, inclination, or application to dharma 
and adharma. 

14. Application to dharma and adharma has for its antece 
dents Desire and Aversion. 254. 

Pravrittih or employment in a prescribed action, is due to the 
link of desire, and in a prohibited action, e. y., killing, is due to the link 
of aversion. Employment, due to the link of desire, in sacrifices, etc., 
begets dharma; employment,;due to the link of aversion, in killing, etc., 
begets adharma. These same desire and aversion cause the wheel of 
transmigration to revolve. Accordingly there is the aphorism of Gau 
tama/ Pravritli or employment is the operation or exeratioii of speceh, 
mind, and body," (Nyaya-Sutram, I. i. 17). Verbal employment is exer 
tion of speech ; it is meritorious, if it is for the expression of what is true, 
kind, and beneficial ; it is sinful, if it is for the expression of what is 
nature, unkind, and baneful. By Buddhih/ (mind), is meant that by 
which objects are cognised, i. e., mind. Therefore mental employment 
is compassion towards all creatures, and other activities. Bodily 
employment, such as almsgiving, ministration, etc., is tenfold as sinful, 
and tenfold as meritorious. 14. 

Vivriti. The aphorism has been framed in a general way. Hence 
no harm has been done to the production of dharma, etc., also from 
chance contact with the water of the Grafiga (the Granges) and such 
other sources, even though desire and aversion do not exist here. 

Dharma and adharma are causes of birth and death. 

Upaskdra. Now he states the end or object of dharma and adharma, . e., reappearance 
after passing away : 



: n ^ i ^ i mi 

Tat-samyogah, conjunction produced by them. 
Vibhagah, disjunction. 

15. Conjunction (of soul with body, sense, and life), produced 
by them (i.e., dharma ar.d adharma), (is called birth) ; Disjunc 
tion (of body and mind, produced by them, is called death). 255- 

From these, namely dharma and adharma, conjunction, i. e., birth, 
results. Connection with non-pre-existing body, sense, and life is here 
termed conjunction. Vibhagah again, denotes disjunction of body 
and mind, characterised as death. The meaning, therefore, is that 
this system of births and deaths, samsdra or ceaseless flow of existences, 
otherwise termed pretya-bhdva or re-appearance after passing away, ia 
caused by dharma and adharma. The Vedic name of this very pretya- 
bhdva is ajarafijart-bhdva or uon-decrepit decrepitude. 15. 



192 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

How moksa is attained. 

Upaskdra. To ascertain, therefore, what moksa is, in which there is an end of this 
re-appearance after passing away, of the system of births and deaths, ho says : 



t II $ I R I ?$ II 

Atma-karmmasu, actions of the soul taking place. 
Moksah, salvation, sqpjqTrT: Vyakhyatah, declared. 

16. (It has been) declared that the actions of the soul taking 
place, salvation (results). 256. 

This same disjunction of body and mind rises into mohsa or libera 
tion, when there exist the actions of the soul. This is the meaning. 
Now, the actions of the soul collectively are as follows : audition/ 
intellection, practice of holy communion, or yoga, constant meditation, 
posture, regulation of breath, (lit. lengthening of life, the acquisition 
of the control of the external senses and of the control of the internal 
sense, spiritual intuition of one s own soul and of the souls of others, 
accurate knowledge of previously produced dharma and adharma, 
which have to be experienced in other bodies and places the building 
up of various bodies suitable to such experience, the exhaustion of that 
dharma and adharma by experiencing them, and ultimate success or 
emancipation, characterised as cessation of pain, on the cessation of 
bii h, when there is cessation of tendency to action, in consequence of 
the non-production of subsequent dharma and adharma, due to the 
overcoming of the mists of faults characterised as desire and aversion. 
Of these the prime action of the soul is knowledge of the real nature or 
essence of the six Predicables. 16. 

Here ends the second chapter of the sixth book in the Commentary 
of ankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms. 

Vivfiti. Spiritual intuition of the reality of the self steals away 
false knowledge, sprung from spiritual blindness, of which the subject- 
matter is that the soul is not distinct from the body, etc. Thereupon 
there is cessation of faults, characterised as desire and aversion ; from 
which there follows destruction of activity or inclination productive of 
dharma and adharma. And from the non-existence of inclination results 
annihilation of birth in the form of the initial conjunction of lifeiwith a 
future body. And hence there results final annihilation of the threefold 
afflictions. It is in this that moksa consists. Therefore this treatise is 
useful, as a system of thought intended for the purpose of intellection 
or thinking abont things. 



KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 2. 195 



BOOK SEVENTH CHAPTER FIRST- 

Allusion to I. i. 6. 

Upaxkdra. Having examined dharma and adharma, as the root oamei of Samidra r 
transmigration, as the efficient causes of all that has a production, as the meana of bhoga or 
worldly experience, and as uniformly attaching to each individual soul, from their origin, as 
wall as the adristam of others as conducive to fruits to be experienced by those others, the 
(tiUhor now calls back to the mind of the disciples the enumeration and definition of Attri 
butes with the intention of examining these Attributes. 



: Uktah, stated, mentioned, enumerated. *pm Gunah, attributes. 
1. Attributes (have been) mentioned (above). 257. 

The meaning is that Attributes have been enumerated and defined- 
Of these colour, etc., seventeen in all, have been verbally stated, and 
seven have been brought forward by the word cha, l and . Accordingly 
all the twenty-four Attributes have been mentioned. Now, Attribute- 
ness connotes possession of the l class directly pervaded by existence 
appearing in eternals present in the eternals, or possession of the class 
directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternals which do not 
appear in combinative causes, or possession of the class directly per 
vaded by existence appearing in eternals appearing in non-combina 
tive causes, or possession of the class not appearing in action which. 
does not co-exist in the same substratum with the effect. 1. 

What attributes are non-eternal. 

Upaskara. Now, the examination of Attributes, as Attributes, is the subject of the Tenth 
book. Of this, in the first Chapter, there are five sections, viz., (1) the examination of Attri 
butes as eternal, (2) the examination of Attributes as non-etenal, (3) the examination of Attri 
butes due to the action of heat, (4) the examination of Attributes which appear of function 
in more substances than one, e. g., Number, etc., and (5) the examination of measure or exten 
sion. Herein he states the non-eternality of the four Attributes, colour, etc. 



I VS H R II 

Prithivi-adi-rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsah, the 
Colour, Taste Smell, and Touch of Earth, etc., L o., of Earth, Water,. 
Fire, and Air. 5nfrsrc*n^ Dravya-anityatvat, on account of the non- 
eternality of the substances in which they reside, nfrtn: Anityah, non- 
eternal. ^l Cha, also. 

2. The Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch of Earth, Water, 
Fire, and Air, are also non-eternal, on account of the non-eterna 
lity of their substrata. 258. 

Of the wholes made up of parts, beginning with Earth, and ending 
\vith Air, the four Attributes, colour, and the following, are non-eternal. 
Although other Attributes also, being present in whole made up of parts, 
are really non-eternal, yet (they are not referred to here, because) their 
destruction is also due to other causes. The four Attributes, beginning 
vrith colour, disappear only on the destruction of their substrata, and 



194 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY 



not in consequence of another, aid contradictory, Attribute. { Dravya- 
anityatvat : The meaning is that the non-etertiality of the dependent 
Attributes is on account of the uon-eternality of substances upon which 
they depend. 2. 

What attributes are eternal. 

Upask&ra. If the non-eternality of substrata governs the non-eternality of colour, etc., 
then, he says, it is obtained from necessary implication, that those colour, etc., which reside 
in eternal substrata, possess eternality. 



I V9 \ \ I ^ II 

Btena, by this. f^T?^f Nityesu, in eternals. T?!^ Nityatvam, eter 
nality. 3<E*^ Uktam, stated. Implied. 



3. By this is implied eternality (of Colour, etc., which reside) 
in eternal substances. 259. 

Of the same four Attributes, colour, etc., present in eternal subs 
trata, eternality is implied by this, which means, by the declaration 
of non-eternality by reason of the non-eternality of the substrata. 



The writer of the Vfitti, however, explains thus : 



this is the reading, with the addition of an sr, (so that instead of 
eternality, the reading is non-eternality. ) Thus, colour, etc., residing 
in terrene ultimate atoms, disappear on the conjunction of fire. 3. 

Above continued. 

Upxakdra. Does, then, eternality belong also to colour, etc., which reside in terrene 
eternal substances ? Accordingly he specifies (the eternals referred to in the preceding 
aphorism). 



II V9 I $ I 8 II 

Apsu, in water. ?fa% Tejasi, in fire. %\q\ Vayau, in air. =g Cha, 
and. fr?n: Nityalj, eternal. i[^Pl9T^Ii^ Dravya-nityatvat, in consequence 
of the eternality of substrata. 

4. And also in consequence of the eternality of their (respec 
tive) substrata, (Colour, etc.) are eternal in Water, Fire, and Air. 
260. 

In aqueous ultimate atoms, Colour, Taste, and Touch are eternal ; 
in igneous ultimate atoms, Colour and Touch ; in ultimate atoms of Air, 
Touch is eternal. " But," it may be asked, what is the contradiction, 
if colour, etc., present even in things eternal, be themselves non-eternal 
like Sound, Understanding, etc. V" Accordingly, an additional reason, 
viz., non-appearance of another attribute (vide IV. ii. 3 ante~), is indicat 
ed by the word xi, and. For, in Sound, the. manifestation of a 
different attribute is observed in the form of tones, high, low, etc. ; and 
in knowledge, etc., samskdra, impression or habit, etc., contradictory 
of, or which oppose, knowledge, etc., (are observed). In aqueous, 
igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms, other attributes, contradictory of 
colour, etc., do not appear. If they appeared, then Colour, etc., 



KANiUA SftTRAS VII, 1, 6. 195 



heterogeneous from the antecedent ones, would be observed also in the 
aqueous and other wholes made up of parts, or compounds, originated 
by the same ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other atomic 
aggregates. But colour, different in kind from white colour, does not 
belong to Water and Fire ; nor do Touches, different in kind from cold 
and hot Touches. " Hot water," "Cold air/ such intuitions are, 
however, due to the influence of upddhi or adjunct or external coadi- , 
tion. This is the import. J. 

Vivriti. " But Colour, etc., residing in aqueous ultimate atoms, 
being destructible by the conjunction of fire/ it may be objected, 
why this generalisation, namely, "in eternals " (in tha preceding 
aphorism) ?" Hence he specifies the eternals. 

The meaning is that Colour, etc., inherent in the eternal earth ( i. e. f 
ultimate atoms of earth), are not certainly eternal, but that it has been 
stated in the preceding aphorism that those only are eternal, which in 
here in the eternal Water, Fire, and Air (i. e., aqueous, igneous, and 
aerial ultimate atoms). 

What attributes are non-eternal. 

Upaskdra. Already it has been stated that (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal in non- 
eternals among terrene substances. Now he states it ia the case of aqueous other non- 
oternals also. 



-" 



II VS | t I % H 



Anityesu, in non-eternals, srf^zns Anityah, non-eternal. 
Dravya-anityatvat, in consequence of the non-eternality of 



substrata. 

5. In non-eternals, (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal, in conse 
quence of the non-eternality of their substrata. 261. 

The meaning is that Colour, etc., of aqueous, and other wholes 
made uo of parts, disappear only on the dissolution of substrata, but 
not in consequence of other, contradictory, attributes. 5. 

Vivriti. Are Attributes, inhering in non-eternals, and other than 
Colour, etc., eternal ? If so, then Conjunction, etc., also will be eternal. 
To remove this apprehension, he says : 

The meaning is that Attributes which exist in non-eternal substan 
ces, are, all of them, non-eternal, because their substrata are non- 
eternal, so that eternal Attributes do not at all exist in non-eternal 
substances. 

Colour, etc., of Earthy produced by burning. 

Upaskdra. In earth, appearing in the form of wholes made up of parts, (i. e., in terren* 
bodies), also, Colour, etc., appear and disappear only on the conjunction of fire. How, 
therefore, are they destructible only by the destruction of their substrata ? To reraore thit 
apprehension, he says : 



i \ i ^ u 



196 VAI&EIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



: Karana-guna-purvvakah, preceded by, or having fo 



antecedents, the attributes of the causes. $fart Prithivjam, in earth. 
i^lTI* Pakajah, produced by burning. Due to the action of heat. 
Thermal. 

6. In Earth, (Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch) have for 
their antecedents (like) attributes in (its combinative) causes, (and 
are also) due to the action of heat. 262. 

Pakajah means Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, due to the 
action of heat, < Karana-guna-purvvakah means preceded by the 
attributes of that, e. g., potsherds, etc., which is the combinative caus& 
of the substratum of Colour, e. y., a water-pot. Thus, the Colour of the 
potsherd is the non-combinative cause of the colour of the water-pot, 
by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object 
with the cause. So also in the case of Taste, etc. Colour, Taste, Smell, 
and Touch possess the jdti or class directly pervaded by attribute- 
ness such as colourness, etc. 

Objection, Colourness, which is nothing but apprehensibility by 
the eye, is the udpdhi or external condition (of colour-perception). 

Answer. It is not. For, this would entail non-appearance of the 
intuition of colour immediately on the falling of the sense, since an 
U}>ddhi or external condition which is not adjacent, is unfit for produc 
ing the intuition of that which is conditioned or super-imposed. Here 
the itpddhij again, is the eye, and the same the ocular sense is 
supersensuous. And apprehensibility is the being the object of 
apprehension. This too is not an object of ocular perception, since 
perception distinguished or determined by colour-ness is ocular. 
Colour-ness, therefore, is the characteristic of the attribute perceptible 
by the external sense of the eye alone. 

Ob j notion. But it does not pervade or include supersensuous colour. 

Answer. The objection does not arise ; for, the possession of the 
jdti or class apprehensible by the external sense of the eye alone, is 
intended. Such jdti is colour-ness ; as also are blue-ness, etc. 

Objection. The manifestations of blue, yellow, etc., are eternal, 
only as each of them is a single, individual, manifestation. There are 
not blue-ness, and other classes, inasmuch as their denotation is a single 
individual. 

Answer. This is not the case, as it would entail the non-appearance 
of the intuition of deeper blue, deepest blue, etc. 

Objection. But the use of the comparative and the superlative may 
be caused here by the absence of inter-penetration of whiteness, etc- 

Answer. It cannot, since there is no proof of it, and also because 
01 the intuition, " Dark colour is gone, red produced." 

Ob j action. But such intuition is caused by the produc ion and 
destruction of combination. 



K ANDA SUTRAS vn, i, . 197 



Answer. No, since there is no trace of combination there, and 
since combination is eternal. The same (* . e., production and destruc 
tion of combination) being applicable also in the case of the non- 
eternality of the water-pot, etc., the result would be non-finality, since 
AnyathAgiddhi t production by other means, or plurality of causes, can 
be easily ascribed there by way of the very non-eternality of com 
bination. 

Another objection. The attributes, blue, yellow, etc., are not 
different from substance, since there is no difference between a property 
and that of which it is a property. 

Answer. -This cannot be the case, as it would entail such uses as 
" Colour is water-pot," " Toucth is water-pot," etc. 

Objection. But there is no harm in it, inasmuch as there are really 
such intuitions as " White cloth," " Blue cloth," etc. 

Answer. -The analogy does not hold, because the intuitions are 
explained by the supposition of elision of the affix, matup, denoting 
possession, or by the supposition of transference of identity. 

Objection. This supposition would be somewhat probable, were 
there proof of difference. 

Answer. But difference is proved by means of such predication as 
- Colour of s-.i idal-wood," " Smell of sandal-wood," etc. If the cloth 
were identical with colour, then, like the cloth, colour also would be 
perceived by the sense-organ of the skin, and being asked to bring the 
colour, one would bring some substance whatever. 

Objection. Let, then, there be identity in difference, seeing that 
in the case of absolute difference as well as of absolute identity, co 
existence in the same substratum would not be possible. 

Answer. -This cannot be, for it is impossible for identity and differ 
ence, which are contradictory to each other, to appear together in the 
same place, without the difference of their situation. 

Objection. But the characteristic of mutual non-existence (or non- 
existence which is the counter-opposite of identity, e. g. y a waterpot ia 
not a cloth) a ipears in that which appears in what is not pervaded or 
included, since it is the characteristic of being the property of that 
svhich appears in eternal non-existence, like the characteristic of 
absolute non-existence (or non-existence which is the counter-opposite 
of connection with the past, the present, and the future, e. g., there is 
no waterpot inside the earth). 

Answer. This is not the case. For, in virtue of the intuition of 
conjunction and its absolute non-existence, the characteristic of appear 
ing in that which is not pervaded, is observed of absolute non-existence, 
but, in the case of mutual non-existence, such intuition does not exist. 

Now, this colour is of various kinds in Earth ; in Water and Fire 
it is only white. Sometimes there is one more colour, i. e., variegated 
or compound colour, also in a cloth, etc. ; for, otherwise, they would net 
be objects of visual perception, since only substances possessing colour 
oan be objects of perception by the eye. 



1&8 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Objection. -But there can be no origination of colour by heteroge 
neous colours. 

Answer. This is not the case ; for, homogeneity, only as constituted 
by the characteristic of being colour, is required in the origination of 
blue, yellow, etc., since otherwise, as has been already stated, they 
would not be objects of visual perception. 

Objection. But the apprehension of the colour of a whole made up 
of parts is possible by means of the apprehension of the colours of those 
parts. 

Answer. It is not, as it would entail that the parts also, possessing 
variegated or compound colour, are themselves void of colour. More 
over, wherever, in consequence of the action of heat, variegated colour 
appears in ultimate atoms, there also variegated colour is produced in 
the cloth, etc., originated by them successively. 

Objection. In the yellow rnyrobalan, then, taste also is variegated. 

Answer . No, for no harm would be done, even if the yellow inyro- 
balan were void of taste. The tradition of six tastes, however, is due 
to the causality which produces the effects or properties of those 
tastes. 

Similarly, smell also is not variegated, since a fragrant and a non- 
fragrant part are not its originators. 

Objection In the parts of a karkatl or cucumber, there is sometimes 
bitterness, and sometimes sweetness. Which taste, then, exists in 
karkatt ? 

Answer. Only sweetness. 

Objection. There existing a conflict of attributes, how can it 
be so ? 

Answer. On account of the non-existence of bitterness in the parts 
thereof. 

Objection. How, then, does such sensation (of bitterness) arise ? 

Answer. It arises from the bitter taste of the bilious substance 
existing at the tip of the tongue irritated by the eating of the karkati. 
It is from this cause that sometimes the mouth also becomes bitter. 

Objection. But how does not this explanation apply in the case of 
the yellow myrobalan also ? 

Answer. Because, in the parts of the yellow myrobalan, various 
tastes are felt, e. g., sour, sweet, salt, etc. There is no need of further 
Argumentation or elaboration. 

And this colour is an auxiliary to the eye. 

Objection. Such being the case, how do the non-existence of Colour 
In air, and darkness become objects of ocular perception ? 

Answer. The question does not arise, since colour is an auxiliary 
to the eye in the apprehension only of existences or objective realities- 



KANlDA SUTRAS VII, 1, 6. 



The colours of all the three, viz., the object, the light, and the eye, are 
exciting causes of ocular perception. 

Taste, again, is that which possesses the jdti or class, taste- 
ness. Taste-ness is the jdti or i class which is the object of immediate 
cogaition producible by the sense taste aloae. And the possession of 
such a jdti or class is taste-ness. It is this, the source of vitality, 
growth, strength, and health, that is a:i auxility to the tongue. Thus, 
taste-ness being possession of the jdti or class pervaded by attribute- 
ness capable of being apprehended by the organ of the tongue, there is 
no non-pervasion, i. e., exclusion, of super-sensuous taste. 

Attribute, apprehensible by the nose alone, is Smell. Smell-ness is 
the possession oc the jdti or l class pervaded by attribute-ness appre 
hensible by the nose only. It is two-fold, being fragrant and non- 
fragrant. Or Sruell-ness denotes the possession of the jdti or class 
directly pervaded by attribute-ness appearing only in that which is 
present in Earth. 

In like manner, Touch also is the attribute possessing the jdti or 
* class, touch-ness. Touch-ness denotes the possession of the jdti or 
4 class directly pervaded by attribute-ness apprehensible by the organ 
of the skin only. Inhering in the quartet of substances, (namely, Earth, 
Water, Fire, Air), it is, again, three-fold, according to the differences 
of neither hot nor cold, cold, and hot. 

Now, in passing, the process due to the action of heat, is considered. 
Here, according to those who hold the theory of the burning of an ear- 
thenpot (as a whole), the whole of the effect and the cause is burnt. 
Those who hold the theory of the burning of the ultimate atoms (consti 
tuting the whole), maintain that it is the ultimate atoms which are 
separately burnt, that it is in them that there take place destruction of 
the previous colour and production of the succeeding colur, etc., and 
that, following the course of the attribute of the cause, colour, etc., are 
produced in the burnt (wholes made up again) of (burnt) parts. Hera 
the sense is as follows : From the impulse or the impact, given by fire, 
to a raw substance, e. g., a water-pot, etc., thrown in a kiln, disjunction, 
which is the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of a compound 
substance, appears among the ultimate atoms originative of that raw 
substance, and on the destruction of originative conjunction by the 
disjunction, destruction of the substance must take place. For, it is 
seen that of rice, etc., placed in a pan, destruction takes place at once 
from frying, only by the application of heat from below, arid that, (under 
similar conditions) intense ebullition takes place in milk, water, and the 
like. Therefore, it is hoping too much that substances, smitten with 
flames of fire on all sides, in a kiln, will endure. Moreover, if there be 
no destruction of substances, then burning at their centre will not be 
possible. For, there is no possibility of conjunction of fire at the 
centre which is enclosed with harder other constituent parts. So that 
there will be this great incongruity that the parts are dark but the 
whole made up of those parts is red. 

Objection. Substances which are wholes made up of parts, are cer 
tainly porous. H)W, otherwise, can oil, clarified butter, etc., poured. 



200 VAlSEIK A PHILOSOPHY. 



into a jar, etc., ooze out, and how also can these be boiled ? Hence, at 
the centre also, there can be conjunction of fire. 

Answer. This cannot be, inasmuch as, on account of exclusion of 
ponderable or corporal or dense substances in virtue of the property of 
impenetrability, conjunction of fire is impossible at the centr* which 
is already conjoined with other (constituent^ parts. 

Objection. If there is destruction of the substance, how, then, can 
there be the recognition, " This is that very water-pot ?" How, again r 
in all changes of conditions, in the kiln, etc., are the water-pot, etc., 
observed in one and the same form ? How is it that a pan, a plate, 
etc., placed on the burning water-pot, etc., are observed in the same- 
position ? For they should fall down on the dissolution of the water- 
pot, etc. How, again, are exactly the same number of wholes as are 
placed in the furnace, afterwards obtained from it ? For, during the 
process of burning, the origination is possible, of more or less substan 
ces, by the (dissolved) ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other 
atomic aggregates. How, again, are water-pot, etc., of exactly the 
same dimensions, observed to come out from the furance? How, again,, 
will not the marks of lines and prints be obliterated ? Burning, there 
fore, takes place only in the wholes. 

Answer. Such is not the case. For disjunction of three or four 
tertiary atomic aggregates being effected from a water-pot, etc., with 
the point of a needle, there being destruction of substance as a whole 
in consequence of the destruction of conjunction originative of subs 
tance, all such contradictions appear in, or are explained on, both the 
theories. For, even they who hold the theory of the burning of the 
water-pot as a whole, cannot venture to say that substance as a whole- 
is not destroyed in the case of the above instance. 

Even in that case the water-pot, etc., are not destroyed, since it i* 
possible for an effect to continue to exist by inhering in the remaining 
constituent parts even when there has been destruction of some cons- 
"tituent parts. Were it not so, recognition, etc., would be really 
impossible. This is the view of the Mimdmsakas. But they should be 
asked ; how the water-pot, etc., bearing relation to the situation or 
arrangement of all the constituent parts, can appear in a smaller num 
ber of consituent parts. If it be their reply that it is possible in the 
same way as is possible contraction of measure or extension or quantit 
in a cloth which is not yet destroyed ; we reply that there can be no such 
analogy, for there is no observation of contraction and expansion in 
the case of wood, stone, pillar, earthen jar, etc., made up of harder 
constituent parts. It cannot be rejoined by thm that what is said to 
destroy the water-pot, etc., destroys only its measure or extension ; 
for, measure or extension can be destroyed only by the destruction 
of its substratum. Moreover, like the recognition of the water-pot, 
etc., measure or extension also is recognised in the case of the needle- 
scratch, whereas in their view its destruction also is impossible. This- 
is the point. 

On the theory of those who hold that disjunction which is the 
counteropposite of conjunction originative of substance aa well as 
disjunction which is not its counter-opposite, are produced by one and 



KANADA StiTRAS VII, 1, 6. 201 



the same action in the constituent part, there is production of red 
colour, etc., at the ninth moment counting from the destruction of the 
binary atomic aggregate, in another binary atomic aggregate, since 
action is conceived to exist in the very same ultimate atom. Thus r 
there is first action in the ultimate atom originative of the binary 
atomic aggregate, from the impulse given by fire; then, disjunc 
tion : then destruction of conjunction originative of substance ; then r 
destruction of the binary atomic aggregate ; then, in consequence of 
conjunction of fire, disappearance of dark colour, etc., from the pure 
or singly existing ultimate atom, after the destruction of the binary 
atomic aggregate ; after destruction of dark colour, etc., production of red 
colour, etc., from another conjunction of fire ; after production of red 
colour, etc., cessation of action in the ultimate atom ; following it, 
action in the ultimate atom, from conjunction of soul possessing adrist- 
am or destiny ; then, disjunction ; then, cessation of previous conjunc 
tion, originative of substance, with another ultimate atom; then, 
production of the binary atomic aggregate ; after the production of the 
binary atomic aggregate, production of red colour, etc., in the pro 
gressive order of the attribute of the cause- These are the nine moments, 
if a different action is produced just at the moment of the cessation of 
the previous actioii. If, on the other hand, a different action is pro 
duced not at the moment of the cessation of the previous action, then 
there are ten moments. Even if disjunction, etc., produced by disjunc 
tion, be admitted, still there are ten moments, if disjunction produced by 
disjunction has reference to the time in which destruction of conjunc 
tion originative of substance takes place. If, on the other hand disjunc 
tion produces another disjunction with reference to the time in which 
destruction of substance takes place, then there are eleven moments 
in the process. Thus, destruction of the binary atomic aggregate 
and disjunction produced by disjunction, at one moment; then, destruc 
tion of previous conjunction, and cessation of drak colour, etc. ; 
subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc. , cessation 
of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action, by means of 
subsequent conjunction ; then, action in the ultimate atom, favourable 
to origination of substance, disjunction from action ; cessation of 
previous conjunction from disjunction ; thence, conjunction originative 
of substance; thence production of substance ; production of red colour, 
etc., in the produced substance. These are the ten moments. Where 
however, production of disjunction by disjunction depends upon the 
passing of the time containing the destruction of substance, there are, 
by the increase of one moment, eleven moments. Thus, destruction of subs 
tances; then disjunction produced by disjunction and cessation of dark 
colour, etc.; then subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc. 
then cessation of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action; then 
action in the ultimate atom, favourable to the origination of substance ; 
then disjunction ; cessation of previous conjunction ; production of 
conjunction originative of substance ; production of the binary atomic 
aggregate ; production of red colour, etc. These are the eleven moments. 
Such is the process on the conception of action and cessation of action 
in one and the same ultimate atom. If action favourable to the origi 
nation of substance is conceived to take place in a different ultimate 
atom, then the production of red colour, etc., should be understood to 



202 VAlSESAIAK PHILOSOPHY. 



appear at the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth moment commencing from 
destruction of the binary atomic aggregate. The same has been ex 
plained in Kandda-Rahaxyam. 6. 

Colour, etc., of Earth, produced by burning, continued. 

UpaskAra. In order to establish that the Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms have 
conjunction of fire as their non-combinative cause, he says : 



I V9 I { | V9 II 

Eka-dravya-tvat, Because of the characteristic of inher 
ing in one substance. 

7. Because their substratum is the same. 263. 

The expression, " of (attributes) produced from burning," is the 
complement of the aphorism. " Being attributes," and " being effects," 
are also intended here. The whole sentence, therefore, means : Colour, 
etc., of terrene ultimate atoms, have conjunction for their non-combi 
native cause, inasmuch as these, being product-attributes, are at the 
same time non-abhorrent or incongruent attributes inhering in eternals, 
like Sound, and like Understanding, etc. Or the sddhya, or what has 
to be proved, is merely the characteristic of being produced from con 
junction. Hence there is no undue extension to, or inclusion of. Sound 
produced from disjunction, since conjunction of Air is the efficient 
cause of all Sounds whatever. And from the observation of the pre 
sence and absence of fire in relation to them, the non-combinative 
causality of conjunction of fire, towards terrene colour, etc-, is proved 
by the force of 2^aksa-dharmatd i. e., the characteristic of the vydpya or 
the middle term, the mark of inference, existing in the paTcsa or the 
subject of the conclusion- 7- 

VivTiti. The question may arise ; how the attributes of the cause, 
as they do not exist in the effect, can be productive of the attributes of 
the effect, when there is thus a difference of substrata. Apprehending 
this, he says : 

Because they have one substance as their substratum, that is to say, 
because there is co-existence in the same substratum. Thus, even 
though the attributes of the cause do not exist -in the effect by the 
relation of immediate combination, yet, inasmuch as they exist in the 
effect by the relation of co-existence in the same substratum in the 
form of combination with that which is in combination with them, their 
productiveness of the attributes of the effect is not unproved. This is 
the import. 

Non-cognition of Minuteness and cognition of Magnitude, 
explained before. 

Upaskdra. Having elucidated Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, by long discourses, and 
going to begin first the examination of Measure of Extension, in violation of the order of 
enumeration (of the Attributes), following the maxim* of the needle and the kettle, inasmuch 
as Measure of Extension is proved by co union consent, whereas there is a wide range of 
divergent views on the question of Number, he says : 

* The maxim of the needle and the kettle is that when a man has got to turn out a needle 
and a kettle, he first makes the needle, the smaller and easier piece of work, and then devotes 
his whole attention, energy, and time to the manufacture of the kettle, th lrg and more 
difficult piece of work. 



KANlDA SfiTRAS VII, 1, 8. 203 



II V9 | ? ( c; || 

ft: Anoh, of the atom or atomic. J?f?r : Mahatah, of the molecular 
or the dense or the extended. ^ Cha, and. ^T^svqgqtTs^ Upalabdhi-anu- 
palabdhi, cognition and non-cognition. f?R^ Nitye, in (the book treating 
of) the eternal. s^TS^n^ Vyakhyate, explained. 

8. Cognition and non-cognition of the atomic and the extend 
ed or massive, respectively, have been explained in (the fourth 
book treating of) the eternal. 264. 

The term, l in the eternal/ signifies the fourth book, demonstrative 
of the eternal, i. e., the container, by the contained. l Cognition and 
non-cognition : The application ( of these words ) will be according to 
relevancy, 01 the maxim., " When one thing is relevant to another, it 
belongs to that other, even though lying at a distance." So that the 
proposition, "Non-cognition of the atomic" is obtained. In like 
manner, in the perceptual cognition, therefore, namely, " l &r ge, 
blue jug/ Measure or Extension also is as much an object (of 
perception) as blue colour. And by means of this Measure or 
Extension, Measure or Extension terminating in the ultimate 
atom, is inferred, as also from Substance-ness. Moreover, n the 
perceptibility of Substance, Measure or Extension also is a cause, 
like colour ; for, without magnitude, substance cannot be perceptible. 
It is, therefore, ascertained that, as being a cause of the perceptibility 
of Substance, and being itself perceptible, an attribute, called Measure 
or Extension, exists. For, were the distinctive form of a water-pot, 
etc., its Measure or Extension, a man would bring any water-pot, 
when he was told to bring *Tf^ > the massive or the extended, and thus 
there would be a contradiction between the order of the master and 
the apprehension of it by the servant. Likewise from the term water- 
pot, Measure or Extension would be understood, or from the term, 
Measure or Extension, a water-pot. 

Measure or Extension is the non-common or specific cause of the 
usage or application of measures, or a universal attribute inhering in 
the object which is the cause of the perceptual cognition of Substance. 
Application of measures is the application of cubits, etc., but not the 
application of weights, numbers, etc., This Measure or Extension is. 
of four kinds, namely, Largeness, Smallness, Length, and Shortness. 
Of thesr, extreme largeness and extreme lenght exist in the four 
1 universals (i. e., Space, Time, Ether, and Soulj ; extreme smallnsss- 
and extreme shortness exist in the ultimate atoms ; the next (higher) 
degree of smallness and shortness exists in binary atomic aggregates; 
largeness and length exist in substances from tertiary atomic aggrega 
tes upwards to composite wholes (or compound bodies as they exist in 
nature). In this manner, all substances whatever possess two Measures 
or Extensions. The attribution of smallness to a vilva or a bael fruit, 
dmalaka (phylanthus emblica ), etc., and of shortness to fuel-sticks, etc., 
is relative. And relativity here denotes non-existence of bulkiness. 
The bulkiness that exists in the dmalaka (emblic myrobalan), does not 
exist in the jujube ; the bulkiness that exists in the wilva, does not exist 
in the dmalaka. It is this bulkiness, which is the denotation of the- 



204 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



terra, relativity, inasmuch as it partakes of both the primary and 
secondary uses. 

Some maintain that length and shortness do not exist in the 
eternal substances. Others hold that these are not even modes of 
Measure or Extension ; for, what they mean is this : As in the com 
mand, " Bring the longer ones from amongst these bodies," so also in 
the command, " Bring the spherical and the triangular ones from 
amongst these bodies," discrimination boing equally possible, spheri 
city or roundness, etc., also could then have |to be admitted as modes 
of Measure or Extension. 3. 

Largeness or magnitude how produced. 
Upaskdra. -Ho now enumerates the causes of measure or extension. 



II vs i ? i s. ii 

Karaua-vahutvat, from a multiplicity of causes. ^ 
Cha, also. 

9. Largeness or Magnitude is produced, from a multiplicity 
of causes also. 265. 

The word cha implies the addition of magnitude and pracliaya 
i. e.j loose conjunction among parts. " Measure or extension is pro 
duced " this is the complement of the aphorism. Among these, 
multiplicity of causes alone produces largeness or magnitude and 
length in tertiary atomic aggregates, since magnitude and accretion 
do not exist in their causes. That multiplicity is produced by the 
relative understanding of God, and the apprehension of particular 
adr*stam or destinies, determines this plurality of objects in such rela 
tive understanding. Likewise, it will be stated hereafter, duality 
existing in two atoms is productive of measure or extension in a binary 
atomic aggregate. In a piece of cloth, originated by two non-coales- 
cent threads, it is magnitude alone which is the non-combinative 
cause, since multiplicity and coalescence do not exist there. Where 
again, a ball of cotton, in this case, inasmuch as an increase of 
measure or extension is observed, therefore accretion is the cause, 
since multiplicity does no!; exist, and since magnitude though existing, 
is not a condition or occasion for increase of measiire or extension. 
Such being the case, were magnitude cause here, there would be no 
defect in the argument, for it has been said, " By two, by one, or 
by all." 

Prachaya, coalescence or accretion, is originative conjunction, 
and is defined as conjunction in an object of some of its constituent 
parts towards itself, in which object some of the constituent parts 
were not in conjunction towards itself. And this conjunction of cons 
tituent parts, it has been observed, is dependent upon a loose con 
junction among their own constituent parts, is productive of measure 
or extension, and is involved in the origination of Attributes and 
Actions. 9. 



KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 11. 205 

The atomic is the opposite of the large or massive ; the short, of the long. 

Upaslcdra. Having demonstrated magnitude and length, he now demonstrates atomic-ness 
or minuteness. 



u vs i ? i ?o n 

^ 

?RT: Atah, of this. f^nrftf Viparitam, the contrary. ?fqj Arm, the atomic, 
small, or minute. 

10. The contrary of this is the atomic. 266. 

Atah/ i. e., from large or massive measure or extension estab 
lished by perception ; viparitam/ (i. e., divergent). The meaning is 
that that is atomic measure or extension. The contrariety arises from 
imperc eptibility, and from contrariety of causes also. For in the case 
of magnitude or massiveness, magnitude, multiplicity, and accretion 
are the causes, while in the case of atomic-ness or minuteness, duality 
inhering in the cause and produced by the relative understanding of 
God. is the cause. By this is also to be understood that the contrary 
of length is shortness, and here too the contrariety is as afore 
said. 10. 

In ichat sense the same thing appears both small and large. 

Upaskdra. He now shows that in the case of a jujube, an dmalaka, etc., the attribu 
tion of smallness is secondary or relative 



v 

^Tirr Anu, atomic, small, minute. JTfc^ Mahat, large, massive. f[f?T Iti, 
such, rfft 1 !^ Tasmin, in that, i. e., in respect of one and the same object 1 
fe^nHl^T^. Visesa-bhavfit, from the existence of the species, or of the 
peculiarity. fe^T^T^T^Visesa-abhavat, from the non-existence of the 
species, or of the peculiarity. 

11. (It is) smaller, (It is) larger, such affirmations, in 
respect of one and the same object, arise from the existence of 
the species, or of the peculiarity, and from the non-existence of 
the species, or of the peculiarity. 267. 

The word, iti/ indicates the sense of attribution or usage. There 
is, then, all this usage that a jujube, is .small in relation to a fraeZ-fruit, 
that an emblic myrobolan is large in relation to a jujube, that a hael- 
fruit is large in "relation to an emblic myrobalan. Amongst these, 

(It is) large such usage with regard to them is primary. If it be asked 

how it is so, says, < visesa-bhavat/ i.e., because of bhava, i.e., existence 
of visesa/ i."e. the very species, magnitude, by bhava/ i. e.. the 
relation of more,, etc. On the other hand, the trantment of them ag 
*mall, is secondary or relative. If it be asked how this is so, he says, 
< visesa-abhavat/ i. e., because of the non-existence in them of the 
species, smallness. For, smallness, as an effect, resides only in binary 

atomic aggregates, and, as eternal, resides in the ultimate atoms, and 

consequently it does not exist in a jujube, etc. 



206 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Or, the meaning may be, that the treatment of a jujube, etc., as 
small is secondary, because of the bhava, i. e., the existence in the 
constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the visesa, i. e, the cause of 
magnitude, namely, multiplicity of constituent parts, magnitude, and. 
accretion, and because of the abhtxva, i. e., the non-existence, in the 
constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the vifiesa, i. e. f the cause of 
smallness, namely, duality which does not co-exist in the same substra 
tum with magnitude. 11. 

In what sense the same thinj appears both small and large, continued. 
ives the reason why the attribution of small nas.s is secondary : 



I V9 I * I ^ II 

Eka-kala-tvat, from simultaneity (of the cognitions of 
largeness and smallness). 

12, (The attribution of smallness is secondary), because of 
the simultaneity (of the cognition of largeness and smallness in 
respect of the same object.) 268. 

Magnitude and minuteness are perceived at one and the same time. 
And these, magnitude and minuteness, being mutually contradictory, 
cannot appear together in one and the same substratum. The intuition 
of magnitude, therefore, is there primary inasmuch as the cause of 
magnitude exists there, and the intuition and application of minute 
ness are secondary. This is the meaning. 12. 

Above continued. 
Upaskdra, He status tho reason for the priiuarinoss of the intuition of magnitude : 



II VS \\ I \\ \\ 

Dristantat, from example, or analogue. ^ Cha, And. 
13. Also because there is the analogue. 269. 

The meaning is that it is seen likewise that in the natural order of 
things the practical recognition, i. e., the application, of large, larger,. 
and largest, must be with regard only to things possessing magnitude, 
namely, the jujube, the ernblic myrobalan, and the bael fruit, just as 
the application of white, whiter, and whitest, is, according to the 
nature of things, with regard only to white objects, namely, a piece of 
cloth, a conch-shell, a crystal, etc. 13. 

Minuteness and magnitude do not exi^t in minuteness and magnitude. 

Upask&ra. It may be objected : In virtue of the usage, " Small Measure or Extension," 
" Large Measure or Extension," it is known that there is magnitude also in magnitude as 
ft measure or extonsion, and that there is sm allness in smallness also. How, then, can these 
bo said to exist in Substance alone ? H ow, again, does not the contradiction result, in 
Attribute, of being existent in Attribute ? 



KANlDA SfrTRAS VII,jl, 16. 207 



Anutva-mahattvayoh, in minuteness and magnitude. 
^l mtva ~ ina k attva - a bhavah, non-existence of minuteness 
and ef magnitude. qTR^^i: Karmma-guuaih, by Actions and Attri 
butes. sqi^FT: Vyakhyatah, explained. 

14. The non-existence of minuteness and magnitude, in 
minuteness and magnitude, is explained by (the explanation, 
already given, of the non-existence of Actions and Attributes, in) 
Actions and Attributes. 270. 

To this he replies : 

The meaning is that as Attribute and Actions do not possess 
minuteness and magnitude, so also do not minuteness and magnitude 
possess minuteness and magnitude. The usage should be regarded as 
derivative. 14. 

Above continued. 

It may be urged that as Attributes are possessed of Attributes, ^and how else could there 
be such uses as Large (i. e., extensive) Sound," " Two Sounds," " One Sound," " Twenty- 
four Attributes," etc. ? and as Actions appear to be possessed of Actions, and how else 
could there be such uses as " It goes quickly," " It goes s.viftly " ? so minuteness and magni 
tude must also be possessed of minuteuess and magnitude. 






: II vs I $ 1 

: Karmmabhih, by actions. ^wrffijr Karmmani, actions. 
Ounaih, by attributes. ^ Cha, arid. JTITi: Grunah, attributes 
Vyakhyatah, explained. 

15. Actions have been explained (to be void) of Actions 
and Attributes, of Attributes. 271. 

With this in view, he says : 

By Actions, Actions are not possessed of Actions. By Attributes 
Attributes are also not possessed of Attributes. In like manner, minute 
ness and magnitude are also not possessed of minuteness and magnitude. 
The usage, however, is, in all these cases, derivative. This is the 
meaning. 15. 

Minuteness and Magnitude do not exist in Attribute or in Action. 

Upaakdra It may be urged that usage suoh as " Lirge Actions," " Minute Actions, 
" Large Attributes," " Minute Attributes," etc., entails that Actions possess minuteness 
and magnitude, and also Attributes possess both of them. In anticipation of this, he says : 



u ^ n i 

Anutva-mahattvabhyam, by minuteness and magni 



tude. ^j5T c irmTKarmma-gunah, actions and attributes. ^ Oha ; and. 
Vyakhyatah, explained. 

16. By minuteness and magnitude, Actions and Attributes 
also are explained (to be void of minuteness and magnitude). 
272. 



208 VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude are not posses 
sed of minuteness and magnitude, so Actions are not possessed of either 
of them, nor are Attributes possessed of either of them. This treatment 
as such however, is derivative as aforesaid. This is the import. 16. 

Bhdsya. Minuteness and magnitude may be predicated of action 
and attribute. 

Length and shortness do not exist in length and shortness. 
Upaskdra. He extends ths process of minuteness and, magnitude to length and shortness, 



II \3 I \ \ \\3 \\ 

Eteua, hereby. 5>J?cr^?rr% Dirghatva-hrasvatve, length and 
shortness. STTW^ Vyakhyate, explained. 

17. Hereby are explained Length and Shortness. 273. 

Length, and shortness also are not possessed of length and short 
ness, Whatever is productive of magnitude, the same is productive of 
length ; whatever is productive of minuteness, the same is productive 
of shortness. If it be asked, the cause being the same, how there can 
be this difference in the effect, the reply is that it is proved or explain 
ed, like attributes produced by burning, by the difference of antecedent 
non-existence. Wherever there is minuteness, there is shortness ; where 
there is eternal minuteness, there is eternal shortness, etc. This is the 
meaning of the extension or analogy. 17 

How Measure or Extension is destroyed. 
Upaskdra. He now points out that which destroys (Measure or Extension): _ 



u 



Anitye, in the non-eternal ^TpTcZW; Anityam, non-eternal, peri 
shable. 

18. In the non-eternal, (Measure or Extension also is) non- 
eternal. 274. 

All this four-fold Measure or Extension, being present in perisha 
ble substance, disappears only on the destruction of the substratum, 
and not on account of contradictory, other attributes. 

Objection. But the Measure or Extension of a water-pot is destro 
yed, although the water-pot still exists; how else, even after the 
breaking of the ueok of the water-pot, can there be the recognition, 
"This is that very water-pot"? 

Answer. This is not the case, in as much as the destruction of 
the water-pot is necessary or inevitable, by the destruction of the 
substratum. For, it stands neither to reason nor to experience that, 
the binary atomic aggregates being destroyed on the destruction of 
the conjunction of two ultimate atoms, there is non-destruction of 
the tertiary atomic aggregates constituted by the binary ones, and 
of limestone, etc., constituted by the tertiary atomic aggregates. 



KANADA SUTRAS VII, 1,21. 209 



Objection. How then does the recognition arisa? 

Answer. It is an error, like the recognition, "This is that very 
flame of the lamp." 

Objection. But the recognition of the the lamp is certainly correct 
knowledge; whereas minuteness and magnitude undergo production 
and destruction. 

Answer. This cannot be maintained, because it has been already 
mentioned that their destruction is not possible without the destruction 
of their substratum. 18. 

What Measure or Extension is eternal. 

I Upaskdra. Is then minuteness, inhering in ultimate atoms, destroyed, as are Colour r 
etc., of terrene ultimate atoms? Is magnitude also, inhering in ether, etc., destroyed, aa 
are Sound, Understanding, etc.? In anticipation of these objections, he says: 

n 

Nitye, in the eternal. f^R^q; Nityam, eternal. 

19. In the eternal, (Measure or Extension also is eternal. 

275. 

Measure or Extension which exists in eternal substances, e. g., 
ether, etc., and also in the ultimate atoms, is eternal since there is 
nothing to destroy it. 19. 

Eternal Measure or Extension is called Parimandalam. 

Upaskdra. He states the name by which the Measure or Extension of the ultimate 
atom is denoted in the Vaisesika system: 



n vs i ? i ** n 

Nityam, eternal. TfcW^TO; Parimandalam, Parimandala, the 
allround, or the spherical. Measure or Extension of the ultimate 
atom. 

20. Parimandala is eternal. 276. 

Pdrimandalyam has the same denotation as Parimandalam/ So 
it has been said, "Elsewhere than in Pdrimandalya, etc." 20. 

Proof of true Minuteness and true Shortness. 

Upaskdra. It may .be asked: If minuteness, or shortness as applied respectively to a 
jnjube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and to fuel-sticks, sugar-canes, etc., is not transcendental 
or real, (but apparent only), what then is the proof of them as transcendental? 

Accordingly he says: 



Avidya, false knowledge. Nescience. *3 Cha, moreover, and. 
Vidya-lingam, mark or indication of knowledge. 



210 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

21. False knowledge is, moreover, the (inferential) mark of 
(true) knowledge. 277, 

The mark of knowledge is false knowledge. The meaning 
therefore, is this: The cognition or consciousness of minuteness 
in respect of a jujube, an eiublic myrobalan, etc., and the consciousness 
of shortness in respect of sticks for fuel, sugar-canes, etc., are all 
avidySi or false knowledge, inasmuch as real or transcendental minute 
ness and shortness do not exist there. Moreover, it is admitted by 
those who hold the doctrine of anyatha-khyati, illusion of the senses, 
that every where unscientific knowledge is just preceded i. e., pre 
supposed, by scientific knowledge. So that true consciousness of 
minuteness, as well as true consciousness of shortness, should 
be inferred. This is the meaning. In like manner, secondary use of 
words being impossible without the primary use, minuteness and 
shortness, in the primary sense of the terms, must be thought of to be 
present somewhere. 21. 

Vivriti. -But why should substance, in the form of the ultimate 
atom, be admitted, when it is not perceptible to the senses ? On the 
other hand, substance which is perceptible to the senses, such as a 
tertiary atomic aggregate, etc., should be recognised. 

To meet this objection he says : 

Avidya/ i. e., unscientific knowledge, in other words, cognitions, 
such as " Earth is eternal," Water is etrnal," etc., of which the 
obje-rs are wholes made up of parts, is the inferential mark/ of 
Vidya, i. e., scientific knowledge, namely, that Earth is eternal, of 
which the object is (i. e., in respect of), the ultimate atom ; because 
everywhere scientific knowledge, is preceded by unscientific know 
ledge, for nowhere it is possible for a man to have the erroneous idea 
that Earth is eternal, if he does not know what eternality is. This is 
an indirect proof. The method ef proof of ultimate atoms as realities, 
which has been pointed out before, should be preferred. 

Ether and Soul possess infinite Measure tr Extension. 

Upaakdra. H.e describes the nature or proper from of the Measure or Extension of Ether, 
to. which has been already inferred by the mark of their substance-ness. 



II \9 I t I RR II 

Vibhavat, in consequence of omnipresence, infinite ex 
pansion, or universality. *TT^ Mahan, vast. Immense. Infinitely large. 
H^istf: Akasah, Ether. ?rn Tatha, so. The same. 5* Cha, and. Also. 
*n?TT Atma, Soul. 

22. Ether, in consequence of its vast expansion, is infinitely 
large. So also is the Soul. 278. 

Vibhavah denotes capacity for conjunction, or the characteristic 
of being in conjunction, with all dense bodies ; and this, being im 
possible, or incapable of proof, without vast magnitude, leads to the 
inference of vast magnitude. It is also observed by us that Sounds 



KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 23. 211 

are produced, just at one and the same time, both at Bar&nast (Benares) 
nd at Pdtaliputra (Patna) ; It is one and the same Ether that is here 
the combinative cause. Consequently the pervasion of Ether is proved. 
Pervasion, again, consists only in connection with infinitely vast 
Measure or Extension. To suppose a diversity of Ether would be 
superfluous ; hence only one Ether should be recognised. Such re 
ference as " A portion or division of Ether/ is, however, relative, 
being due to conjunction with the water-pot, etc.. (occupying a limited 
space, or) possessing limits. And the relativity consists in the charac 
teristic of being in conjunction with substances possessing limits. 

Tatha atma : As Ether is immensely vast, since it possesses 
universal pervasion, that is, the characteristic of being in conjunction 
with all dense bodies, so is also the Soul immensely vast. Did not the 
characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies belong to 
Soul, then action would not be produced in the respective dense bodies, 
as a result of conjunction of the Soul carrying its adristam or destiny, 
inasmuch as adristam, being present in a different substratum, is 
dependent upon or stands in need of, proximity, (or a common plat 
form), in order that it may be productive of action ; and that 
proximity is nothing but conjunction of the Soul carrying its adris*(iml 
Likewise, as the body moves on, the production of knowledge, pleasure, 
etc., in particular situations, is impossible or incapable of proof except 
on the theory of the universal pervasion of the Sould. Consequently, 
the Soul also is pervasive. The Soul, however, is not only one, like 
Ether, since, as has been already pointed out, difference of status or 
condition is observed. This is the import. 

In these cases, the magnitude is infinite, and is also eternal, like 
the minuteness of the ultimate atom. 

In like manner, should be inferred infinite length in the case of 
Ether, etc., and infinite shortness in the case of the ultimate atom. 22. 

Mind is infinitely small. 

Upaskdra. -It may be asked that Mind being all-pervading, inasrauoh as it is always a 
touchless substance, like Ether, and inasrauoh as it is, like the soul, the field wherein takes 
place the conjunction which is the non-oombi native cause of knowledge, etc., why has it nots 
been raertioned along with Ether and the Soul ? Henoe he says : 



II V9 I \ \ 

Tat-abhavat, in consequenes of the non-existence of that, 
i. e., universal expansion. ?mj, Arm, atomic. Minute. Small, ift: 
Man ah, mind. The internal organ. 

23. In consequence of non-existence of universal expansion, 
Mind is atomic or infinitely small. 2,79. 

Manah is ami, in consequence of the non-existence of that/ 
i. ., universal expansion or the characteristic of being in conjunction 
with all dense bodies. .Did the characteristic of being in conjunction 
with all dense bodies exist (in it), then, there being simultaneous 
conjunction with |0tt>re|3ian <6ne sense, simultaneity of cognitions would 



212 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

follow, with, the result that there would be no particular attachment or 
act of attention. The two inferences, ^namely, that Mind is all-pervad 
ing, because it is a touchless substance, and that mind is all-pervading, 
because it is the seat of conjunction which is the non-combinative 
cause of cognition, etc.) are, however, unproved in point of their sub 
ject matter, so long as Mind is not proved (to exist), while in the state 
of Mind being proved (to exist), they are counter-oppposed by proof 
which leads to the cognizance of the object i. e., Mind as an atom.) 

Objection. Minuteness cannot be thus proved from non-existence 
of universal expansion, since the inference would be unduly applicable 
to the water-pot, etc. 

Answer. It would not, inasmuch as (only) non-pervasion (and not 
atomic-ness) is proved by non-existence of universal pervasion. 

In one body, therefore, there is just one mind, since the supposition 
of plurality would entail randundancy. To imagine parts even of a 
single mind would be showing exuberance of imagination. Moreover, 
being touchless, they cannot originate. By such arguments, (infinite) 
minuteness is proved. This is the import. 23 

Space is all-pervading. 
Upasltdra. He states the argument for the infinite magnitude of space : 



\ \ \ W \\ 



?T% G-unaih, by attributes. f\3T Dik, space. 5g[<5qffi[ Vyakhyata, ex 
plained. 

24. By attributes, Space is explained (to be all-pervading). 
280. 

The meaning is that, * gunaih, i. e., by attributes characterised as 
priority and posteriority inherent in all dense bodies, and appearing 
in the forms of the intuitions of the Bast, the West, etc., common to 
all persons inhabiting all the island or divisions of the globe, space 
also is explained under the aspect of pervasion. For, it will be men 
tioned later on that in the production of (the notions of) priority and 
posteriority, the cause is relative understanding having for its subject- 
matter larger and smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct. 
Moreover, the supposition of a plurality of space is contravened by 
(the fault of) superfluity of supposition. 

Objection. How, then, can there be the intuition and the expression 
or reference, namely, " Ten spaces (i. e., quarters)"? 

Answer. The objection does not arise, since it has been already 
stated that they are due to particular upddhi or external condi 
tions. 24. 

Time is all-pervading" 

Vpaskdra. He explains the universal expansion of Time : 

* n u 1 1 1 w n 



KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 1, 24. 213 

Karane, in cause. To a specific cause, or to a universal cause. 
Kalah, time. 

25. Time (is the name given) to (a specific, or a universal) 
cause. (Hence, in either case it is all-p3rvading).281 

Time is the name which fully designates the substance which is the 
cause of the intuitions of reciprocal prior and posterior, simultaneity 
non-simultaneity, slow, and fast.- Such an intuition, common to all 
persons in all countries, would be impossible without the universal 
pervasion of time. Universal parvasion, that is to say, connection with 
infinite magnitude, therefore, belongs to it. 

Or, in virtue of such intuitions as "barn now/ Time is known to 
be the efficient or occasional cause of all that is produced; a-id this is 
dependent upon universal pervasion, for an occasional cause must be, 
as a rule, in proximity with the cambinative and non-combinative 
causes. 

Or, the use or application of past, future, and present is universal: 
consequently time is all-prevading. 

Or, time is the name of the substance which is the cause of the 
application or use of moments, lavas (thirty-six winks), hours, watches, 
days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, 
etc- Consequently, such use or application being universal, time is 
universal, and therefore, infinitely large. 

The supposition of its manifoldness is, as has been already stated, 
contravened by (the fault of) superfluity of supposition. 25. 

Here ends the first chapter of the seventh book in the Commentary 
,of Sankara upon the VaiSesika Aphorisms. 



214 VAIS*ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

BOOK SEVENTH CHAPTER SECOND. 

Number : Proof of Unity. 

[7paslcdra.~ln the second chapter there are five section : (a) the section on the examina 
tion of attributes existing in one, and in more than one, object ; (b) the section on the 
examination of attributes existing only in more than one object ; (c) the section, in passing, 
on the examination of the relation of sound and significance (i. c., of words and their meaning); 
(d) the section of the examination of attributes existing in one object and baring for their 
non-combinative cause conjunction with universal substances void of particular or distingui 
shing attributes ; and, (c) the section on the examination of combination. Now, the percep 
tibility of Number, etc., also is dependent upon combination in the same object with magni 
tude. Accordingly, with a view to examine number, and also separateness, immediately after 
the determination of measure of extension, in violation of the order of enumeration, the 
author says : 



Rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsa-vytirekat, because of 
difference from Colour .Taste, Smell, and Touch. smfaTTO ArtMntaram, 
a different object, t^^q Ekatvain, unity. 

1. Because of its difference from Colour, Taste, Smell, and 
Touch, Unity is a different object. 282. 

Rftpa-rasa-gandha-sparsa is indicatory of all attributes other 
than the pentad beginning with number, (i. e. } number, measure or 
extension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction). Vyatirekat* 
= because of difference or divergence. The meaning, therefore, is this i 
li One water-pot Such particular intuition can be produced by some 
particularity. And that particularity is not colour, etc., for the intui 
tion is produced by difference from, or without, them. Nor is it the 
being a water-pot, etc., that is the condition or occasion (of the intui 
tion), for such intuition is produced in respect of a piece of cloth also. 
Nor is unity a Genus, like Existence, for its denotation is neither less- 
nor more than that of Existence- Nor, again, is it a Genus confined to 
substance only, for it is neither less nor more extensive than Subs 
tance-ness. Nor does the difference or mutual distinction (of Unity 
and Substance-ness) arsie from difference of intuition, even though 
they are neither less nor more extensive than each other ; for if differ 
ence of intuition were caused by itself, existence also would be differ 
entiated if, on the other hand, it were to be caused by difference of 
subject-matter, then, difference of subject-matter, as has been stated, 
is not possible, since, otherwise, there would be difference of the 
characteristic of being a small water-pot and of being a large water- 
pot. Nor is the view, held by Bhusana, that unity is non-difference 
from (or identity withj itself, a reaaoi.able one. Were self-identity of 
the water-pot its Unity, then there would be no intuition of Unity in 
the case of a cloth, etc., Bhuiaha s other view, namely, that difference- 
from itself constitutes Duality, etc., is also not valid ; for variety 
of uses of difference from itself or self-distinction, as being common to 
three, four, and so on, is not possible or capable of proof. This is the- 
import.r 1. 

Proof of Separateness. 

Upaskdra^With a view to prove separateness also, by means of its similarity to Unity,, 
he says : 



KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 2, 2. 215 



II V* I * I * II 

HIT Tatha, similarly. ^W7^n Prithakatvam, separatenesg. Indivi 
duality. 

2. Similarly, Separateness (is a different object). 283. 

The practice of discrimination or separation verily exists, in the 
form, namely " This is separate from, other than, a different object 
from, this. For, separation means definite apprehension or grasp, 
having regard to certain limits. Here, again, Colour, stc., are not the 
cause, since they are not its invariable antecedents, and also because 
the limits (of them) are undefinable. 

Objection. Separateness is nothing but anyonya-abhdva, mutual 
non-existence, non-existence which opposes identitity ; for, like " This 
is separate from, other than, a different object from, this," the intuition 
u (This is) different from this " rests on anyonya-abhdva. 

Answer. li is not so. Although the terms separate, etc., are 
synonymous, they do not convey the sense of anyonya-ahdva, since in 
that case the use of the ablative ( from ,) would not be possible or 
reasonable, because the intuitions, " This is separate from this, " and 
" This is not this, " contain different subject-matter. Nor is separat 
eness an object or entity which possesses anyonya-abhdva, for , then, in 
" A cloth is a not water-pot, ,, there would also be the use of the 
ablative. Objection. The intuitions, " It is separate, and It is 
distinct, " having the same form, Separateness is nothing but distinct 
ness. Answer. It is not. For, in that case, while Maitra possessed the 
distinction of a staff, the intuition, " This Maitra is separate fcrm 
Maitra. " would also arise. Likewise it would entail the application of 
Separateness to Ether it is distinguished by Sound, and to the Soul 
when it is distinguished by Understanding. 

For the same reason, dissimilarity or difference in property also is 
not Separateness, inasmuch as it would entail, in the case of a water- 
pot, which has been burnt to redness, such usage as " This water-pot 
is separate from the dark water-pot." For, it is the possession of 
properties repugnant to a thing, that constitutes difference in property 
from that thing. And this appears in the state of redness immediately 
after darkness. 

Nor is it Genus itself, which is Separateness. For, the limits of a 
-Genus are undefinable. Moreover, it would entail inter-mixture of 
classes ; for, if it exist only in existent things, then its denotation 
would be neither less nor more than that of existence, andlif it exist in 
substance only, then, than that of Substance-ness. 2. 

Unity and Separateness do not exist in Unity and Separateness. 

Upaskdra. It may be argued that inasmuch a3 there is thia nsage, namely " On* 
Unity," "Separateness is separate from colour, etc.," therefore (there is Unity also in Unity, 
fieparateness, and similarly, iu other and other instances. Accordingly he saya : 



216 VAIiEiA PHILOSOPHY. 



u vs i * i \ (\ 

Ekatva-ekaprithaktvayoh, in Unity and Separa- 



teness of one, or Individuality. 

abhavah, non-existence of Unity and Individuality. 
Anutva-mahattvabhyum, by minuteness and magnitude: 
Vyakhyatah, explained. 

3. The non-existence of Unity and Individuality, in Unity 
and Individuality, is explained by minuteness and magnitude. 

284. 

The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude do not possess 
minuteness and magnitude, the application of which to them is deriva 
tive, so Unity and Individuality do not possess Unity and Individu 
ality do not possess Unity and Individuality, the application of which 
to them is derivative. 

" By Actions, Actions," " By Attributes, Attributes," these two 
aphorisms (vii. 24, 25, infra") also, which employ analogy, here seem to 
carrv the same import as the preceding ( i, e., the present ) aphorism 
employing an analogy. The meaning is that as Actions are not possess 
ed of Actions, nor are Attributes possessed of Attributes, so Unity and 
Individuality are not possessed ef Unity and Individuality. 3. 

Unity is not universal, but is confined to /Substance only. 

Upaskdra. It may be asked : The application or use of Unity is indeed common to 
Attributes and Actions- What does here lead to the conclusion that Unity exists only in 
Substances and not in Attributes, etc ? To this, he replies : 



n vs i R i a n 

Nih-amkhatvat, being void of Number. ^v&fTOiJFn Karm- 
ma-gunanam, of Actions and Attributes, ^rssfa^ Sarvva-ekatvam, Uni 
versal Unity. T Na, not. f^q^ 1 Vidyate, exsists. 



4. Actions and Attributes being void of Number, universal 
Unity does not exist. 285. 

Unity of all that does not exist. On what ground ? So he 
says. Nihsamkhyatvam means the state or condition of standing 
away from Number. Thus Actions and Attributes are void of Number. 
Number being an attribute, Number by no means exists in attributes ; 
nor, again, in Actions, because Attributes are excluded from, or denied 
to, Action, since, otherwise, Actions would possess Substance-ness- 
And the attributeness of Number has been proved, and also the Nunu 
ber-ness of Unity. This is the import. 4. 

Cognition of Unity in Attribute and Action is erroneous. 

Upaskdra. How, then, do such cognitions arise, as " One colour,"" One taste, "etc. P 1 
To this, he replies : 



KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 2,5. 217 



I V9 I * I * II 

yT rf Bhrdntam, mistaken ; Erroneous. <T<^ Tat, that, i. e., the cogni 
tion of Unity in Action and Attribute. 

5. That (i.e., the cognition of Unity in Action and Attri 
bute) is erroneous. 286. 

The meaning is that the cognition of Unity which arises in the 
case of Attributes and Actions, is erroneous. Cognition this is the 
complement of the aphorism, because an objection of the opponent has 
bee i thrown into it. The application (of Unity in these cases) is, 
however derivative, and it is non-difference from itself, or self-identity T 
which constitutes the derivation. Nor is Unity nothing but that (i. e., 
self identity), for the reply has been already given. 4. 

Bhdsya : explains VII. ii. 5 as demolishing the view contained 
in VII. ii, 4. 

Indirect proof of Unity. 

Upaskdra. It may bo asked : tk Let this application of Unity bo secondary in tho case 
of substances also and the intuition of it erroneous, what is the use of unity at all ? " To- 
this, he replies : 



Ekatva-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of 
Unity. *T?rfi: Bhaktih, derivative (function. Secondariness. 3 Tu, but. 
However. ^ Na, not. frq^ Vidyate, exists. 

6. In consequence of the non-existence of Unity, however, 
secondariness would not exist. 287. 

If Unity in its transcendental or real sense be nowhere to be obser 
ved, then the application of the term could not be secondary, for the 
secondary, has for its antecedent the primary, use. Nor, again, could 
the intuition be erroneous, for error has for its antecedent certain 
knowledge. For it is the certainly known that is (erroneously) attri 
buted, and not the erroneous, for the intuition of the non-existent has 
been disproved, and the intuition of the otherwise (i. e., the existent) 
has been proved. 6. 

J3hdsya : explains^?!!, ii. 6in support of the interpretation of VII. ii. 
5, thus: Did not unity exist everywhere, there would be no bhalfti, pro 
duction, of things at all. For, any one thing is the joint product of 
several things ; but there can be no such production in the absence of 
one-ness or unity ; unity, therefore, exists in all places. 

Unity and Separateness of one do not exist in effect and cause. 

Upaskdra. Effect and cause, e. g., threads and cloth, possess Unity and single Indivi 
duality. Single Individuality also belongs to them for the very same reason for which Unity 
belong to them. For it is not possible that a thing can be separate from itself. For when a 
piece of cloth is torn asunder and the threads are drawn out one after another, a piece of cloth 
different from them is not observed. Were a piece of cloth different from the threads, then it 
shou Id be observed under the characteristic of being different from them, like a water-pot. In 
like manner, a water-pot also is nothing but identical with the two potsherds (which compose 
it), since a water-pot also being broken, nothing over and above the two potsherds is observed. 
Accordingly it has been said, " A whole made up of parts is nothing else than the parts.": 
This is the view of the Sftmkhya thinkers. And for the purpose of controverting it, he says : 



218 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



v* I * I V9 II 



Karyya-karanayoh, of or in effect and cause. 
Ekatva-ekaprithakatva-abhavat, in consequence of non-exist 
ence of identity and heterogeneity. f^rclNr 1 ^^?^ Ekatva-ekapritha- 
ktvam, Unity and Individuality. ?f Na, not. fcent Vidyate, exists. 

7. Effect and cause are neither the same nor similar (in 
being equally distinguished from all other things) ; therefore, Unity 
and (single) Individuality do not exist in them. 288. 

Effect and cause these two are not one. Why ? So he says : from 
non-existence of ekatva, i. e., from non-existence of non-difference and 
because co-existence of plurality and unity in the same substratum is 
not therefore, possible, as would be required by the proposition that 
the very same thing which is the effect, is also the cause, e. y., that 
threads are a piece of cloth. 

Objection. But there is as a matter of fact such co-existence in the 
same substratum, seeing that the term, waters, is applied to a drop of 
water only, and also seeing that the term, wives, is applied to a single 
Woman. 

Answer. Such is not the case. For such applications can be 
possible by reference to multiplicity of constituent parts. In the case 
of the ultimate atom of water, however, such application takes place, 
according to some thinkers, by means of multiplicity of colour, etc., 
naturally belonging to it ; while, according to others, it is due to the 
characteristic force of sound or language which should not be found 
fault with. Nor do fibres present in a salvinia cucullata and honey 
comb obtain the application of cloth. Nor do threads singly prevail to 
contain and to drag anything. 

Nor, again, can the two, effect and cause, become the substratum 
of single Individuality, for it is saor. that they become the limits of 
each other. How ? So he says, eka-prithakatva-abhavat, i. e., in 
consequence of the non-existence of eka-prithakatvam, or non-hetero 
geneity or non-difference in property ; in other v\ords, because, of effect 
and cause, difference in property is observed, for it is universal among 
mankind that the notions of thread and cloth, as well as of warter-pot 
and potsherds, are embraced by different acts of understanding. 

Objection. Why, then, are not Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, 
cognised by their difference (or separately from one another, i. e., one 
after another always) ? 

Answer. Because of the absolute similarity of their forms, i. e., 
modes of manifestation. And when sometimes, as in a piece of cloth of 
variegated colour, etc., separate cognition also takes place, it is because 
the differences of Number, Measure or Extension, etc., are most mani 
fest there. 7. 



KANADA StTTRAB VII, 2, 8. 219 

Only non-eterml unity and separateness of one proceed from like 
attributes in their causes. 

Uj> i->kdra.T3.o points out that non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one have for 
their antecedents attributes of these causes. 



H V? I R | t; H 

Etat, this, i. e., the characteristic of having the attributes of 
the cause as antecedents. ^n^T3i4t : Anityayoh, of the two non-eternals, 
namely, Number and Separateness. 5 7T<Rf<WC Vyakhyatam, explained. 

8. This, (as) explained in the case of the two non-eternals 
(namely, Number and Separateness, should be understood only 
in the case of non-eternal Unity and Separateness of one). 289. 

The characteristic of having attributes of the cause as antecedents,. 

which has been explained in the case of non-eternal Number and 

Separateness, should be understood to apply to only non-eternal Unity 

and Separateness-of-one, since other Numbers and Separatenesses are 

produced by relative understanding. As the characteristic of having 

attributes of the cause as antecedents belongs to non-eternal colour 

and touch of Fire, so it belongs also to non-eternal Unity and Separate 

ness-of-one. This is the import. It follows, therefore, that Numbers 

beginning with two and ending with the highest arithmetical number, 

possess or reside in more than one substance. It also follows that 

separatenesses beginning with Separateness of two and ending with. 

Separateuess of the highest arithmetical number, co-exist in the same 

substratum with those Numbers. Now, the processes of the production 

and destruction of Duality, etc., are as follows ; When two homoge 

neous or heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye, cogni 

tion of the attribute qualified with the notion or characteristic of 

Unity, which is the genus of the two numbers, Unities, inhering in the 

two substances, are produced immediately after the elimination of differ 

ence in thought i.e., the assimilation of the two substances under the notion 

(of Unity); and it is this cognition which is called relative understanding 

or the conception of the one in the many. By it Duality is produced in 

the two substances. Then there takes place reasoning about the notion 

or characteristic of Duality which is the genus of the Duality so produ 

ced. After it, simultaneously there appear destruction of relative under 

standing by means of that reasoning, and a qualified or concrete- 

understanding having for its content the attribute Duality as qualified 

with the notion or characteristic of Duality. And in the next 

moment there are simultaneously produced destruction of the attribute- 

Duality in consequence of the destruction of relative understanding, 

and cognition, in the form of "Two substances," qualified with Duality. 

Thereafter, results Samskdra, impresssion or a fixed idea, from the 

above cognition of substances qualified with Duality. Thus, to sum 

up : Beginning with contact with the sense and ending with Samskdra 

or impression, there are eight moments ; viz., contact of the sense with 

the substratum of Duality which is going to be produced, then cognU 

tion of the genus inherent in the attribute Unity, then relative under 

standing in the form of cognizance of the many along with the 



220 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

attribute Unity as qualified with the generic notion or characteristic 
of Unity, then production of the attribute Duality, then cognition of 
the genus inherent in Duality, then cognition of the attribute Duality 
as qualified with that genus, then cognition of substances as qualified 
with the attribute Duality, and then Samskdra or impression. The 
order of destruction, again, is as follows : Destruction of the generic 
notion or characteristic of Unity, from relative understanding ; 
destruction of relative understanding, from cognition of the generic 
notion or characteristic of Duality : destruction of the generic notion 
or characteristic of Duality, from cognition of the attribute Duality ; 
destruction of cognition of the attribute Duality, from cognition of subs 
tances as qualified with the possession of Duality; and destruction of the 
latter, from Samskdra or impression, or from cognition of other objects. 

Objection. Why is not cognition of substance qualified with the 
possession of Unity, itself produced after the cognition of Unity, when 
all the causes of its production are present there ? For, cognition of 
attribute taking place, there can be no delay in the cognition of 
substance. From that same cognition (of substance so qualified), 
therefore, there being destruction of relative understanding, from its 
destruction will follow, at its very next moment, destruction of Duality. 
Hence destruction of Duality resulting at the very moment prior to the 
qualified or concrete cognition in the form of " Two substances," the 
production of cognition of substance as qualified with the possession of 
Duality, becomes impossible. 

Answer. The argument is defective ; for, it is relative understand 
ing uninfluenced or unobstructed or unobscured by the causes of the 
production of Duality, etc., which invariably produces cognition 
qualified with the content of substance, the above supposition being 
made on the strength of the result. 

Objection. But still destruction of relative understanding being 
caused by the very Samskdra or impression produced by itself, the 
fault, pointed out above, again appears all the same, since there is 
possibility of destruction of Duality at the very moment prior to the 
cognition qualified with Duality. 

Answer. It does not, since cognition of pure attribute, or of 
attribute unassociated with substance, is not productive of Samskdra or 
impression. For pure attribute can be nowhere called back to mind, 
since everywhere it is only by the background of, or as contained 
in, substance, that there can be recollection of attribute. 

Objection. Let it be so; still inasmuch as even at the time of the 
production of qualified or concrete cognition, there may be destruction 
of Duality, the possibility of non-production of qualified cognition 
remains in the very same state. For qualified or specific cognition, 
illuminative of that which is present, cannot possibly appear at the 
moment of the destruction of the qualification or that which serves to 
specify, since there is no such observation. 

Answer. This is not the case. For, cognition of that which serves 
to specify, contact of sense with that which, is specified, and non-appre 
hension of non-association of the above two, which make up the whol* 



KANADA SUTRAS VII, 2, 8. 221 

cause of specefic cognition, are possible also in the case of the subject 
under discussion. If, however, contact of sense with that which serves 
to specify, is also required, then this too existing at the preceding 
moment, the very contact, which exists at the preceding moment, is 
observed to be the cause. That which serves to specify, or a qualifica 
tion or distinction, which is beyond the compass of specified cognition, 
may also exist: for, it is only the being the object or content of cogni 
tion productive of specified cognition, which determines the charac 
teristic of being a distinction or that which serves to specify, but the 
being the object of specified cognition does not also determine it. 

Objection. In this view, an upalalcsdnam or indication also will 
come to have the nature of a visesaiiani or distinction. 

Answer. By no means; for, existence in the same substratum, 
which is invariable and which does not cause specified cognition, 
determines the characteristic of being a distinction, whereas an indi 
cation exists in a different substratum from that which it indicates. 
Thus, when there is possession of a raven in the house of Devadatta, 
then the raven is a distinction. But when, flying over the house, it 
does not exist in it, then the raven is an indication. 

Objection. This being so it would follow that in such cases as 
"There is taste in that which possesses colour," etc., colour, etc., also 
would be distinctions. 

Answer. This is not an objection, since it is desired to be so. 
Objection. Then there too taste will exist. 

Answer. No, since that which exists in something distinguished by 
the possession of something else, does not necessarily exist in that by 
which it is so distinguished. For a distinction and that which is dis 
tinguished are not one and the same thing. 

Objection At the time of the destruction of Duality, there exists 
no connection with the distinction. How can specified cognition, or 
cognition of that which is distinguished, be produced? 

Answer. The question does not arise, for the meaning of the term, 
the being distinguished or qualified, is only non-variation or non- 
deviation or non-divergence from that (i.. e., the distinction); whereas 
the manifestation of that (i. e. } the distinction) exists there (i. e., in 
specified cognition) also. 

Hence, the teachers say, nothing remains unproved. 

In like manner, on the analogy of the production and destruction 
of Duality, should be understood the production and destruction of 
Triplicity. 

Duality is destructible by the destruction of relative understand 
ing, for an existing attribute cannot be destroyed in the absence of 
another attribute opposed to the destruction of its substratum, like 
ultimate cognition, since ulitimate cognition is destroyed by destruc 
tion of adristam. In some cases it is destroyed also from destruction. 



222 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

of substratum, e.g., where there is knowledge of the genus, unity, simul 
taneously with action in the constituent parts of the substratum of 
Duality. It is in this way: Action in constituent parts and cognition 
of the genus; Disjunction and relative understanding; destruction of 
Conjunction and production of attribute Duality; destruction of 
constituted substance and cognition of the genus Duality; here des 
truction of Duality results from destruction of substance, and destruc 
tion of relative understanding from cognition of the genus Duality; 
since, destruction of relative understanding taking place at the same 
time with destruction of Duality, there exists no relation, resembling the 
relation of effect and cause, between them. Where, however, there is 
simultaneity of action in the constituent parts of the substratum of 
Duality and relative understanding, there destruction of Duality results 
from both destruction of substratum and destruction of relative under 
standing. It is in this way: Action in the constituent parts and rela 
tive understanding; production of disjunction and production of 
Duality; destruction of conjunction and cognition of the genus Duality; 
destruction of constituted substance and destruction of relative under 
standing; destruction of Duality from both, the capacity of each for 
destroying being observed. This process properly fits in with the- 
theory of two cognitions being related as the destroyed and the- 
destroyer ; and it is this theory which is legitimate or established 
by proof. 

Objection. The entire group of cause being the same in the cases 
of Duality, Triplicity, etc., how is it that there is this difference in 
their effects, namely, Duality is constituted by two Unities, Triplicity 
by three Unities ? 

Answer. The question cannot arise, since Duality, etc., do not exist 
in Unity. 

Objection. It is Duality, Triplicity, etc., inhering in the combina 
tive cause, which determine cognitions of Duality, Triplicity, etc. 

Answer. This is not the case ; for prior to the production of 
Duality, etc., Duality, being absent therefrom, the enquiry after the 
cause of Duality, etc., does not cease even there, and the existence of 
such difference in relative understanding, and in Unities, or in the 
supposition of that on the strength of the result, is contravened by 
non-observation. 

Objection. Let the use also of Duality, etc., proceed from the 
same source ; what is the need of Duality, etc.? Difference will result 
from difference of adristam. 

Answer. Were it so, Triplicity, and Four-ness, would be sometimes- 
produced also by the set of causes originative of Duality. Hence it 
would entail non-uniformity. Moreover, it may be said in this con 
nexion that difference in the effect is explained by difference in prior 
non-existence ; aa in the case of colour, taste, smell, and touch, pro 
duced by burning, difference is produced under the same set of causes. 

Objection. Prior non-existence also ia common to all, or ia th& j 
same in all cases. 



KANADA SUTRAS VII, 2, 8. 223 

Answer. It is not ; for each prior non-existence in each parti 
cular case has been ascertained to have causality towards its own 
effect only. 

Or, the process should be carried on in this way that Duality is 
produced by pure relative understanding, and Triplicity by relative 
understanding accompanied by Duality. In such cases as " I have 
killed a hundred of ants/ Duality is not at all produced in conse 
quence of the non-existence of combinative cause. Accordingly, it 
should be observed, the use of number is there derivative or secondary. 

Professor Sridhara opines that in the case of an army, a forest, 
etc., iu consequence of the non-existence of constant relative under 
standing, only multiplicity is produced, but not hundred, thousand, 
and ether numbers. With regard to this view, Professor Udayana 
observes that if such be the case, then in these cases no doubt 
could arise whether it be hundred, or thousand, etc., nor could 
there be such cognition as " A large army," " A. larger army," and 
that hence this is not the case. Here the matter should be discussed 
in the following manner : Multiplicity is either nothing but number 
commencing from Triplicity, and terminating with the highest arith 
metical number, or another number different from them. It cannot 
be the first since in the case also of any army, a forest, etc., there is 
as a rule production of hundred, thousand, and other numbers. Nor 
can it be second, since multiplicity different in mark from Triplicity, 
tc., is not observed. Multiplicity, therefore, is only number, namely, 
hundred, etc., produced by relative understanding which is uniformly 
constant in each case and which does not depend upon Unity. The 
manifestation of hundred, etc., does not, however, take place there, 
since nothing exists there which can manifest it. 

We, on the other hand, say that multiplicity is really a different 
number, existing in the same substratum with Triplicity, etc., and 
producible by relative understanding productive of Triplicity, etc. 
It is so in consequence of the difference of prior non-existence. How 
else can such a statement be possible as " All I can say is that there 
.are many"? I do not know particularly whether they be a hundred or 
a thousand "? As magnitude or largeness and length co-exist in the 
same substance, so do Triplicity, etc., and multiplicity co-exist in one 
and the same substratum. For, to the query, " Shall I bring a hundred 
or a thousand of mango fruits ?" the reply is given, viz., " Let a large 
number of them be brought. What is the use of inquiring about a 
particular number ?" This being so, Triplicity is produced by rela 
tive understanding accompained by Duality, Four-ness by relative 
understanding accompained by Triplicity, and so On, one after the 
other. In the production of multiplicity, on the contrary, there is no 
rsuch uniformity or law that the relative understanding must be quali 
fied with the possession or accompaniment of all the numbers which 
.stand behind it. Hence in the case of an army, a forest, and the like, 
only multiplicity is produced, but not any other number ; and sj the 
alternatives amongst which Doubt has to swing also become really 
non-existent. 



224 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Separateneas, again, exists in the same substratum with that (i. e., 
number). Hence as is Duality, so is also separateness of two ; and 
so on. 

Objection. The use of separateness of two, etc., being possible by 
means of separatenesses of one existing in the same substratum with 
Duality, Triplicity, etc., what is the use of Separateness of two, etc.? 

Answer. The question cannot be raised in view of the discrepancy 
that while in the case of " A cloth and a clod are separate from a water- 
pot" there is no perception of the separateness of the dual (cloth and clod) 
being produced by the dual and the single limiting each other, there is 
such perception in the case of their individual separateness. Nor does 
this theory entail and explain Priority of two, for Priority of two is 
explained and possible by means of two priorities existing in the same 
substratum, or co-extensive, with. Duality- The contradiction in respect 
of one being the limit of the other, which exists in the case of separate 
ness, does not exist in the case of Priority ; since the intuition. " These 
two are prior," is possible or proved in same way as the intuition. 
" These two are blue." For, though two bodies occupying the same 
part of space possess equal manifoldness of conjunctions with the con 
junct, yet production of different effects is possible by moans of the 
difference of the conjunction of space and body, which is the non-com 
binative cause. Moreover, as two Unities jointly become the non-com 
binative cause of Duality, it being, in like manner,, possible for two 
separatenesses of one or single individualities, jointly operating, to 
possess non-combinative causality towards the production of separate- 
ness of two, or dual individuality, it is not observed that more than, one 
i.e., many, conjunctions are, by their joint operatioii, originative of one 
effect, which is not a constituted substance, by means of the proximity 
known as combination in the same object with the effect. On the other 
hand, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same 
object with the cause, a larger number of conjunctions of threads and 
the cylinder of wood in a loom do really originate a single conjunction 
of a cloth and the cylinder of wood in a loom This is the direction. 

On the analogy of destruction of Duality, etc., should be under 
stood also destruction of separateness of two, etc. 8. 

Vivriti. It may be objected : " The thread is distinct from the 
cloth and is dissimilar to the cloth " such intuitions are simply erro 
neous, since it is threads conjoint among themselves, which becomes 
the cloth, and since no proof exists that the cloth is distinct from the 
threads. It cannot be said that difference from the thread can be 
proved to exist in the cloth by means of its dissimilarity to the thread, 
for dissimilarity itself is not proved. For, the nature of the cloth does 
not constitute its dissimilarity to the thread, inasmuch as in the state 
of the manifestation of the cloth, the nature of the cloth i.i recognised 
in the threads themselves. Accordingly it has been taught by Professor 
fjvarakrisna : 



The effect is existent (in the cause, in an enveloped state, prior to- 
its production) ; For, there can be no production and manifestation of 



KANADA StfTRAS VII, 2, 9. 225 



that which is non-existent ; there can be no connection of the cause 
with the effect (if the latter be non-existent) ; (some connection must 
exist between the cause and the effect, since) the production of every 
thing is not possible from everything else ; there can be production of 
one thing from another, if the two are mutually related as the producer 
and the producible (and such relation cannot be possible if the effect 
be non-existent) ; and the cause and the effect are identical, (so that 
the one cannot be non-existent, while the other is existent). S&mkhya- 
kdrikd, verse 9). 

This being the case, the non-existence of non-difference and non- 
dissimilarity between the cause and the effect remaining itself unproved r 
how can it establish the relation of Unity and of Separateness of one 
or single individuality ? 

To meet this objection, the author says : 

Etat/ i. e., the possession of the non-existence of Unity and 
Separateness of one in consequence of the possession of the non- 
existence of non-difference and non-dissimilarity, has been observed, 
anityayofy/ that is, in the case of non-eternal cause and non- 
eternal effect. This is the meaning. Accordingly on the hypothesis of 
the non-difference of the threads and cloth, it would follow that in the 
state of the production of the threads, there would arise the intuition 
and use of language that the cloth is being produced ; in the state of 
the production of the cloth, that the threads are being produced ; iu the 
state of the destruction of the threads, that the cloth is being destroy 
ed ; iii the state of the destruction of the cloth, that the threads are 
being destroyed ; and so on. Nor can it be maintained that production 
and destruction are not themselves entitled to acceptance, inasmuch- 
as such intuitions are explained on the very theory of development or 
appearance and envelopment, or disappearance ; for the hypothesis of 
an appearance, will entail a regress to infinity. If, on the other hand, 
the production of the appearance is admitted, then how does the theory 
of the production of the cloth, etc., become offensive ? If, again, the 
production of appearance in appearance be not admitted, then appea 
rance would become omniferous, or all-sided, (which is not desired by 
the objector). For, the all-sidedness of appearance is not recognised 
even by the Samkhya thinkers. In reality, the common consent of 
humanity that the cloth is produced, the cloth is destroyed, and so 
forth, is proof of production and destruction ; for, if experience of one 
thing be admitted to have another thing as its object, we must deny 
also the water-pot, cloth, etc. 

Conjunction, how produced. 
U paskilra. H.Q begins another section or topio : 



5 Anytara-karmma-ja^, produced by the action of either 
of two things. CTq^fTPF^T: Ubhaya-karmma-ja^, produced by action of 
both. ?-f4tT5T: Samyoga-jah, produced by conjunction. ^ Oha, and. 
Samyogali, conjunction. 



226 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

9. Conjunction is produced by action of any one of two 
things, is produced by action of both, and is produced by Conjunc 
tion, also. 290. 

Unobstructed intuition that things are conjunct is proof of con- 
juntion. So also are effects ; e. g., substance, in the case of conjuntions 
of constituent parts ; colour and other attributes produced by burning, 
in the case of conjunction of fire ; particular measure or extension, in 
the case of accretion ; sound, in the case of conjunction of the drum 
and ether ; such other instances should be understood. Nor is Con 
junction merely production without the intervention of empty space. 
The theories of transiency and transformation of things having been 
thrown away, Conjunction is the coming together which has non- 
coming together for its antecedent. And it is produced by the action 
of one of two things ; as is the conjunction of a motionless post with a 
hawk in motion, or the conjunction of one in motion, when the 
motion is not directed where the conjunction takes place, e. </., conjunc 
tion of a runner with the back of another runner. Conjunction pro 
duced by the action of both the conjunct is that of two rams or of two 
wrestlers, since it is produced by both of them exercising strength 
towards each other. The third (conjunction producced by conjunction) 
is the conjunction of the hand and the tree resulting from the conjunc 
tion of the finger and the tree- And it results sometimes from one con 
junction even, as the conjunction of cloth aud reed may result from 
the conjunction of thread and reed. In some cases, one conjunction is 
produced from two conjunctions, as from two conjunctions, of ether 
with two threads, may result only one conjunction of a two-threaded 
cloth with ether. In some cases, again, a single conjunction is originat 
ed even by a plurality of conjunctions, as ten conjunctions of ether 
with ten threads may originate only one conjunction of a ten-threaded 
cloth and ether. Sometimes, on the other hand, two conjunctions are 
produced even from a single conjunction as their non-combinative 
cause. For example, there having first taken place non-originative 
conjunction between two ultimate atoms, terrene and aqueous, subse 
quently two conjunctions, originative of two binary atomic aggregates, 
are produced, namely, one in the terrene ulimate atom with an other 
terrene ultimate atom, and another in the aqueous ultimate atom 
with another aqueous ultimate atom. By those two conjunctions 
inhering in homogeneous things, two binary atomic aggregates 
are simultaneously produced. Therein by that one non-originative 
conjunction alone, produced between the terrene and the aqueous 
ultimate atom, one conjunction of the terrene ultimate atom with the 
aqueous binary atomic aggregate, and another conjunction of the 
aqueous ultimate atom with the terrene binary attomic aggregate, are 
produced simultaneously with the production of the colour, etc., of the 
two binary atomic aggregates. 

Inasmuch as the conjunction of cause and not-cause must neces 
sarily produce conjunctions of effect and not-effect, the conjunction of 
all-pervading substances (viz ., Space, Time, Ether and Soul) with dense 
or corporal bodies is produced by action of one of the two only. Of two 
all-pervading substances, however, there is no conjunction, since there 
is no cause (of conjunction). For in them there is no action, nor is 



KANADA SOTRAS VII, 2, 9. 227 

there any (combinative) cause ; hence there cannot be in this case also 
conjunction of effect and riot-effect resulting from conjunction of cause 
and not-cause. Eternal conjunction, on the other hand, is not possible, 
for conjunction is the coming together of two things, which has the 
not-coming together as its antecedent, and eternality is opposed to it. 
And were conjunction eternal, Disjunction also would be without pro 
duction ; and eternality of conjunction will not be obtained, since it 
would be impossibe for Conjunction and Disjunction, which are contra 
dictories, to exist side by side in their indestructible states. More 
over, yuta-siddhi or uncombined or naturally unassociated existence is 
a necessary condition of Conjunction, and it is not possible in the case 
of two all-pervading substances. For yuta-siddhi is merely the separate 
existence of two or of one of two ^unrelated) things, or the relation of 
one thing being inherent in another, as its substratum, when the twe 
have been externally brought into relation with each other. 

Destruction of Conjunction, however, results from Disjunction 
having a common substratum with Conjunction. la some cases it results 
from destruction of substratum also. For example, action is produced 
in the constituent fibre of a thread immediately after the Conjunction 
of two. threads ; thereby is caused Disjunction from another fibre ; from 
Disjunction results destruction of originative conjunction ; from this 
follows destruction of the thread ; and from destruction of the thread 
results destruction of Conjunction, where two threads haying been long 
conjoined, action is not produced in them. Some, on the contrary, main 
tain that Conjunction is destroyed by simultaneously produced destruc 
tion of substratum, and by Disjunction, inasmuch as action is conceived to 
exist in another thread at the moment when by action iu the constituent 
parts of a thread there is effected destruction of Conjunction origina 
tive of the thread. This is impossible ; for there can be no production 
of Disjunction at the moment of destruction of the combinative cause, 
since the rule is that the combinative cause is of equal duration with 
the effect. 

This same Conjunction which is an independent agent in the origi 
nation of substances, and a dependent agent in the origination of 
attributes and actions, is the counter-opposite of the absolute non- 
existence existing in the same substratum with itself, since it is obser 
ved to be so. For it is perceived that there is conjunction of an ape 
in the Banyan tree, although conjunction of the ape present in a large 
Banyan tree is limited to a branch only. Were such mere limitation to 
a part not sufficient to account for it, then conjunction would come to 
exist in ultimate atoms, and so would not be cognizable. In the case 
of the all-pervading substances also, it is the difference of upddhi, 
adjunct or external condition, which serves to localise them. Conjunc 
tion present by limitation to that is not pervaded in its denotation . Of 
Conjunction residing in the ultimate atoms also, direction in space, 
and the like should be regarded as determinants. 9. 

Disjunction, how produced. 

Upaskdra. By extending the mode of the production of Conjunetion to Disjunction ho 

says : 



228 VAl6EIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



: II vs I R I ?o || 

Etena, by this, f^rm: Vibhagafc, disjunction. n$W Vyakhyatah, 
explained. 

10. By this Disjunction is explained. 291. 

Like Conjunction, Disjunction also is produced by action ef either 
of two things, by action of both, and by Disjunction. Disjunction takes 
place between a hawk and a post by the action of the hawk ; disjunc 
tion of two wrestlers or of two rams fighting with each other, by the 
actions of both. And Disjunction in these cases has its production at 
the moment immediately following the production of action, inasmuch 
as there exists nothing else to be waited for or depended upon. Accord 
ingly it has been said," Action is an independent cause of Conjunction 
and Disjunction " (vide Li. l~, t above). 

Objection. There is dependence upon substratum where Disjunction 
has to be produced, and upon destiuction of antecedent Conjunction 
where Conjunction has to be produced. 

Answer. This is not the case, for action is independent since it 
does not depend upon anything in the form of an existence which has 
its production immediately after the production of itself. 

Disjunction, produced by Disjunction, however, is two-fold, 
according to the difference of Disjunction of cause and not-cause pro 
duced by Disjunction of cause alone, and the difference of Disjunction 
of effect and not-effect, produced by Disjunction of cause and not- 
cause. Therein Disjunction of potsherd and Ether, resulting from 
Disjunction of the two potsherds, is an example of Disjunction of cause 
and not-cause, resulting from Disjunction of cause alone; and Disjunc 
tion of hand and tree resulting from Disjunction of finger and tree, and 
Disjunction of body and tree, resulting from Disjunction of hand and 
tree, are examples of Disjunction of effect and not-effect, resulting from 
Disjunction of cause and not-cause. 

Objection.- There is no proof of Disjunction itself, the term, Dis 
junction, being used to denote only non-existence of Conjunction. 

Answer. It is not so. For, if non-existence of Conjunction be 
absolute non-existence, then it would follow that the term Disjunction 
would be used to denote attribute and action also. 

Objection. Absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present 
in two substances, is the source of the intuition of the disjunct. 

Answer. It cannot be, since it would in that case follow that abso 
lute non-existence of Conjunction, being present also in a constituted 
whole and its constituent parts, would be the source of the intuition 
of the disjunct. 

Objection. The term " two substances " should be qualified by tho 
expression " not being related to each other as effect and cause." 



KANiDA SftTRAS VII, 2, 10. 229 



Answer. In that case, absolute non-existence of Conjunction, 
being present in the Vindhya and Himalaya mountains also, would be 
the cause of the intuition of the disjunct. 

Objection. Indeed there it is. 

Answer. It is not. For there being existence of erroneous intui 
tion, due to it, in the case of attribute and action also, it should be 
considered how far it will be valid to make it the source of convention 
or usage with reference to the accurate intuition only. 

Objection. Destruction of Conjunction is Disjunction. 

Answer. Were this the case, it would entail the use of the terra 
Disjunction on Conjunction being destroyed by the destruction of any 
one of the two things in Conjunction. 

Objection. "Things in Conjunction" should be qualified as being 
existent. 

Answer. In that case, it would entail the intuition of Disjunction 
even in the state of Conjunction of a jujube and an emblic myrobalan 
which become conjunct again immediately after the destruction of one 
conjunction. 

Objection. Disjunction is the destruction of all Conjunctions. 

Answer. If it be so, then there would be non-existence of Disjunc 
tion in the case of destruction of one Conjunction, since the denotation 
of all finds no place there. 

Disjunction, therefore, exists, and it is an additional attribute. 

This attribute, again, is destructible by another contradictory attri 
bute, inasmuch as, so long as the substratum exists, destruction of 
attribute cannot be possible without a contradictory attribute existing 
in the same substratum. 

Objection. Action itself may be destructive of Conjunction. 

Answer. It cannot be, since only a contradictory attribute is des 
tructive of attribute. Moreover, although where finger, hand, arm, and 
body come to have conjunction with the tree, by means of their respec 
tive actions, there is possibility of destruction of conjunction of the 
finger and the tree, by means of theiaction produced in the finger only, 
yet there would not follow destruction of conjunctions of the hand and 
the tree, of the arm and the tree, and of the body and the tree, since the 
hand, etc. are inactive and the action of the finger rests in a different 
substratum. If it be supposed that even action resting in a different 
substratum may be destructive of conjunction, it would then follow that 
there would be destruction of all conjunctions at one and the same 
moment of time, by action wherever it may be produced. 

Objection. -What then is the solution here on your theory? 

Answer. Disjunction of the hand and the tree, produced by Dis 
junction of the finger and the tree, is destructive of conjunction of the 
hand and the tree. This is a matter of observation. 



230 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Sarvajna has said that there may very well be destruction of 
conjunction of the hand and tree, by the very action of the finger, rest 
ing in a different substratum, and that there will be no undue exten 
sion (of the causality of action), inasmuch as it is observed that mutual 
non-conjunction of the container and the contained is itself destructi 
ble by action resting in a different substratum. This too is not a sound 
opinion; for, distructiveness is everywhere observed to belong only to a 
contradictory attribute appearing in the substratum, and it is not 
reasonable to abandon that without some argument to the contrary. 

Sound and Disjunction, again, are effects of Disjunction. Therein 
we shall ponder over the non-combinative causality of Disjunction to 
wards the production of Sound. For, of the Sound which is produced, 
when a bamboo is being split up, and one of the two halves is held down 
by the pressure of the foot, and the other is drawn upwards, we find no- 
other non-combinative cause than the disjunction of the half and ether 
(or of the ether within the halves). Nor do we find any non-combina 
tive cause over and above Disjunction in the case of the sounding forth 
of a bamboo bursting out while it is being burnt in a conflagration, 
We also infer the Disjunction of the effect and not-effect from the Dis 
junction of the cause and not-cause. How else, where conjunction of 
the finger and the tree, conjunction of the hand and the tree, conjunc 
tion of the arm and the tree, and conjunction of the body and the tree 
are produced by the respective actions of the finger, etc., can there be 
destruction of the conjunction of the hand and the tree, and of other 
conjunctions, even on the destruction of the con junction of the finger 
and the tree, consequent on the disjunction of the finger and the tree 
produced by action produced in the finger alone? For, in this case, 
it is the series of disjunctions, produced by disjunctions, that is, as has 
been already stated, destructive of the corresponding conjunctions* 
There is, however, no clear evidence in the case of disjunction of the 
cause and not-cause, of which the antecedent is the disjunction of the 
two (constituent) causes (i.e., the two halves of the bamboo); for, it is 
observed that, production of the disjunction of ether, etc., like the dis 
junction of one of the two halves of the bamboo, being also possible 
by the action produced in the other half, disjunction is produced by 
the action of that other half from all those with which that half was 
conjunct. For it is not that disjunctions are not produced also from 
particular parts of ether, etc., by action produced in a finger, equally 
as disjunction from another finger. Nor is it that disjunctions from 
particular parts of ether, etc , are not originated by action produced 
in a lotus-leaf, even as disjunction from another lotus-leaf is produced. 
We maintain, "Let a single action originate even a hundred disjunctions, 
which are not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. But 
that action which originates disjunction which is opposed to the con- 
jumction originative of substance, cannot also originate disjuuction 
which is not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. And 
that which originates disjunction which is not opposed to the^ conjunc 
tion originative of substance, cannot also originate disjunction which 
is opposed to the conjunction originative of substance." 

Objection. Is there any reason for taking such a view ? 



KANlDA SftTRAS VII, 2, 10. 231 



Answer. Yes, there ia, diversity of cause being rendered necessary 
by diversity of effect. 

Objection. Variety is necessary in action, so that one action may 
produce disjunction which is opposed to conjunction originative of 
substance, as in the case of flowering lotus-blossoms, etc-, and another 
action may produce both, i. e., disjunctions which are opposed and not 
-opposed to conjunctions originative of substance. 

Answer. This cannot be. For contrariety of effect is the origin 
of the supposition of diversity of cause ; and that contrariety arises 
lay way of the characteristic of the one being the counter-opposite of 
conjunction originative of substance, but by way of the characteristic 
of the other not being the counter-opposite of conjunction originative 
-of substance, inasmuch as diversity also ought to be supposed by those 
very ways. 

This same action, present in the one half of the bamboo, produces 
only disjunction of the two halves. And this disjunction first originates 
disjunction from the particular parts of ether, etc., disjunction which 
is not the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance. 
And if it produced disjunction by itself, it would then bear the charac 
teristic of action ; hence it depends upon time which is distinguished 
-with the possession of destruction of substance. 

Objection. At that moment also let that action itself produce 
Disjunction. 

Answer. It cannot do so, being past in time. In the production 
of Disjunction, Time follows immediately after the production of action 
itself. 

Objection. But subsequent Disjunction being thus produced by 
antecedent Disjunction, action cannot produce conjunction with other 
places. 

Answer. This is not the case ; for towards the production of con 
junction, action is not past time. Otherwise, action will be never 
destroyed, it being destructible only by subsequent conjunction. 

This same Disjunction, destructible by subsequent conjunction, 
lasts for three moments only. Sometimes it is destructible by destruc 
tion of substratum. It is in this way : Action is produced in the fibre 
which is a constituent part of the thread ; Disjunction of two fibres 
follows it ; at the same moment, action is produced in another thread ; 
then there is destruction of conjunction, originative of the thread, by 
disjunctiou of two fibres, and Disjunction is produced by action in the 
thread ; then there is destruction of the thread from destruction of 
conjunction originative of substance, and from destruction of the 
thread results destruction of Disjunction produced by action in another 
thread. 

Objection. Such being the case, there will be no destruction of 
action produced in another thread, since there is nothing to destroy 
it. For, it can be destroyed by subsequent conjunction, but Disjunction, 
being destroyed, there is no subsequent conjunction. 



282 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY 

Answer. The argument is not valid. As Disjunction of the thread 
in the state of being destroyed is produced by action which is produced 
in the thread, so by the same action should be produced Disjunction of 
the thread from the fibre also. Such Disjunction also is really opposed 
to originative conjunction. By this Disjunction of the fibre and the 
thread is produced Disjunction of the thread and ether, which produces 
subsequent conjunction, and this, in its turn, causes destruction of 
action. Or, wherever action is produced in a thread, action is pro 
duced in its fibre also. That action, again, in the thread in the state 
of being destroyed, originates simultaneous -Disjunctions from the 
constituent parts of the thread, and particular parts of ether, etc., all 
these Disjunctions being not opposed to originative conjunction. There 
is, therefore, destruction of action combined or co-inherent in the 
thread, by conjunction which has its production immediately after the 
Disjunction of the effect, e. y., thread, from the not-effect, e. g., ether, 
etc., produced from the Disjunction of the cause, e. <j. } the fibre, and 
the not-cause, e. g., ether etc. 

Sometimes Disjunction is destroyed jointly by subsequent conjunc 
tion and destruction of substratum. It is in this way : There beino- 
conjunction of a thread, and a thread, action is produced in the con 
stituent parts of the thread, namely, the fibre, and action is produced 
in the reed. This is one moment of time. By action in the fibre is 
produced Disjunction from another fibre, and by ;his there is destruc 
tion of conjunction originative of the thread. By the action in the 
reed also, there is Disjunction of the thread and the reed, and 
there is also destruction of the conjunction of the thread and 
the reed. Destruction of the thread immediately follow destruction 
of conjunction originative of the thread. Conjunction of the reed 
with another portion of space immediately follows destruction of 
conjunction of the thread and the reed. Jointly from both of them, 
viz., destruction of substratum, and conjunction, results destruction 
of Disjunction. 10. 

Conjunction and Disjunction do not possess Conjunction and Disjunction. 

Upaakdra. It may be said, " Let there be Conjunction in Conjunetion also, and Dis 
junction in Disjunction also." To prorent this he says : 



I R I \\ II 

Samyoga-vibhagayot, in Conjunction and Disjunc 



tion. ^nttrf^TTTT^n^ Samyoga-vibhaga-abhavah, non-existence of Con 
junction and Disjunction. WJWTfr^Tvqi Auutva-mahattvabhyam, by 
minuteness and magnitude. KJI^m^T: Vyakhyatah, explained. 

11. The non-existence of Conjunction and Disjunction, in 
Conjunction and Disjunction, is explained by Minuteness and 
Magnitude. 292. 

As Minuteness and Magnitude are not possessed of Minuteness and 
Magnitude, so also are not Conjunction and Disjunction posaeaaed of 
Conjunction and Disjunction. 11- 



KANADA SUTRAS VII, 2,13. 233 



Actions are void of actions, and Attributes, of attributes. 



r: Karmmabhih, by actions. ^T*?!f^r Karmmani, actions. $: 
Grunaih, by attributes. JT^: Guuah, attributes. %f H^^T^Issn Anutva- 
mahattvabhyam, by minuteness and magnitude. ffrT Iti, this. 

12. Actions are (void) of Actions ; Attributes are (void) of 
Attributes. This (is explained) by Minuteness and Magnitude. 
293. 

Upaskara. This second aphorism has been already explained. (Vide VII. i. 15 supra). 

Bhdsya. reads VII. ii. 12 as two aphorisms viz., Karmabhirkar- 
mdni yunair-gundh and Anutvamahattvabhydmiti, and explains them 
in the same way as VII. i, 16. 

Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause do not exist. 

Upaskdra. If it be asked why there cannot be conjunction of two substances, namely 
of constituent part and constituted whole, so he says : 



II v I * I 



Yutasiddhi-abhavat, in consequence of the absence 
of separate or independent existence. ^TF 3 ! * K*u4t Karyya-Karanayoh, 
of effect and cause. ^*^TJTf=t*n M Samyoga-vibhagau, Conjunction and 
Disjunction. !f Na, not. feef% Vidyete, exist. 

13. In consequence of the absence of separate existence, 
there exist not Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause. 
294. 

Yutasiddhih means the state of being existent, of two things 
which have no connection with each other, or the characteristic of 
being supported by separate substrata. A constituent part and a con 
stituted whole, however, do not possess this. This is the meaning. 13. 

VivTiti. * Yutasiddhih means the existence of two uncombined 
things. Of cause and effect, e. g., of constituent part and constituted 
whole, conjunction and disjunction do not exist, because of the absence 
of their uncombined existence. For constituted wholes such as a water*- 
pot, etc., do not exist having no relation to constituent parts such as 
potsherds, etc., whereby their conjunction and disjunction might be 
possible. 

The relation between a word and its meaning is neither conjunction 

nor combination. 

Upaskdra. ~ Now follows from the context another section intended to establish the 
conventional relation of words and objects. Therein he states an adverse argumint. 



234 



II vs I ^ | 

> because it is an attribute. 

14. (There can be no conjunction of Sound or Words with 
Objects), because (Conjunction, is an Attribute. 295. 

Of conjunction *- - this is the complement. Thus, the meaning is r 
how can there be conjunction which is an attribute, of an attribute, 
e. g., Sound or Word, with objects sujh a water pot, etc. ? -14. 

Above continued. 

Upaxkdra. Moreover, the object also is sometimes characterised as colour, taste, eto. r 
Therefor*, conjunction is riot possible, inasmuch as the existence of attribute in an attribute^ 
has not been admitted. This is what he says : 



n 

nm: Gunah, attribute. ?ffa A pi, a ^ 3() - f^TT 5 ^ Vibhavyate, is known 
or established. 

15. Attribute also is known (to be an object denoted by 
Word), or is established (by Word). 296. 

1 Attribute also, object this is the complete sentence. Attribute 
also, e. <JT., colour, etc., is an object denoted by Word, but with that 
there is no relation of conjunction. This is the meaning. Or, the 
meaning is that attribute also is established (by being denoted) by Word 
and that with that there is no relation of conjunction of Word. 15. 

Above continued. 

Upaskdra. .Further, conjunction (of Word and Object) cannot be produced by th<r 
action of either or by the action of both, because any substance whatever, <>,. g., Ether, etc., 
as well as Word are inert. This is what he says : 



u ^ i R i \\ ii 



fM^T?TT^, Niskriyatvat, because of inactivity or inertness. 
16. Because Word and Object are inert. 297. 

4 Of Word and of any Object whatever Such is the complement 
of^the aphorism. 16. 

Above continued. 
Upaskdra. He states another obstruction to the inter-relation (of Word and Object) : 



u v* i ^ i ?vs u 



Asati, not existing. !f ?rf^T Na asti, (It) does not exist, ^frf Iti 
such, q Cha, and. SpftTI^ Prayogat, because there is application. 



KANADA SftTRAS VII, 2, 1. 235 

17, (Word and Object are not in conjunction), also because 
in the case of a non-existent object there is such application (of 
word) as " (It) does not exist." 298. 

Even in the case cf a non-existent water-pot, cloth, etc., such 
application (of word) is observed as " There is no water-pot in the 
room," " Cloth does not exist," "The letter r/ajwhich was heard before, 
no longer exists," 5 There was a cloth," There will be a cloth, etc. ; 
therefore (there is no inter-relation) This is the meaning. The import 
accordingly is that there is no conjunction, nor again combination, 
of Word with a non-existent water-pot, etc. 17. 

Word and Object are unrelated. 
Upaskdra. What then ? He gives the answer : 



&abda-arthau, sound and sense. Word and object. 
Asambandhau, unrelated. 

18. (Therefore), Word and Object are unrelated. 299. 

If Conjunction of Word and Object does not exist, it then comes to 
this that Word and Object are unrelated. This is the meaning. 18. 

Above continued. 

{Jpaskdra _ It may be asked why one or other of the relations of Conjunction and 
Combination should not exist (between Word and Object). Accordingly he says : 

n 



Samyoginah, which is in conjunction. The conjunct. 
Dandat, from the staff. Wflfrr: Samabayinah, which is in combination. 
The combined. f^t<*T^ Visesat, from a distinction or distinguishing 
element. ^ Cha, and. 

19. (Cognition of Conjunction results) from (e. .,) the 
staff which is in conjunction (with the hand of a man), and (of 
Combination) from a distinguishing element which is in combina 
tion (with the whole). 300. 

" This person is carrying a staff," " The elephant possesses a 
trunk "these intuitions take place. Of these, the first results from 
conjunction, and the second, from combination. The intuition in 
respect of the trunk which is a particular member of the body, is depen 
dent upon its combination with the elephant, since it arises from the 
distinction that that is an elephant to which belongs a trunk as being m 
combination with it. The distinction itself, viz., the trunk, etc., is distinc 
tive in consequence of the relation of combination. But there is no intui 
tion of threads, etc. also, such as " A cloth possesses threads " ete., 
under the relation of distinctive possession of the parts. Likewise, 
" The object, water-pot, is that which possesses the word, water-pot," 



236 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

such intuition does not take place. Of Word and Object, therefore 
tport!l.l9 ""iwurtioi., nor again oombinat j This is & 

Intuition of object from word proceed* from convention. 

^a^5T^T: N vs | R | ^o || 

*wfor: Samayikah, conventional. According to direction. w*m; 
babda-artha-pratyajah, intuition of object from word. 

2 The intuition of Object from Word (takes place) accord 
ing to the direction (of God). 301. 



. 

object. The same is convention, depended ^ upor tL wm of Co 1 f V 
example, -Whatever plant the ichneumo tw^Mito*h ?i 
antidote to poison.- This is the meaning. h 1S an 



This convention is learnt sometimes from usage;,,/, when 
employer gives the order -Bring the water-pot/ and an employe* 

?n g ,%h U k J8C r S T:\? V UbUlai> " eCk > a W standing Tear J by 
infers the knowledge of the latter in this way. This his 

produced by knowledge, because it is activity? like my a ot f {ha 
knowledge again is produced by the words of this o/der, because 
follows immediately after it; and the subject-matter of this knowdre 
namely, this object with a tubular neck/is the denotation of the term 
water-pot. By such processes of transposition of verbs and cases 
boy becomes informed in respect of the object, water-pot, cloth etc. 

Sometimes the convention is learnt directly from testimony alone 
e.g that this tubular-necked object is designated by the term, water 
pot. Sometimes it is learnt from comparison; e.g., from a con prison 

cow Tat a 11 , ! ^ T CaS6S aS , Uiata W a ^ that which is P like a 
w that as is mudga so is mudya-parni (a kind of bean), that as is 

edVe ofobiecr f 7i a ;- U ?, f le * "? ^^ etc. Sometimes (know! 
f objects is derived) from condemnatory passages also- e a 
the camel with too pendulous upper lip and long neokf the eater of hard 
thorns, the vilest of animals-when after hearing this condenatory 
sentence one sees a body of this description, knowledge arises in one 
tm ^ "This is that camel/ Sometimes it springs from commun ty o f 
substratum, or synonymy, with words of known import; . T "The 
honey-bee ,s sipping the honey with, n cloven lotus-blossoms^-after 
hearing this proposition, (the knowledge arises), "This is what is desig 
nated by the term, honey-bee, because it is the sipper of honey within 
cloven lotus-blossoms," or as in the case of the proposition, -The cuckoo. 
sings sweetly ,n the mango-tree.- Here, in the above instances, it s- 

.ther a case of inference, or a case of word itself being productive of 



KANiDA StTTRAS VII, 2, 20. 237 

knowledge through the force of synonymy with words of known import, 
or only a particular mode of comparison or analogy, inasmuch as the 
being the agent in drinking honey infers resemblance to other 
individuals such as the bee, etc. 

The convention, again, has reference to classes only, individuals 
being brought home by means of special characteristics, such is the 
view of the followers of Tutdta. According to the followers of Prabhd- 
kara, the force of word is in respect of both the class and the individual, 
but so far as it refers to the class, it denotes the object by the word, by 
being known, and so far as it refers to the individual, by being its 
proper form. The teaching of the ancients or elders is that convention 
is the force itself and that classes appearing in the forms of the indi 
viduals are the objects denoted by words. This is the case with words- 
like cow, etc., but the objects denoted by words expressive of attribute 
and action are both classes and individuals as detailed in the 



l. He now points out the connection between words and 
objects, which is the means of verbal knowledge. 

* * * < gamaya is arbitrament or convention. It is two 
fold, eternal and modern. Eternal arbitrament is called force (of 
words), and modern arbitrament is called definition. Arbitrament has 
for its form, This object is to be understood from this word, or Let this 
word convey this signification. Accordingly it has been said, 



Convention has been declared to be two-fold, original and modern. 
Therein the original is the eternal, which is called force; whereas the 
modorn is the occasional, imposed by scientific writers and others. 

The apprehension of the force of words proceeds from conduct,. 
etc. So it has been said, 



The elders declare the apprehension of the force of words to proceed 
from grammatical analysis or etymology, from comparison or analogy, 
from lexicography, from authoritative sayings or testimony, from co.i- 
duct (of the employer who gives an order which is carried out by the 
employed,, from contiguity to a wordof well-known import, from context, 
and from explication or description. 

* The doctrine of the force of the word to denote 
primarily the class is not sound, for, in such instances as " Bring the 
cow," the fact which is established by experience, namely, that the indi 
vidual is the object of verbal cognition, cannot be explained except on. 



238 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

the theory of the force of the word primarily to denote the individual. 
Nor does the knowledge of the individual arise from implication or 
derivatively, for in the absence of a primary use a derivative use ia im 
possible. Nor is the knowledge of the individual possible even by the 
equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge); 
for, inasmuch as the being an object of verbal cognition, standing in the 
position of an effect, must be produced by a cause, the equivalence of the 
act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge; which is sun >osed 
to be the condition, cannot be the condition there, as is desired We 
should, therefore, respect the doctrine that the force of the words cow 
etc., lies in denoting the individual charaterised by, or possessing, the 
generic form and the class or the universal. It has been a;;- u-dingly 
laid down in the aphorism of Gautama, " The individual, the generic 
form, and the universal are, however, the object of the word." (Nydya- 
S&tram, II. ii 63). 

Priority and Posteriority, how produced. 

l7pankdra. Now he explains Priority and Posteriority, the next in the order of 
enumeration, in one context, as these are the causes of mutually iuvolved USOH, and for the 
purpose of clearing up the understanding of the disciples as well as for bhe sake of brevity. 



ii v* m *t n 



Eka-dikkabhyam, lying in the same direction. 
Ekakalabhyam, existing at the same time *TflTgfrjTeT*<lT Sannikrista- 
vipkraristabhyam, near and remote. ^ Paratn, prior, SPTC Aparam pos 
terior. <g Cha, and. 

21. The Prior and the Posterior (are produced by two 
objects) lying in the same direction, existing at the same time, 
and being near and remote. 302. 

" The Prior and the Posterior the reference here is principally in 
a substantive sense. " Are produced" such is the complement. Or, the 
word "usage" or "convention" is to be supplied after The Prior and the 
Posterior : such . The word "such" should be understood. Ekadikkabhyam 
means by two bodies which have the same direction in space. Two bodies 
occupying equal place (i. e., equally distant) may also have the same 
direction in space, but by them Priority and Posteriority are neither 
produced, nor come into use. Accordingly it has been said, Near and 
remote, which expression means, possessing nearness, i.e., the quality or 
state of containing a smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct, 
and remoteness, i. e., the quality or state of containing a larger number 
of con junctions with the conjunct. Hereby combinative cause (of 
Priority and Posteriority) is stated ; whereas conjunction of bodies and 
direction in space is the non-combinative cause. Priority and Porteri- 
ority are thus produced in a man standing with his face towards the east, 
by observing a relative paucity of conjunctions with the conjunct in 
one of two bodies lying in the east and a relative plurality of conjunc 
tions with the conjuct in the other. The non-comcinative cause is thus 



KANlDA StiTRAS VII, 2, 21. 239 

stated. Near and remote the term implies intuition, as the contained 
metaphorically denotes the container. Relative understanding or 
cognition of relativity is thus stated to be the efficient cause. Priority 
and Posteriority are produced in respect only of two bodies lying in 
the same direction in space ; hence there is no production of them in 
all places. Relative understanding is produced in One and the same 
observer only ; hence there is no production of them in all circums 
tances. Being regulated by relative understanding, there is no produc 
tion of them at all times. There is no mutual dependence between 
them, inasmuch as being produced from the capacity or power of the 
cause, they are proved by sense-perception. For otherwise they would 
be neither produced nor perceived. For in case of mutual dependence 
there would be non-production as well as non-perception of both 
of them. But Priority and Posteriority are perceived, and their 
perception cannot be possible without their production. 

Existing at the same time this has reference to Priority and 
Posteriority in time. Now existing at the same time means, by two 
bodies one young and the other old, which occupy the same, i. e., the 
present, time. Here nearness is the state of having the birth intervened 
by a fewer number of revolutions of the sun, and remoteness is the 
state of having the birth intervened by a larger number of revolutions 
of the sun. Here too understanding i. e., the container, is implied by 
the contained. Thus the young and old bodies are the combinative 
causes. Conjunction of tirno and bodies is the non-combinative cause. 
The understanding of the state of having the birth intervened by a- 
fewer number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause in the case 
of Posteriority, and the understanding of the state of having the birth 
intervened by a larger number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient 
cause in the case of Priority, 

These, Priority and Posteriority, again, are produced even in 
respect of bodies indeterminate in place and direction in space. 

Now there is a seven-fold destruction of Priority and Posteriority 
iu space but their production is simultaneous, else there would be 
mutual dependence. Priority and Posteriority in space then are 
destroyed from the destruction of relative understanding (1) from the 
destruction of conjunction which is the non-combinative cause, (2) 
from the destruction of substance which is the combinative cause, (3) 
from the destruction of the efficient and non-combinative causes, (4} 
from the destruction of the efficient and combinative causes, (5) from, 
the desi ruction of the efficient cause, (6) from the destruction of the 
non-combinative cause, and (7) from the destruction of the combinative 
cause. Now, from the destruction of relative understanding, thus: 
Production of Priority ; knowledge of the genus Priority ; then destruc 
tion of relative understanding ; after its destruction, at the moment of 
knowledge of substance distinguished by Priority, destruction of 
Priority, the process should be understood in the same way as in the 
case of destruction of duality. Destruction of Priority and Posteriority 
follows also from the destruction of the non-combinative cause. Thus, as 
soon as there is relative understanding, action takes place in the body 
which is the substratum of Priority ; as soon as Priority is produced 
therefrom, disjunction takes place between direction in space and the 



240 VAI!ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

body ; after it, when there is knowledge of the genus Priority, then there 
is destruction of the conjunction of direction in space and the body ; then, 
destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the genus ; at 
the very same moment, destruction -of Priority and Posteriority results 
from destruction of conjunction of direction in space and the bodies. 
And in this case destruction of relative understanding does not destroy 
them, inasmuch as it is synchronous with destruction of Priority. 

Objection. On the theory of destruction of attribute even from de 
struction of non-combinative cause, great confusion will result from 
the thus possible destruction of Samskdra, (tendencies, impressions), 
adristam (invisible after-effects of acts performed), etc., also from the 
destruction of the conjunction of Mind and Soul. 

Answer. It is not so. For Priority being pervaded by the char 
acteristic of being remote, there must needs be cessation of Priority 
consequent on the non-existence of remoteness on the removal of the 
substratum of Priority to some other place- Nor is there at the time 
any other agent of destruction ; hence, such destruction being other 
wise impossible, destruction of conjunction alone is conceived to be 
the destroying agent. Ou the other hand samskdra, adristam etc., as 
well as their effects, e. g., recollection, pleasure, etc., cannot be suppos 
ed to be so destroyed, inasmuch as they are observed even after a 
long time. 

This also implies that Priority and Posteriority are destroyed also 
"by the destruction of the conjunction between that particular place 
and the standard limit as well -as the observer, the argument being the 
same as above. 

Destruction of Priority sometimes results also from destruction of 
combinative cause. Thus, relative understanding arises at the very 
same moment that action produced in a portion of a body causes dis 
junction from another portion ; from disjunction results destruction of 
the conjunction originative of the body, and then production of 
Priority ; at the next moment, destruction of substance results from 
destruction of conjunction, and there takes place knowledge of the 
genus Priority ; destruction of Priority follows destruction of substance, 
and destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the 
genus. So that, being synchronous, destruction of relative understand 
ing does not destroy Priority. 

Destruction of Priority sometimes takes place by the destruction 
of substance and destruction of relative understanding. It happens 
in this way : Production of action and relative understanding in a 
portion of the body ; then, disjunction from another portion, and pro 
duction of Priority ; next desruction of originative conjunction and 
knowledge of the genus ; thereafter, destruction of substance and des 
truction of relative understanding , and following them, there is destruc 
tion of Priority. 

Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of 
substance and destruction of conjunction. It is in this way : Simultane 
ously with disjunction amongst the constituent parts of substance, 



KANlDA SftTRAS.VII,2, 22. 241 

there is production of action in the body and of relative understand 
ing ; following it, appear destruction of conjunction of constituent 
parts, disjunction between space and body, and production of Priority -, 
thereafter there are- destruction of substance, destruction of conjunc 
tion of space and body, and production of knowledge of the genus : 
thereafter destruction of Priority results from destruction of substance 
and destruction of conjunction of space and body, and destruction of 
relative understanding from knowledge of the genus. 

Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of 
conjunction and destruction of relative understanding. It is in this 
way : Production of Priority, and action in the body ; knowledge of 
1 the genus, and disjunction ; destruction of relative understanding, and 
destruction .of conjunction of space and the body then, destruction 
of Priority. 

Destruction of Priority results sometimes from destructions of 
combinative, non-combinative and efficient causes. It is in this way : 
Production of Priority, disjunction among constituent parts of the 
body, and action in the body, take place simultaneously ; knowledge of 
the geauj Priority, destruction of conjunction of constituent parts and 
disjunction between space and the body follow them ; thereafter results 
destruction of Priority or of Posteriority in space, from destruction 
pf relative understanding, destruction of substance, and destruction 
of conjunction of space and the body, which destructions are simultane 
ously produced. 

Of Priority and Posteriority in time, however, there is no destruction 
due to destruction of non-combinative cause. As in the case of Priority 
and Posteriority in space, there is destruction of nearness and remoteness 
on the destruction of conjunction of space and the body, ao it is not the 
case with Priority and Posteriorityin time. The three cases, therefore, 
of their destruction namely from destruction of combinative cause, from 
destruction of relative understanding, and from both jointly, should be 
understood in the way described above. 21. 

Vivriti. It should be observed that, according to the writer of 
Muktdvali, destruction of relative understanding is destructive of 
Priority and Posteriority in both their forms (i. e., in space and in 
time), whereas in the Upaskdra it is stated that it is the destruction of 
their three-fold causes which is destructive of Priority and Posteriority. 

Priority and Posteriority in 2 1 ime ) how produced. 
UpasM.ra.-~ He states a peculiarity in the oase of temporal priority and posteriority. 



Karana-paratvat, from priority of the cause. 
Karanaaparatvat, from posteriority of the cause. "^ Cha, and. 

22. (Temporal Priority and temporal Posteriority are said, 
by suggestion, to arise respectively) from Priority of the cause and 
from Posteriority of the cause. 303. 



242 VAlgEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

The cause of Priority and Posteriority is time. Priority and 
Posteriority belong to it. Conjunction of time which is the non- 
combinative cause of priority, and conjunction of time which is tfre 
non-combinative cause of posteriority are stated, by implication, as 
otherswise, the result would b want of congruity or syntactical 
connexion. For, priority and posteriority cannot be produced by 
priority and posteriority themselves. The terms, priority and posteri 
ority, denote, by implication, conjunctions cf time which are productive 
of them. 22. 

Vivfiti. If the uses of prior (remote) and posterior (near) are pro 
duced by cognitions of remoteness and nearness, then, inasmuch as the 
cognition, Ka4i (Benares) is near in relation to Prayaga (Allahabad), 
refers also to Prayaga as its object subject-matter, why does not there 
arise the use of Posteriority (or nearness) in respect of Prayaga ? Lite- 
wise, why is there not the use of Priority (or remoteness), i respect of 
Kasi, etc., which also become the subject-matter of the cognition of 
remoteness ? 

He removes this incidental doubt. 

1 Karana-paratvat, i. e., owing to the priority or remoteness of the 
combinative cause ; and also owing to its posteriority or nearness. 1 he 
uses of priority and posteriority are only in respect of the combinative 
cause, but not in respect of anything else simply because it becomes tn/e 
subject-matter of relative understanding. For use is detemiued by 1$he 
object in respect of which the use arises. This is the import. 

Priority and Posteriority do not exist in Priority and Posteriority. 



II V9 I * I 3 II 



Paratva-aparatvayoh, in priority and posteriority. 
Paratva-aparatra-abhavah, non-existence of priority 



and posteriority. SH^Mfcfsrp^n Anutva-mahattvabhy&m, by minuteness 
and magnitude. cqronft: Vyakhyatafc, explained. 

23. The non-existence of Priority and Posteriority, in Priority 
and Posteriority, is explained by mintuteness and magnitude. 
304. 

Actions are -void of actions. 



II vs I R I W II 



KarmiDabhih, by actions qrwrffor Karmmani, actions. 
24. Actions are (void) of Actions. 305. 

Attributes are void of attributes. 



KANlDA SfrTRAS VII, 2, 26. 243 

ip^: Gunailj, by attributes. 3TWT : GunAh. attributes. 
25. Attributes are (void) of Attributes. 306. 

CTpafclra.--Those aphorisms, being rirfcually explained above, are nofc explained 
here. 23, 24, 25. 

VIL ii. 24 and 25 aa one aphorism. 
Combination 



{7paskJra.I haa been stated that priority, posteriority, etc., are combined in deng 
or corporal substances only, and that knowledge, pleasure etc., are combined in the soul. Now 
what ia this combination itself ? Hating regard to this inquiry of the disciples, he steps 
ovr Understanding which is the next subject for treatment according to the order of enuruer#- 
ifeu, and describes the examination of Combination. 

: II v$ I ^ i 



{f Iha, here, 4. e., in the cause. ff*j Idam, this, i. &., the effect. 
f% Iti, such. HT Yatah, whence. VT^f^TCCfr Karyya-karanayofc, qf 
effect arid cause tf: Salj, that. ^WUfi Samavayab^, combination. 



26. That is Combination by virtue of which (arises the intui 
tion) in the foim of " This is here/ with regard to effect and 
. 307. 



.^Aryya-karanayob/ is an indication ; non-effect and non-cause 
also are implied. So it has been said in the section called the Locality 
of the Predicables, " Combination is that relation of things mutually 
involved or associated in nature and bearing to one another the 
relation of the contained and the container, -which ia the source of 
intuition in the form of " (It is) here."" Ayuta siddhih, inseparable 
association, is the non-existence of things unrelated. As in the case 
of " There is curd here in the bowl," " There are jujubes here in th.e 
bowl," so in the case of " There is cloth here in the threads," " Ther.e 
is mat here in the reeds," " There are substance, attribute, and action 
Here in substance," " There is bovineness here in the cow," " There is 
knowledge here in the soul," " There is Sound here in Ether," the 
cognition of here which is thus produced, cannot be produced without 
somo relation ; whereby it is inferred that some relation exists. And 
this relation is not mere conjunction. For the causes of conjunction, 
namely, action or either of the two things, etc., are absent here ; it does 
not terminate in disjunction ; related things do not exist unrelated ; it 
can be inferred as a uniform substratum ; it is not perceptible to the 
senses ; it is one ; and it is eternal. 

Objection. If combination be one, it would then entail intermix 
ture of substance-ness, etc , since combination of action-ness, etc., 
would be possible in substance. 

- Answer. This cannot be the case, since non-intermixture follows 
from tke very rule of the container and the contained. Although the 
same combination which is the combination of substance-neas. is also 
the comibation of attribute-ness, action-ness, etc., still substance 
is not their container or substratum, since they are not observed there. 



244 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Substance-ness is observed in substances only, attribute-ness in attri 
butes only, action-ness in actions only, but not elsewhere. It is from 
the observation of this agreement and difference, that the uniformity 
(of the container and the contained) results. As even in the absence 
of a particular conjunction between the bowl and the curd, it is the 
bowl which is the container, and not the curd, and hence there is the 
uniformity of the relation of the container and the contained, so the 
uniformity is valid in this case also from the very difference of the 
power of the revealed and the revealer, for action-ness, etc., are not 
revealed by substance in the same way as substance-ness is. Accord 
ingly it has been said. 

*rfa^ ft *m^ 3*tqj|ir *: **K 

All-powerful consciousness is, verily our resource in the apprehen 
sion of things. For consciousness in respect of the being the container 
is not reversible ; nor is there the intuition that substance is action ; 
nor, again, that threads are in the cloth. It is for this reason that r 
notwithstanding the combination of colour in Air; " There is colour ia 
Air" such characteristic of being the container is not observed in 
the case of Air. It is natural capacity , therefore, which everywhere 
determines the relation of the container and the contained. 

This combination, again, is eternal, inasmuch as it is uncaused. 
For the rule cf production from combinative causes applies to exis 
tences or beings, and efficient and non-combinative causes are subsi 
diary to those causes. Therefore that which would be the combinative 
cause of combination would be either another combination, or 
that combination itself. It cannot be the first, as it would entail non- 
finality ; nor the second, as it would involve self-dependence, for that 
very combination cannot produce combination with itself. 

Objection. How does the intuition arise that there is combination 
of cloth in threads, and that there is combination of colour in cloth ? 

Answer. It is by means of the relation of their intrinsic form, or 
essential relation, as the supposition of another combination would 
entail non-finality. 

Objection. The intuition of here, e. g., " There is colour here in th& 
cloth," will, then, arise by means of the same essential relation. What 
is the use of combination ? 

Answer. It is not so, since there is no obstruction here to the 
admission of an additional relation. 

Objection. If it be so, then " Here in this place there is non-exis 
tence of the water-pot," in this case also there will be either. combina 
tion or any other relation. 

Answer. No, as the intuition can be possible by means of essential 
relation itself. For, on the contrary supposition, the absolute and 
mutual non-existences of the water-pot, which are eternal and combined 
with more than one substance, would have the characteristic of being 
G-enera, subsequent non-existence also, being an effect in combination, 
would be perishable or destructible, and antecedent non-existence also, 
not being produced, though combined, would be indestructible. 



KANlDA SftTR AS VII, 2, 27. 245 



Nor is the quality of existence the determining factor there, for the 
quality of existence can "be produced at any -time.-. >- 

The Bhattas maintain that in non-existence there really is present 
a different relation called distinguisheduess or qualifiedness. Nor is this 
distinguishedness be one and the same in the case of all individual mani 
festation of non-existence, then it would follow that there is non-existence 
of the water-pot even in that which contains a water-pot, inasmuch as 
the distinguishedness of the non-existence of the water-pot would exist 
by means of the same distinguishedness of the non-existence of the 
cloth. 

Objection. But the water-pot itself will in this case prevent the 
cognition of the non-existence of the water-pot. 

Answer. It cannot do this, since the non-existence of that which 
will prevent such cognition is itself present there by means of the 
relation of distinguishedness. Nor is the very nature of the substratum 
.(i.e., where the water-pot lies) such that on account of it there can be 
no manifestation of the non-existence of water-pot in that place, for 
immediately after the removal of the water-pot follows the intuition of 
the non-existence of water-pot in that very place. 

Objection. In your view also, why is there not intuition of posses 
sion of colour after the destruction of colour, since Combination is, as 
you say, eternal and one? 

Answer. Because non-intuition of colour is proved from the very 
destruction of colour. 

The arguments against Combination have been demolished in the 
Maytikha under Sense-Perception. So we stop here. 26. 

Combination is different from Substance, Attribute, Action, 
Genus, and Species. 

Upaskdra. By way of proving its difference from the five beginning with Substance (i. e., 
Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species), he says : 



|| v9 \ ^ 

: Dravyatva-gunatva-pratisedhah, negation or exclu 



sion of substance-ness a-nd attribute-ness, (in or from Combination). 
Bhavena, by existence. n^fiT: Vyakhyatah, explained. 

27. The negation of Substance-ness and Attribute-ness (in 
Combination) is explained by Existence. 308. 

Bhavah, means Existence. As Existence is not identical with 
substance, etc., being cognised by a different form of understanding, so 
combination also is different from the same Substance, etc., i Dravyatva- 
gunatva is an indication ; Action-ness, etc., also should be under 
stood. 27. 

Combination is one. 

Upaskdra. He proves Unity : 



246 VALEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



drfHil^H \\ V9 I R I V: II 

Tattvam, that-ness. One-ness. Unity. >n%T Bhavena, by Exis- 



28. The Unity (of Combination, is explained) by Existence. 
309. 

Explained is the complement. Tattvam, i. e , Unity, bhavena, 
i. e., by Existence, is explained. As one Existence everywhere induces 
the cognition of the existent, so one Combination everywhere induces 
the cognition of the combined. Moreover the inferential mark of Com 
bination is not differentiated, nor is there any other particular mark. 
For, we do not find any particular mark, i. e., differentiating mark, of 
Combination, whereby we could recognise its diversity. For the very 
ame reason, Combination is eternal ; for, as in the case of Existence, 
non-eternality cannot appropriately belong to it which is un differen 
tiated even in the difference of Space, Time, etc. 

Objection If combination is nothing but this relation, then there 
may be disunion of threads and cloth, or of the cloth and its colour. 

Answer. This cannot be, for in the absence of (previous) uncor- 
relsted existence, disunion is not possible. For, there is no unrelated 
existence or colour and that which possesses the colour, or of the parts 
and the whole, that there may be a disunion between them. 

Objection. But theirl uncorrelated existence may be brought to 
pass. 

Answer. It cannot, for the effectuation is contravened by being 
never so experienced. 

The followers of Prabhdkara hold that Combination is manifold and 
also non-eternal. But this is not a reasonable view to take, for the 
intuition of " Colour is destroyed," whereas it is the intuition of no 
body that the Combination of colour is destroyed. 

The view of the school of Nyaya that Combination is perceptible to 
the sense is also not valid. Combination is supersensuous, for being 
different from the Soul, it is at the same time in a state of being ui;- 
combined, like the Mind, or like Time, etc. 28. 

Bhdsya : Combination is proved to be an attribute in the same 
way as is existence, and further, like existence, Combination also is 
produced by itself, p. e., does not depend upon any other Combiuation 
lor its production. 

Here ends the second chapter in the seventh book of Sankara s 
Commentary on the Vaisesika Aphorisms. 



KANADA SflTRAS VIII, 1, 1. 247 

BOOK EIGHTH CHAPTER FIRST. 
Cognition explained by allusion to III. i. 2, 18. 

\Jpaskdra.~ The order of enumeration was violated in favour of the curiosity of the 
disciples. The author now adopts the order of enumeration. Therein the examination of 
understanding is the subject of theleighth book. Understanding hat been already mentioned 
for the purpose of proof of the Soul. By recalling it, he says : 



Dravyesu, among substances. Jirff Jnanam, knowledge. Cogni 
tion. sqi<p{||HH Vyakhyatam, explained. 

1. Cognition (has been) explained among Substance. 310. 

By the term, " Among substances," the author implies the third 
book, as the the container by the contained. The meaning is that 
cognition, jndnam, has been explained by the two aphorisms, namely, 
" The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of 
(the existence of) an object different from the senses and their objects" 
(III. i. 2), and " That (i. e., knowledge) which is produced from the 
contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false 
mark)" (III. i. 18). 

Now in the kindred system (i. e., the Nydya-Sutram of Gautama), 

under the defination of understanding, there has been made a declara 

tion of synonyms, namely, " Understanding, Apprehension, Cognition, 

Intuition these are synonyms/ (Nydyd-Sutram, I. i. 15), for the pur 

pose of demolishing the Sankhya doctrine. For the Sankhyas maintain 

a difference in meaning of the terms, Understanding, etc. Thus Prakriti f 

Matter, is the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the 

principles of purity, passion and darkness, or the principles of illumina 

tion, evolution, and involution, respectively. Prakriti is one, and one 

only, while Purusas, Spirits, are divided to infinity. They are seated 

in the cave (i. e. } retired, unaffected, indifferent spectators), eternal, 

immutable, and characterised, by eternal consciousness. They are 

called lame, as it is not their nature to undergo modification or trans 

formation, while Prakriti is said to be blind, being stupid or insensate. 

When there arises in Prakriti a desire for fhe enjoyment of sensuous 

objects, or a desire to see the difference between Prakriti and Pwrusa, 

at that moment Prakriti is modified, or transforms, under the influence 

or osculation of Purusa. And its first transformations Buddhi, Under 

standing, a particular form of the inner sense. Understanding it is 

that is called the principle of Mahat, the great one ; accordingly it 

has been said, " The great one evolves from Prakriti." And this under 

standing is pure or stainless like a mirror. And that particular trans 

formation of it, which takes the form of an object in such shapes as 

" It is a water-pot/ u It is a cloth," etc., through the channel of the 

external senses, is called cognition, jndnam, and faculty, vritti. Appre 

hension, upalabdhi, is the same as a kind of abhimdna, egoity or self- 

consciousness, in the form of " I know," which arises in consequence 

of the non-perception or non-apprehension of the distinctness or differ 

ence of Purusa which is consciousness, by cognition present in transpa 

rent or pure understanding. Pratyaya, Intuition, is that particular 



248 VAIE$AIAK PHILOSOPHY. 



transformation of understanding itself, which takes the form of 
pleasure, pain, etc., through the channel of the senses alone, in conse 
quence of the contact of garland, sandalwood, and other objects of 
sense. Hence it is that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire^ aversion,. 
volition, reminiscence, virtue, and vice are, all of them, particular 
transformations of understanding, and being present in Pralcj iti itself, 
in subtle forms or in minute proportions, appear and disappear, accord 
ing to difference of circumstances ; while Puritsa is as free from 
adhesion or affinity or attachment as a lotus-leaf, but casts its shadow 
in the understanding. This theory which the Sankhyas hold is thrown 
away by the proof indicated in the above declaration of (these terms as) 
synonyms. Thus, if the term, understanding, be derived in the instru 
mental sense, viz., as that by which a thing is understood, then it comes 
to be nothing else than the mind. Nor is the mind an object of percep 
tion, whereas understanding is surely cognizable by perception in the 
form of " I understand." , Nor are cognition, etc., the properties of the 
internal sense, inasmuch as they are proved to exist only as being the 
properties of an agent. For the manifestation of " I know," " I intuit," 
" I apprehend," takes place as having community of substratum with 
I-ness or egoity. If they reply that this phenomenon is abhimdna or 
conceit, we rejoin that it cannot be so, since there is no obstruction to 
its being real. It cannot be contended that such obstruction is supplied 
by the very characteristic of the Purusa as being seated in the cave, 
that is to say, by its not being the receptacle of adventitious properties 
or changes ; for, we would then reply that eternality is compatible 
with the nature of being the substratum of adventitious modes. For 
that which possesses a property and the property are not one and the 
same reality, so that the production and destruction of the property 
should themselves be the production and destruction of the substratum 
of the property. It is only he, then, who is conscious, that also under 
stands, cognises, apprehends, and intuits. Hence the hypothesis of 
distinct entities (e. y., Soul and understanding) is not reasonable. This- 
is the point. 1. 

Soul, Mind, Ether, Time, Space Air and Ultimate Atoms are not 
(ordinarily ) perceptible. 

ITpaskdra. This cognition, again, is two-fold, Vidyd, Science or true knowledge and 
A.-vidyd, Nescience or false knowledge. Vidyd is of four kinds, characterised by perception, 
inference, memory and testimony. A- Vidyd also has four kinds characterised by doubt,. 
error or mistake, dream, and uncertainty or indecision or non-finality. Among the above 
four kinds of true knowledge, that which is inferential, is not produced by the senses. Why 
this is so, is explained here. 



u c i \ \ * \\ 

<f3T Tatra, therein, among substances. Sff?*n Atma, soul, q^s 

Manas, mind. ^ Cha, and others, e. y., Ether, Time, Space, Air and 
Ultimate Atoms. W&rt A-pratyakse, non-perceptible, not objects of 
perception. 

2. Among Substances, the Soul, the Mind and other ara not 
objects of perception. 311. 






KANiDA StiTRAS VII, 1, 2. 249 



The word, soul, in the aphorism denotes the soul of another or one s 
own soul. That even one s own soul is not an object of perception, has 
been already declared, inasmuch as the casual mental intuition of the 
I, aham, in one s own soul, is repudiated by such intuitions " I am 
fair," " I am thin/ " I have long arms, etc. (where the I has reference 
to the body). The word, "cha," extends the application of the predicate 
to the substances, namely, ether, time, space, air, and ultimate atoms. 
Sense-born cognition again is of two degrees, being that of the 
omniscient and that of the non-omniscient. That of the omniscient is the 
cognition of such and such complements of objects by means of the 
proximity or presentation (or reaching upto ordinarily supersensuous 
objects) characterised by virtue or merit springing from Yoga (i. e. t 
inhibition of the activity of the internal organ, the mind, and con 
sequent freedom of the all-pervading soul, in other words, the steadi 
ness of the mind in the soul. Vide v. ii. 16 above-*) Thus ultimate 
atoms fall within its sphere, (or are objects of perception), being de 
monstrable, nameable, and existent. 

Objection. Since there is no material or data of such cognition, 
how can this be the case ? Magnitude also is a cause of sense-percep 
tion, but ultimate atoms do not possess magnitude. The possession of 
colour, again is the cause of visual perception, but sapce, etc., do 
not possess colour. How then can there be perception in these 
oases ? 

Answer. The objection does not stand, for such omniscience is 
possible by means of the mind alone as an auxiliary to the virtue or 
merit born of Yoga, or by means of the eye and other senses under the 
favourable influence of such mind. For the virtue or merit produced 
by Yoga is of inconceivable efficacy, and does not stand in need of any 
other auxiliary. 

" The man whose omniscience is the subject of controversy, is 
not omniscient, because he is a man like myself," such reasonings, 
however, are inapplicable, since they are void of argument which would 
render impossible the proposition of the other side (maintaining the 
existence of omniscience in the man in question), as is the case with 
the reasoning, " A follower of Prabhdkara (a writer of the Mimamsa 
school) is not versed in Mirnamsa, because he is a man like myself." 

Perception of the non-omnisciont, again, is two-fold, discrimina 
tive and non-discriminative- Discriminative cognition, according to 
Dharmakirti and Dinndya and others of the Bauddha school, is not 
certain knowledge or proof. Thus they argue : Such cognition owes 
its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words. But 
the connection of an object with a word, a name, is not possible, that 
there should be such intuition, coloured with a name, as it were, as 
" A water-pot," or " A piece of cloth." Nor is jati, the universal, 
really existent or objectively real, that the being distinguished with 
the possession of it should be apprehended in objects by the sense. Nor 
is possible connection of the existent characterised by itself with that 
which is non-existent. Nor is the non-existent within the cognizance 
of senses. Therefore, discrimination (alochanam) is produced by the 
senses, and while in the process of being produced, and leading to 



250 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

corresponding objects, by the power of the discrimination, discrimina 
tive cognition is called perception and also proof. (To this the com 
mentator gives the reply.) Now, while discriminative cognition may 
be objectively unreal, besause it owes its manifestation or apparent 
reality to connection with words, it may be at the same time real, 
because it is the product of contact of sense and object. Hence 
it is doubtful that discriminative cognition is unreal. Moreover, the 
being distinguished with the possession of a name may very well be a 
possible object in visual cognition, its appearance in consciousness 
being possible form presentation by memory, as is the case with the 
perception " Fragrant sandalwood." Or, it may be, the being distin 
guished with the possession of a name does not come to light in perceptual 
cognition, and there is only recollection of the name, which as soon as 
it is recollected serves to. distinguish its corresponding object, like the 
recollection of the counter-opposite in the case of the cognition of non- 
existence. Also it has been proved that jAti, the universal or class, 
ect., are immanent in objects or" entities, Hence, discriminative or 
modified cognition also is perception, inasmuch as it is produced from 
contact of senses and objects. 

Objection. Non-discriminative, or unmodified, cognition neither 
excites to activity, nor is an object of current use. What then is the 
proof of its existence ? 

Answer. The proof is discriminative, or modified, cognition itself ,. 
for, this is a specialized cognition, or the cognition of a thing as pos 
sessing, and being accordingly distinguished by, something else. Nor 
can it be produced without the cognition of that which is possessed and 
serves to distinguish or individualize, that is the distinctive element. 
For it has been ascertained above that the cause of specialized cogni 
tion is cognition of that which serves to specialize, contact of sense 
and that which is going to be specialized, and non-apprehension of 
non-connection of both. 2. 

Bhdsya: Among substances, Self, Mind, and Ether are not objects 
of perception. 

Cognition, how produced. 

Upaiskdra.lu order to elucidate how Coguition is produced, in what circumstances, and 
from what causes, he says : 



Jnana-nirddese, in the differentiation of a particular cog 
nition. 5TFff^Gqfflf%fa: Jnana-nispatti-vidhih, mode or process of produc 
tion of cognition. TTF: Uktah, stated, described. 

3. The mode of the production of Cognition is being descri 
bed, in connection with the differentiation of a particular Cognition. 
312. 

A cognition should be marked off or distinguished from other 
cognitions, in i-espeet of the mode of its production, in respect of its 
subject matter, and in respect of its property. Now, differentiation of 



KANADA SfiTRAS VIII, 1, 4. 251 

cognition having .to be made, the process of the production of cognition 
ia going to be described. This is the meaning. In uktah, the past 
participle affix Ha is used in the sense of incipient action. 3. 

Vivriti. What is the cause of cognition ? There being this expect 
ancy, he says : 

Jnana-nirddese/ i. e., in the third |book, where enunciation of 
cognition has been made. There too the process of the production of 
cognition has been described. The meaning is that the causes of cogni 
tion have been mentioned in. the aphorism, " That (i.e., knowledge> 
which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense and the objec. 
is other (than a false mark) " (III i. 18.) Thus, the soul is the combi 
native cause of cognition, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the 
non-combinative cause, and contact or contiguity of the object is the 
efficient cause- This has been mentioned in that very aphorism. It 
should be observed that the causality of contact has been stated under 
the topic of perception. 

Substance is the cause of cognition of Attributes and Actions. 
. He describes the mode of production (of cognition) : 

11 ^ i ? i 3 n 



Gruna-karmmasu, Attributes and Actions. ^TRT^55 Sannikris- 
tesu, being in contact. jjTFTf^iVt: JMna-nispattehyo f the production of 
cognition, ^wf, dravyam, substance. ^TTW* Karanam, cause. 



4. Substance is the cause of the production of cognition, 
.where Attributes and Actions are in contact (with|the senses). 313. 

Substance is the cause of the cognition which is produced in respect 
of attributes, e. g., colour, etc., and in respect of actions, e. g. } throwing 
upwards, etc., Both of them are apprehended only in so far as they 
inhere in substances appropriate or perceptible to the senses. Hence 
it is the appropriateness or perceptibility of the substances which deter 
mines their perceptibility. It is by substance, moreover, that their 
co itiict with the senses is constituted, they being apprehended by means 
of their combination with the conjunct (i. e., Substance which is con 
junct with the sense). Althogh there is apprehended the odour of dis 
persed particles of champaka flower, and of portions of camphor, which 
aio all imperceptible, yet it is substance, imperceptible though it be,. 
which effects their contacts. Although perceptibility of substance ia 
not a requisite in the apprehension of sound, yet sound is apprehneded 
Only as it is combined or inherent, therein and hence this itself is the 
requisite. If it be asked, why is made this supposition of contact which 
is invisible ? we reply that the production of cognition, being 
an effect, necessitates the supposition of a cause. This is the import. 4. 

Substance is the cause of cognition of Genus and Species also. 
UpaaJcdra.He describes another mode of the production of knowledge : 



252 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



n s i ? i 



%*iJ<| Sainanya-vifiesesu, in genera and species. 
Samanya-visesa-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of genus 
and species, *T<T: Tatah, thence, from aubstrata. ^ Eva, alone. STT^J? 
Jnanam, cognition. 

5. In consequence oflthe non-existence of Genus and Species 
in genera and species, cognition (of them) is due to that alone. 314. 

Existence is the (summum) genus, its species are substanceness,. 
attribute-ness and action-ness. These again are genera, and their 
species are earth-ness, etc., colour-ness, etc., throwing-upward-ness, 
etc. Among these, omnisensuous cognition of the genera inhering in 
substance is due to that only, that is, due only to appropriate or per 
ceptible, particular substratum, and also to combination with the* 
conjunct, combination with the combined with the conjunct, .and com 
bination with the combined, all these combinations being related to 
that substratum. Omnisensuous cognition, again, is produced, in the 
case of attribute, from combination with the combined with the 
Conjunct; in the case of sound-ness, fca-noss, etc., from combination with 
the combined ; in the case of existence, from combination w th the 
conjunct, from combination with the combined with the conjunct, and 
from combination with the combined. In the case of attribute, the 
proximity or contiguity which is the condition of perceptibility, is not 
Constituted by combination with the conjunct, or combination. 

It may be objected : Tatah, eva/ i. e., from contact with or 
contiguity to their substrata alone auch delimitation or exclusion is 
not valid. Because in genus and in species also there do exist other 
genus and species. Contact with, or contiguity to, them also is a cause 
of cognition. In anticipation of this objection, he says, * In consequence 
of the non-existence of genus and species. For genus and species do 
not exist in genus and species, since that would entail infinite regres 
sion. The intuition of their mutual distinctions arises from their own 
forms or natures alone, or in this way, for instance, that the genus, 
bovine-ness, is cognised from the distinctness of the upddhi, adjunct or 
external condition, characterised by being present-in-all-bovine ai i- 
inials ; while being absent from other than bovine animials. Similarly 
with regard to pot-ness, etc., also. 5. 






iolnt* and Species are causes of cognition of Substance, Attribute 

and Action. 

*TI*_ 

Upaskdru. It may be asked : As, in consequence of the non-existence of genus and 
epeoies, cognition of genus and, species is absolutely independent of them, is it likewise 
absolutely independent of them in (the case of substance, attribute and action also ? He 
says, No : 



n * i n 5 ir 



CANADA SftTRAS VIII, 1, 8. 253 

Samanya-visesa-apeksam, dependent upon genus and 
species ^s^n^wfg Dravya-guna-karmmnasu, in respect of substance, 
attribute and action. 

6. (Cognition which is produced) in respect of Substance, 
Attributes and Action, (is) dependent upon genus and species. 
315. 

" Cognition is produced " this is the subject in discourse. In 
respect of substance, attribute and action, ithere is no doubt cognition 
specialized with the content of substance-ness, attribute-ness and 
action-ness. Such specialized cognition, again, cannot be produced 
without the contact of the subject specified, that which serves to 
specify, a-.ctthe sense. Hence dependence upon genus and species is 
there necessary. For there is such specialized cognition as " This is 
substance," " This is attribute," " This is action." This is the 
import. 6- 

Substance, Attiribute and Action are causes of cognition of Substance. 

[fpaskdra.Ia, then, in the case of substance also, cognition dependent only upon genus 
and species ? To remove this curiosity, he says : 

II c I ? l vs ii 



^5^ Dravye ,in substance. ^s^JT^T^^I^n? Dravya-guna-karmraft- 
apeksam, dependent upon substance, attribute and action. 

7. (Cognition), in the case of Substance, (is) dependent upon 
Substance, Attribute and Action. 316. 

" Cognition is produced" this is the subject in discourse. " A 
white cow, possessing a bell, is going," .this is a cognition. Here subs 
tance, the bell, is the distinction or that which serves to specify ; white 
denotes an attribute ; is going denotes action. Thus in specialized 
cognition or intuition of a thing distinguished with the possession of 
something else, there cannot be non-apprehension of the distinction or 
that which serves to specify, nor can such specialized intuition take 
place without relation to that which serves to specify. Hence in the 
cognition of substance there is dependence upon substance, attribute 
and action. Such is the import. 7. 

Attribute and Action are not causes of cognition of Attribute 

and Action. 

Upaskdra. Is there, then, dependence upon attribute and action, also in the case of 
attribute and action ? He saj s, No : 

U c m c II 



Guna-karmmasu, attributes and actions. n^TW^faraT^ Gruna- 
karuuna-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of attribute and 
action. JpJHJ^ft^t Gruna-karinnia-apeksam, dependent upon attribute and 
ctioa . f Na, not. f%T^ Vidyate, exists. 



254 VAT^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

8. (Cognition), dependent upon Attribute and Action, does- 
not exist in the case of Attributes and Actions, inasmuch as Attri 
bute and Action do not exist in Attribute and Action. 317. 

" Cognition " is the complement of the aphorism. Since there is 
no cognition of attribute as distinguished with the possession of an 
other attribute, and since there is no cognition of action as dis 
tinguished with the possession of another action, there is no cognition 
thereof, which is dependent upon attribute and action. For there 
exists no attribute in an attribute nor action in actions, whereby .they 
might appear as distinctions in them. This is the import. 8. 

Combination (as well as Attribute^ is a e< use of Cognition. 

Upaskdra. Lest it might be asked that since thore is manifestation of attribute and 
action (in the cognitions thereof), why there should not be dependence upon attribute and 
action in the cognition of attribute and in tho cognition of action, BO ho begins another 
topic in reply to that : 



ii * i n s. u 

Samavayinah, of that in which combination exists, the 
substratum, "tfaqr^ovaityat, from whiteness. >%q^: Svaitya-buddheh r 
from cognition of whiteness. =g Cha, and. ft Sveto, in a white object. 
gfe;: Buddhih, cognition, ^ Te, they. ^ Ete, those. ^T 5 ^^^ Karyya- 
karana-bhute, related as effect and cause. 

9. The cognition, ( It is white ) in respect of a white object, 
(results) from whiteness of the substance in which combination of 
whiteness exists, and from the cognition of whiteness. These two, 
(cognition of white object, and cognition of whiteness), are related 
as effect and cause. 318. 

By using the term Samavayinah he states the causality of relation. 
Thus, inasmuch as combination of attribute does not exist in attribute, 
and inasmuch as combination of action does not exist in action, in 
their respective cognitions there is no dependence upon attribute and 
action as distinguishing marks or qualifications ; but there does exist 
dependence upon attribute and action as subject-matter or objects of 
cognition. This being so, it is stated that in the case of such intuitions 
as " A white conch shell/ the combination of whiteness, the attribute 
whiteness, and the cognition of whiteness as a distinction or that which 
serves to specify, are the causes. So that relation with the distinction r 
the distinction, and cognition of them are the causes of specialized 
perceptual cognition. Hereby is proved all that has been stated. 
before. 9. 

Bhasya. reads VIII. i. 9 as two aphorisms, viz., Samavdyinah 
Svaitydchchhaiiya buddhescha svete buddhih, and Ta ete kdryakdrana- 
bhtite. 



KANiDA SftTRAS VIII, 1, 11. 255 

Exception to the above. In the case of Substances, Cognition is not 

a cause of cognition. 

Upaskdra. It may be objected. As in the case of " possessing a bell," cognition of 
substance (e. g. t the cow possessing the bell) is dependent upon substance (e. g., the bell), so 
also in the case of (the serial cognitions of) " It is a pillar," It is a jar," etc., where the 
the cognition does not embrace another substance as a distinction, cognition of (the first) 
substance, (the pillar), is the cause (of the cognition of the second substance, jar), 
(and so or). Thus nowhere can there be cognition of substance in the first instance 
or at first hand. 



Dravyesu, in substances. %(P)d\d<^KU(|: An-itara-itara-kai anali, 
11 ot causes, one of another. 

10. In the case of Substances, (cognitions are) not causes of 
one another. 319. 

Accoodingly he says . 

" Cognitions " is the complement of the aphorism. Cognition of 
the jar, even though it takes place immediately after the cognition of 
the pillar, is yet not the effect of the cognition of the pillar, inasmuch 
as the pillar cannot properly be the distinction of, or that which serves 
to specify, by being containedlin, the jar. 10. 

The exception explained. 

Upaskdra. It may be urged that the sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the 
cloth, etc., is observed, and that that sequence is due only to the relation of effect and 
cause. So he says : 



Karana-ayaugapadyat, ifrom non-simultaneity of 
causes- ^TKm**ll<^ Karana-Kramat, from succession of causes. ^ Cha, 
and- ^rerf^^l ri Ghata-pata-adi-buddhinam of the cognitions of the 
water-pot, the cloth, etc. 3W Kratnah, succession. ^ Na, not. 



Hetu-phala-bhavat, in consequence of the relation of cause and effect. 

11. The sequence of the cognition of the water-pot, the cloth, 
etc., (results) from the sequence of their causes, due to the non- 
simultaneity of the causes, and not in consequence of the relation 
of cause and effect (amongs the cognitions.) 320. 

The sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is 
dependent upon the sequence of their causes, and not dependent upon 
the relation of cause and effect. If it be asked, where the sequence of 
causes itself comes from, so he says, from the non-simultaneity of the 
causes. Simultaneity of cognitions has been denied or disproved. 
Hence there is not simultaneity also of diverse causes of cognition, If, 



256 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



on the other hand, there were simultaneity of causes, it would entail 
simultaneity also of effect, and thus the argument that non-production 
of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the existence of the mind, 
would be shattered. This is the import. 11. 

Here ends the first chapter of the eighth book in the Commentary 
of Sankara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms. 

Vivriti. The sequence or order, in the form of antecedence and 
subsequence, of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., arises, not 
from the relation of cause and effect amongst them, but from the order r 
or the antecedence and subsequence, of the contacts, etc., of the water- 
pot, cloth, etc., (with the senses), which contacts are the causes of those 
cognitions. The word cha, and, implies the addition of non-simul 
taneity which is not mentioned here, and this word is to be construed 
after the word sequence or order. The mean.ing, therefore, is this that 
the non-simultaneity of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., is> 
due to the non-simultaneity of their causes, e. g., contacts with senses,, 
etc. Where, however, simultaneity of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot 
and the cloth exists, there is simultaneously produced a collective cogni 
tion of all the objects in contact with the senses for the time being. 
Hence it is also to be understood that simultaneity of effects follows. 
from simultaneity of causes, . and non-sequence of effects from non- 
sequence of causes. 

Understanding or Intelligence, buddhi, is primarily divided into 
presentation, anubhtiti, and representation, smTiti. Presentation, 
according to the doctrine of Kanada, is again two-fold, being divided 
into perception pratyaksa and inference, anumdna. Perception is of 
six kinds, as derived from smelling, etc., (t. a-, from the five external, 
and the internal, senses) ; and is two-fold, as discirminative, saviTeal- 
paka, and non-discriminative, mrvikalpaka ; and two-fold, as ordinary 
or popular, laukika, and super-ordinary or hyper-popular, alauTciJca. 
Inference, again, is three-fold, as produced by illation from only positive 
conditions, kevala-anvayi, or purely agreemental ; from only negative- 
conditions kevala-vyatireki or differential ; and from both positive and 
negative conditions Sdmdnyato-drista, or inference from commonly 
observed marks. For example, " This is expressible by words, inas 
much as it is knowable," etc., are illations from purely positive condi 
tion (or by Mill s method of agreement). " Earth differs from other 
substances, inasmuch as it is possessed of odour," and the like are illa 
tions from purely negative conditions, (or by Mill s method of differ 
ence) ; and " The mountain is fiery, inasmuch as it smokes," and the- 
like are illations from both positive and negative conditions (or by 
Mill s method of agreement and difference.) Representation, reproduc 
tion or memory, on the other hand, is uniform, dependent on that form 
of Samshdra which is called Hhdvand or permanent mental impression,, 
having the same form as the original presentation and dependent upon 
certain cognition in which inattention played no part. In another 
point of view also, understanding is two-fold, science or correct know 
ledge, pramd, and nescience or incorrect knowledge, apramd. Science- 
is cognition a certain form of that which has that form. Nescience 
is cognition in certain form of that in which there is non-existence- 



KANADA SfiTRAS VIII, 1, 11. 257 

of that form. Understanding or Intelligence is also two-fold accord 
ingly as it is divided into doubt, sam^aya, and certitude, niSchaya. 
Doubt is a cognition whereof the form is (mutually) repugnant exis 
tence and non-existence in one and the same object; certitude in regard 
to a thing is cognition in the form thereof, and not in the form of the 
non-existence thereof. In this doctrine, in the case of cognition of 
similarity, and in that of knowledge of terms, an inference takes place 
by the production of a judgment respecting the inferential mark, 
subsequently thereto. Evidence or proof, pramdna y is of two kinds, 
perception and inference ; and science is exact experience or correct 
presentation or presentation in accordance with reality. Tnis will be 
explained by the author of the aphorisms himself in the sequel. 



258 VAlSESTKA PHILOSOPHY. 



BOOK EIGHTH CHAPTER SECOND. 

Cognition of a doubly specialized nature, illustrated. 

Upaskdra. Having described the mode of production of percoptual cognition, both 
<hscriminative and non-discriminative, now the author, with a view to describe the per 
ception of (a doubly specialized nature, or) the being specialized in the specialized, gives a 
few examples: 



I e: | ^ | \ \\ 

Ayam this, ^r: Esah that. ?*W\ Tvayii, by you. $rf Kritam, 
done. tfpTq Bhojaya, feed y*H En am, him. ffr Iti, such. f^n^ Buddh i- 
apeksam, dependent uponunderstauding or cognition. 

1. This, That, Done by you, Feed him such (cogni 
tions are) dependent upon Understanding. 321. 

The cognition, this, arises in respect of an object which is near 
and, that/ in respect of an object which is dista.it. By you _ such 
cognition, coloured with the characteristic of being an agent, presup 
poses or depends upon the cognition that he is independent in the 
action. The cognition of the act, namely, done, de: ends upon the 
cognition that it is the subject of the operation of the instrument of 
act! n. The cognition, feed/ depends upon the cognition that he in 
the agent in the act of feeding, and also the employer of the instru 
ment. The cognition, him, depends upon the cognition that he is the 
subject of the operation or relation of the fed and the feeder. Similar 
other instances of cognition, dependent upon cognition, should be 
understood. 

Dependence of cognition upon cognition, explained. 

Upaskdra. He says that this (i.e., dependence of cognition upon cognition in some o- 
is proved by induction from agreement and difference: 

d*f *TRRseiGwraR[ ii * i * i R n 

?tw Dristesu, in the case of objects seen. rRT^ Bhavat, from their 
existence or appearance. SK|<| A-dristesu, in the case of objects ui-.seen. 
Abhavat, from their non-existence or non-appearance. 



2. (Such cognitions depend upon previous other cognitions), 
inasmuch as they appear in respect of objects seen, and do not 
appear in respect of objects unseen. 322. 

When the contiguous object of the cognition This; the object, 
though distant yet presented in consciousness, of the cognition That, 
the object, i-e., the contiguous agent, of the cognition By you/ the 
object, i. e., the action, of the cognition done/ the object, i.e.", the em 
ployer and the employed, of the cognition Feed/ the object, i.e., the 
occupation of both of them, of the cognition Him/ when these objects 
come into contact with the senses, then such cognition is produced. 
Whereas with reference to unseen objects these cognitions do not 



KANADA StiTRAS VIII, 2, 5. 259 

appear. Hence this (i.e-, the dependence of cognition upon cognition 
can be inferred from agreement av.d difference. This is the mean 
ing. 2. 

Substance, Attribute and Action are called artka or object. 

\3pankara. Ho now begins another topio : 

II c: I R I % II 



H*: Arthah object. *fr Iti, such. jfw^Wg Dravya-guua-karm- 
masu, in respect of substance, attribute, and action. 

3. (The Vaisesikas apply) the term, object, to Substance, 
Attribute and Action. 323 

Of these, i. &-, Substance, Attribute and Action, the characteristic 
of being sought after or apprehended (by the senses) or objectified in 
such and such ways, has been stated. Hence, (It is) an object/ such 
is the terminology of the Vaisesika thinkers with regard to hem, inas 
much as as they are presented by the term, object. Accordingly it has 
been said by Professor Praaastadeva, "The characteristic of being 
denoted by the term, object, belongs to the three. "- 

IV- ii. 2, re-called. 
Upaskdra. He introduces another topic. 

H * i * i * ii 



, Dravyesu, under substances. *|gnw!7?^. PaScha-atmakatvam, 
t.euta-subsfcantiality, the characteristic of being a compound of five 
-substances. stfM^H Pratisiddham, denied, contravened. 

4. In (the topic dealing with the ascertainment of) Substances, 
(the theory) that bodies, etc., are a compound of five elements, has 
been refuted. -324. 

Under substances the term indicates the topic of the determina 
tion <>f the predicable, substance. By the aphorism (IV. ii. 2, supra*)", 
"Of things perceptible and imperceptible, etc.," the penta-substantiality 
of the body, etc., that is to say, (the theory, that they are compounds 
of five elements, ; pratisiddham, has been refuted. As a variety of 
constituent causes does not belong to the body, so also it does not belong 
to the senses of smell, etc., which are going to be described, It, there 
fore, becomes proved that the senses are uniformly percipient of their 
corresponding attributes. This is the import. 4. 

The Sense of Smell is constituted by the element of Earth. 
a.yie states the proposition for which the topic was begun : 

II 5 I R I V, II 



260 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



Bhuyastvat, by reason of preponderance or predominance. 
Gandha-vatvat, by reason of possession of smell. ^ Cha, and. 
Prithivi; earth. 7TOITFT G-andha-jnane, in (the constitution of) that 
by which smell is perceived, i. e., the olfactory sense, gfift: Prakritih, 
matter, material cause, essence. 

5. By reason of (its) predominance, and of possession of 
Smell, Earth is the material cause of the olfactory sense. 325. 

That by which smell is cognised, is gandha-jnanaih/ that is, the 
olfactory sense. Therein prithivi, Earth, alone is prakritih, the 
material cause. It may be asked, why is it so ? Accordingly he says 
4 gandha-vatvat ; for it has been said already that that which possesses 
smell cannot be originated by that which isivoid of smell. The posses 
sion of smell (by the olfactory sense) or its odorousness is proved from 
the rule or well-known uniformity of nature that the external senses 
themselves possess attributes similar in kind to those which are appre 
hensible by them. If it be urged, how then can there be such unifor 
mity that the characteristic of being the revealer of smell does not 
belong to the other members of the body but only to the olfactory sense- 
orwan, even when terrene-ness belongs to all of them without distinction V 
80 he says bhuyastvat. It is the being constituted or originated by 
terrene particles uninfluenced by other substances, which is called 
bhuyastvam, predominance. This, bhuyastvam, is a technical 
term, and has been so used in the kindred system (i. e., the Nydya- 
Sutram) also. 5. 

Similarly the Senses of Taste, Colour and Touch are respectively 

constituted by the Elements of Water, Fire and Air. 
Upaskdra. B.G extends the argument to the other senses : 



I c I R I ^ II 

Tatha, in like manner, snq: Apah, waters, ^n: Tejah, fire ^pj: 
Vayuh, air. *3 Cha, and. m^^TyiffSHl^ Rasa-rupa-sparsa-avifiesat be 
cause of the non-difference of taste, colour and touch. 

6. In like manner, Water, Fire and Air (are the material 
causes of the sense-organs of Taste, Colour and Touch), inasmuch 
as there is no difference in the Taste, Colour and Touch (which they 
respectively possess, from what they respectively apprehend). 326. 

1 The material causes of the organs of the tongue, the eye, and the 
akin this is the complement of the aphorism. Water, etc., are then 
respectively the material causes of the tongue, etc., inasmuch as the 
latter respectively apprehend the objects with which they are uniformly 
related. Here too it is bhuyastvam, predominance, which governs 
the uniformity (that the characteristics of being the revealer of taste> 
etc., belong respectively to the tongue, etc-) It has been declared that, 



KANlDA SCTRAS VIII, 2, 6. 261 



it is the rule or uniformity that the tongue, etc., possess particular 
.attributes of the same kind as are apprehensible by them, that is the 
proof of the possession of taste, etc., by the tongue, etc. Likewise the 
organ of hearing is only a portion or division of Ether confined within 
the hollow of the ear and favourably influenced by particular adyistam 
or destiny. 6. 

Here ends the second chpater of the eighth book in the Commentary 
of Sarikara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms. 



262 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY 

BOOK NINTH CHAPTER FIRST. 

Perception, e. g., of antecedent non-existence is produced ly other means 
than conjunction or combination. 

Upaskdra. After the determination of popular or ordinary perception produced" 
from contact or contiguity in the form of either conjunction or combination, the author 
begins the ninth book of whioh the object is to demonstrate ordinary or popular and super- 
ordinary or hyper-popular perception produced from proximity or presentation due to other 
causes : 



II S. I t I t II 

i?i consequence of 

the non-existence of application or predication of action and attribute. 
prak, prior, antecedently. *RT^ A-sat, non-existent. 



1. In consequence of the non-application of Action and 
Attribute (to it), (an effect is) non-existent prior (to its produtcion.) 
227. 

An effect/ such is the complement of the aphorism. Prak/ i. e. 
prior to the production of the effect, an effect/ e. g., a water-pot, cloth, 
etc., a-aat/ (i. e., non-existent), that is to say, the counter-opposite or 
contradictory of the contemporaneous non-existence of its own pro 
ducer. Here the reason is the impossibility of the application of action 
and attribute. If the effect, e. y., a water-pot, etc., were really existent 
during that time also, then it would be affirmed to possess action and 
attribute- As in the case of a water-pot already produced reference- 
can be made to it in such forms as "The water-pot is at rest/ "Th& 
water-pot is in motion/ "The water-pot is seen to possess colour," etc., 
there can be no reference made to it in like manner also prior to its 
production. It is therefore inferred that the water-pot is during that 
time, non-existent, And this, antecedent non-existence; in such cases 
as while straws are in the course of weaving or threads in the course 
of joining, or when clay is placed on the potter s wheel, while the- 
activity of the potter, etc., is yet going on, is the universally experien 
ced perceptual cognition that there will be in that place a mat, or a 
piece of cloth, or a water-pot, inasmuch as such cognition takes place- 
as soon as the eyes are opened. Here proximity or presentation con 
stituted either by conjunction or by combination cannot be the cause 
of the cognition. Hence proximity or presentation in which the thing 
in itself or the qualification or distinction of that which is connected 
with the sense, (indriya samboddha visesanata) is here the necessary- 
condition of perception. It cannot be said that in this explanation 
there is mutual dependence (of cause and effect) in as much as the- 
distinction of antecedent non-existence being existent, there is percep 
tion of it and the perception being existent, there exists the distinction 
for the characteristic of being the distinction is here really the proper 
or essential form of both the cause and the effect and it is capable of 
producing perception in which both are mutually involved and that is- 
really existent even prior to the perception so it has been declared in. 



KANADA SttTRAS IX, 1, 2. 26? 



the Nydya-Vdrtika, "In the case of combination as well as if Non-exis 
tence, the relation of vis?sna that which serves to specify and visesya 
that which is specified, (is the proximity between the sense and the 
object)." 

This same antecedent non-existence is productive of its counter- 
opposite (that is, the object not yet existent). For when a water-pot 
is produced, it is not produced just at that very moment. Even though 
the other (partial) causes existed at the time, the iniperfectness of the 
cause, being pursued, should pursue only the imperfectness consisting 
of the antecedent non-existence of the water-pot itself. If it be 
objected that the (antecedently non-existent) water-pot itself would 
then be an impediment to its own production; our reply is that since, 
by its non-existence at the time, it constitutes the absence of impedi 
ment, its causality should not be thrown away. Nor can it be objected 
that the water-pot itself constituting the non-existence of its antecedent 
non-existe.ice, it would follow that its antecedent non-existence will 
again appear when the water-pot is destroyed; for, the destruction of 
the water-pot also is repugnant to its antecedent non-existence, so 
that there can be no appearance of a contradictory also during the 
existence of another contradictory. For the contradiction between 
them is not merely spafci il, so that they might be simultaneous like (the 
genera of) bovine-ness and h-jrse-ness. The contradiction is temporal 
also, and therefore how can they be existent at one and the same 
time? 1. 

Note. In this and the few following aphorism*, the author deals with the topic of 
non-existence. Now, non-existence is primarily divided into two kinds, samsarga-abhdva 
and anyonya-abhdva. Anyonya-abhdva or reciprocal non-existence is characterised as non- 
existence of which ithe counter-opposite (i. e., the object non-existent) is determined by 
the relation of identity ; in other words, it is equivalent to absence of identity, that is, 
difference. Samsarga-abhdva or relational non-3xistenco is non-existence other than 
reciprocal non-existence, and it is sub-divided as antecedent, consequent, and absolute 
non-existences. 

Bhdsya. Non-Existence is not the seventh predicable inasmuch as 
absolute non-existence, e. y., a castle in the air, is not a predicable at 
all, while non-existence of the existent, in the forms of non-production, 
destruction, and absence of identity, cannot exceed the number of 
the six-predicables. 

Consequent non-existence also is proved by perception and inference. 

Upatkdra. He states that another (form of) non-existence is established by the foroe 
>f cognition. 



?3T Sat, existent. 5RTc^ A-sat, non-existent. 
2. The existent (becomes) non-existent. 328. 

As the non-existence of the effect, prior to the operation of the 
cause, is proved by perception and inference, so is it proved by percep 
tion and inference, after the operation of a club, etc., which destroys 
it, that a really existent effect, e. g., a water-pot, etc., is now non 
existent. And this same non-existence is commonly described a. 



264 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



annihilation or destruction (or consequent or emergent non-existence.) 
For there arise such cognitions as that the water-pot is now destroyed, 
annihilated, that the letter ga which was heard before, no longer exists, 
etc. This is the import. 2. 



existent is a different thing from tli< j non-existent, so that 
after annihilation there can be no continuation of existence. 

Upaskdra.lt may be objected : It is the same water-pot that under a partioulai 
condition gives rise to the idea, or conventional use, of annihilation ; and not that th 
annihilation of the water-pot is different from the water-pot : 



& I t I ^ II 



: A-satah, from the non-existent. fsKmTOtf^r^Wn^T^ Kraiya-guna- 
vyapadesa-abhavat, in consequence of the non-existence of reference- 
by, or predication of, action and attribute. ?T*lfaT?:JI Artha-antaranu 
a different object. 

3. (The existent is) a different object (from the non-existent), 
inasmuch as Action and Attribute cannot be predicated of the non 
existent. 329. 

Accordingly he says : 

"The existent" such is the complement of the aphorism. The- 
existent is a different object from the non-existent. If it be asked, 
How ? So he says, kriya-guna-vyapadeia-abhavat. For there can 
be no such predication, during the period of annihilation also, as- 
" The water-pot remains," " The water-pot exists at this moment, 
" The water-pot possesses colour," " Bring the water-pot," etc. In 
consequence of this difference, therefore, the existent is a different 
thing from the non-existent. 3. 

Bhd$ya. Whatrver is non-existent prior to its apperanoe as air 
effect, is non-existent only by the nature of an effect, but is really 
existent at the time by the nature of a cause, and that, therefore, it is- 
essentially different from absolute non-existences. 

Reciprocal non-existence or absence of identity, explained. 

Upaskdra. Antecedent and consequent non-existences being proved, the p resent 
Aphorism is laid down with the purpose of proving mutual or reciprocal non-axistence : 



II S. I * I 8 II 

^ Sat, the existent. ^ Cha, and, also. 3RT^ A-sat, non-existent. 
4. The existent also is non-existent. 330. 

Where. a really existent water-pot etc., are spoken of as being non- 
, there non-existence of identity is perceived. For the-e arise- 
" The horse is non-existent by the nature of the cow," 
<v is non-existent by the nature of the hoi^se," " Apiece of cloth 



KANADA SftTRAS IX, 1, 5. 265 

is non-existnt by the nature of a water-pot," "A piece of cloth is a not- 
water-pot," "A cow is a not-horse," " A horse is a not-cow," etc. Now y 
" A cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a horse," " A water- 
pot possesses reciprocal non-existence with a piece of cloth/ it is this 
reciprocal non-existence, otherwise called absence of identity, that 
appears in the above cognitions. Here identity is that which de 
termines the counter-oppositeness or contrariety (of absence of 
identity). And this (reciprocal) non-existence has the same substratum 
or denotation or extension as its counter-opposite ( . e., identity); for 
there is such cognition as that the water-pot is not the ground (on 
which it lies). It is also eternal, for it is impossible that there should 
be at any time identity between a water-pot and a piece of cloth. 4. 

In addition to antecedent, consequent, and reciprocal, non-existence, 
there is absolute non-existence. 

Upaskdra.Novf he describes the fourth (kind of) non-existenoe called absolute 
non-existenoe. 



M . I ? I , M 



q^ Yat, that, which. =g Cha, and. STl^ Any at, different. 
A-sat, non-existent. ?ffi: Atalj, from these, i. e., antecedent, consequent, 
and reciproeal, non-existents. ^ Tat, that. ITOc^ A-sat, non-existent. 

5. And that which is a different non-existent from these, is 
(absolutely) non-existent.- 331. 

Atah/ from the three forementioned non-existences, *yat any at 
a-sat tat a-sat/ (that which is a different non-existent is non-existent) 
*. e., that is absolute non-existence. The word a-sat (non-existent) is 
in both the places used in a substantive sense. Of these, one a-sat/ 
is the subject and the other a-sat is the predicate in apposition with 
the subject. The meaning of the aphorism, therefore, eomes to be this 
that non-existence which is different from the three fore-mentioned non- 
existences, is absolute non-existence. Amongst these, antecedent non- 
existence is limited in the future or at the end, consequent non- 
existence is limited in the past or at the beginning, and reciprocal 
non-existence has the same substratum or extension as its counter- 
opposite ; but absolute non-existence differs from all the three. Hence 
it is the fourth (kind of) non-existence. 5. 



i. There are three things repugnantto absolute non-existence, 
viz., the counter-opposite or the object non-existent, its antecedent non- 
existence, and its consequent non-existence. The ancients teach that the 
cognitions that dark colour does 4 not exist (after baking) in a red water- 
pot, and that red colour does not exist (before baking) in a dark water-pot, 
are conversant about consequent and antecedent non-existences, but not 
absolute non-existence. The moderns, on the other hand, maintain that 
consequent and antecedent non-existences are not repugnant to absolute 
non-existence and hence that there certainly is absolute non-existence 
also by reference to annihilation, production, etc. They hold that when 
a water-pot, etc., previously removed, are brought back to a place, 
there is no cognition of the absolute non-existence of the water-pot, so 



266 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

long as the water-pot exists, inasmuch as the time during which the 
water-pot is existent does not constitute connection with non-existence. 
Some, again, teach that when there has formerly stood in any place a 
water-pot, and this has been removed and brought back again, there 
arises in this case cognition of a fourth kind of non-existence under 
the aspect of connection (Samsarga-alhdva), called temporary non- 
existnce, and not of absolute non-existence. 

Causes of the perception consequent non-existence. 

Upaskdra. He nowibegins another section and therein states the causes of the perception 
of consequent non-existenoo : 



A-sat, non-existent, jfr Tti, such. 3JFTJK<r5TPTT3T^ Bliftta-pratyaksa- 
abhavat, because of the non-existence of the perception of a past object. 
Bhuta-smriteh, because of the recollection of a past object. 
Virodhi-pratyaksa-vafc, similar to the perception of the 



contradictory or opposite. 

6. "(It is; non-existent " such (perceptual cognition) is similar 
to the perception of the counter-opposite (of non-existence), because 
fin both cases) there is non-existence of the perception of that which 
is past and gone, and there is recollection of the past.- 332. 

A-sat iti ; By the word, iti/ he indicates cognition in the form 
of perception. Thereby (it is obtained that) there is such perceptual 
cognition as " The water-pot is non-existent," " The water-pot has- 
been destroyed," " The water-pot is now in a state of annihilation." 
An example of this cognition is given by l virodhi-pratyaksa-vat ; as 
there is clear perception of the counter-opposite (of existence) e. </., a 
water-pot, etc., so there is of its annihilation or consequent non-exis 
tence also. The reason of this stated as bhuta-pratyaksa-abhavat, which 
means, because there is non-existence of the perception of bhuta, i. e., 
a water-pot, ete., which having been first produced have been subse 
quently destroyed. Hereby the non-apprehension of the (once) appre 
hensible is stated. There, again, the following argument is confirma 
tory (of the perceptual cognition) : If there were a water-pot here,. 
it would be seen, as the place is seen ; but it is not visible ; therefore 
there is none. He mentions another auxiliary cause : bhuta-smriteh, 
which means, because there is recollection of the counter-opposite, e. </., 
a water-pot, etc., which is past and gone. Hereby recollection of the 
counter-opposite is stated. 6. 

VivTiti- The four kinds of non-existence being explained, the per 
ception of consequent non-existence is explained. 

A-sat, iti, " The water-pot is non-existent," The water-pot is 
destroyed/ 5 " The water-pot is annihilated," such perception, virodhi- 
pratyaksavat, is similar to the perception of the water-pot which is the 



KANlDA SftTRAS IX, 1, 7. 267 

counter-opposite (of ita non-existence), that is to say, is proved by 
sense-experience and produced from the ordinary or popularly under 
stood contact (of sense and object). Between them there is, however, 
this difference that the perception of the counter-opposite is produced 
from the conjunction of the eye, etc-, (with their objects), while the per 
ception of consequent non-existence is produced from there being a 
modification or qualification (e< g., non-existence of water-pot in. 
("plac.e possessing non-existence of water-pot") conjoint with the eye r 
etc. He mentions another point of difference, viz., bhuta-pratyaksa- 
abhavat. The meaning is that perception of consequent non-existence- 
is produced from a cause in the form of the non-apprehension of the 3 
apprehensible consequent on the non-existence of the perception of the- 
past, i. ., the counter-opposite, e. g., the water-pot, etc., and also from 
the recollection of the past water-pot etc., in other words, from cogni 
tion of the counter-opposite, which cognition is here identical with 
recollection. Thus the perception of consequent non-existence is pro 
duced from the non-perception of its counter-opposite as well as from 
the cognition of the counter-opposite, whereas the perception of the- 
eounter-opposite is not so produced. There is, therefore, difference 
between them in this respect also. This is the import. * It should be 
observed that recollection as such is not intended (in this aphorism,. 
though the word has been used), but mere cognition is intended. Thai 
being so, the idea is this that as the water-pot, etc., are proved by 
perception, so also are their consequent non-existences. 

Causes of the perception of antecedent non-existence. 

Upaskdra. Extending to (antecedent non-existence the mode in which consequent 
non-existence is an object of perception, he says : 



ii & i ? i va u 

<fl>JT Tatha, similarly. Wt& A-bhave, in the case of (antecedent) 
non-existence. HTMH?^?^!^ Bhava-pratyaksa-tvat, in consequence of 
the perceptibility of the .existent, xj Cha, also. 

7. Similarly (there is perceptual cognition) of (antecedent) 
non-existence, in consequence also of the perceptibility of the 
existent. 333. 

Although this word, non-existence is a general terra, still from the 
context it signifies antecedent non-existence. As there is perceptual 
cognition in the case of consequent non-existence, so also in the case of 
antecedent non-existene. Q. How? A Bhava-pratyksatvat : praty- 
aksatvat, in consequence of the characteristic of being made an object 
of cognition by perception, bhavasya, of straws, etc., while these are 
in the course of weaving (for a mat which is then antecedently non-exis- % 
cent). Or, the meaning is this: pratyaksatvat, in consequence of the fit 
ness (for the senses) or apprehensibility, bhavasya/ of the substratum as 
well as of the counter-opposite (t. e., the mat after production) ; in 
asmuch as the apprehensibility of the substratum as well as the appre 
hensibility of the counter-opposite govern the apprehension of Samsarga- 
abhdva or relational non-existence. The word cha, also, brings 



268 VAI/SEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



forward the recollection of the counter-opposite and the argument 
already stated (in the preceding aphorism, as contributory causes of 
the perception of antecedent non-existence.) (It ia to be obserred that),. 
although antecedent non-existence has no beginning, and although 
consequent non-existence has no end, yet they are preceptible under 
particular conditions only. 7. 

Vivfiti. It may be asked, inasmuch as antecedent non-existence 
has no beginning, how is it that there is no perception of it long before 
the production of the conjunction of the two halves of a water-pot, 
etc., the fore-mentioned causes (of such perception) being possible at 
that time also? Hence the author adds, bhava-pratyaksatvat. 
* Bhava means the final collocation of causes, according to its deriva 
tion from the root bhti,, to be by the affix ghaK, in the ablative sense 
that it springs from this. Bhavapratyaksatvat means the state or 
condition of that whereof perception takes place by means of bhava. 
The resultant meaning of the term, therefore, is, because it must be mani 
fested by the final collocation of causes. Thus, the import is, in the 
instance in question, there can be no perception of antecedent non-exis 
tence in consequence of the non-existence of the final collocation of 
cause. 

Causes af the perception of reciprocal non-existence. 
.Ho shows that reciprocal non-existenoo is an object of perception : 

II . I ? I c l| 



Eton a, hereby. *TTC: A-ghata^, not-water-pot. *pft: A-gauh,. 
not-cow. Wiwf: A-dharmalj, not-dharma. ^ Cha, and, also. cWMTft: 
Vyakhyatah, explained. 

8. Hereby also are explained * not-water-pot, not-cow/ 



1 Etena by this term he extends (the causality of) the recollection 
of the counter-opposite, apprehension of the substratum, and the .argu 
ment stated before. Non-apprehension of the apprehensible is the same 
in all cases. The word, cha, also, has the object of bringing forward 
what has been stated before. A-dharma^ : By saying that the 
reciprocal non-existence of dharma, merit, though it is supersensible, 
is an object of perception in its substratum, e. g. : pleasure, knowledge, 
etc., he suggests that in the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence, 
apprehensibility of the counter-opposite is not the governing condition, 
but that only the apprehensibility of the substratum is the governing 
condition. How otherwise eould the reciprocal non-existenoe of a 
fiend, in the form that the pillar is not . a fiend, be apprehended in the 
pillar ? For, the non-apprehension of a fiend as being coincident or 
identical with the pillar is the cause of the apprehension of the re 
ciprocal non-existence of a fiend (in the pillar), and, it is again 
impossible, were the pillar identical with a fiend, that there should be 
such non-apprehension (of a fiend in the pillar), since such non- 
apprehension is contradictory to, or contravened by, the existence of 
the entity (e. </., a fiend) which is the counter-opposite (of its non- 
existence.) 



KANiDA SftTRAS IX, 1, 9. 269 

Objection. Identity with a fiend is not in this instance the counter- 
opposite. Is it then a fiend ? But it may be that though it is present 
in the pillar, yet, like its gravity, it is not apprehended. Hence its 
non-apprehension would not be contradictory to the existence of the 
entity which is the counter-opposite, (viz., a fiend.) 

Answer. It is not so, for, like the non-apprehension of the counter- 
opposite, the non-apprehension of that which determines the charac 
teristic of being the counter-opposite, also causes the apprehension of 
non-existence. 

Objection. The apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is depend 
ent upon the apprehension of counter-opposite-ness, and counter-oppo- 
^iteness is of the nature of the absence of reciprocal non-existence; 
and hence it follows that the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence 
is really dependent upon the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence. 

Answer. This is not the case; for, as has been already stated, it is 
a. property which is cognised as being not present in any given subs 
tratum, that determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite, 
but the apprehension of that property also as that which determines 
counter-opposite-ness, is not the governing condition (of the apprehen 
sion of reciprocal non-existence.) 8. 

Vivriti. The causes of the apprehension of reciprocal non-exis 
tence are determination (or possession of attribution, or intrinsic form) 
in relation to the senses, indriya-nambaddha-visesanatdj non-appre 
hension of the counter-opposite, and cognition of the counter-opposite- 
The difference, however, is this that the perceptibility of the counter- 
opposite is the condition of apprehension of Samsarga-abhdva or rela 
tional non-existence, whereas it is the perceptibility of the substratum 
that is the condition of apprehension of reciprocal non-existence. Thus, 
in spite of the super-sensibility of dharma or merit, there is no impedi 
ment to the perception of its reciprocal non-existence in the sensible 
substratum thereof, e. g., pleasure and the like. Whereas some have 
taught that perceptibility of both the counter-opposite and the sub 
stratum is the condition of apprehension of relational non-existence, 
this is inaccurate ; for, were this the case, since the perception of non- 
existence of fragrance in a stone, of non-existence of bitterness in 
treacle, of non-existence of colour in air, and of non-existence of touch 
.as well as sound in ether would be impossible their respective substrata 
would not be perceptible to the several senses cognisant thereof res 
pectively. It is from this consideration that Paksadhara Misra has 
maintained that the perception of the destruction (or cessation) of the 
touch of air is produced by the determination or qualification thereof 
by time conjoint with the skin. 

Perception of absolute non-exivtence, how produced. 

Upaskdra Now in this aphorism he says that absolute non-existence is an object of 
perception: 



ii s. i ? i s. ii 



A-bhutam, not produced. 5f Na, not. tff^T Asti, exists, ffa Iti r 
this. *H*lfrtH?j; An-artha-antaram, not different objects. 



270 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

9. That which has not been produced, does not exist; this is- 
an identical proposition. 335. 

That which was produced, at present does not exist such cogni 
tion rests upon annihilation, and is not conversant about, or does not 
bring out, the having been produced; whereas perceptual cognition 
which embraces simply this that it does not exist, reposes upon absolute 
non-existence. A-bhutam, (that which has not been produced), 
denotes non-cognizance of production and destruction. The being 
an-artha-antaram, not different objects, also has the same purport 
only. For example, Earth-ness dues not exist in Water, and Water- 
ness does not exist in Earth. For, were there Earth-ness in watery 
wholes, it would be perceived, but it is not perceived, therefore it does 
not exist; a reference to such argument is to be observed in this case 
also. We must, in like manner, hold that there is absolute non-exis 
tence of a thing where such a thing will never be, nor even has been, 
produced. The cognition, on the other hand, in the form that it does not 
exist, of the non-existence in their substratum, of that which has been, 
and that which will be, depends upon consequent non-existence and ante 
cedent non-existence. Hence it is that this (absolute non-existence) is de 
signated as absolute or illimitable and as of trinal time or eternal. 9. 

Vivriti. Na asti iti, perception in the form that something does 
not exist, which is abhutam/ not conversant about the past, an-artha- 
antaram, that is, has for its object nothing but absolute non-existence, 
such as consequent non-existence etc. * * * *. The word bhuta or 
past includes the future also. 

The perception, "Tht water-pot dot-u not (71010) wist in the room," explained. 

Upaskdra.It may be objected: The non-existence of the water-pot in the room 
is not absolute non-existenoe, because of the existence of the water-pot there at some 
time or other. Nor is it either antecedent non-oxietenoe or consequent non-existence, 
for they appear only in combinative causes. Nor is it absolute non-existence undergoing 
production and destruction, for the expression absolute non-existence undergoing pro- 
dcution and destruction involves a contradiction in terms. Nor is it a fourth kind 
of samsarga-abhdva or non-existence of association, since inithat case the three-fold division 
of the non-existenoe of association would be disproved. 

To meet this objection, he says : , 



: u 

f Na, not. uf^T Asti, exists, qi: Grhatah, water-pot, ff^ Gehe, in 
the room. $f?T Iti, such. ^T: Satah, existent, vrapj Grhatasya, of water- 
pot. Jfr^nEffafrre^ Geha-samsarga-pratisedhah, negation of association 
with the room. 

10. The water-pot does not exist in the room such is (the 
form of) the negation of association of the existent water-pot with 
the room. 336. 

(* Geha-samsarga-pl-atisedhah means) the negation or privation of 
the association or conjunction of the water-pot with the room. And it 
would be simply absolute non-existence, if the water-pot do not exist 






KANADA SUTRAS IX, 1, 10. 271 



at any time whatever ; antecedent non-existence, in the case of the 
water-pot which will exist; and consequent non-existence, in the case of 
the water-pot which had its existence in the past. 

Objection. That being so, the cognition should have been in this 
form that connection of the water-pot does not exist in the room. 

Answer. What is meant by the cognition should have been ; ? If 
it means l the cognition of which the actual object or content is the 
-connection of the water-pot, should have been, and so conveys the 
sense of inclusion, then what is desired is obtained. If, on the other 
hand, it means (the cognition) which refers to or suggests that (i. e., 
connection of the warer-pot), then (we reply that), it is the reference 
to the substratum, viz-, in the room, which leads to, and results in, the 
reference to the connection, inasmuch as it is the being the substratum 
that appears in the form of con.nection of the property (or conjunction 
-of the contained.) 

Objection. Does then the water-pot really exist there V 

Answer. What do you mean by really exist ? Is it combined or 
conjunct ? It cannot be the first since there is in the room non-exis 
tence, of the water-pot as combined with it (that is, since the room is 
not the material cause of the water-pot). Nor the latter, since there is 
denial of conjunction. 

Objection. It would then follow that the water -pot, etc., are always 
present, inasmuch as there is everywhere denial only of the one or the 
other of their conjunction and combination. 

Answer. This would not follow, since the denial itself of both of 
them is idcntial with the denial of the water-pot. Are then the water- 
pot and its conjunction one and the same thing, whereby denial of con 
junction of the water-pot would be the denial of the water-pot ? Are 
then the water-pot and its combination one and the same thing, where 
by the admission itself of its combination would be the admission of the 
water-pot ? For, there is not presence of the water-pot there where 
both of them (conjunction and combination) are denied, whereby the 
water-pot might be in constant agreement. Thus it is the denial or 
negations of the admission or affirmation of something, that constitutes 
the denial or negation of that thing. .. / 

Or, it may be that there is really absolute non-existence of tho 
water-pot in the room in the relation of being in combination, and that 
it is this (absolute non -existen.ee) that is the object of the cognition that 
the water-pot does not exist in the room ; as for example, (there is 
absolute non-existence of the water-pot) in the potsherd in the relation 
of being in conjunction. 

Objection. Such being the case, the water-pot would be non-exis 
tent, being the counter-opposite of the constantly present absolute 
non-existence. 

Answer- It would be so, were it everywhere non-existent under the 
joint characteristics of being in conjunction and being in combi 
nation. 10. 



272 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Perception of the Soul, how produced, in the yogins who are (called) 

united. 

Upaskdra. Having thus ascertained popular perception having for its object existence 
and non-existence, he begins a new section in order to ascertain the perception of the 
yoyint : 

fi. I ? I I 



Atmani, in the soul. TTW?^T: Atma-manasoh, of soul and 
mind. ^nftMftsflMT^ Samyoga-visesat, from a particular conjunction- 
Atma-pratyaksara, perception of the soul. 



11. Perceptual cognition of the Soul (results) from a particu 
lar conjunction of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul. 337. 

" Knowledge is produced " such is the complement (of the aphor 
ism.) Now, the yogins or ascetics are divided into two classes ; those 
whose internal organs have been steadied in samddhi or deep medita 
tion, and they are called united ; and those whose internal organs are 
no longer steadied in samddhi, and they are called disunited- Therein 
those who are united, having with eagerness fixed their mind on the 
object to be presented to it, are engaged in constant meditation ; and 
in them cognition of the soul, of their own souls as well as of the souls 
of others, is produced. Atrna-pratyaksariV means in the manner of the 
cognition in which the soul is the percept or object of immediate 
presentation or intuition. Although in ourselves and others also, 
cognition of the soul sometimes exists or appears, yet, as it is obscured 
by avidyd or nescience, it has been declared to be virtually non-existent. 
Atma-manasoh samyoga-visesat means from particular contiguity 
between the soul and the mind, i;amely, a favourable influence by virtue 
born of yoga or holy communion. 11. 

Vivriti. Having examined perception produced through ordinary 
or physical presentation or contiguity, he now explains perception 
produced through super-ordinary or hyper-physical presentation or 
contiguity. 

* Atma-manaso^ samyoga-visesat, from the conjunction of the soul 
and mind, accompanied by the power or virtue born of yoga, or holy 
communion ; Atmani, there being effort or volition towards the origi 
nation of understanding, (dtmdjne&uing volition) on the authority of 
the lexicography : " Soul or Atmd, Volition, Patience or Contience, 
Understanding (are synonymous)," that is to say, when there arises 
the thought^ produced by volition towards the origination of under 
standing ; Atma-pratyaksam/ perception of one s own soul as well as 
of the souls of others ; " takes plaee/ this is the complement of the 
aphorism. 

ITow, super-ordinary or hypher-physical presentation or contiguity 
is three-fold, according to its division as Sdmdnya-lakaand, having the 
form of the genus, jfidna-laksand, having the form of cognition, and 
yogaja-dharma, virtue or power born of holy communion. Therein 
yogaja-dharma is a particular merit or virtue produced by the practice- 



KANADA StiTRAS IX, 1, 13. 273 

of yoga or holy communion, and to the existence of which the Vedas, 
Puranas, etc., testify. It is again two-fold according to the two-fold- 
ness of the yoyins as those who are united or have attained to holy 
communion mid those who are in the process of being united or are in the 
course of attaining to holy communion. Among them those are called 
the unit t d, who have subdued their mind or inner sense by the practice 
of yoga and have achieved the siddhis or < powers/ perfection or attain 
ments by means of Samddhi or meditation. It is they that are also 
called the specially united, on account of their possessing conspicuous 
or advanced yoga. Those who are in the process of being united are they 
whose minds are turned away from objects of the senses and who are 
immediate beholders of all objects through the accompaniment of con 
templation. The present aphorism has been laid down with reference to 
such yog-inn only. 

Xott. It would seem that the word viyukta has been differently used by SaAkara Misrct 
and Jayandrdyana ; by the former in tho sense of the disunited, and by the latter as denoting 
those who are specially united through the possession of highly advanced yoga Vide IX. . IS 
infra, Upaskdra. Sahkara Misra obviously does not recognise the distinction, made by 
Jayanilrdyana, of the united and those in the process of being united. According to him, yogiut 
are of rwo classes, namely, the united and the ultra-united or dis-united. 

Omniscience of the united yogins, how possible. 

L pathira. Do then the tinned have cognition in respect of the -soul only? How there 
fore oau they possess omniscience ? In roplyito these possible queries, he says : 



N & i ? i 33 ii 

mil Tatha, similarly. 3*11^3 Dravya-antaresu, in the case of other 
substances. SCT^R Pratyaksaih, perceptual. 



12. Perceptual (cognition is) similarly (produced) in the case 
of the other substances. 338. 

" Cognition is produced this is implied by the context. <Tath& 
means by the mind, only as favourably influenced by, or accompained 
with, the virtue or power, born of yoga or holy communion. Dravya- 
antaresu means in respect of the four kinds of ultimate atoms, the 
mind, air, space, time and ether. By the term, substance, are included 
attribute, action and genus inhering in substance ; the predicable, 
species, combination ; also gravity, elasticity, etc., appertaining to 
things which are not objects of perception ; and also volition, the sourc* 
of vitality (or spontaneity), non-discriminative thought, dharma, 
adharma, etc., residing in the soul. For the favourable influence of the 
virtue or power born of yoga is equivalent to a perceptive apparatus ; 
otherwise omniscience would not be affirmed (of those who are 
united. ) 12. 

Omniscience belong also to those yogina who are (called) dis-united. 

Upnskiira. Having described the perceptual cognition of the united, he now describe* 

that of tho disunited. 

I! . I ? I t^ II 



274 VAI!ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



A-samahita-antahkaranah, whose internal organs 
are not attached to meditation. SH*fd^*TT>5ni: Upsamhrita-samadhayahj 
who have given up meditation, for Tesam, their. 5 Cha, also. 



13. They whose internal sense-organs are not attached to 
meditation, are those by whom meditation has been given up. They 
too (have perception of hidden and distant objects.) 339. 

1 Upasamhrita-samadhayah is simply an explication of asamahita- 
antahkaramih. Or, to the question, why they are called asmahita- 
antahkaranal? V the reply is given by upasamhrita-samadnayah, 
meaning, because they are those by whom. Sarnadhi of which 
the essence is constant meditation, upasamhrita, has been thrown 
away. For they, being able to transced the senses through the 
influence ^>f Samddhi, absorption or intentness of mind on o;ie 
acquiring Sarira-Siddhi, powers over, or perfection of, the physical 
object only, and, organism, e. </., the power of attenuation, etc., and 
Indriya-Siddhi, powers over, perfection of, the senses, e. (/-, the power 
of hearing at a distance, i. c., clair-audience, etc., and then feeling 
the insufficiency of Samddhi itself, realise the need of other parctices 
as referred to in following and other texts of the Veda : rTT^^I^J 
f%< m^t f%*ft^T ^*I 3*T?**I, There is need for it so long as I am 
not freed and fulfilled. They learn that every form of blioya or 
experience whether agreeable or disagreeable, must be undergone, 
and that they will undoubtedly reach firm ground from which there is 
710 fall, only after experiencing Karma-dtaya, vehicles of karma, c., 
physical organisms, previously merited or acquired, in different 
countries, divisions of the land, peninsulas, etc., by different births as 
horses, elephant, birds, serpents, etc., as well as by existence as celes 
tials, sages, or men. They, therefore, make the whole universe of 
things, hidden and distant, the objects of their perception, the powers 
of their senses having been enlarged or heightened by the force 
of the virtue or power born of Yoga. 13. 

Vivriti. After describing the perception of the yoyin who is in 
course of union, he describes that of the yoyin who has attained union. 

Asamahita-antahkaranah, those whose internal sense is destitute 
of tiamddhi or meditation ; upasamhrita-samadhayah, those by whom 
samadhi or deep meditation has been consummated, that is, carried to 
fruition, in whom are produced the various siddhiy, perfections or 
attainments which are the fruit of samddhi or deep meditation; such 
united yog ins attain perception of souls and other substances. Such is 
the sense to be gathered from the aphorism- In fine, in the perception 
of the yoyin who is in course of union, there is need for dhydna, thought 
or contemplation, while in the perception of the yoyin who is united, 
there is no need of satnddhi or meditation involving thought or con 
templation. 



. According to the vivriti, the word asam4hita-antahkranah would seem not to 
have syntactical connection in the approhism. The classification of yoyins, made by 
Jayantirdyana, is, therefore, so far unsatisfactory. 



KANlDA StTTRASIX, 1,14. 275 

The Yog in a perception of Substance, Attribute and Action, 
popularly explained. 

UpasMra. It may be objected: In them ( ., substances, etc.) cognition (of the Ypgins) 
is not mental, inasmuch as the mind is no* self-dependent outside its sphere. Nor ia it 
product of the external senses; for, they apprehend objects present as being connected with 
them, depend upon the development of colour, etc., as the case may be, to the degree of 
perceptibility, and particularly depend also upon light, etc. 

In anticipation of this objection, he proves proximity (. ., the medium of cognition) in 
the case of certain predioables, and says: 



Tat-samavayat, from combination with that, i.e., subs 
tance. qTFFtJTQt!! karmma-gunesu, in respect of actions and attributes. 



14. (Perception) of Actions and Attributes (arises) from (their) 
combination with Substance. 340. 

" Perceptual cognition is produced" this is the complement (of 
the aphorism.) If the elemental senses are dependent upon some pre 
sentation or contiguity (of objects to them for the apprehension of 
those objects by them), then from the combination in that which is in 
conjunction with the mind of the perceiver, cognition of the genera 
of attributes combined or inhering in the ultimate atoms, ether, space 
and timo, is produced and in the case of other substances, since 
there is conjunction with them of various sterile (seed-less ?) minds, 
favourably directed towards, or taken over for, the experience of mortal 
coils, cognition is produced in respect of the attributes, etc., of those 
substances through their combination in those substances which are 
thus conjoint with those minds. This is declared here, regard being had 
to, or in view of easy demonstration. In fact, in the case of the external 
senses as well as of the mind, it is the virtue or power born of yoga that 
constitutes the proximity or presentation to the senses, inasmuch 
as all uncertainty or impossibility of proof is set at rest by it alone. 
Tho drinking up of the ocean by Agastya (the sage), and the conver 
sion of the kingdom of Dandaka into a forest are examples in point. 
-.14. 

Vivriti. It may be urged that omniscience is not possible or proved 
in the 1 oyin, for though there be perception of substances, there is no 
such cognition of attributes, etc. Accordingly he says : 

The meaning is that from combination of that/ i. e., conjunction 
of mind facilitated by the power or virtue born of Yoga or holy com 
munion, there is produced in the Yogin, whether united or in course of 
union, perception of attributes and actions. 

* * * The term k of actions and attributes is indicative, and 
genus, etc., also are to be understood. In a like manner, should be 
understood perception produced from super-ordinary or hyper-physical 
presentation or contiguity in the form of Sdmdnya-laJesana or general 
implication, and jndna-laksana or implication of cognition. 



276 VAlgEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



The Y ogins perceive the attributes of their own souls in the popular way. 

Uvakdra.ls it then, it may be asked, combination with that which is conjoint with 
,ome other substance, that constitutes the presentation or proximity to the mind ^ even i 
the case of one s own understanding, etc. ? He replies, No : 



^ Atma-Samavajat, from combination in the soul. 
Atma-Gunesu, in respect of the attributes of the soul. 

15 (Perceptual cognition) of the attributes of the Soul 
(results) from (their) combination in the Soul. 341. 

Perceptual cognition of the yogins is produced" this is the topic 
Perceptual cognition of understanding, etc., combined in the soul is on 
the other hand produced simply from combination in the conjoint 
(t.c , the soul which is conjoint with the mind), as it is with ourselves 
and others Ihe meaning, therefore, is that in such cognition there ik 
no dependence upon any other form of contiguity or presentation 
Now, ordinary or popular perception is cognition, which is never 
changing, produced from the contact of the senses and objects It 
may be said to be produced by objects. Perception is connected with 
the genus of presentation (that is, without some form of immediate 
presentation, there can be no perception). And this is common to 
ordinary or popular and to super-ordinary or hyper-popular C omi- 

t!071S. - 15. 



n *4t?~\v e v r *^ P L nt . heililltlbook f the Commentary 
of bankara on the \ aisesika Aphorisms. y 

BhCtsya.-lii the view of Kandda, there are only three independent 
and ultimate predicates, namely, Substance, Attribute, and Action 
jr while describing the process of yoyic cognition of all realities, he 
deals with these three predicates only and is entirely silent with regard 
to the other so-called predicables. 



KANiDA S&TRAS IX, 2, 1. 277 



BOOK NINTH CHAPTER SECOND. 

Marks of inference enumerated. 

Upaskdra. Thus in the preceding chapter the perception of goyins and non-yogin* 
IIBH been determined aouording to its cause, its nature, and its characteristic. Of the two 
kinds into which pramJna or proof has been divided, viz., perceptual or sensuous and 
inferential or produced by marks, the author now commences to determine that which is 
produced by means of marks : 



has 






II 5. I R I ? II 



Asya, of this, f^ Idam, it. qn4 Karyyam, effect. Tl^Hi Karanam, 
cause. *f4lfa Samyogi, conjunct. f^ttfe Virodhi, contradictory, ?=RrTfo 
.Samavayi, combined. gf Cha, or. jft Iti, such. 5fflFFH Laingikam, produced 
by the mark of inference, mediate. 

1. "It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory 
to, or combined in, this," such is (cognition) produced by the^ 
mark of inference. 342. 

Cognition this is the topic in hand. Laingikam means pro 
duced from liny am or mark. Line/am is a property of the paksa, possess 
ing vydptij pervasion or invariable concomitance with the major term. 
Therein vydpti has been already declared. (Vide III. i. 14, supra.} One 
thing is paksa in relation to another, when there is in the former non- 
existence of proof or evidence repugnant to the desire for proving the 
latter. Such evidence includes proof and disproof, or is demonstrative 
as well as obstructive, for a paksa or minor term is that which contains 
non-existence of both of them. For, there existing either demonstrative 
or obstructive evidence, no one feels doubt or desire of demonstration. 
It is for this reason that the ancients defined the paksa to be an object 
wherein the existence of the sddhya, that which has to be established, 
the major term, is doubtful, or an object wherein the existence of the 
xddhya, is desired to be demonstrated. According to Jlvandtha Miira, 
a paksa is that in which there is non-existence determined by the being 
evidence preventive of the appearance of doubt terminable by the ascer 
tainment of the possession of producible sddhya. Some others say that 
that is & paksa in which there isnon-existence of demonstrativeevidence 
accompanied with absence of desire of proof. In this view, the nature 
of the paksa will exist even in the case of obstruction (i. e., even where 
obstructive evidence, in other words evidence which disproves the 
existence of the major term in the minor, exists.) This then may be 
seen in the Anumdna-Mayukha. 

It then becomes apparent that the property or characteristic of 
this paksa is the lih-ja or mark of inference. And the cognition, in the 
form of a preseutative state of consciousness, which the mark, whether it 
be a visible, an inferred, or a heard one, produces, is laingikam or 
that which is produced from a mark. Accordingly it has been said. 



278 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



That mark is the medium of inference, which is connected with 
that which is to be inferred, is known to exist in that which is accom 
panied with that which is to be inferred, and does not exist at all 
where that does not exist. 

If is, therefore, the mark which is the instrument of inferential 
cognition, and not its pardmarsa, subsumption, inasmuch as subsnraption, 
being destitute of function, lacks causality whereas lit is the same (i. e. r 
to cause inference) that is th* function of the mark. 

Objection. How can there be illation or inferential cognition, 
where the smoke, etc., (i. e., marks) are either past or future ? 

AnswerThis is not a valid objection, as in this case the sddhya 
or that which is to be proved, is also inferred as past or future. 

Objection. How can there be illation where, in consequence of au 
impediment in the case, it is not ascertained whether the smoke etc., 
be past, future or present ? 

Answer There can be by no means, since in such an instance 
there is uncertainty also as to the sddhya, that which is to be proved. 

Objection. How can an illation take place where there is certainty 
as to the existence (of the mark) on a previous and a following day 
and uncertainty as to the intermediate day ? 

Answer. In such a case, the inferential cognition results from the 
inference of fire, etc., limited to those days, by means of smoke, etc , 
limited to those days, such having been ascertained to be the causalitv 
of vydptt,, pervasion or the universal concomitance of the major and 
minor terms, (in the process of inference.) 

Objection How does inferential cognition arise from a cloud of 
dust mistaken for smoke V 

Answer. It is because that which is understood to be pervaded 
(i. e., the cloud of dust, supposed to be smoke, and therefore pervaded 
by fire), is the mark of inference, and because the inference is 
correct or incorrect according to the correctness or incorrectness of 
such understanding ; else how should your own paramar-sa or subsum j- 
tion be the instrument (of inferential cognition) in such a case V 

Objection. In the case of a supersensible mark, pardmarsa or sub- 
sumption not being producible thereby, how can the mark have 
the function (of being the means of inference) ? 

Answer. Such function is effected by there being a practical or 
saving argument demonstrative of existence ( ksaimika sddhanata), for 
otherwise, the function of combination in the case of hearing, etc . 
would not be possible. 

Inference results from a mark which is an effect, as the inference 
of fire, etc., from smoke, light, etc. ; also from (a mark which is) a 
cause, as the inference of sound by a deaf man from a particular con 
junction of the drum and the drumstick, or the inference of dharma or 
merit, heaven, etc., by a pious man from the due performance of. 



KANiDA S&TRAS IX, 2, 2. 



sacrifice, ablution, etc., or the inference of rain from the due perfor 
mance of kdrlri or Sacrifice for rain, or the inference of the efflux of 
water from a channel which men are digging out from a river, etc., full 
of water, or the inference of the rising of a stream from the observation 
of rain overhead. This is, then, a single connection, characterised as 
the relation of effect and cause, which has been stated in two ways. 
Inference from a conjunct object is such as the inference of the sense- 
organ of the skin from the observation of the physical organism which 
is in conjunction with it. Inference from a contradictory or repugnant 
object is such as the inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes, 
etc., from the observation of an excited snake which is its natural 
-ants:-j >:iist. Inference from a combined object is such as the inference 
of fire connected with water by means of the warmth of the water. 1. 

Vivriti * * * * Cognition by means of marks is of three kinds, 
according as it contains a cause, or an effect or a co-existent thing as the 
mark, and is called 2 > ^ rva ~ va ^ sesa-vat, or sdmdnyato-dristam. Piirva-vat 
means that which contains as the mark the antecedent, that is, the cause. 
$ sa-vat means that which contains as the mark the consequent, that is, the 
effect. Sdmdnyato-dristam means that which contains as the mark some 
thing other than a cause or an effect. The author explains these forms 
of inference, which have been also explained in the aphorisms of Gau 
tama (i.e., the Nydya-S&tram). 1 Asya idam karyyam ;<Asya, of this, i. ., 
of the sddhija or that which is to be proved, idam, this the sddhana or 
that which will prove the sddhya, is karyyam/ i.e., the effect where such 
usage arises, there it is the case of inference by means of an effect as 
the inferential mark. e. </., the inference of fire and the like, by the 
mark of the smoke and the like Asya idam karanam : that is infer 
ence of which the mark is a cause is as, e. </., the inference of a shower 
by means of a particular ascent of clouds. Sdmdnyato-dristam or that 
which appears in the form of that of which the inferential mark is 
something other than a cause or an effect, is manifold ; as, for example, 
the inference of the iron ring as being in conjunction with the mortar 
and the like, by means of the mark of a particular pestle which is 
conjoint with the iron ring (at its end) ; so also is the inference of an 
ichneumon concealed behind bushes and the like, by the sight of a 
particular excited snake which is the enemy of the ichneumon ; and 
also the inference of fire and the like (as existing) in a frying pan and 
the like, by means of the hot touch combining in fire, in the form of the 
counter-opposite of combination favourable to fire. 

Inference and the Law of Cause and Effect, how related. 

(Jpaskdra. It may be objected that this enumeration (of marks) is inadequate, since it 
floes not include the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of tho moon, of the 
rise of Canopus (a bright star in the southern constellation Argo navis) from the tranquility 
-or clearness of the waters of the rising of tho moon from the expansion of the Nymphaja, of 
the sotting of the fourteen lunar mansions or naksatras from the rising of the other fourteen, 
of colour from taste, or of a particular taste from a particular colour. 



II & I ^ I R It 

Asya, its, to it. ^ Idam, it. ^T^WH^^f^?*: Karyya-karaua-sam- 
bandhah, (The suggestion or introduction of the relation of effect and 



280 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY 



cause.) ^ Cha, and, whereas. SRT^n^ Avayavut, from a member of the- 
argument or syllogism, vr^fr Bhavati, arises. 

2. l It is its ( this cognition is sufficient to cause an illation 
to be made) ; whereas (the introduction of) the relation of effect 
and cause arises from a (particular) member (of the argument). 
343. 

In anticipation of this objection, he says. 

It is its this much only becomes the instrument of illation. 
Asya/ i. e., of the means of illation, e. g., smoke, etc., idam/ i. e., (it 
is) that which is to be established, e. </., fire, etc. ; or, l asya/ I. e., of the 
pervader, e. g., fire, etc., idam, i. e., (it is) that which can be pervaded,. 
e. jr., smoke, etc. It is, therefore, only the apprehension of the being 
that which can be pervaded, that governs (the process of illation), and 
not also the relation of effect and cause, etc. Lest it might be objected 
that the enumeration (of marks of inference) in the preceding aphorism 
is consequently futile, he adds the relation of effect and cause. Other 
relation (i. e., of the conjunct, the contradictory, and the combined), 
mentioned above, are also hereby implied. In the word l relation/ 
there is the tropical suggestion of that in which relation is the thing 
contained. Relation accordingly means the introduction or talk of 
relation. Whence does the introduction or talk or relation arise ? He 
gives the reply by saying avayavat, i. <>., from a part or member (of the 
argument), that is to say, only from the uddharana or example or illus 
tration. The fifth case-ending or the ablative inflection (HI avayavat } 
bearsithe sense of the infinite. The meaning, therefore, is that, in this 
Darsana or philosophy as well as in the Samkhya and other Darsanas 
the introduction of the relation of effect and cause, etc., has been made 
in conformity with, or regard being had to, the uddliarana or illustra 
tion (q. v. } further below). 

Thus, then, vydpyatva, the being that which can be pervaded (as the- 
mark, by that of which it is the mark) denotes the possession of a 
natural connection, the natural being that which is not accidental or 
adventitious. This quality of being non-accidental is in the case 
of perceptive object, known simply from its being ascertained, in some 
cases that they do not pervade (or are not invariably concomitant with) 
that which is to be proved (or that which is denoted by the major term), 
and from the certainty, in other cases that they pervade the instru 
ment of inference or inferential mark. Of supersensible objects esta 
blished by proof, some are pervasive of both (that which is to be proved, 
and the instrument of inference), or non-pervasive only of the instru 
ment of inference, or non-pervasive only of that which is to be proved. 
Amongst these, the quality of being non-accidental is to be ascertained, 
in the first case, from their being pervasive of the instrument of infer 
ence ; in the second case, from their being non-pervasive of that which 
is to be proved ; and in the fourth case also, from their being pervasive 
of the instrument of inference. In the third case also, there being room 
for the further inquiry that while it is not possible or proved why that 
which pervades, should pervade only this much (t. e., the instrument of 
inference) and not more, how it is at the same time possible for that 



KANlDA SOTRAS IX, 2, 2. 281 

which does not pervade, to pervade even so much (i. e., the instrument 
of inference), and thus acquisition and preservation (or loss and 
gain) being counter-balanced, and from other considerations, the 
quality of being non-accidental should be determined. The attitude 
of mind that the demon of apprehension that some upddhi, accident, 
adjunct, or external condition, may exist is these cases, attacks 
all rules of conduct, prescriptive and prohibitive, should be 
rejected, inasmuch as there is possibility of certainty of non-accidental 
nature. The definitions of upddhi nnd vydpti (pervasion) have been 
already stated. 

This inference is of two kinds self-satisfying or logical, and other- 
satisfying or rhetorical. Therein inference for the sake of , or origina 
ting from, oneself, arises from the investigation by a person himself 
of vydpti, pervasion or universal concomitance of the major and middle 
terms, and paksadharmatd, the being a property or characteristic of 
the minor term or the existence of the middle in the minor term ; and 
inference for the sake of, or originating from, another, results from the 
knowledge of vydpti and paksadharmatd produced from an argument 
(nydya, ) enunciated by another. 

A nydya argument or syllogism is a proposition productive of 
verbal cognition which leads to the recognition or sub-sumption of the 
mark of illation in the third member of the syllogism. The members 
thereof are five ; and membership here denotes the being a proposition 
productive of verbal cognition, which again is productive of another 
verbal cognition leading to the recognition or sub-surnption of the infer 
ential mark in the third member. Such propositions are : pratijnd, 
enunciation ; hetu, mark or reason ; uddharana, illustration ; upanaya, 
application, ratiocination, or deduction ; and nigamana, conclusion. Of 
these the pratijnd, enunciation, is aproposition which is a member of the 
argument or syllogism, conveying verbal cognition the object whereof 
is neither less nor greater than that of the inferential cognition desired ; 
the hetu, mark or reason, is that member of the syllogism, ending with 
the ablative inflection, which is applied to the instrument of inference 
or the middle term under consideration ; the uddharana, illustration, is 
that member of the syllogism which is declaratory or demonstrative of 
the inseparable existence of the given major and middle terms ; the 
upanaya, application or deduction, is that member of the syllogism 
which establishes that the hetu which is so distinguished by the posses 
sion of inseparable existence, is a distinguishing characteristic or con 
tent of the paksa, the subject of the conclusion, %. e. } the minor term ; 
and the nigamaua, conclusion, is that member of the syllogism which 
declares that the object denoted by the given major term is a distin 
guishing characteristic or content of the paksa. Thus the syllogism 
proceeds as follows : 

Sound is non-eternal, pratijfid, 

Because it is an effect, hetu. 

Whatever is an effect or producible is non-eternal, uddharana, 

It (sound) possesses effectness or producibility pervaded by 

non-eternality, upanaya. 



282 VAlSESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Therefore, (it is) non-eternal, nigamana. 

The significant appellations given by the l Vaifesikas to these very 
members are pratijnd (enunciation of that which is to be proved), 
apadesa (reason), nidarsana (instance), anusandhdna (investigation), 
and pratydmndya (re-stateraent of the pratijnd ). In this connection, 
the mode of the application of vdda, theory or discourse, jalpa, disputa 
tion or demolition of the argument of the opponent and establishment 
of one s own theory, and vitandd, controversion or only destructive 
criticism, and the characteristics of chhala, misconstruction, jdti, futile 
or adverse reply, and nigraha-sthdna, ground of defeat, ^. e., misapplica 
tion or non-application of the argument advanced, may be sought in 
the Vddi-vinoda. 2. 

Inferential Cognition includes Verbal Cognition. 

U"paskdra.With the purpose of including other forma of proof into (the {inferential, ho 
commences another topic. 



Etena, hereby. STT*^ Sabdam, verbal. sqT93TrTO( Vyakhyatam, 
explained. 

3. Hereby verbal (cognition is) explained. 344. 

This cognition is Sabdam (verbal), produced by the instrument 
ality of sound or word this doctrine, maintained by the Nydya school, 
is also, vydkhydtam, explained, etena (by this), by the characteris 
tic of being inferential, that is to say, simply as being produced from 
marks (of inference). As inferential cognition depends upon vydpti, 
pervasion, paksadharmatd, the existence of the middle in the minor 
term, and recollection, so does verbal cognition also. Thus, e. </., "These 
objects denoted words, or meanings of words, are mutually connected, 
since they are represented in memory by words possessing expectancy 
for, or dependence upon, one another, etc., as are the meanings of words 
in l Drive away the cow. " Here it is by observing or apprehending the 
characteristic of being represented in, or called to, memory by a 
number of words possessing expectancy for, or dependence upon, one 
another, which characteristic is pervaded by the possession of mutual 
connection by these meanings of, or objects denoted by, those words, 
that one infers the possession of connection. What then is the use of 
the supposition of sound or word or language as a form of proof ? 

Objection. There can be no inference in cognition produced by 
words, inasmuch as such inference fails where the words are spoken by 
an untrustworthy person, e. g., that there are fivs fruits on the river 
bank. 

Answer. The objection does not arise, as the words must have 
the qualification of coining from the mouth of an dpta or trustworthy 
person. For trustworthiness denotes the possession of knowledge of 
the meaning of the statement corresponding to objective reality within 
the reach of the meaning of the given statement, and not merely that 
a person is not a deceiver. 



KAWADA StiTRAS IX, 2, 3. 283 

Objection. But this is hard to apprehend, prior to the intuition 
of the meaning of the statement. 

Answer. Not so, for even those who hold the theory of the autho 
ritativeness of word or language, admit the apprehensibility of the 
quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person, which serves to 
differentiate fallible or false language. 

Objection They depend upon that (i. e., the quality of being 
spoken by a trustworthy person) for the apprehension of authoritative- 
ness, whereas verbal cognition is produced even without the apprehen 
sion of that quality. In your case also the apprehension or inference 
must needs be in accordance with nature of the inferential mark. And 
that which is pervaded (i. e., the middle term), is qualified with the 
possession of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person. 

Answer. The objection is not successful, since it is possible to 
have such general apprehension as " He is here infallible." 

Objection But the term here ultimately means the same thing 
as the term the connection under consideration/ So that to apprehend 
that (i. e., the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person), previ 
ously, is simply impossible. 

Ansict r. It is not, in consequence of the possibility of ascertain 
ment of the inferential mark by means of the possibility of ascertain 
ment in a general way of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy 
person, from the force of association with the topic and other circum 
stances. If even then discrepancy sometimes appears the inferential 
process proceeds as by the property of smoke (mistaken) in vapour, etc. 

Objection. What is in this case the vddhya or the major term ? Is 
it that the meanings of words are in fact connected, or that their 
connection is something possible ? It cannot be the first, as it is not 
the case with the statement of an untrustworthy person. Nor can it 
be the second, for, even though mere connectibility or coherence of 
words be proved, still inference cannot proceed unshaken, in conse 
quence of the uncertainty of actual connection. Moreover, coherence 
being previously known as the qualification of the inferential mark, 
what is the use of inference ? 

Answer. This is not a valid objection, inasmuch as it is the gene 
ral proposition or uniformity which is the addhya or the thing to be 
proved, and, there can be no violation of the rule in consequence of 
the qualification, as has been already stated, by the characteristic of 
being spoken by a trustworthy person. 

Objection. Expectancy or interdependence of the words of a sen 
tence is equivalent to antecedent non-existence in the hearer of the 
cognition of connection (of the meanings of words) producible by it. It 
is only so long as it exists as such that it can be the inferential mark. 
The futility of inference (in verbal cognition), therefore, follows from 
this that in order to the cognition of expectancy, the cognition of con 
nection must take place beforehand, and not at any other time. 



284 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Answer. This is not the case, for we do not say that expectancy 
is merely antecedent non-existence of the eognition of connection. On 
the other hand, expectancy is distinguished with the possession of 
inseparable existence or universal agreement of what is presented to 
consciousness by the words and what is represented in memory, as it is 
from the cognition of this adjective element that the cognition of 
expectancy results. 

Objection. Let then inseparable existence itself constitute ex 
pectancy. 

Answer. By no means. For, " The water of the river is pure," 
" The buffalo grazes in the basin of the river " in these cases also it 
would entail the consciousness of the connection of the river and the 
basin by means of their inseparable existence in the form of the cogni 
tion that the buffalo grazes in the basin of the river of pure water. 
And in such instances as " The water-lily is blue," in the presence of 
inseparable existence of the water-lily and blueness even in particular 
cases, would make the inseparable existence of the substance and 
attribute presented to consciousness by the words, possible (that is, that 
all water-liles were blue.) 

Or, it may be that expectancy is nothing but the desire to know 
or enquiry with reference to the object recalled by words, or that it is 
the complement of the connotation. Still the cognition of it is neces 
sary, inasmuch as in a cause which is being known, there must appear 
divergence in characteristic from what is not a cause, appro 
priate to such cognition, as is the case with pervasion or univer 
sal concomitance. It is for the very same reason, whether 
connectibility or coherence of the words of a sentence mean 
the absence of certainty of non-agreement, or the non-existence of 
contradictory evidence, or the observation of agreement with similar 
other words, or that in the connection of the meaning of the one 
word (e.</., fire) with that of another (e.g.. wets), there exists as something 
contained therein, certain knowledge that the one (e. </., fire) is not 
the counter-opposite of absolute non-existence inherent in the other 
(e. y.j wetsj, that cognition of coherence is necessary. Cognition of 
adjacency of the words of a sentence, in the form of recollection 
without interval of the objects denoted by them, is also a condition. 
It may be that differences or peculiarities of connection of words result 
only from the peculiarities of differences of the words which are going 
to be connected ; and the proof of the peculiarity or difference in this 
way, is not undesired. Or, the desired peculiarity may be proved by 
the characteristic of its so determining cognition, inasmuch as the 
inference takes place that these words, being a collection of words 
possessing expectancy, co-herence, and adjacency, are preceded by, or 
liave for their antecedent, cognition of the connection of the ideas or 
mailings represented in memory, as is the case with the group of the 
words " Drive away the cow." The opposition that the sddhya or thing 
to be proved is that these words have the connection of the meanings 
recalled, and that the possession by words of connection with the 
meanings of those words, is impeded, is better left unnoticed. Nor is 
it the being expressive of, or the means of making known, connection, by 



KANADA StiTRAS IX, 2, 3. 285 

being the inferential mark, that is the possession of connection by the 
words, since the mark not being proved to exist prior to the inference, 
there can be no apprehension or cognition of the peryasion thereof. 

Some say that expressive movement or gesture is a new form of 
proof. To this it is replied: Gesture is of two kinds, conventional, and 
non-con-ventional. Therein that which is conventional, calls back to 
mind the sound or word lying in the understanding or intent or com 
mon consent, but does not also produce certain cognition of connection 
(between gesture and its significance), as letters do. It is sound or word, 
rising up in memory, that is the means of proof there, and it has been 
.already declared that the chracteristic of being a mark of illation 
belongs to sound or word. Nor is recollection of the word a collateral 
or secondary function of gesture, inasmuch as, in order to exercise 
-such function, gesture would have to be uniformly present in all 
cases,, whereas there takes place intuition of meanings from words even 
without the intervention of gesture. 

Objection. This being so, how does the conduct of a deaf person 
come to depend upon, or spring from, gesture ? For, it is impossible for 
him to have knowledge of the convention in a given instance. 

Answer. The objection cannot prevail, for it is to be considered 
how he derives certain knowledge of the meaning or idea even, from 
gesture, when it is impossible for him to grasp the sense or connection 
of the meaning or idea also. His conduct, again, springs from the 
apprehension of inseparable existence (or serviceable associated (habit), 
in the same way as particular adaptations of conduct are possible in 
the case of the elephant and the horse in accordance with the pricks of 
the goad and strokes of the whip. 

On the other hand, non-conventional gesture, that kind of it 
which, further, is in agreement or association with action, causes 
.-activity in the employee by reminding him of the intention of the 
-employer, but does not produce sure cognition in any case. For example, 
as according to the instruction " You should come on the blowing of 
"the conch-shell/ the man turns up on hearing the blowing of the 
.conch-shell, so a man strikes another at the proper time- according to 
the pre-ordination " You should strike him when I shall raise my 
forefinger," but this does not prove anything. Non-conventional 
gesture, again, which is in agreement with cognition, is either pro 
minent on its subjective side, as in " By the raising of the ten fingers, 
it should be understood by you that the number of coins, (or contor 
tions of the limbs in ascetic posture), or of the purdnas is ten ; " or it 
is prominent on its verb or predicate side, as in " You should come up, 
after seeing contraction of the hand." Thus, by this form of gesture 
the meanings of words are no doubt recalled, but only severally or 
each independently of the rest ; but their mutual association or con 
nection also is not illuminated by it, as it is by nominative, objective, 
And other case-endings which explain that inter-relation, inasmuch as 
in the case under consideration, invariable or constant components of 
.gesture do not exist. 

Objection. How do then activity and inactivity proceed from 
gesture in the absence of cognition of connection ? 



286 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Answer. Yon may take it that these follow from either the one or 
the other of doubt or uncertainty amd pratibhd or inventive genius or 
instinct. Gesture also is, therefore, no proof. _ 3. 

Sound or word cannot produce cognition of its sense or meaning. 

UpasMra.li may be B ked, how sound (or word) conld be a mark of illation, when- 
its difference from the nmrk appear* from its posting the nature of an apadeia or I 
description. Anticipating this, he says : 



\g: Hetuh, reason. *jq^ : Apadesah, description. Sound, 
Lingam, mark. JWWT Prainanarn, proof, ^ Karanam, instrument. 
fftr Hi, these. fR*rf??R3( An-artha-antaram, not different things. 

4. Reason, Description, Mark, Proof, Instrument these are 
not antonyms. 345. 

Apadesah means sound (or word), according to its derivation 
that by it objects are referred to, i. e., affirmed or described. And it is 
really a synonym of hetu, reason, and linya, mark. Pramanam means the 
instrument of true cognition in the manner of the inferential mark. In 
like manner, the word karanam also is equivalent to the mark itself 
which is the instrument (karana) of inferntial cognition. For the 
operation of karana or the instrument is two-fold : Some karana 
operates or exercises its function under ur subject to contact or conti 
guity, and some karana exercises its function on the strength of inse 
parable existence. Sound (or word;, on the contrary, has neither 
contact nor inseperable existence with the object or meaning ; htmee,. 
how can it lead to the object ? 

Objection. -It leads to the object with the help of arbitrament or 
according to direction. 

Anawer.It cannot do so, for arbitrament or direction is with. 
reference to the meaning of words, and not to their connection. 

Objection^- There may be arbitrament or direction with reference 
to that also. 

Answer. No for that connection being of a manifold nature it is 
impossible that ,t could be the object of reference by arbitrament O r 
QI recti on. 

O^zon.-But it iB from the force of arbitrament or direction in 
e a f ni& t: dS ^ ^"^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a ^^nce also 

Answer. This i is not the case, as there would be then over extei 
sion or undue application of the principle, if something is oroughV 
thing else! * " P 7 arbltrameilt or directj o" with regard to some- 

fT,i a ^ c **?-r- I f Y* riB , l)le antecedei ^e or pervasion of connection in, 
this case will be that of connection as recalled by sound. 



KANADA 8CTRA8 IX,/2, 5. 287 



Answer. If it be so, then, by that admission, inference itself finds 
admittance on the strength of invariable antecedence or pervasion. 
Arbitrament or direction also, if it implied mere intention or desire, 
would be unduly applied or too wide. 

Objection. -But the desire of tsvara, G-od, cannot be said to be too 
^vide. 

Answer. Yes, it may be so, inasmuch as even in the absence of 
divine will, the words, river or Ganga (Ganges), etc., suggest or call up 
the ideas of the bank, etc. 

This is enough of over-forwardness in a logician. 4. 
Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition 
are all included in Inference. 

UpaskAra. For the purpose of showing that comparison, etc., also, recognised of others 
(as so many independent means of proof) and which proceed on the strength of inseparable 
existence or universal concomitance, are merely different forms of inferential cognition, he 
.says : 



Asya, its. f^* Idam, it. fft Iti, such. This. ^MMRidrMl^ Buddhi- 
Apeksitevut, because of the cognition or notion being needed. 

5. (Comparison, Presumption, Sab-sumption, Privation, and 
Tradition are all included in Inference by marks), because they 
depend, for their origin, upon the cognition, namely, " It is its." 
346. 

The words " of comparison, presumption, comprehension or sub- 
sumption and privation " complete the aphorism. Asya, of the per- 
vader, i idam (it is) the pervaded, the cognition is in this form. The} - 
are dependent upon it, by which it is depended upon as their originator. 
< Buddhi-apeksitatva means the state of being so dependent. In 
consequence of such dependence, -this is the meaning of the term, it 
being a relative compound formed similarly to dhita-dgnih (by whom 
fire has been deposited), or formed with the affix ita (which signifies 
that something, e.g., dependence upon the cognition, has been produced 
in the something else, e. y., comparison, etc.), according to the rule that 
it is applied to the words star, etc., (so that tdrakd + ita = tdrakita = 
starry, heaven). 

Upamdna, comparison or analogy, is in every respect nothing but 
<inumdna, or inference, by means of words. Now the sentence, " A 
gavaeus or gayal looks like a cow," is spoken by a forester in reply to 
-the enquiry by a twonsman, viz., " What does a gayal look like to ? " 
Here immediately after hearing the above sentence at distant place, 
"the townsman determines the meaning of the name, gayal, of the 
strength of the community of substratum, namely that which is like a 
cow is the object of reference by, or designate of, the word, gayal. 
Then when ho goes to the forest and meets an animal body of that des 
cription, he recognises that that is that which is the designate of the 
word, gayal. 



288 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Objection. At the time of hearing the sentence at a distant place r 
the generic nature of the gayal, which is condition or occasion of the 
recognition or application of the name, is not known. How then can 
there be such determination by, or application of, the name ? 

Answer. There can be such determination, as the cognition there 
of (i. e., of the generic nature) is possible by means of suggestion or 
metaphorically. 

Objection. But where is the room for suggestion, when in the 
sentence, " A gayal looks like a cow/ there is no want of proof of the 
agreement or positionjof the subject and predicate ? 

Answer. There is room for suggestion, inasmuch as complete equi 
valence of the two terms still remains to be proved. For it is not 
proper to hold up before one, who desires to be enlightened Tn the 
matter, likeness to a cow as the condition or occasion of partial appli 
cation of the name. Therefore, it (the name) refers to a particular 
genus or class in its entirety. Hence arises the possibility of sugges 
tion. Or, the word, gayal, is denotative of the animal, gayal, being 
applied thereto by the elect, and there existing no other application 
of it. Other applications being non-existent, whatever word is applied 
by the elect to a certain object, the same is denotative of that, as the- 
word, cow, is of the cow. It is from this inference that the application 
of the name, gayal, comes to be determined. 

And the reasoning which you may set forth as being auxiliary to 
upamdna, comparison, would better go with anumdna, inference, which 
has been established as a method of proof. What is the use of upamdna 
which, as a method of proof, is yet to be supposed ? 

More detailed consideration on this subject may be sought in the 
Anum Ana-May tikha. 

Arthdpattiy Presumption or Explanation, also is nothing but infer 
ence. Thus, (1) presumption from the observed, arises where by means 
of the non-existence of Chaitra who is living, in the house, ascertained 
by stronger evidence, (e. g., perception), his existence outside it is 
presumed. Here the cognition of Chaitra s existence outside the house 
is wholly dependent upon the ascertainment of the relation of the 
pervader between the demonstrable and the demonstrator. For, as a 
matter of fact, the non-existence of a living person in the house is 
accompanied with this existence outside it, or there arises the cogni 
tion that the non-existence of a living person in the house is impossible 
without his existence outside it. In the first case, there is apprehen 
sion of positive pervasion or concomitance, and, in the last, of negative- 
pervasion. 

Objection. Pervasion does exist, but the apprehension thereof does- 
Hot here take place. 

Answer. Were this the case, then, in the absence of the 
apprehension of pervasion, there would be no scope or occasion for the- 
manifestation of presumption, and there would consequently be sup 
position of only that which, as an entity, would demonstrate pervasion 
existing in its proper form or as such. This is the direction or point. 



K ANiDA StiTR AS IX, 2, 5. 289 



The inclusion of presumption due to the instrumentality of doubt 
or uncertainty as well as of that due to the instrumentality contra 
diction or contrast or opposition, in inference, should be also under 
stood or inferred ; for contrast or opposition, characterised as unifor 
mity of non-co-existence, also is constituted by pervasion or (negative) 
concomitance. 

(2) Presumption from what is heard, is also inference by means of 
the inferred. " Deva-datta, who is stout, does not eat by day" By this 
proposition, stoutness is inferred, and, by means of that stoutness, there 
takes place inference of eating at night in this way that Deva-datta 
eats at night, because, as he does not eat by day, stoutness cannot 
otherwise appear in him. 

fSamhhava, Comprehension or Sub-sumption, also is merely a form 
of inference. For, the examples of it are : A drona (a standard measure)- 
does nut exceed a khdri (one khdri = 4t dronas) ; an ddhaka does not 
exceed a drona (one drona = 4i ddhakas) ; a hundred does not not exceed 
a thousand ; etc. Here a khdri contains a drona, being constituted by 
it. One thing being constituted by another thing, the former is 
possessed of the latter by means of the latter, as a water-pot is possessed 
of its components. Other instances should be similarly understood. 
That learning is probable in a Brdhmana (because Brdhmanas as a class 
are learned), that valour is probable in a Ksatriya (because Ksatriyas as 
a class are valiant), etc., on the other hand, do not at all become means 
of proof, inasmuch as they do not produce certainty. 

Abhdva, Non-existence or Privation, also is not a different form of 
evidence ; for, being similar to the inference of the cause by means of 
the effect, the inference of the non-existence of the cause by means of 
the non-existence of the effect, is included within inference itself, as 
pervasion or universal concomitance is the ground of such inference 
by means of non-existence. 

The Jthattas (Prabhdkara and other Mimdmsakas), however, maintain 
that the evidence which causes the apprehension of non-existence in the 
ground, etc., (v.g-, The water-pot does not exist on the groundj, is called 
non perception. Now, this evidence or proof is in some cases included in 
perception, and in other cases, inference, inasmuch as non-existence is 
apprehended by the eye, etc., themselves. For, it cannot be said that the 
senses are exhausted Justin the apprehension of the substratum (of 
non-existence, e. </., the ground), since their function continues up to 
the apprehension of non-existence. 

AitUiya, Tradition, is a succession of sayings of which the authors 
are not known. Itiha this collection of expletives appears in the 
narration of past events. The state of being such narration of past events 
is called aitihya, traditional saying. If it is not impeded in its meaning, 
then, coining under the class of verbal cognition, it is a made of 
inference. For example, In this Banyan tree there dwells a Yaksa 
There is a Gaurt (a Buddhistic Spirit) in the madhttka tree (Bassia 
latifolia*) etc. Now, if the traditional sayings come from the mouth of 
trustworthy persons, then they are as has been already declared ; if 
they do not come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are 
no evidence at all. 



a90 VAI^ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

Accordingly it is established that proof or evidence is of two kinds 
only, perception and inference __ 5. 

Wvriti.Sambhava or Probability is cognition dependent upon a 
plurality of concomitances ; e. g., learning is probable in a Brdhmana 
a hundred is probably contained in a thousand. 

Note. The construction put by Jayandrdyana upon the word, 
Sambhava is explicitly rejected by Sankara Misra. In the lexicon 
Medmi also we find that the meaning of the word is Adheyasya 
ddhdrdnatiriktatvdm, i. e., the state of what is contained not exceeding 
that which contains it, or, simply, the relation of the part not bein? 
greater than the whole. 

Reminiscence, how produced. 

Upatkdra. Inferential cognition having been explained, he now begini another 
topic. 



Atma-manasot, between the soul and the mind. 
Samyoga-visesat, from a particular conjunction. ^TRPj; Samskarat, 
from impression or retention or latency. ^ Cha, and. *nfr:Sm ritilj, 
Reminiscence. 

6. Reminiscence (results) from a particular conjunction 
between the Soul and the Mind and also from Impression or 
latency. 347. 

" Results"--This is the complement of the aphorism. Samyoga- 
vise^afc means contact or contiguity such as reflection or meditation or 
inter-penetration, etc. From this as the non-combinative cause, in the 
soul as the combinative cause, < Srnritifc/ (reminiscence), a particular 
kind of cognition or knowledge, is produced, He states the 
efficient cause by Samskarat. By the word cha he implies past 
experience which too is operative here as the object recalled. Re 
miniscence or recollection imitates the correctness of the previous 
experience, such alone being the recollection of him who has mistaken 
a rope for a snake and has consequently fled from it. It does not, 
moreover, follow that reminiscence should take place at all times or 
continually, einee it depends on the resuscitation of the mental im 
pression. Accordingly it has been said by the revered Prasastadeva, 
4< Reminiscence, caused by the inferential process (as in inferring fire 
from smoke there is recollection of the universal concomitance of fire 
and smoke), desire, re-produetion (or suggestion of one idea by an 
other), and aversion, and having for its content the past, among 
objects seen, heard, and otherwise experienced, (results) from a parti 
cular conjunction between the soul and the mind, due to the observa 
tion of a suggestive mark, voluntary attempt at recollection, etc., and 
from impression or latency produced by intuitions constantly repeated 
vnd attended to with interest." 



KANADA SCTRAS IX, 2, 7. 291 



The cognition of highly advanced sages, or their intellectual 
intuition has not been separately noticed by the author of the apho 
risms. It is included within perception by Yogins or ascetics (See IX- 
ii. 13 below). In tho treatise, called the Paddrtha-Pradefa, an account of 
it has been given, which is as follows : Prescient or inventive cogni 
tion which is produced from conjunction between the soul and the 
mind, and also from a particular d/tarma, virtue or merit, independently 
of inferential marks, etc., in advanced sages, the promulgators of the 
Vedas, in respect of objects, supersensible, or past, present, arid future, 
or in respect of dliarma, etc., as preserved in books, that is called 
sagely cognition. " This form of cognition at times arises in ordinary or 
wordly people also ; as when a young maiden says, " My heart assures 
me my brother will depart to morrow." 6- 

Dream y how produced. 

Upankdra. Thus four-fold vidyd, or true cognition, or knowledge, having been 
explained, it now becomes proper to explain \avidyd or false cognition or knowledge. 
Therein doubt or uncertainty and error have been incidentally ascertained before. For the 
purpo.se of ascertaining dreaming, he says : 



H S. I * I vs || 

, Tatha, so. ^Jf: Svapnah, dreaming. 
7. So (also is) dreaming. 348. 

The meaning is that as reminiscence results from a particular con 
junction between the soul and the mind, and from impression or latency, 
so also does cognition in dreaming. Cognition in dreaming is the mental 
experience, through the channels of the senses, belonging to one, when 
one s senses have ceased to be active and one s mind is in a quiescent 
state. And this is of three kinds (1) It partly arises from acuteness of 
impression or facility of reproductiveness ; as in a man who, in love or 
in auger, thinks intently on some object, when he goes to sleep, in that 
state, cognition resembling perception, in the form, " This is the contest 
between Karna and Arjuna " (two heroes of the Mahdbhdrdta), is pro 
duced, through the influence of impression, reproductiveness or latency, 
produced by previous hearing of the Purdiias, etc. (2) It arises partly 
from deran gemeut of the humours or affections of the body, viz., wind, 
bile, and phlegm. Therein, in consequence of disorder of the wind, one 
dreams of moving about in the sky, wandering about on the earth, 
fleeing with fear from tigers, etc., and the like ; under the influence of 
an unwholesome excess of the bile, one dreams of entering into fire, 
embracing flames of fire, golden mountains, corruscations of flashing 
lightning, sudden extensive conflagrations, etc. ; while, through predo 
minance of phlegmatic deragement, one dreams of swimming upon the 
sea ; immersions in rivers, sprinklings with showers of rain, silver 
mountains, etc., (-3) Dreams appear also uuder the influence of adrstam 
(the invisible after-elfects of past acts) or deserts. These are cognitions, 
produced in one whose internal sense has been lulled to sleep or over 
powered with sleep, in respect of the experiences of the present or 
previous states of existence. Therein soinnial cognition, signifying 
good, results from dharma or merit, and has for its object the riding 
upon elephants, ascending on mountains, acquistion of the royal 



2&2 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



umbrella, feasting upon pudding, interview with the sovereign, and the 
like ; whereas soranial cognition, signifying evil, arises from adharmi 
or demerit, and has its object unction with oil, falling into blind wells, 
riding upon camels, immersion in mire, the seeing of one s own nuptials, 
and the like. 

The above three, only as jointly operating, have causality here (i.e., 
in the production of dreams). It should be further observed that this 
division of causes, is based on the predominance of one or another of 
the qualities of these causes in their effects. 7. 

Cognition accompanying dreaming, how produced. 

Upatkilra.- It may bo objected : The cognition which springs up in tho midst of a 
dream, in the form of reoollootion of the very same object which is experiencad in sonmial 
cognition, does not posaoss tho nature of dreaming inasmuch as dreaming takes the form of 
perceptual experience. From vrhat cause, then, doea it arise ? 

To this he gives the reply : 



Svapna-antikara, that which intervenes in, or lies near 
to, or accompanies, dream. 

8. (So is) consciousness accompanying dreams. 349. 

The word so comes in from the preceding aphorism. The mean 
ing, therefore, is that as dreaming, so also consciousness accompanying 
dreaming arises from a particular conjunction between the soul and the 
mind and also from impression or retention. The difference between the 
two cases extends only thus .f ar that soranial cognition results from impres 
sion or retention produced by former experience, while consciousness 
accompanying dreaming results from impression or retention produced 
by experience arising at the very time (of dreaming.) It has been accord 
ingly stated by Professor Parsatttadcva, " Somnial cognition is merely 
recollection, inasmuch as it results from looking back upon past cogni 
tions." The writer of the vritti also says, " Somnial cognition, its 
function being the illumination of experienced objects, is not a different 
thing from recollection. 

Some teach that consciousness accompanying dreaming is cogni 
tion amounting to certitude, in the midst of dreams, as, for example, 
" I am in a state of lying on the bed," etc. 8. 

Another cause of dreaming and of cognition in dreaming. 

Upttakdra. He adds another cause of dreaming and consciousness accompanying 
dreaming. 



II S. T R I 5. II 

Dharmat from dharma or merit, ^r Cha, also. 

9. (Dreaming and consciousness accompanying dreaming 
result) from dharma also. 350. 

The word cha is used with the purpose of adding adharma r 
demerit. This has been already explained. 9. 



KAN AD A SftTRAS Ix, 2, 11. 293 

Vivrlti. * * * * Some think that this aphorism has been laid 
down for the purpose of showing that in some cases dreaming, etc., are 
also produced from dharma, etc., alone, even without the action of 
Samskdra or impression, and that the poetic observation of Sriharsa 
that the maid Sleep brings before the vision of man, through the all- 
pervading efficacy of adfistam, even objects which have not been 
observed before, accordingly becomes explained. 

Causes of Avidya or Incertitude. 
I7paskdra.-Now, referring to the series (of doubt, dream, incertitude) he says : 



n s. i * i?o H 



Indriya-dosat, from imperfection of the senses. 

13amskara-dosat; from imperfection of impression. *3 Cha, and. 
A-vidya, false knowledge. Incertitude. 

10. False knowledge (arises) from imperfection of the Senses 
and from imperfection of Impression. 351. 

The word A-vidya/ though a general term, applies to incertitude, 
according to the context, doubt, dream, and incertitude having 
been mentioned. Therein imperfection of the senses is inefficiency 
caused by predominance of the bile, etc. Imperfection of impression 
is the being accompanied with non-observation of distinctions ; for 
under such non-observation, false cognition is produced. 10. 

Vivfiti. Understanding according to another mode is divided into 
two kinds, certitude and incertitude. Of these, he states the cause of 
incertitude. 

Indriya-dosah, is such as opthalmia, etc. Samskara-dosah ig 
the being the effect of erroneous experience, etc. The word and 
implies the. addition of such imperfections as remoteness, etc., and also 
sub-sumptions of false marks or middle-terms, etc. The cause, then, of 
false knowledge or incertitude is imperfection ; and imperfection, aa 
consisting of biliousness, remoteness, etc., is of diverse kinds. 

The characteristic of Avidya. 
. He states the characteristic oridefinition of avidyd in general : 



II & I * I U N 



^ Tat, that. Avidyd. false knowledge. g9MH Dusta-jfianam, im 
perfect cognition. 

11. That (/. e., Avidya) is imperfect knowledge. 352. 

Tat, an indeclinable word, conveying the sense of a pronoun, 
alludes to avidyd. That, avidyd, is dustajnanam , i.e., cognition which is 
anduly applied, cognition that a thing is what in fact it is not, in other 
words, cognition determined in the manner of a divergent object, and 



294 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

having the mode which does not reside in the object in question. Imperfec 
tion consists also of cognition taking the form of uncertainty. Doubt, 
therefore, even where there is only one alternative, is vicious, being 
identical with non-assurance or non ascertainment. 

The four (forms of avidyd), therefore, namely, Doubt, Error, Dream, 
and Regression or Indecision are included in this aphorism. -11. 

The characteristic of Vidya. 
Upatkdra. (He declares what scientific cognition is :) 

II S. I R I ?R II 

Adustatn, not imperfect. Free from imperfection, f^nj Vidya 
true knowledge, Vidyd. 

12. (Cognition) free from imperfection, is (called) Vidya or 
scientific knowledge. 353. 

The word " Cognition " comes in (from the preceding aphorism). 
* Adustam means produced by organs of sense which are not inefficient 
or defective (in consequence of any derangement mentioned above). 
The meaning, therefore, is that vidyd is the experience of a thing in its 
proper place, or the experience of a thing in the same manner in which 
another thing having a common substratum with the former ig experi 
enced, or experience of a thing not having the mode which does not 
reside in the thing in question. It is of two kinds, immediate or sensu 
ous, and mediate or inferential. -12. 

Cognition by tiaycis Siddhas, how produced. 

Upaskdra. It may be objected : The cognition (of objects beyond tho reach of senses), 
by advanced sages, also appears in tho very samo form in which other cognitions, having 
a common substratum with the former, take placu. It is again not produced by the senses, 
inasmuch as it cognizes objects which are not in contact with them. Nor is it produced 
by means of inferential marks, as it is produced in tho absence of any investigation of such 
marks. Hence it follows that there is a third form of proof (besides perception and inference) 
which is the instrument of suoh cognition. 

In view of this objection, ho says : 



: n a. i ^ i \\ n 

Arsam, sagely. Of advanced sages, fa^fa Siddha-darsanam, 
viiion of tho Perfected Ones. ^ Cha, and. vwqfVif : Dharmmebhyah, from 
dharma or merits. 

13. Cognition of advanced sages, as also vision of the Per 
fected Ones, (results) from dharma or merits. 354. 

Arsrn or sagely cognition is the cognition of sages such as Gdlava, 
etc., having for its object things past and yet to come. Siddha-darfianam 
means the vision by those who have attained success in the direction of 
cognition apprehensive of objects remote as well as screened from view, by 
means of mantra or incantation, herbs, eye-salve prepared from cocoort, 
etc. Both of them arise from dharma or merit, such that there 
cognition of objects, in their true light. The author of the 



KANADA SttTRAS IX, 2, 13. 295 

observes that this cognition is not a different kind of vidyd or scientific 
knowledge, as it is included in Yogic or ascetic perception. Sagely 
cognition is really the fourth kind of vidyd, and it occurs to sages as 
well as to worldly people. And it is simply a form of mental percep 
tion, being produced by the mind accompanied with inattention (to 
internal and external objects), or produced by inferential marks such 
as faithful observances of the rules of conduct. The cognition of 
pervasion which is the ground of inference is here solely dependent 
upon or due to Samvkdra, or impression having its origin in a former 
state of existence I. e-, in the same way as is the pervasion or universal 
concomitance of sucking the breast and the cognition that this is the 
means of securing what is desired, (in the case of the instinctive 
application of the baby to sucking the breast.) 

The revered Professor Prasasa<ieva,however,says that Siddhadaria- 
nam, cognition of the Perfected Ones, is not a different form of cognition. 
His reasoning is as follows : If it is said that cognition, by the 
Perfected Ones, of objects remote and hidden from view, takes its rise 
from conditions brought about by means of eye-salve prepared from 
cocoon, and the like, then it is nothing but perception. If it be, on the 
other hand, cognition which apprehends objects beloging to the earth, 
the region lying between the earth and the vault of heaven, and the 
space beyond it, and which is dependent upon the conditions or 
inferential marks such as the movements, etc., of planets and the lunar 
mansions (naksatras^ then it is nothing but inferential cognition, 
inasmuch as pervasion, or universal concomitance of the thing to be 
inferred and the mark of inference, is determined by the observation 
of such accompaniment.- 13. 

Here ends the second chapter of the ninth book in the Commentary 
of aiikara upon the Vaisesika Aphorisms. 



296 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

BOOK TENTH CHAPTER FIRST. 
Pleasure and Pain are two different things. 

Upakdra.-ThQ purpose of the tenth book is the exposition of the differences of the- 
attributes of the soul according to their causes. Now, in the aphorism of Qautama, which 
enumerates or classifies the provablea or objects of certitude, viz., Soul, Body, Sense, 
Object, Understanding, Mind, Activity, Fault, Metempsychosis, Desert, Pain, and Emanci 
pation are the provable" Nydya-Sdtram, I. i. 9.), there bein<4 no mention of pleasure, the 
error may arise that pleasure is really not different from pain. With the purpose of 
dispelling this possible error, the author first of all points out the difference of pleasure and 
pain themselves. 



: II *o I t I t II 

Ista-anista-karana-visesat, in consequence of the- 
differrence of causes, (in the forma of) desirables, and undesirable facjvftfj 
Virodhat on account of opposition. ^ Cha, and. faaj: Mithah, between 
them, towards each other, mutual, g&:&qt: Sukha-duhkhayoh, between 
plasure and pain. ^farc^TR: Artha-antara-bhava^, relation of different 
objects. 

1. In consequence of the difference of (their) causes, in the 
form of desirables and undesirables, and on account of (their) 
mutual opposition, Pleasure and Pain stand in the relation of 
objects different from each other. 355. 

1 Sukha-duhkahayoh/ (between pleasure and pain there exists) 
mitha^/ mutual, l artha-antara-bhavah, distinction that is to say 
heterogeneity. Whence (does this distinction arise)? To this quention 
the author replies, ista-anista-karana-visesat i. #., in consequence of 
visesah, distinction or difference, of their causes which have, in the one- 
case, the form of istam, desirable objects such as garlands, sandal-paste, 
women, etc., and, in the other case, the form of anistam/ undesirable 
objects such as snakes, thorns, etc. For heterogeneity of effect 
necessarily follows from heterogeneity of cause. He lays down another 
principle of distinction, viz., virodhat/ on account of opposition 
characterised by non-dwelling together, for pleasure, and pain are- 
not experienced in one and the same soul at one and the same time. 
The word, cha, and, brings forward the difference of the effect of 
pleasure and pain as a further means of distinguishing betwean them. 
Thus, graciousness, the embrace, clearnesss of the eyes, etc., are the effects 
of pleasure, while despondency, a sullied countenance, etc., are the effects 
of pain; hence on this ground also pleasure and pain must differ from 
each other. Accordingly it has been stated by Professor Prasaftta-deva f 
"Pleasure has the characteristic of agreeable feeling. In the presence 
of garlands and other desirable objects, from the contact of the senses- 
and objects in the recognition of something desirable being produced,. 
and from the conjunction of the soul and the mind and dependent upon 
dharma or merit and the like, that which is produced and is the cause 
of complacence, embrace, and kindliness of the eyes, etc., is pleasure." 



KAN ADA SOTRAS X, 1, 2. 207 



In the ase of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., enjoyed in the pait, plearure 
arises from smriti, reminiscence, and, in the case future objects, it 
arises from $an/ra/pa, desire or appetency or imagination or will. 

The non-enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of Gautama is in 
order to promote indifference or dispassion, in other words, to teach 
that dispassion would arise in one who should account even pleasure as- 
pain. (Cf- Nydya IStitram, IV. i. 58, 5:wfr^THTfanrT^, The idea of 
pleasure takes place in an alternative form of pain). 

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition. 

Upaakdra. It may be urged : Lot pleasure ad pain bo mutually distinct. But ( hy 
way be non-different from cognition, like recollection and perception of sensation. 

Accordingly the author says : 



Samsaya-nirnaya.antara-abhjiva, non-inclusion in 
doubt and certainty. * Cha, and. 10*1*^$ JMna-antaratve, in the 
matter of being different from cognition. \g: Hetuh, reason, mark. 

2. And the non-inclusion (of Pleasure and Pain) either in 
Doubt or in Certainty, is the mark that they are other than 
cognition. 356. 

The meaning is that non-inclusion either in doubt or in certainty 
is the mark of inference that pleasure and pain are other than, i. e.. 
different from, cognition. The idea is this ; Were pleasure or pain a 
kind of cognition, it would either have the form of doubt, or have the 
form of certainty. It cannot be the first, as the two alternatives (which 
must be present in doubt; do not exist ; nor can it be the seeond, as 
the single alternative does not exist (see Vivriti below). And the 
species or parts being thus excluded, the geuns or whole is necessarily 
excluded. For the species of cognition, are two only, the characteristic 
of doubt and the characteristic of certainty. And both of them are 
excluded from pleasure as well as from pain ; hence the characteristic 
ofcognition also finds no place in them. 

The word, cha and, a Ida on the exclusion of external sensation or 
perception. The perception of pleasure and pain is mental i. e . t by the 
inner sense, in the forme, " I feel pleasure," " I feel pain " whereas 
perception of them does not take such shape of form as in "I k <ow " 
" I and doubtful," " I am certain." 2. 



i- * Neither pleasure nor pain has the form in which 

two repugnant alternatives are present together, that it should be 
probable that they have the nature of doudt, nor has either possession 
of a given form together with absence of negation of that form, that it 
should be likely that they have the nature if certainty. The supposi 
tion of a third form of cognition is chimerical like the horn of a hare. 
Ooncequently neither pleasure nor pain can come under knowledge. 

Pleasure and Pain are not form cognition continued. 
UpaikAra. Ho laya down another principle of differentiation, 



298 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



?r4t: Tayoh, their, of doubt and certainty, f^qfw: Nispattih, pro 
duction. S^fTl^fff fiP^ J, Pratyaksa-laiagikabhyarn, by means of percep 
tion and inference. 

3. The production thereof (i.e., of Doubt and Certainty) is 
by means of perception and inference. 357. 

Tayoh, of doubt and certainty, nispattih, production, (is) from 
perception and from inferential marks. Neither pleasure nor pain is 
produced by the perceptive apparatus or by inferential marks. For, 
pleasure is four-fold, being objective, subjective, imaginative or 
sympathetic, or habitual. Of these, the last three by no means possess 
the characteristic of taking their origin from the contact of the (outer) 
senses (with their objects). Should it be contended that the first is 
cognition, inasmuch as it is generated by contact of the senses and 
their objects, we reply that it is not so, for a part only of the whole 
cause, (being the same), cannot entail homogeneity in the effect ; else 
ill and sundry effects would come to be. homogeneous as they must have 
pace and time as their common antecedents. Moreover, (if pleasure 
ivere cognition), the pleasure which is not produced through contact of 
r,he senses and their objects, would be either non-discriminative or 
udefinite, or discriminative or definite. But it cannnot be the first, 
1 >r then it would be supersensible ; nor can it be the second, inasmuch 
as it does not consist of a judgment respecting two objects in 
the relation of subject and predicate. Again, pleasure and pain 
are necessarily accompanied with sensibility ; (were they forms 
of cognition), there would be involved in the (consequent) notion of a 
sensibility of cognition a regression to infinity. Laingikam 

(the adjective) meaus merely lingam (the noun), mark, as the word, 
objective, (means an object). 

The author of the VTitti, on the other hand, explains the aphorism 
thus, that the origin thereof, i. e., of cognition and pleasure, is explain 
ed, pratyksa-laingikam, L e., by the explanations of perceptual and 
inferential cognitions, that is to say, that whereas perceptual cognition 
is produced by the senses, and inferential by marks of illation, it is not 
so with pleasure, etc. 3. 



i _ It may be urged that as non-discriminative cognition is 
neither "doubt nor certitude, so too may be pleasure and pain. Accord 
ingly he says : 

The proof of pleasure and pain is furnished by perception and 
inference. In one s own soul, pleasure and pain are proved by per 
ception ; in other souls, pleasure is inferred by brightness of the eyes, 
etc. and pain by paleness of the face, etc. So that, had they the form 
of non-discriminative cognition, there could be no perception, nor 
could it be possible for them to be the subject of inference by such 
marks as brightness or paleness of the face, and the like. Hence, 
the import is, they are not included in cognition. 



KANADA SftTRAS X, 1,5. 



Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition. continued. 

Upattkdra. Ha points out the difference of pleasure, etc., from inferential tqgnltion. 
depending upon a difference of their modes or appearance. 



MO i * i * M 

Abhut, (it) was. ffa Iti, such modal distinction. <jfo Api, also. 

4. (It) was " such (modal distinction) also (establishes the 
difference between pleasure or pain and cognition.) 358. 

The word iti indicates the form. The word l api implies another 
form, viz., " (It) will be." Thus, in inferential cognition, e. g. t " Ther& 
was or will be lire in the mountain," the modal distinction of the past, 
etc., is observed ; but pleasure or, pain, produced under this form, has 
never been observed. 4 

Vivriti * * * * Cognition is conversant about objects past, 
future, and present. But of other pleasure or pain, no object whatever 
exists. Therefore, by the application of contradictory properties, viz.,. 
objectivity and non-objectivity, it follows that pleasure and pain ara 
not identical with cognition. 

Plcasiire and Pain are not forms of cognition continued. 
Upasledra. He brings forward a further ground of differentiation : 



U ?* I \\ * II 



Sati, existing. ar Cha, also. ^TT^jfofTT^ Karyya-adarsanat, be 
cause of the non -observation of the effect. 

5. Also (Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition), 
inasmuch as the effect, (pleasure or pain), is not observed, where 
(the antecedents of cognition) are present. 359. 

Pleasure or pain is not merely perception or merely inferential 
cognition, since the effect, pleasure or pain, is not observed, where 
contact of the senses and objects exists, or where there is recognition of 
the universal concomitance (which is the ground of inference), of the 
mark of inference being a property of the minor term, etc. The mean 
ing, therefore, is as follows : It has been already stated that pleasure 
and pain are not cognition in general, (i. e., non-discriminative cogni 
tion). Should they be cognition in particular (or discriminative 
cognition), they would be either perceptual cognition or cognition in 
the form of inference". (Pleasure and pain cannot be the former), 
inasmuch as the experience of the element of pleasure does not take place 
during the perception of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., on the contact 
of the senses and their object ; nor can they be the latter, since there 
is no experience of the pleasurable or the painful, as the case may be 
where there exists an inference respecting sandal-paste, etc., or an 
inference respecting fire, etc. In like manner, pleasure and pain being; 



300 VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



not experienced in any particular act of perception or in particular act 
of inference, they are also not the particulars of that perception or 
that inference. 5. 

Bhdtya reads tiaticlia of X i. 5 as a separate aphorism, and explain/* 
it thus : Cognition arises, Sati, i. ., iu respect of objects actually exist 
ing at the moment. Cognition accordingly relates to past, present, and 
future objects. But this is not the case with pleasure and pain. Herein 
also, therefore, there is difference between cognition, on the one hand, 
and pleasure and pain, on the other. 

Above continued : Causes of Ple,a*ure and Pain. 
Upaikdra. He mentions another! differentiating characteristic. 



I ? \ \ \ \ II 

Eka-artha-samavayi-karana-antaresu, there ex 
isting other causes co-inherent in one and the same object. JffTFT 
Driftatvat, from the being observed. Because they are observed. 

6. (Pleasure and Pain are not form of cognition), because 
they are observed, when there exist other causes co-inherent in one 
and the same object, (i. e., the soul). 360. 

" Of pleasure and pain " such is the complement (of the aphorism). 
In relation to pleasure, uncommon or specific causes co-inherent in one 
and the same object are dharma or merit, attachment to, or attraction 
for, pleasure, desire for the cause of pleasure, volition or striving to 
secure the material (cause) of pleasure, and cognition of garlands, 
sandle-paste, etc.; while in relation to pain, they are adliarma, or 
demerit, and cognition of thorns and other undesirable object. The 
meaning is that (pleasure and pain differ from cognition;, inasmuch 
as they are observed on the co-inherence of these causes in one and the 
same object. But cognition which is non-discriminative, does not at 
*11 stand in need of an uncommon cause co-inherent in the same object 
(with it). Discriminative cognition, of course, depends upon a cogni 
tion of predication or attribution (or judgment), but this is not another 
cause, that is, a cause heterogeneous to the cause of the cognition itself. 
Conjunction of the mind, as being a cause common (to pleasure and 
pain with cognition), does not require mention. Though reminiscence 
requires samskdra, impression or reproductiveness, as its specific or 
uncommon cause, yet the difference therefrom is quite obvious, as it is 
for this reason that the difference (of pleasure and pain) has been 
investigated with reference only to cognition or perceptual experience. 
Although in inferential cognition there is dependence upon the recollec 
tion of pervasion or universal concomitance, the cognition that the mark 
is a property of the minor term, etc., yet it is thrown overboard by 
the very word antara, other, (in the aphorism). The probative sense 
(of the aphorism) is, therefore, that pleasure and pain are different 
from cognition, inasmuch as they are the products of uncommon or 
particular causes, of their own kind, co-existing in the same subs 
tratum with them, as is the case with reminiscence, and with the first 
sound (in a series of sounds). 6. 



KANiDA SfrTRAS X, 1,7. 301 



An objection answered. 

L paskAra. It may be objected; If the difference ef pleasure and pain from cognition 
depend on the difference of their causes, and if the difference of pleasure and pain from eaoh 
other be just like the mutual difference between a pillar and a water-pot, etc., then there oan 
be no mutual difference between the body and its parts euoh as the head, the feet, the back, 
the stomach, etc., there being, in regard to ihese, no difference in their causes, whether they 
be thf! ultimate atoms, binary atomic aggregates, etc., or blood and semen. 

To meet thi* objection, he ays: 



Eka-dese, in the part. f% Iti, such. This, j^rf^i^ Ekasrain, in 
one body). f*K Sirah, the head. 1% Prietham, the back. Wf^ Udarain, 
the stomach. <rotff% Marmmani, the vitals. 5T%jfa: Tat-viAesah, their 
distinction. rTfi^r^^: Tat-visesebhyah, from the distinctions or their 
causes .) 

7 . The head, the back, the stomach, the vitals are in the 
parts of one and same (body) ; this their difference (results) from 
the differences thereof (/. ., of their causes). 361. 

1 Eka-desa iti means, in the part. Ekasmin means, in the body ; 
* Siralj this is one part ; udaram ; pristham ; and marmmani, 
1. ?., the sinews, etc. ; their viiesah/ difference in kind, (results). tat- 
visesebhyah, from the difference in kind of their causes. There, again, 
(i.e., in the case of the heterogeneity of the causes), heterogeneity 
results only from the heterogeneity of the causes (of those causes) ; for, 
the combinative causes of the stomach, the back etc., also are not just of 
the same kind as that of the head ; just as the heterogeneity of a spiece 
of eloth, a water-pot, etc., results from the heterogeneity of threads, 
postherds. and other material causes ; heterogeneity being possible, 
in them also, the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, etc., also, results 
from the heterogeneity of fibres, dust, etc. Heterogeneity is, in like 
manner, to be sought in the successive material causes : for, while the 
ultimate atoms may be common, the heterogeneity of the respective 
material causes universally gives rise to heterogeneity (in their res 
pective effects) ; whereas homogeneity of the material auses, constitu 
ted by their substanceness, does not cause such heterogeneity. This is 
the point. 7. 

Hkdsya : rtad Ekadeie iti of X. i. 7 with X. i. 6, and explains it 
as giving an additional reason why pleasure and pain cannot be forms 
of cognition, the meaning being that pleasure and pain are localised 
in the body, whereas cognition is not so localised. 

Here ends the first chapter of the tenth book in the Commentary oE 
Sankara upon the Vaiaesiki Aphorisms. 



302 VAI&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



BOOK TENTH CHAPTER SECOND. 
Substance is tlie only combinative cause. 

Upaskdra. As a collateral topic, the author now commences a special discrimination of 
the three causes : 



II ? 1 H I ? U 

Karanam, cause. ffa Iti, such. ^ Dravye, iu substance. 
Karyya-samavayat, from the combination of effect. 

1. "(It is the combinative) cause" such (intuition and usage), 
with regard to Substance, (arise) from the combination of effect 
(in it). 362. 

1 Karanam/ that is, that it is the combinative cause ; < iti/ such 
intuition and usage, are to be observed, l dravye, with regard to 
substance. Why so ? He gives the reply : kfiryya-samavayat/ be 
cause effect, viz., substance, attribute, and action, combine in it 
alone. 1. 

Vivriti. _ * * * * The definition of a cause in general is that 
causality consists in constant antecedence, there existing at the same 
time voidness of failure to produce the effect (that is to say, in Mill s 
phraseology, causality o-onsists in invariable and unconditional antece 
dence). There are three kinds of causes, according to their division into 
the combinative or material, non-combinative or formal, arid instru 
mental or efficient. * * * * 

Substance i-s- effcient cause also. 

tfpatkdra. It may bo aaked : Do then subatancoa (possess only combinative causa 
lity ? 

So he says : 



Samyogat, from conjunction, ^l Va, or, and. 

2. And, through conjunction, (Substance becomes the efficient 
or conditional cause also). 363. 

As combinative causality, so also efficient causality, belongs to the 
threads, in the production of a piece of cloth. Inasmuch as conjunction 
of the shuttle and the threads is also a cause of the cloth, the shuttle 
and the thread, are, mediately through that conjunction, also efficient 
cause of the cloth. The word va is used in a collective sense, 
inasmuch as, though the thread possesses combinative causality to 
wards the conjuction of the shuttle and the thread, yet it possesses 
efficient causality towards the cloth, mediately through such conjunc 
tion. 2. 

Vivriti. He says that combinative causality belongs to subs 
tances, not only because effects combine in them, but also because they 
are fields for the operation of non-combinative causes. 



KANADA SftTRAS X, 2, 4. 303 



Samyogat means because they are the support or substratum 
wherein takes place c&njunctiou which is the non-combinative cause.* * 

Actions are non- combinative causes. 
Upaskara. He explains what causality resides iu Action : 



MO 



Karane in the cause. <4*HNK Samavayat, from combination. 
Karmmani, actions. 

3. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Actions 
(are non-combinarive causes). 364. 

" Non-combinative causes" such is the complement (of the apho 
rism.) Non-combinative causality is causality combined or co-inherent 
in one and the same object connected with the state of effect and cause. 
Such causality results either from combination in the same object with 
the effect, or from combination in the same object with the cause. Of 
these the former is called, in the terminology of the VaisesiJeas, the 
slighter or minor, and the latter, the greater or major, proximity. If it be 
asked by means of which proximity, then, actions possess non-co v nbin- 
ative causality towards disjunction, and samsJcdra or impression ; it is 
here replied, karane samavayat, (that it is; through combination in the 
combinative cause of conjunction, etc. The meaning, therefore, is that 
non-combinative causality is exercised by action in (the production of) 
conjunction, etc., by means of the minor proximity characterised as 
combination in the same object with the effect. 3. 

Certain Attributes are non- combinative causes, and occasionally 

efficient causes also. 

Upaskdra. In anticipation of the question as to what kind of causality pertains to 
ooloui and other attributes residing in the (conseituent) parts, in relation to the attributes of 
the wholes, he says : 

O I R I 8 II 



WH\ Tatha, so. ^T Rupe, in colour. BTCmin? *nwn^ Karana-eka- 
:artha-aaraavayat, through combination in the same object with the 
cause. ^ Cha, and, also. 

4. So also in Colour (there is non-combinative causality) 
through combination in the same object with the cause. 365. 

The expression colour indicates colour, taste, smell, touch, num 
ber, magnitude or quantity, separateness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, 
etc. The term so extends (the application of) non-combinative causality. 
Karana-eka-artha-samavayat : (This non-combinative causality of 
colour, etc.) originates the colour, etc., of the wholes, by means of the 
major proximity (constituted) by (their) combination in the same object 
with the whole, which is the combinative cause of the colour, etc., of that 
whole ; as, for instance, the colour, etc., of the potsherds originate the 



304, VAIEIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



colour, etc., in the water-pot, and similarly it should be observed in all 
other cases. The word <cha implies that occasionally colour, etc., 
possess efficient causality also. 4. 



X. ii. 4 as two aphorisms, viz., Tatkd r&pc, and 
KAr&nai-kdrtha-Samavdydcheha. 

(Jon junction in a non-combinative cause. 

Cpatkdra.He states that the minor proximity belongs to conjunction whil it is a 
non-combinative cause in the origination of substances : 



II ? o | *n U. II 

Karana-samavnyat, through combination in the cause. 
: Samyogah, conjunction, q^q Patasya, of the cloth. 

5. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Conjunc 
tion (is a non-combinative cause) of the cloth. 366. 

The meaning is that, through combination in the combinative cause, 
conjunction also is a non-combinative cause, in the production of effects 
such as a piece of cloth, etc., by means of the proximity characterised 
as combination in the same object with the effect. The word l cloth 
indicates product substance in general. 

A certain author maintains that if, on the other hand, conjunction 
of part with part be also a non-combinative cause of a piece of cloth 
and the like, then combination in the same object with the cause is also 
(a non-combinative cause). 5. 

Above continued. 

^Upaskdra. He says that causality sometimes pertains to oonjuuotion by means of the 
major proximity : 



o I ^ I ^ || 

. Karaua-karaua-samavayat, through combination 
in the cause of the cause, ^r Cha, and, also. 

6. And, through combination in the cause of the cause, 
(conjunction becomes a non-combinative cause by means of the 
major proximity) also. 367. 

The conjunction, technically termed prachaya, (loose) coalition 
aggregation, and residing in the constituent parts of a bale of cotton 
originates magnitude in the bale of cotton. Here the proximity is 
-constituted by combination in the same object with the cause. This is 
the meaning. 6. 

Efficient causes declared. 

UpavMra. Having thus ascertained causality determined by the combinative cause ha 
begins a new section for ascertaining efficient causality. 

11 1 . i V t it, ( 



SftrRASX,2, 8. 305 



*TS!*nWPlT^ Samyukta-samavayat, through combination in the con 
junct. m? Agneh, of fire, t^lfa^ Vaisesikam, distinctive attribute. 

The distinctive attribute of Fire, (i. e., heat), (becomes an 
efficient cause), through combination in the conjunct. 368. 

1 Vaisesikam, distinctive attribute, agneh, of fire, in other word 
lieat, becomes an efficient cause in relation to the effects (colour, etc./ 
produced by burning or baking, through combination (of colour, etc.,) 
in the conjunct, (i. e., the water-pot placed in fire.) This is indicative ; 
in relation to cognition everything possesses efficient causality. Under 
standing, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and 
impression possess efficient causality only. It should be observed that 
this system or elaboration of thought has the purposes of establishing 
the mutual differences of pleasure, etc. 7. 

Vicfiti * * * * The general definition of an efficient cause is 
to be understood to be a cause other than the combinative and non- 
combinative causes. * * * * 

Observances produru adristam an their fruit, on the authority 

of the Veda. 

Upask.ira. Xow, in order to confirm the authoritativeness of the Vedas, he repeate the 
very same statement which has been made by him before : 



in* * i * n 

T DristanAm, of acts observed or known to be productive of good. 
Drista-prayojananam, of acts the purpose of which has been 
taught. ^T*n% Drigta-abhave, in the absence of visible or observed. 
faults or defects. spfm : Frayogah, performance. SFi^W? Abhyudayfiya, 
for the production of exaltation or adfistam. 

8. The performance of acts of observed utility and of acts 
the purpose whereof has been taught (in the sacred writings), is, 
for the production of adristam, (as these teachings are authoritatArie 
being the word of God in whom) the defects found in ordinary 
speakers do not exist. 369. 

Dristunum means, of acts which have been proved to be useful by the 
evidence of experience, e.</., sacrifices, almsgivings, ablution, and the like. 
Drista-prayojananam means, of acts the purpose whereof has been 
taught. For, thus, "in such precepts as " He who desires heaven, shall 
perform sacrifice," u He who desires heaven, shall offer oblation in the 
aynihotra sacrifice," etc., the fruit or purpose is mentioned at once 
along with the injunction ; in some cases, the purpose is given out by 
way of a recommendation, as in a The pitrt-x or departed ancestors of 
him who studies during these nights, pour down upon, or send down to, 



806 VAlgESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 

him streams of clarified butter and streams of honey," etc. ; in other 
cases, the purpose is left to be imagined, as in " He shall perform the 
Viivajit sacrifice," etc., for, here the purpose is neither mentioned along 
with the injunction nor presented by way of a recommendation, and is 
therefore, suppositional, and (it cannot be any thing but heaven), for 
heaven alone should be supposed as the purpose or fruit which is 
charming in itself. That being so, it does not stand to reason that 
these acts which so shortly come to their end, should have causality 
towards the production of fruits or results in the distant future. Hence, 
the meaning is, prayogah, the performance, of these acts, is abhyuda- 
vava, for the purpose of apfirvam, that is, adTistain, or deserts. It might 
be objected as follows : This would have been the case, were the 
authoritativeness of the Vedas a fact. But that is hard to maintain. 
For the authoritativeness of the Vedas as being eternally free from 
faults or defects in themselves, is not desired by you, (t. e., the Va-is- 
faifca), as it is by the Mimdmsd school, inasmuch as you recognise them 
as the production of a person, and in that case, it is possible that 
mistake, absence of mind, intention to mislead, and other defects exist 
ed in the person. To this the reply is given by the phrase, drista- 
abhave which means, there being non-existence of personal defects 
such as error, absence of mind, desire to mislead, and the like, which 
are found in other persons, namely, in ourselves and others ; inasmuch 
as the Supreme Person, inferred whether as the Creator of the earth or 
as the Speaker of the Vedas, is presented to us entirely under the 
characteristic of freedom from faults or defects. So that His words 
can neither have no meaning, nor convey a contrary meaning, nor 
convey a useless meaning. It is only impurities caused by error, 
absence of mind, inefficiency of the senses, and the like, due to defec- 
tiveness of the elements constituting the physical organism, the external 
senses, and the mind, that may possibly vitiate speech. But they cannot 
possibly lurk in the word of ffivara. It has been accordingly de 
clared : 



Being influenced by passion, ignorance, and the like, a speakei 
may tell untruths. But these do not exist in Isvara. How can He 
speak otherewise (than truthfully) ? 8. 

NotQ~Cf. VI. ii. 1, supra. 

Vivriti. Thus the Prcdicables have been ascertained, as also Res 
emblance and Difference. This Sdstra or System of Self-culture faci 
litates manana, intellection or thinking about things, in them only 
wfiose chitta, or inner sense or mind, has been purified by the perfor 
mance of acts, and not in them whose cliitta has not been so purified. 
Observances are productive of purity of cliitta, as declared by such 
text of the Veda as " They desire to know," etc. The same has been 
mentioned before. He repeats it for further confirmation. 

* : * Observances, *** when performed disinteres 
tedly, do not produce elysian bliss, etc., as their fruit, but produce at 
their result purity of .cliitta or intellect, etc., according to the text of 



KANADA StfTRAS IX, 2, 2. 307 



the of. Veda, " They desire to know," and the /SmTiti, " When worldly 
attachment has, by observances, borne its fruits, knowledge is after 
wards produced." 

Authoritativencas of the Veda established. 

UpasMra It may be urged : The Veda has been revealed b} God, it is here that there- 
is conflict of opinions. 

Accordingly he says : 

11 to R i s. H 



Tat-vachanat, from being the word of Him, G-od. 
Amnayasya, of the Vedas, snTT*rtf Pramanyam, authoritativeness 
finis. According to Sridhara, author of Nyaya kandati, " " tat refers 
to Risis. 

9. The authoritative ness of the Veda (follows) from its beintr 
the Word of God. 370. 

iti ; indicates the conclusion of the Sdstra or system. The authori- 
tntiveness, amnayasya/ of the Veda, (is derived), l vaehanat, from its 
being the composition, tena, by tsvara. For, thus,, we have already 
proved that the Vedas have a personal author, inasmuch as they are a 
collection of sentences or declarations. Nor can we and others possibly 
l.e the speakers of them, divided and sub-divided as they are in a thou 
sand branches, for they treat of objects which transcend the senses, and 
beings of our nature cannot behold objects which transcend the senses. 
Moreover, the Vedas must have been spoken by a trustworthy person, in 
asmnch as they ar.e accepted by men of light and leading. That which is 
not spoken by a trustworthy person, is not accepted by men of light and 
leading, the Vedas are accepted by men of light and leading, therefore 
they have been spoken by a trustworthy person. To be spoken by a 
trustworthy person is to be declared by a self-governed or independent 
person ; and to be accepted by men of light and leading is to be 
believed in, and acted upon, by persons attached to all the systems of 
thought. It has been stated before that non-appearance of the fruit or 
result, which occasionally happens, is due to defect or flaw in the act, 
or performance, the agent, and the means or requisites. If it be denied 
that this is so, there being no recollection on the part of the agent ; 
we reply that the denial has no value, it having been already proved 
that there is recollection on the part of the agent. The composition 
thereof by Him is proved, inasmuch as they could be declared only 
by an independent person, while such independent power to declare 
the Vedas in their thousand branches is as has been said, impossible 
fryr beings of our nature. Moreover, since certitude must be the product 
cf excellence or superiority, the certitude derived from the Vedas must 
also have excellence for its condition, and excellence must in this case 
be pronounced to be only the speaker s accurate knowledge of the true 
meaning of the sentences. The speaker of the Veda must, therefore 



308 VA1&ESIKA PHILOSOPHY. 



1)6 one of that description, one who has immediate cognition of heaven, 
udristam and like other objects ; and there is none such but tsvara 
alone. This is well said. 9. 

Xotf. ty. I. i. 3, supra. 

| 

The fortunate Sahkara, who is the son of Bhavandtha by Bhavda,}., 
and who is devoted to the worship of Siva, has written this commentary 
on the Aphorisms of Kandda. 

Even though this production of mine may not find favour \\ith 
others, nay, may be an object of ridicule with them, yet, (it is hoped), 
it will be adored a thousand times and over by my pupils, out of respect 
for their teacher. 

_ + _ 

Here ends the second chapter of the tenth book in the commentary 
on the Vaisesika Aphorisms by $ri Sankara Misra, son of Mahamahopa- 
<lhyaya Bhavanatha Misra. 

And complete is also this treatise. 



APPENDIX 1. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

(Compiled h-om the Vjdvakosa and Hull s Catalogue}. 



An -nit* of Work*. 

1 A.paabda.-khandana 

2 A-hetu-aama-yvakarana 

:> Atiua-tattva-vi vekn 

4 -~kal},alaf:a 

~t -didh.it i 

r> K auada-rahasya 



8 K.anadtt-riihasya-saiiigraha 

l . K ana da-samgrah a vy a khy a 

1 Kanada-siitnv-vyakhyfui 

1 1 Knrikfxvali 



10 
17 

18 



tika 



prakaia 

... kafiika ... 

vy a khy ft 

20 -bhaskara 

21 ...... rahasya ,., 

22 Kusumunjali (-karika) 

-v-yakhyu... 



-oraktUa 

-makaranda 

-vritti 
vvakhva 



2 Kornala-tika-tika 
->3 Guna-kiranAvali 
-34 ...... -tika , /. 

^ ...... -praka^n 

:36 liuna-didhiti-tippani 
37 ^nna-prakaAa -didhiti 

...... ... -raathtm 

...... -vivriti 

.......... bhava-praka$ika 

41 Guna-rahasya 



4--J Guna-6irauiahi 

44 

40 GunA,iuuidi (oji No. 22) 

46 JAti-satka-j)rakarana 

47 Tattva-jfsana-vivrid dhi-praka4a 

48 Tattvanusandhana 



f 



Karuulu 



LJdayana ^Icharya. 
Saukara Misra. 
Raghnnatlia Bhattacliary* 
Padiuaiiabha Mifiva. 
Saukara .Misra. 



Anonymaux. 

RaghudeVa Nyayalaukftrai 
Visvanaiiha. 
Udayana Achai ya. 
Udayaua. 
Krisiva JBliatta.. 
Blmjjjiratlia Thukkura. 
Mathuratiatha. 
Vardhamana Upadhyav i. 
Meglia Bhagiratha. 
Unknown. 

Padmanabha Varadaraj-t 
Mathuranatha. 
Udayaua Acharya. 
Haiidaaa Bhattacharyn 
Rumabhadra 
Rudra F>hattucha rya. 
Misra. 

Vardhamann (Jpadhyay*. 
Ruchidatta. 
Unknown* 

Narayana Tirtha Yati. 
TriJoohaua Deva. 
Visvauatha. 
Untraced. 
Untraced. 
Vardhamana. 
Jayarama Bhattacahrya. 
Kaghanatha. 
Mathuranathft. 
Raghunatha. 
Rudra BhattachArya 
Rfimbhadra. 
Madhava Deva. 
Raghunatha. 
RAmakrisna 
Gunatianda. 
YiSvamltha 

* 

Unknown. 



310 



APPENDIX I. 



49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
32 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
SB 
89 
90 
91 
92 
9 3 

94 

95 

96 

97 



100 



-prakasa 



Tarka-karika 

Tarka-kaumudi 

Tarka-dipika 

Tarka-pradipa 

Tarka-bhasa 

Tarka-inaujari 

Tarka-ratua 



Tarka-sariigraha 

- chart drika 

-tattva-prakhsa .. 
Tarka-samgrahopanyasa 
Tarkamrita 

-chasaka 

-tatparya-tika 

-tarangiui .. 

Dravya-kiranavali-praka&a .. 

-pariksa ... 

-sabda-viveehana 
Dravya-guna-paryuya 
Dravya-nirupana 
Drav\ a-pataka ... 

Dravya-padartha 
Dravya-prakaaa-vivaiti 
Dravya-prakaAika 
Dravya-bhagya-tika 

Drayya-sara-samgraha 
Dvandva-viohAra 
Nirukti 
Nyaya-kandali 
Nyaya-tantra-bodhini 
Nyaya-tarangi ni 

Nyay a-bodhini 

Nyaya-lilavati 

-kanthabharana ... 
... -prakasa ... 

-didliiti, 

... -viveka ... 

-bhava-prakafca ... 
Nyaya-aai a ... 

Nyaya-siddhanata-muktilvali ... 
Nyayartha-laghu-bodhini ... 
Pada-krrtya 
Pada-samgraha 
Padartha-khandara 

-t.ika ... 

tatparya-tika ... 
Fadartha-cliandrika 

-vilasa , 4i 

Pti-lArtha-tattvavaloka .. 

... -nirnaya 



. Jivaraja Diksita. 

Laugaksi Bhaskara. 

Annain Bhatta. 
. Nilaka^tha ^astri. 

Konda Bhatta. 

V r isva;iHtha. 
. Jivaraja Diksita. 

Konda Bhatta. 
. Viraraghava Sastri. 

Aniiam Bhatta. 

Mukunda Bhatta. 

Unknown 

Meru Sastri. 
Jagadisa Tarkalankars. 

(fangai a ma Jadi. 

MukumJa Bhatta. 
, Vardhainana. 

Rudra Vachaapati. 

Chandrafiekhara Bharati. 

Untraced. 

Untraeed. 

Untraced. 

Paksadhara. 

Raghu.iatha. 

Megha Bhagiratha fhakkur*. 

Anonymous. 

Baglmdeva. 

Gokulanatlia Maithila. 

Pattabhirama Sasfcri. 

Sriidhara Aohirya. 

V iftv i at ha. 

Keaava. 

Grovardhaa Misra. 

V allabha A . harya. 

Sankara Miara. 

Vardhttuia ia. Upadhysiya. 

Raghunatha Siromani. 

VidyavagiAa Bhattacharya. 

Bliagiratha. 
Madhava Deva. 
Visvauatha Panch&nana. 
Govardhana Ranga Acharya. 
Chaudraraja Simha. 
Krisna Mist a 
Raghunaih-i Siromani. 
Govinda, Madhava, Kaghudeva., 
Ruchi-datta, and Ramabhadr*. 
Krisna Misra. 
Misaru Misra (or Sarngad- 

hara ?) 
Krisna Bhatta. 
Viavanatha. 

Anonymous. 



APPENDIX 1. 



311 



101 

102 

103 

104 

105 

10ft 

107 

lu8 

J09 

110 

111 

112 

113 

114 

115 

lit) 

117 

118 

119 

120 

121 

122 

12-3 

125 
126 
127 
128 
12 
130 
131 
1 2 
133 
134 
135 

13(5 

137 
13S 

1-J9 



Padartha-dipika 

Padartha-dharina-samgraha 

Padartha-airupana ... 

Padartha-parijata 

Padartha-pr&aeSa 

Padartha-bodha 

Padartha-mani-mala 

-prakaaa ... 

Padartha-viveka (-siddhanta- 

tattva) 
-tika 

P a r i b ha sa - v i se sa 
Praiuaiia majijari 
Baliyartha-bhanga-uirakaraiia 
Bhasa-parichchheda ... 

Bheda-prakasa 
Mita-bhasiui 

Mithya-tva-vana-rahasya 
Mukti-vada-tika 
Hutu a kosa 

... -kara-padartha 

... -tnata-vada 
-karika-vichara 
-mata-rahasya 
-vada or -vic hara... 

rahasya 
Uasa sara 

Ua lilhauta-muktahara 
Laksanavali 

-tika 

Lilavati-rahasya 
V a la-sudha tika ratnavali 
Vaisea ka-vatna-ma!a ... 

[t-Sutra 

-ii, askara 
-tika ... 

.. -bliasya ... 

-vantika ... 
-vi\ riti 
-vritti 



Sa ( )t;t-padarthi 



-vyakhya 



142 
14 i 
144 
145 
1 
14/ 
148 
149 Siddhanta-mnktavalr-prftkasa 



Sibdartha-tai-kararita 
Siirabandhopadesa 

... -tika - 

Siddhauta-chandrika 
Siddhanta-tattva-viveka 



Koiida Bhatta. 
Prasastapada. 
Ny ay a vac hasp at i. 
Krisna Miara. 
Saiikara.-harya. 
Untraced- 

Jayarama NyayapafichAuana. 
Laugaksi Bhaskara. 

Untraeed. 
Gropinat.ha Muni. 
Untraced. 
Sarvadeva Pun . 
Visva tar,ha Pafichanana. 

Sankara Afiara.- 
Ma lhava Sarasvati. 
Grokulai at,ha. 
Visvanadia. 
Prithvidhara Acharya. 



Harira:na. 
Grada 1 hava. 
Malhava Vadindra. 
Padmar.a .ha MiSra. 
jldaya i:. A -harya. 
Sosa oa> anoradhra. 
Math 11 1 a arha Tarkavagiaa. 
Krisua M-sra. 
Bha\adeva Pandita Kavi. 
K ana. la 

San kara M ; fira. 
Udayana Acharya ; ChandrA- 

11 anda. 
Havana / Raghudeva; Chandra- 

kit : a, 

Vijfia ia Bhikau. 
Jay a a ay an a. 
Bht>ja ? 



Hari. 



Mi lra. 



Jaykriana (or Kriana Maunin) 

Baugadasa. 

Gobardhana. . ^ _. -. 

Kriana Dhurjati DJksita. , 

Gokulanatha. - v 

Q-opinatha Maani. 



A P PEN J) I X 11. 
INDEX OF WORDS. 



wfir 



i n i u : in 13 n : * n iv. 



*.nn 
inn 
iiii^ 
urn : 



APPENDIX II. 



HIS 



314 



APPENDIX II. 



4 



m 



mi 



IRK ; 



IRK -, 



IRU 



Mill* 

iir 

n i 



m IH ; 



sTTcjnjur 



arm 



1111* ; 11111* ; 



srr 1 ? 



APPENDIX II. 



315 



<* 1 1 1 1 



5 mi ; 



M1IU 



nun : 



1RI%1 



-Rll i 
1RI* : 
-hl"> 



11% 111 : 



APVUN WX II. 






: 1RR 



1RR 



1M!^ : Hill* 
: 1I1R* : 1R|1 



1RR 



APPENDIX II 



317 



Rll : 



: 1RR 



*RR 



*I 
ifr 

*fr 
ftc 



: IhK; 
; ^hho- 

^ 



; IRIS, -, iRlu 



5 S 111 



mm 



APPENDIX II 



mi ; 
mi* ? 



319 



1RR : 



firflrei 



; Ri** 
, <m|1* 
;1RI^ 



320 



1RI11 5 



5 1RI11 



51T5TT 



Ulil , 



: 1I1R1 
1I1R* ; 1RR 



5RR 



IIIR 



*hll ; 



APPENDIX II 



32 1 



qasr 



qr 



322 



APPENDIX II 



, imu 



APPENDIX II 



32S 



fsr^Tsf 

f^flfllZ *|1|1<S : 

fsrsta in i* ? 



-,mi 



11111 , 



S24 



APPENDIX II 



;o ; 

JT 



1 llh 



*RI1* 
*RI1* 
*R|1 



APPENDIX II 



325 



1111*5 



o { 



R1 



3(1 



326 



APPENDIX II 



^17 {i 



i o : 



APPENDIX II 



327 



Is 




APPEND! X III. 
INDEX OF APHORISMS. 

j o Words left out by *9we editor* are shown within brackets. 



. V.ii, 13 

... Hi, i, 6 



... I, ii, 6 
... in, i, 7 



... II, ii, 6 



: ... VII, it 14 



: ... VII, i, 16 



... VII, i, 11 

: ... IV, ii, 4 



... VII, i, 8 

... VII, i, 10 



V, ii, 17 



v, H, a 

srqi 
V, ii, 3 



tan ... IX, ii, 12 

... VI, ii, 12 



... II, i, 13 

:V,i, 

: ... II, iii 28 
... VII, i, 18 

,i,5 

... IV, ii, 6 i 
,.Lii, 11 



V.ii, 11 
in%5ts 
q^: ... HI, i, 15 



... VII, i, 4 

.. II, ii, 5 



V, i, 5 



: ... V, i, 3 

T[^ 
... II, ii, 30 



... IV, i, 8 



: ... VII, ii, 9 



.. VI, ii, 2 

c 
fq ... X, i, 4 



329 ) 



... VI, ii. 8 



ii, 17 



... VIII, ii, 1 

... IV, i, 12 

... VIII, ii, 3 
... VI, ii, 7 

nrfT^qrSifT^: III, i, 8 
... IV, i, 5 

... VII, i 21 
: ... VI, ii, 6 
... VI, ii, 9 

VII. 



... IX, i, 11 

^T: 5ET%J 

: IX, ii, 6 



... IX, i, 15 



VI, i, 5 



ii, 15 



:^ V, 



... IX, i, 3 

T?J 

... IX, i, 6 



... I, i, 26 



... IX, i, 



, ii, 5 



... IX, ii, 2 



,...IX,ii, 1 
arsfjrfrr sr?*jnTcJTftr *rar^ qt^ni 
r: . . Ill, ii, 14 



III, ii, 18 



III, ii, 9 



... V, i, 6 



... VI, i!, 16 



... Ill, i, 18 



... Ill, ii, 1 



( tfrtft ) If ii; 14 



: IX, 






VI, ii, 14 



... II, ii, 10 



... IX, ii, 10 



... Ill, i, 2 



: ... X,i, 1 



) ... VII, ii, 26 



( ^*fffftT ) I, i, 7 
: ... .1, i, 13 



330 ) 



VII, i 12 

VII, ii, 6 



: VII, i, 15 



I, ii, 15 



: VII, ii, 3 ; II, i, 2 



VII, ii, 21 



cSITr ... VII, ; 



23 
I^ 

, ] 17 



X, i, 6 

c^ftr^l 

H^T wH^ 

... V, ii, 22 



VIM, 



^^ ... X, ii, 



VII, ii, 22 



... VII, i, ( .) 

r^TR: ... IV, i, 3 



X, ii, 1 



13 



... I, i, 31 

Hrr^rf^ft *T<JTT; V, ii. 2t 

T T ... Ill, i, 4 

fe* ... II, 



i 22 



ii, 16 



f ii, 10 ( VIII, i, 11 
ii 3 ^>T ^t *Fr?: ... VII, i) 25 
: . . V, ii, 20 





,i, 12 



... X, ii, 3 



X, ii, 5 



> i, 10 



IX, i, 8 



Ij 1? a 

... VII, ii, 24 



... VII, ii, 12 



f^^r ... VII, ii, 7 
I, i, 14 



J ... Hi i, 25 
... IILi, 5 



( 331 
II, i, 12 



V, ii, 9 



IV, ii, 5 
?T5f Tcfrr 



IX, i, 1 



VIII, i, 8 



ii, 



i, 14 



... V 1 1 1 , i , 2 

... IX, 



ITTJTT: 



... \ r l, ii, 15 

I, i, 19 



VIII, i, 4 

VII, ii, 14 



ii, 13 



i, 



... V, i, J< 

.. V, i, 12 



i 24 
*r 

, ii, 25 



II, ii, 15 

^lT 

12 



... IX ,i, 



VII, ii, 25 

: ... V, ii, 25 ; VII, 



VII, ii, 15 



, i, 29 

rp:T3r 

VI, n, 3 



VI, ii, 13 



VIII, i, 3 

f^?T^ ... II, i, 5 
... II, i, 29: II, ii, 8; 

II, ii, 12; VII, ii, 28 



...VIII, ii, 6 

... VII, ii, 2 

.. VI, i, 4 

... IX, 



i, 7 

JT 

X, ii, 4 



: ... VI, i, 13 
IX, ii, 7 



V, i, 2 



I, i, 3; X, ii, 9. 



... IX, ii, LI 

... VI, i, 6 

... VI, i, 9 

) . , . 



( 332 ) 

jwftr ?\x\T&f IT 

: ... V, ii, 16 
II, 



VI, ii, 1 



i, 31 



... VIL i, 23 



X, ii, 8 

VII, i, 13 

... VIII, 



V, 11, 18 
i^fo^^ 
II i, 21 



VI, ii, 11 



X, i, 3 



II, i, 17 

: III, ii, 8 

i 



III, 11, 2, III, ii, 5 

wftrsr r^rcrtf ^t* ... VI, 

i, 8 

: ... IV, i, 10 



. IT, ii, 22 
... V, i. 11 
II, ii, 4 

V, ii 20 
... II, i, 3 



12 



: ... Ill, ii, 



Ill, 11, 15 



... V, ii, 4 



I, i ,l8 
[5^T OT^ 

V,Ti, 19 
^m 

ii 8 



... I, 



... I, ii, 5 



IV, i, 9 



... II, i, 7 



... V, ii t 21 

VI, i,7 
... II, ii> 18 



VII, a, 27 
[5 *Rc?ic% 

II,n, 7 ; II, ii 11 



II. i. 28 
, i, 23 



... I, i, 10 



irr?f 



) I, i, 16 

VIII, i, 7 
VIII, i, 1 



: III, 11, 11 



VIII, i, 10 



( 333 ) 
II, ii, 33 



... I, i, 25 



, i 4 



.. IV, ii, 7 



... IX, ii, 9 



II, i, 10 



... II, ii, 29 

: I, ii, 2 



T <J 



.. Ill, ii, 17 

... I, i, 12 

... I, ii 21 

.V, ii, 5 

...II, ii; 24 

flrf ^Tclt ^l 
.. IX, i, 10 

... VII, i, 20 

... H^ ii, 27 

T ... VII, i, lg 



... V, ii, 1 



V, i, 8 



...!!^, 26 



s?n^m:...Vii, u, 23 

...II, i, 27 
: ... VI, i, 10 



ii, 1 



... VII, i, 2 



..., , 5 



... II, ii, 9 



) ... II, i, 20 

... VII, ii, 16 



V, ii, 23 
r 

... vii, ii 4, 



J ... V, i, 10 
{^fTfTcn^ 
* ^ V, i,17 
, ii, 6 



TO: v&ft 

... V> ii, 12 



: II, i, 19 



... IV, ii, 2 
... II, ii, 34 

:... V, i, 9 



III, ii, 3 



III, i, 19 

: ... Ill, i, i 

...III, i, 14 



) III, ii, 4 

... VI, i, 1 

rr: ... VI, i, 3 

vi, i, 2 



( 334 ) 
...VI, ii, 4 



... I, i, 28 

: $TSc[: ... IT, ii, 32 



I, ii, 4 



...III, i, 12 
... Ill, i, 13 



... II, * , 15 



II, i, 1-i 



;fa: ... VIII, ii, 5 
... VII, ii, 5 



V, i. 15 

T?. 

i, (i 



w>gr: IV, 

... IX, i, "> 

HT?T^PTT 
... III. ii, (> 



^T*S[FT: ... II, ii, 20 
VII, 



i, 22 



... Ill, i, 11 
... VI, i- I J 



51* 



II, i, 8 

V, ii, 7 



I, i, 2 



T ... V, i, 13 

II, ii, 10 



... IV, ii 11 
t*r ... V, ii, 10 

I i >>7 
... -> i, 

5TT5TT ... Ill, ii, 20 



, 



: ... VI, ii, 5 
III, ii, 10 



II, i, 30 



. . Ill, i, 10 
lftf?r ^T 
Tfrarq; ... Ill, i, 17 



... VII, ii, 18 
... Ill, ii, 21 



... VII, ii, 13 
II i, 1 



... VII, ii, 1 

: ^f^TT; 



... IX, i, 4 

W *l^1^3[f 5 TTr^...X, i, 5 
...II, ii, 26 



:} ... I, ir G 
Tq 
II, i, 2 



... IX, i, 2 



T.ii, 7 



( 335 ) 



... IV,li 10 



III, 11, 16 
r 

30 



... II, ii, 35 



VII I, i, Q< 



.. IV, ii, 



VI, i, 15 



VI, i, 11 



ii, 20 
IflP 
i, lOj III, ii, 7 



II, ii, 



VIII, i, (5 



ar ... I, ii. 

10; I, il, 12: I, ii, 14; I, ii, 16 



... VIII, i, 5 

,ii, 3 



...IV, i, 11 



II, i, 18 



IV, ii, 9 

..x,ii, 7 



: VII, ii, 11 



I, i, 20 



, , 



^m^: 2R*jfoTJ...II, i, 23 



II, 11, 31 



II, i, 6 
... VII, 

TT VII, 11, H) 
j. j_, 



V, i, 7 



.. Ill, i, 
af 

X, i, 2 



V, i, 18 



: ... II, i, 4 
: ... II, i, 9 

... IX, ii, 8 



III, ii, 19 

:...VI, ii/ 10 
, i, 3 



37 



V, i, 11 



V, ii, 14 



: ... VI, i, 14 
STOHJf 

IX, ii, 






BINDING SECT. OCT 2 19i 




PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE 
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET 

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY 



B 

132 
V2K3 
1923 



Kanada 

The Vaisesika sutras of 
Kanada 2d ed., rev. and enl.